QDR Gossip and Guesswork, or a Foregone Conclusion

Colin Clark recently discussed the QDR with some unnamed source who stated the QDR major decision process is already over, that the decisions made on April 6th ends up accounting for all the major changes. That is not exactly true.

The major attention of the media regarding the QDR is procurement, so the program aspect of the QDR is getting virtually all the attention. If there are no major program shifts, changes, cancellations, or beginnings the attention span of the average American gets lost quickly. Too many people have come to believe that technology is the primary factor in defense, and the DoD revolves around money primarily due to technology. These are urban myths.

A few things here. First, the reason the DoD budget is so high and not likely to go down over the Obama administration is because the administration would be hard pressed to cancel enough programs to make a significant dent in the DoD budget. This was one of the April 6th decisions, specifically to continue increasing the size of the Army and Marines, and to stop the decline in personnel of the Navy and Air Force. People, not stuff, is by far and away the largest expense of the DoD budget and the Obama administration is promising more benefits for the people, thus increasing the cost of the largest cost factor of the DoD budget.

When someone complains about the DoD budget being too big, if they are complaining about equipment, they are an ignorant fool. The equipment problem is different, the real challenge facing the DoD is how to responsibly spend the money allocated for technology to produce enough equipment for a balanced force. In the end, with the size of the force increasing, the procurement decisions and arguments are about insuring the money is spent to meet the demand for quantity, instead of the procurement trend that has focused on quality. The costs are essentially the same, which is why watching people celebrate cancellation of a defense program as a cost savings move is laugh worthy.

Another thing, and this is key for naval discussions. Since April 6th, if not long before, my take on the Navy QDR study is that the Navy will find a way to validate exactly what they are already doing with procurement, but will then attempt to make the argument that they can take what they have and use the equipment differently. This is where the QDR comes in, the QDR is going to discuss how more than with what, and that can end up being much more important in shaping the future force (and can also end up being irrelevant).

I also believe we will see a major battle develop between the "<> 300 ship" crowd. It will be easy to tell who is part of what crowd. Anyone who advocates for 55 LCS as a starting position and more than 2-3 total new destroyers after FY11 is in the less than 300 ship crowd, and anyone who advocates for a major change to surface combatant procurement specifically for smaller warships is in the greater than 300 ship crowd.

It is hardly surprising, as Colin Clark also reports, that the amphibious study is going nowhere. If the Navy attempts to disrupt the Marine Corps amphibious force, the Marines will come right back and disrupt the Navy surface combatant force. What has likely surfaced in QDR study is that the two forces - the surface navy and the amphibious force - are linked, because the surface combatant force must provide access to the requirement for amphibious capability.

If the Navy changes the amphibious force, the surface force must also make significant changes in order to meet the requirements of the adjusted amphibious force (greater demand on the surface fleet for assured access to green water). I would guess that the Marines finally realized that the Navy refuses to change the way they buy surface forces, so changes to amphibious forces were never going to happen as long as the link between surface forces and amphibious forces was locked into the discussion. The Navy was never going to give up a precious handful of destroyers to support assured access requirements for a less protected amphibious force that must tractor from greater distances of sea in anything short of assured access environments. Come on.. the amphibious study was dead on arrival primarily because the surface fleet force structure was already decided before the QDR study even began.

In the end, the QDR programmatic result for the Navy and Marines was largely decided long before the QDR process began. The Navy will validate what they are already doing, and attempt to explain how they will use the platforms produced from existing force plans in new and dynamic ways to meet 21st century challenges. What amazes me is that so many very smart people thought the QDR process was something different this time.