My Response to the Salamander

CDR Salamander has a take on my earlier post from last night. He emphasizes a point that I want to clarify I agree with - specifically that there are many, many factors involved in decisions to consolidate and generalize. I completely agree. Multiple contributing factors would still not explain the outright broad rejection of specialization when NCW, a touted foundation of naval doctrine, is supposed to (by design) offer the Navy the benefits (like lower cost) of specialization and the Navy has rejected specialization almost in total.

I disagree with his take regarding the 'mirage' of network-centric warfare. I think NCW holds incredible promise, but needs to be approached with expectations that networks in the Navy will be complex primarily because they will be most effective for local coordination, as opposed to a complex global picture. The biggest difference between the analogies used in Parameters and the way the Navy has implemented NCW is that the Navy is building resiliency with the expectation that catastrophic disruption will occur, while the financial system was built with expectations they knew everything. Resiliency is a major factor why the Navy favors generalization over specialization, but it doesn't explain the rejection of specialization.

I would note the E-2D is one of the best examples today where the Navy has built a platform that can substitute itself as a local network provider when satellite disruption or other catastrophic disruption occurs. The development of local network providers for fleet forces is a resiliency in the network chain the financial system didn't have. In the financial system, many small banks survived without much damage, but they weren't coordinated at all to any degree to act as a buffer even though collectively they had the capital to do so. In many ways, the SSGN may potentially reveal the power of NCW as well, but the limitations of bandwidth and real-time reliable communication with distributed deployables have had to be addressed. In the future, it is entirely possible a SSGN could potentially coordinate several dozen devices over great ranges without relying on communication technologies from orbit or elsewhere, but that bandwidth tech has not matured sufficiently for submarines to be a local provider to thus realize that promise of NCW. Despite all the emphasis of the attack submarine force to integrate into the rest of the fleet thanks to network innovations, the submarine force has rejected even small levels of specialization, even when there are good reasons like sea control of the Arctic.

I think for surface warfare, NCW is the critical enabler for the Navy to specialize in the mission sets the Navy is tasked in the 21st century, and both BMD and Littoral Warfare represent two specific examples where specialization is required to be successful.

BMD requires multiple high end radar, coordination, and weapon components distributed over vast geographic distances able to communicate in real time to be successfully conducted. Littoral warfare requires greater quantity of specialized vessels to be effective. The generalization approach has forced the Navy to use the same shoes for both paths, even if it is more expensive and is knowingly less effective. It is stupid though, because is it more likely the US is going to be attacked by a ballistic missile today or attacked through some means of widely available commercial maritime technology? I'd say the likelyhood the US would be nuked by a ballistic missile is lower than the likelyhood a ship would sail into port with a nuke onboard. Neither are high probability, but just saying.

It is often suggested I am somehow against large multi-mission ships like the Burke because I oppose building more today, but my position isn't a knock against the ship class, rather I believe 62 is sufficient quantity of the multi-mission capability the Burke addresses unless they are being built to specifically replace existing CGs. The resources needed to build only a handful more Burkes at around $2 billion each could easily be used by the Navy to build specialized ships of significantly higher quantity, and NCW would allow the Navy to utilize these specialized ships to maintain competitive advantages over challengers in warfare areas that are truly challenging.

The US Navy's current large multi-mission platforms are capable of being leveraged to support specialized platforms, and I believe the result would significantly offset the weakness of the specialized ships while increasing the total strength of the fleet. That would suggest the Navy is tapping the power of the network, but there is no example anywhere wants to do that. By 2012 there will be 84 AEGIS ships able to provide significant support to specialized ships on the back of NCWs promise, but the only 'specialized' type ship the Navy intends to field that this AEGIS force could support is the LCS.

The LCS! Jeez. Forget the mission modules, because the ugly truth of mission modules is that they must conform to the platforms, so lets look at the platforms. The LCS platform is speed and space. Space because it needs to be everything to everyone and speed because it needs to be fast in performing its function of getting to port so it can become everything to everyone when necessary. The platform is designed so it can be everything to everyone; that is not specialization, that is a manifestation of the generalist - everything can be made to fit - attitude in the Navy's approach to maritime strategy. The specialization of the LCS is in the modules, but the modules are limited and always will be because the Navy decided to make their trucks (the LCS) small and while making all the race cars (destroyers) enormous. I have said for years the Navy got that backward with Seapower 21.

I think the Navy should at least make an attempt to use existing assets and capitalize on what is possible with NCW by starting small, specifically starting in the Littoral. For the price of the 2 Burkes expected in the FY2011 budget, the Navy could probably build at least 24 1000 ton specialized littoral warfare ships to augment the 12 Littoral Combat Ships that will have been funded through FY 2011. Since the LCS is a logistics nightmare anyway, working with 1000 ton ships shouldn't create an extra logistics burden. Put a LCS and a pair of corvettes together and call it a squadron. Then put a few squadrons with a Burke and call it something else - and see if NCW increases presence and actionable capabilities in today's threat environment.

I bet the results will be good, and those results will be greater than the loss of just 2 more Burkes. NCW is more assured in quality at the low end, so why not specialize at the low end to exploit and explore NCWs potential.