Great news from the Pacific Fleet after Thursday's successful BMD event near Hawaii. According to the linked-to story, this was the first test event to feature two different versions of the BMD software. This is an important statement. I'd be interested in knowing how "interoperable" the two versions were, and to what extent (if any) interoperability problems were engineered into the system. Clearly this was a successful event, but it would be interesting to know what data (if any) was not not jointly held and evaluated by the shipboard combat systems involved. Moving to a paradigm in which the "shooters" all see/evaluate/and process the same data and reach the same conclusions--even with different "software versions" is a "Holy Grail" state of affairs that those of us who've worked in missile defense worked hard to bring about. I'm not current on these matters, so those who are please pipe up.
This and other Navy BMD successes raises once again the extent to which the Navy ought to be invested in missile defense. This is a huge issue at a strategic level and as a question of resource priorities. Some in the Navy fear a broadened role in missile defense, and much of that fear is (in my opinion) a manifestation of the fear of control. The story goes something like this...So the Navy spends all this money to build ships, very, very scare (and getting scarce-er) money, and then because of the critical nature of the mission, that ship gets to sit in a very small operating box waiting to shoot down missiles. It doesn't do engagement/shaping, it isn't a Strike Group asset, it isn't out chasing Han submarines....it essentially becomes a national or theater asset. So we spend the money and then don't get to optimize hull use for the many other things we need ships to do. This is a sane and honorable argument born of Washington area budget realities and experience in operating within the DoD bureaucracy.
But in my view, it is a path to declining relevance if the Navy isn't careful. Because of the successes of our BMD program, sea-based missile defense is one of the programs out there that seems to have consensus support. And while I understand that our National Missile Defense system consists of an architecture of land, sea, air and space-based assets, the manner and priority in which that architecture is constructed is in no small way a reflection of the importance the NAVY places on its part of the architecture. Put another way, if the Navy stepped up and made the case that 1) we do this well--our processes and military-industrial relationships are successful and proven and 2) the political cost of land-based sites (radar and missile) overseas may be too high a burden for politicians to bear 3) the Navy should move toward the capability to destroy a ballistic missile throughout all phases of operation (pre-launch, boost, ascent, mid-course and terminal--I think I got 'em all), it could change the nature of the entire missile defense debate in this country and create a new and lasting relevance for its operations.
Without a more aggressive stance on missile defense, the Navy is in a difficult position with respect to resources. The QDR will to a large extent reveal the effectiveness of the argument put forward by the Maritime Strategy for the role the Navy has in sustaining the global system, and whether global system sustainment really is a national priority. But the critical role of missile defense as a contributor to that stability must not be underestimated.
Would this "grab" for missile defense primacy have a cost? Yep. Big time, and not just in money. The law of unintended consequences would dictate that such a move--if adopted--would be funded primarily by cuts in virtually everything else the Navy does, something that few would advocate (what the folks I speak of above fear). Clearly, the Navy would have to argue that this mission is not unlike the strategic deterrent provided by the ballistic missile submarines, and that much if not all of the funding for the mission should come out of "OSD" lines (or at least not out of present day views of Navy TOA).
Would the Navy be on solid strategic grounds if they made this argument? I think so. Classic deterrence theory basically says, "if you do this, I'll do that, and what I'll do to you is much worse than what you did in the first place." Missile defense changes this dynamic to say "don't even think about doing what you're about to do. Not only will we retaliate, but the chances that your initial attack will succeed have greatly diminished to the point where it is fool-hardy." This adds another layer to the decision making process of the other side of the equation. More importantly though, it adds to the decision making space of our leadership--and here's how. Should the Norks, or the Iranians or anyone else for that matter--shoot a ballistic missile at us or an ally today, it would likely cause us to respond. We don't like things like that, especially if lots of people die. The National Command Authority could come under considerable pressure to "do something", and the options for what to do may not be immediately apparent. What missile defense does is buy decision space for political leaders to escalate (or de-escalate) in a more prudent and considered manner--no one has died, life goes on where the missile was headed (albeit under a more anxious manner).
I don't know what the right answer is on this one, and I know that it is argued vociferously at the highest levels of the Navy. But my suspicions are that the Navy should consider a more aggressively forward leaning position on missile defense, to the extent that it comes to be considered the Navy's missile defense provider.
Bryan McGrath
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