The Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, USAF, gave a speech this week in which he presented the view that he would give up state-of-the-art space systems in order to swell the number of satellites the military could launch as the need arises. I rise in support of the General's view, and I would suggest that the Navy has a role to play here.
China's January 2007 ASAT test sent the US a message, that The Middle Kingdom intends asymmetrically to challenge our space dominance and our ability to exercise global command and control of our forces. This is an interesting development, one that demands a strategic response.
Clearly, if we were to assess the Chinese as having more than a "one off" capability to deny us the use of space, we (the Nation) must figure out a way to contest this capability. Persistent airborne relay systems are one part of the answer, but effective "Operational Space Responsiveness" (OSR) must also be part of the strategy. To that end, Navy platforms--surface and subsurface--should be considered for launch platforms for rapidly programmable satellites that would gap-fill or repair architectures disrupted by enemy ASAT attack.
One candidate for such a capability is the replacement for the OHIO Class SSBN. Rather than looking at the SSBN's strategic role in a narrowly focused way--i.e. as the platform for delivering nuclear ICBM's--the OHIO Replacement should be seen as a true STRATEGIC asset, one that could continue its strategic nuclear role, while also serving as a launch platform for rapidly programmable satellites, as well as long range conventional weapons and possibly even boost phase interceptors.
Additionally, the CG(X) class should be planned with missile launching systems that would be flexible enough to accommodate the large-size of rapidly programmable satellites--as well as the systems recommended above for the Ohio Replacement.
Critics of such initiatives generally take come in two flavors. The first wonder (with justification) whether these missions are best or properly carried out by Naval platforms, and this is a question worth some credible analysis. I just don't know the answer.
The other variety of critic is the one who looks at the employment of ballistic objects--missiles or satellites--from US naval platforms as inherently destabilizing. This line of thinking was of course, very logical when we were squaring off with the Soviet Union. But it strikes me as an intellectual surrender to think that we would take such capability off the table now for fear of its being misinterpreted (as in, how would someone else know whether the ballistic object launched was an ICBM nuke, an ICBM conventional, or a satellite) while we sit back and allow a Chinese developed anti-ship ballistic missile to partially drive Navy shipbuilding plans without so much as a peep as to the destabilizing nature of the weapon. Yes--I know--the ASBM's are not ICBMS--they are MRBM's. And I know that we have some capacity to discern this--at some point in the flight of the missile. But let's face it--until such time as an evaluation is made that the missile is not an ICBM headed for the US, it COULD be. Hence, the destabilizing nature of the launch.
Which brings me back to quicklaunch of rapidly programmable satellites. Such a capability--architected with airborne gap filler comms/sensor relays--provides the Chinese with a moving target so to speak, one that would be increasingly difficult to overcome. The Chinese are MAKING us compete with them (by the development of the ASBM). Let's get into the game.
Bryan McGrath
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