What isn't mentioned in his article is that this information dates back to mid-November, and not likely to be reflecting the wargame out in the Pacific that took place in mid-November. That in itself makes it about as useful as a roll of toilet paper, because that Pacific wargame in November will turn out to be the one people talk about - come QDR and POM 12.
However, if we take the data as reported by Insidedefense and use it as one theoretical possibility, we can look specifically at the 5 year plan which is likely more accurate than anything in the 40 year plan. The five year plan looks like this:
FY 2011
CVN-78 $2655
DDG-51 $3240 (2)
LCS $1150 (2)
SSN-774 $5144 (2)
SSBN(X)
LPD-17
LHA(R) $1085 (1)
JLV $50
T-ATF(X)
JHSV $181 (1)
Totals $13505 (8)
FY 2012
CVN-78 $498
DDG-51 $2186 (1)
LCS $1190 (2)
SSN-774 $4626 (2)
SSBN(X)
LPD-17 $1869 (1)
LHA(R) $2085
JLV $330 (1)
T-ATF(X)
JHSV $375 (2)
Totals $13159 (9)
FY 2013
CVN-78 $2496 (1)
DDG-51 $3440 (2)
LCS $1848 (3)
SSN-774 $4282 (2)
SSBN(X)
LPD-17
LHA(R)
JLV
T-ATF(X)
JHSV $381 (2)
Totals $12446 (10)
FY 2014
CVN-78 $3155
DDG-51 $2077 (1)
LCS $2550 (4)
SSN-774 $5756 (2)
SSBN(X)
LPD-17
LHA(R)
JLV
T-ATF(X)
JHSV $393 (2)
Totals $13932 (9)
FY 2015
CVN-78 $2534
DDG-51 $3836 (2)
LCS $2640 (4)
SSN-774 $4465 (1)
SSBN(X) $963
LPD-17
LHA(R)
JLV
T-ATF(X) $59 (1)
JHSV $403 (2)
Totals $14900 (10)
FY 2011 - FY 2015
CVN-78 $11339 (1)
DDG-51 $14779 (8)
LCS $9378 (15)
SSN-774 $24272 (9)
SSBN(X) $963
LPD-17 $1869 (1)
LHA(R) $3170 (1)
JLV $380 (1)
T-ATF(X) $59 (1)
JHSV $1732 (9)
All Totals $67941 (46)
Lets study the numbers a bit, starting with a historical comparison of percentage of budget spent for vessel types.
| Ship Type | Last 30 Years (1980-2009) | Reagan Buildup (1982-1989) | Last 15 Years (1994-2009) | Next 5 Years (2011-2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surface Combatants | 36 | 34 | 36 | 35.5 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 16 | 14 | 19 | 17 |
| Submarines | 30 | 34 | 27 | 37 |
| Amphibious Ships | 11 | 9 | 14 | 7.5 |
| Other Ships | 8 | 10 | 4 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Shocking... or not. The amphibious force in the near term will be funded at an astonishing low percentage. Why? Because according to this plan the Navy would only build 2 amphibious ships. Ironically, that extra LPD-17 the Marines are asking for, if included with the same bottom line number of $67,941 billion over five years, would align the percentage of spending on amphibious ships to the historical average.
Look, I understand that in any five year period spending is likely to be slanted towards one capability over the other. With that said, is that really how to manage a shipbuilding industry? One of the best things Congress has done is spread out payments of large warships, CVNs specifically but big deck amphibious ships as well.
The big problem here is the bottom line figure. The projection is the Obama administration intends to reduce the bottom line for shipbuilding to around $13.5 billion a year, and that simply isn't enough money given the shape of the shipbuilding industry in the US right now. Everyone in Congress talks about wanting competition and to fix the shipbuilding industry, but the administration is sending a bold message when the bottom line figure is $13.5 billion, and that message is they don't really give a shit about your jobs.
The shipbuilding industry workforce is old, getting older, and is about to retire in large numbers. With fewer shipbuilders, it will get even more expensive to build ships, thus making the money spent travel a shorter distance, and ultimately raise the inflation on shipbuilding even more. This isn't Obama's fault, it is a problem he inherited going back to both the Clinton and Bush administrations, who did several things beginning with allowing consolidation of the shipyards and ending with a disregard to the health of the industry while they were either celebrating the "peace dividend" or the Middle East wars.
Congress has seen the model for the shipbuilding industry. Consistency in the funding structure combined with steady rate procurement combined with robust R&D of submarines has led to fantastic results in the submarine shipbuilding community. While it would be legitimate to complain that submarines are very expensive, we must account for the nuclear reactor which is almost 1/4 of the cost. Considering that the US Navy submarine and associated community in industry, academia, and government is one of the major nuclear power science resources for our country, we are getting out what we are putting in. It doesn't hurt that the product being delivered is the most powerful conventional weapon system on the planet, and the single most important source of naval power for the United States.
What is needed is a higher shipbuilding budget figure, specifically a figure closer to $15.5 billion. Here is why. We need to be able to sustain industries based on fleet total requirements, and the only way to do that is to build consistency into our purchasing like we have with submarines. Following the Navy 5 year plan as released in that document, the Navy will buy a LPD-17 in FY12, but won't any other year. That is a recipe for a stale workforce. Using the numbers in the InsideDefense chart for the target 324 ship force, note the projected fleet requirements of certain hull types.
Ship Type | Number in Requirement | Estimated Costs Per Vessel | Ship Life Expectancy | Annual Estimate
Aircraft Carriers - 11 ($10604) (50 years) - $2333
Surface Combatants - 96 (1847) (40 years) - $4433
Littoral Combatants - 55 ($600) (25 years) - $1320
Attack Submarines - 48 ($2697) (33 years) - $3923
Ballistic Missile Submarines - 12 ($????) (33 years)
LHX class - 11 ($3170) (40 years) - $872
LPD-17 hull - 22 ($1869) (40 years) - $1028
Without counting Ballistic Missile Submarines, Sea Basing ships, Combat Logistics Force Ships, and Support Ships, if the Navy was to sustain an annual average for building the ships listed in the requirement, the shipbuilding budget would be around $13.9 billion. If the SSBN was only $3.5 billion per hull (will almost certainly be more), then the Navy would need $15.2 billion annually to meet the requirement, and this doesn't include Sea Basing ships, Combat Logistics Force Ships, and Support Ships.
This isn't pretty folks. As I play with these numbers, all I see is a bottom line that doesn't add up. Either someone in Washington will will care what sea power means to the United States, or they won't. If they don't, then expect the Navy decline to be swift, immediate, and ugly as everything begins to cost even more than it already does.
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