HA/DR: Operational or Strategic?

From a Sept. 30 bloggers roundtable with Rear Adm. Richard Landolt, Commander of the Amphibious Force 7th Fleet based in Okinawa, Japan. I was supposed to make the call, but my work schedule has been fairly crazy for 6 weeks (ends later today, thankfully). I was able to email in a question early that morning, and Petty Office Selby let the question fly.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Okay. And we'll go back around the horn in a second. I have a question from Galrahn, sir: 7th Fleet generates a lot of regional publicity surrounding their humanitarian assistance programs, like Pacific Partnership, but also their disaster response and recovery operations -- the 2004 tsunami being one of the most visible, but also in several cyclone and mudslide responses in southeast Asia. As we are at the two-year anniversary of CS21, I was wondering if you can answer whether HA/DR is strategic or operational for the Navy, and how and why; or even what might be missing.

ADM. LANDOLT: I would say it's both strategic and operational. We're going to continue to do these. The amphibious force is that force that's on call and in high demand to practice these with other countries, as we do during Pacific Partnerships or African Partnership Station, or when they go down to South America. But we also make money when we do this and create those relationships during their execution that stand the test of time.

I have -- as I just said, USS Denver has done this twice now in the last two months. It's a good example of this -- to set for other countries who could be thinking about this, because a lot of countries take heat, their governments take heat when they don't respond well to these type of events. We are more than happy to show them how we train for this and the capability we bring. And that, in turn, might help them to drive some of their programs towards those kind of platforms or assets they may need.

Having been around the world in a number of places, for instance, I see too many countries that -- they want to buy a fast, sexy, pointy-nose aircraft; and what they really need are helicopters that can lift cargo and get into mountainsides and help their own people out during times like these.

So I think it -- the answer is both, strategic and operational. We will continue to do this. Pacific Partnership, by the way, is going to involve Indonesia next year. And in fact, the Indonesians have a hospital ship called the "Doctor Soeharso," S-O-E-H-A-R-S-O. Because there was so much damage to the hospitals in Padang, the Soeharso pulled into port there, and was very useful to them. And that same ship will take those lessons learned -- she learned from this real-world exercise -- real-world event, and use it during the Pacific Partnership next year.

I would have followed up by asking what he means when he says "we also make money when we do this." I have a few ideas how this analogy applies, but I'd be curious for his specific examples.

I think the answer is interesting, but I'm not sure I am convinced. I remain unsure, two years after CS-21, whether HA/DR is strategic or operational. Obviously it is operational, but there are so many things that go into effective HA/DR and I am starting to lean towards the camp that says for the US Navy, HA/DR is operational.

That isn't to say HA/DR can't be, or isn't strategic, only that it isn't for the US Navy. Let me touch on my thoughts here.

Many of the aspects of HA/DR that make the effort strategic comes from outside the US Navy, for example, the strategic communications and political cooperation and partnerships that build from HA/DR can have a strategic quality about them, but the Navy piece is operational. With that said, all of those other pieces that make the combined total effort don't work without the Navy, so this is a complex issue and not cut and dry.

What this means is Navy can do everything right in HA/DR and still fail in a strategic objective, and the Navy can do everything wrong in HA/DR and still succeed in a strategic objective. That doesn't mean the quality of the Navy effort doesn't matter, only that the effort itself is dependent upon so many external factors and the work of so many others throughout government that I think that elevating HA/DR as a prominent strategic activity in CS-21 is going to always be controversial, particularly as it may not always be a strategic activity.

Obviously this is theory and academic as a discussion, built on the idealism that assistance is always welcome in times of disaster or need, but we all should recognize that is not always the case. In the Pacific I think there is a good argument to be made that assistance provided to the Philippines and Indonesia are strategic, when part of a strategic communications package at the political (and population) level that contrasts our response with the response of others, specifically the Chinese. I am not much into the financial analogy used by Rear Adm. Richard Landolt regarding how we make money, but I do see a college football sports analogy here.

As an operational effort the US Navy is scoring political points by helping the local political leaders be seen as responsive. As a strategic effort, the more our assistance is contrasted with the absence of assistance by those like China, we are scoring strategic points in the region as well. The domestic political points are field goals and close wins as they don't impress much, but the strategic points enabled by the STRATCOM wizards who engage the population and political level in a meaningful way are like touchdowns and can ultimately influence the perception of the games outcome, in particular by influencing the BCS voters around the region who like to see blowouts over close victories.

----

I think there is plenty of room for a good discussion on this topic. I'll get the comments fixed tonight (doesn't show comment count), and be moderating throughout the day to insure comments are posted quickly (be aware, regular users are approved immediately and will no longer be moderated, only new users are moderated through the first 5 posts). If you want to sign up with a unique nickname for comments, sign up with a js-kit account.