"We will do to you what we did to the Russians"

This is outstanding war coverage.

We walked into a trap, a killing zone of relentless gunfire and rocket barrages from Afghan insurgents hidden in the mountainsides and in a fortress-like village where women and children were replenishing their ammunition.

"We will do to you what we did to the Russians," the insurgent's leader boasted over the radio, referring to the failure of Soviet troops to capture Ganjgal during the 1979-89 Soviet occupation.

Dashing from boulder to boulder, diving into trenches and ducking behind stone walls as the insurgents maneuvered to outflank us, we waited more than an hour for U.S. helicopters to arrive, despite earlier assurances that air cover would be five minutes away.

That is the second article by Jonathan Landay of McClatchy News of the attack, this one was filed earlier in the day.

Also, check out the analysis at NightWatch.

Landay’s experience reinforces the NW contention that without air support, US ground operations are unsustainable. As a result of Landay’s excellent dispatch plus earlier reports of a number of US defeats at the hands of the Taliban, mostly in Konar Province, it is no longer accurate to assert that the US wins every battle. The ability of the Taliban to leverage their information operations to support their combat operations, as described by Landay, is a breakthrough in insurgent tactical success.

The ability of the Taliban to win successive battles in Konar Province against the best armed, supported and networked forces in the world is nothing short of astonishing! The Marines got beat, not because the Taliban were better on the battle field, but because they had better intelligence, i.e., were smarter. That ought to be a wake up call to someone.

No insurgent or nation respects a country because it has a great counter-insurgency capability. Great power status rests on air power and, in appropriate situations, naval power. Consider, the Taliban are so afraid of US ground forces that they persist in fighting them with turbans, AKs, RPGs, sandals and flowing robes. No body armor, no armored vehicles.

The NW hypothesis is that the security of US forces is not sustainable without air support. Landay’s article proves that proposition. Protecting the Afghan populace … from NATO forces … has become the responsibility of the Taliban in the south and northeast. If Landay’s account is typical, the US apparently has no coherent strategy that translates into effective tactics, and that puts US soldiers’ lives at increased risk.

Troubling.