We have met the archetype strategic warrior, and his name is David Petraeus. He is joined by a remarkably successful cadre of leaders who have demonstrated exceptional talent in the chaotic environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some names are familiar because they reached three or four stars: Chiarelli, Stavridis, Dempsey, Ward, Dubik, Eikenberry. Others are equally successful but less well known because of their lesser rank and profile. These are behind-the-scenes officers who have offered advice and insight to their flag officer bosses: Nagl, Yingling, McMaster and Mansoor, among a few others.The Navy takes a beating on the subject of strategy, fairly or not. Whether in books or even by Naval officers, the reputation for strategic excellence in today's Navy is simply not there. When I ask retired officers about it, they usually say something like "in my twenty something years as a Naval officer, it was never something I was exposed to."
Most of these proven strategic thinkers share a remarkably common provenance. Very early in their careers they learned to think critically and communicate strategically by attending a government-financed graduate program at a top-tier civilian university. Later, most of them sharpened these skills by teaching at a service academy. They all share (along with fellow intellectual travelers such as Adm. Mike Mullen and Marine Gen. Jim Mattis) a lifelong obsession with reading history and studying the art of war. At some time in their careers, they ignored the caution of personnel officers about spending too much time in school while under scrutiny for command selection. Today, this is a critical period for upwardly mobile officers because those who are screened for command are on the fast track to flag rank. Those who don’t command will not grasp the brass ring. The proclivities of service culture cannot be easily overcome. The reality is that educational reform hinges on the ability to create a path for the intellectually gifted to be promoted to flag rank. But the climate today tends to reward tactical rather than strategic excellence. This must change.
Granted, today the Navy has 12,000 IAs, so everyone is doing a bit more here and there to make up the slack, but it does not explain why the Navy gets beat up as the reputation of the tactical service.
Yes, I am aware it doesn't count for everyone, I can name names too, but reputations are built on the whole, not the parts. I'd be interested in hearing from current and retired naval officers their opinion on the subject covered in the article, and I will mention that I know of at least 3 different think tanks studying this very issue, likely to pay attention to the comments made.
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