CNO Guidance 2010

Let's try this again--the way I posted it yesterday nearly shut Galrhan down, so I hope it goes better today.

The CNO Guidance for 2010 is out, and it is once again entitled “Executing the Maritime Strategy”, something that warms the heart of someone who had a hand in its creation. I would be doubly warmed had it been entitled “Planning and Resourcing the Maritime Strategy”, given that OPNAV’s “execution” role is a limited one and my perception that it is on this front (planning and resourcing) where additional emphasis must be placed. That said, the fact that the document continues to frame the Navy’s actions is gratifying.
The document closely resembles its predecessors, well-written and generally informative. It maintains the same general flow, including restating the CNO’s focus areas (building the future force, maintaining warfighting readiness, and developing Sailors, Navy civilians and their families), and his 18 “intentions”. However, for 2010 he has selected five “intentions” for special emphasis:
• Continue to be the dominant, ready naval force across all maritime missions
• Build a Navy with appropriate force structure and strategic laydown
• Achieve decision superiority
• Align the requirements, resources and acquisition processes
• Evolve and establish international relationships

Looking back at 2009, the CNO cites a series of accomplishments/worthy facts binned under his three focus areas. A few are worthy of note:


• “We truncated the DDG 1000 class and restarted production of the DDG 51 class to improve our capability and capacity to meet increasing Combatant Commander demands for integrated air and missile defense and open ocean anti-submarine warfare”
o What isn’t stated here is an implicit diminishment of importance on surface-gunnery/Naval Surface Fire Support. I’ve always questioned the USMC’s logic and numbers on NSFS, and I’m beginning to wonder if we haven’t reached a point in which the Combatant Commanders are reinforcing this doubt.

• “We approved the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System as the launching system for the CVN 78 class”
o Click your heels three times…..

• “We restarted the Title X wargame series and conducted the “Leveraging the Undersea Environment” wargame to assess undersea capabilities and concepts.”
o Bravo. Long overdue. But the Title X wargame process must be ongoing and iterative—not just a spasm of activity annually followed by the production of a report no one reads.

• We established the Navy Air and Missile Defense Command, the third of four warfare centers of excellence, which will lead Navy efforts to assess, integrate and synchronize air and missile defense capabilities.
o Again, an excellent move on the Navy’s part, but the Devil’s in the details, specifically command relationships (with OPNAV, CFFC and C3F) and working out swim lanes.

• We completed our 1000th successful TRIDENT strategic deterrent patrol since the first patrol of USS OHIO (SSBN 726) in 1982
o Big questions here about what comes next and how many. Will it be nuclear conventional or nuclear electric drive? Will it be a strategic platform in a broader sense of the word (tactical satellite re-seed, conventional strike and nuclear deterrence) or will it be nuclear deterrent only? With our strategic nuclear forces likely to fall in numbers, what will be the mix? Will there be a triad? Assuming the SSBN survives, will we need as many if we move to a 1000-1400 missile force?

• We developed a non-classified enclave and an unclassified Common Operating Picture to allow us to share information in support of anti-piracy operations, to include sharing information with Russia and China
• We established a “Vessel Information Hub” to improve prototype Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and make maritime data available to U.S. government entities
• We achieved initial operating capability of a prototype MDA capability to improve global vessel tracking and detection of anomalous maritime activity
o These are notable inclusions, as it appears that the Navy is getting traction in embracing MDA as a necessary condition for a number of its other missions. Incidentally, I’ll be attending the “Global Maritime Information Sharing Symposium” at the National Defense University 15-17 September, and I’ll be blogging while there.

• We increased the number of Foreign Area Officers to 212 and are now half way to our goal of 400 by FY15. We trained more than 50,000 Sailors through the Regional Security Education Program, Mobile Training Teams, and a new NROTC policy that allows students to major in Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) programs.
o All very good news.

As for the future, especially priorities for 2010, the CNOG lays out all 18 “intentions”, with specifics laid out in each area. Points that caught my interest were:

• “Continue to be the most dominant, ready and influential naval force globally and across all naval missions”
o Here the CNO says “we are a capable force today, but we require additional capacity to meet Combatant Commander demands for Navy forces globally”. Who is making this case and where? Where are we coming up short? Does the Congress know where these shortfalls are? This was the danger in letting the QDR drive the Navy’s force level projections, rather than creating a force level appropriate to the Maritime Strategy and then ENTERING the QDR deliberation with it as the Navy’s position. Instead, it enters with a 313 ship force planned prior to its new strategy, and so it starts from a clean sheet of paper.

• “Build and a Navy with appropriate force structure and strategic laydown necessary to implement the Maritime Strategy”
o Good words, I would clearly like to see this happen.
o CNO goes on to say “We are moving toward a strategic laydown of our forces that will ensure effective operations in the event of a natural or man-made disaster”. Looks to me like the Navy is resolute on a CVN in Mayport—which is a good thing.

• “Achieve Decision Superiority”
o Standup of FLTCYBERCOM/TENTHFLT and DCNO N2N6 remain big news—but I’m still not sure how they help. Would love to see a brief if someone’s got one.

• “Integrate warfighting and capabilities with the Marine Corps to meet objectives of the Maritime Strategy and Naval Operations Concept”
o CNO says, “We, with the Marine Corps, desire a return to amphibious core competencies, and will pursue opportunities as operational and fiscal conditions allow”. Seems to me that all the cosmic tumblers are clicking into place to indicate that the “forcible entry” kinds of things that the USMC does are going to receive less emphasis going forward. If ever there were a case of damning by faint praise, “as operational and fiscal conditions allow” is it.

• “Leverage Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to ensure warfighting benefits accrue to future Sailors
o I am gratified to see this entire discussion.

In summary, I see nothing earth-shattering, but some subtle shifts. Talk of overland strike and forcible entry on the wane; MDA, maritime security, ballistic missile defense and ASW on the rise. I don’t imagine the USMC is thrilled with this document, but at this point, I think they’ve got bigger battles on their hands in QDR.

Bryan McGrath