The New Somali Navy

This article on "commander" of the Somali Navy is kind of interesting from both a policy and a theoretical point of view. On the policy side, resurrecting the Somali Navy would seem to be one important component of the effort to end piracy off the Horn of Africa. There's a fair bit of absurdity, of course; he has no men, no boats, and virtually no coastline. Then again, the prospects for an ocean-going Somali Navy are probably a touch better than those for the Bolivian Navy. On the theoretical side, the idea of resurrecting or reinventing military organizations fascinates me. The next Somali Navy will bear almost no resemblance to the last Somali Navy (which was no great shakes), or to the navies of Somalia's colonial rulers. The Somalis won't have to reinvent the wheel, however; they presumably will have the support of the international community in building up material stocks and in building an officer corps. The issue interests me because "inventing" a navy isn't at all unusual. Apart from the great powers of Europe (Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, Russia) very few navies have emerged organically. The Royal Navy, for example, emerged from a series of different institutions over the course of several centuries. I recommend N.A.M. Rodgers' Safeguard of the Sea and Command of the Ocean on the history of the RN. For most navies, however, it's not difficult to identify an inception date.

Historically, states have had two broad options for inventing a navy. On the one hand, states can essentially invent their own institutions, perhaps borrowing from their other military organizations. On the other, states can import institutions from other navies. The latter is less expensive, less time consuming, and I think far more common than the former. There are also hybrid models. Characterizing very crudely, Japan is essentially a borrower, while Germany and the People's Republic of China are essentially inventors (I've done some reading on this topic, but not a ton, so feel free to dispute these characterizations). The Imperial Japanese Navy had native historical antecedents, but was basically built around the model of the Royal Navy (with the assistance of British officers) during the Meiji Restoration. The Kaiserliche Marine was cobbled together from the small fleets of a number of German states, with a big assist from the Prussian Army. Both methods can, apparently, be somewhat successful. The IJN lost to the USN and the RN, but gave a good show. The Kaiserliche Marine went toe-to-toe with the RN and Jutland and lived to tell about it; indeed, German training and doctrine in some areas seem to have exceeded British standards.

Of course, the German and Japanese experiences have limited utility for thinking about post-colonial navies, although most seem to pursue the "borrow" path. Borrowing tends to be a two way street, requiring some cooperation from the state that's being borrowed from. This means that the USN has the opportunity to influence the institutional development not just of the Somali Navy, but also of the various other navies of East Africa, and the rest of the world. The same goes for the USCG, which would probably be better as an exemplar for East African navies. The USN, the USCG, and other relevant actors are, of course, aware of this; foreign military assistance means more than just creating a market for US defense products. This is a way in which "soft power" operates, and in which soft power is replicated and enhanced. I'd also hazard to say that there's great potential for enabled borrowing/foreign institution building within the Cooperative Maritime Strategy framework.