Observing "How the US Lost the Naval War of 2015"

Americans woke up to a different world the day after the attack. The war was over almost as soon as it had started. Outmaneuvered tactically and strategically, the United States suffered its greatest defeat at sea since Pearl Harbor. The incident—could it really be called a "war"?—had been preceded by a shallow diplomatic crisis between the two great powers. No one in the West expected the dispute to spiral out of control. George Washington was conducting routine patrols off the coast of China to send a signal of U.S. resolve. China responded with a signal of its own—sinking the massive ship. The ship broke in two and sank in twenty minutes. The Chinese medium-range ballistic missile had a penetrator warhead that drilled through all fourteen decks of the ship and punched a cavernous hole measuring twenty-feet wide from the flat-top landing deck through to the bottom of the hull. Ammunition stores ignited secondary explosions. Two million gallons of JP-5 jet fuel poured into the sea. The attack was calamitous and damage control was pointless.

While the Pentagon was reeling to determine exactly what happened, a well-orchestrated and pre-planned ‘‘rescue’’ effort was already underway by a flotilla of first responders from China. The Chinese media reported on the bravery of Chinese naval forces, fisheries enforcement police and common fishermen who happened to be in the vicinity of the disaster and were able to save numerous lives. The massive warship had a crew of 3,200 sailors, and there were nearly 1,800 additional sailors and airmen embarked with the wing of aircraft on board the ship. Among this floating city, thousands of souls either incinerated or drowned. In the end, China saved hundreds of desperate survivors floating in the water. Chinese state television filmed distraught young U.S. navy personnel, weeping, grateful to be alive as they were plucked from the oily water. Family members back in the States rushed to Beijing to reunite with their sons and daughters, hosted by the Chinese government and state media.

Beijing denied the attack. China shuttled to the Security Council, claiming that an accident on board the aircraft carrier had created a "radioactive incident" in its fishing zone, spreading nuclear fallout throughout the air and water in the region. The International Maritime Organization had declared the area of the attack a marine sanctuary one year earlier, and China had publicly warned that foreign warships posed an environmental risk to the natural marine environment. The United States, it was suggested, was liable for damage to China’s living and nonliving resources in the oceans, in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention. Beijing also rushed to the area activists from environmental NGOs to monitor the situation. Expressing solidarity and sorrow for the U.S. loss, China flatly denied that it had anything to do with the catastrophe.

Kraska, CDR, James, "How the U.S. Lost the Naval War of 2015," FPRI Orbis, Winter, 2010, pp 40-41.

CDR Kraska has a very interesting article in the latest issue of Orbis. The article projects a bit over 5 years into the future a scenario where China launches a single anti-ship ballistic missile striking the USS George Washington and killing around 4000 sailors and airmen. What follows is a well orchestrated strategic communications strategy intended to create an atmosphere of global intimidation and doubt regarding the incident. The scenario goes on to note it takes several weeks for the US Navy to gather enough forces to project power in the Pacific, with no small assistance by a various coincidence of events including closure of the Panama Canal for 'maintenance' purposes, leaving the US incapable of developing regional support for a military response.

As all scenarios go, there are several premises the scenario is based upon, beginning with complete political and strategic failure. For me, the assumptions of the scenario offered are part of simulating future scenarios in exercises, as accepting conditions no matter how probable is how wargaming works (and after this decade, haven't we learned to respect the possibility of improbable scenarios). That is one reason why I was disappointed in Tom Ricks analysis of the article. He should have traded in his reporters cap for his CNAS analyst cap when examining this article.

With that said, I note this only partially a military scenario specific to weapon systems like the anti-ship ballistic missile, but also a strategic scenario dealing with China's non-military strategic communications efforts intended to shape political outcomes. With that in mind, lets examine both.

Military Considerations

When considering this article, I first began wondering about how a self-guiding anti-ship ballistic missile could create dangerous problems for the US Navy in the future. We don't know enough detail yet to outline how such a weapon system will work, but what concerns me is how it might work. If, for example, the weapon is a fire and forget weapon that is fired towards an area at sea intended to strike the largest detectable target within an area; the ASBM would immediately become the most dangerous weapon in history that could be potentially exported.

What if, for example, one of these missiles somehow ended up in the hands of a non-state actor and was set up for launch in the Sudan. When thinking about the possible range, the weapon could be fired at a nuclear aircraft carrier transiting the Mediterranean Sea. How do you think the Europeans are going to react if a nuclear powered aircraft carrier is sunk in a major fishing area in their neck of the woods? What are the credible political options at that point, and to what degree would China be accountable for exporting such a weapon?

The thing that concerns me about China isn't necessarily a war between the US and China, rather the more likely possibility that Chinese weapons end up fighting the US somewhere else. China is a military supplier to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan - all of whom have not always been responsible with exports, including nuclear technology.

One more note. This piece by CDR Kraska is the first public source article I have read that points to the Type 041 Yuan class submarine as a major military capability. Expect more of this. The Song class submarine has a much inflated reputation based on the Kitty Hawk incident that has been reported in the press, but in general I do not get a sense from anywhere the Song is considered a major weapon system.

The Yuan class, on the other hand, is considered a major weapon system in the PLAN. There is a lot of speculation that the Yuan class may have a range on diesels around 10k nautical miles. If true, that would put Pearl Harbor within the potential patrol zone of a Yuan class submarine. If you are one who believes that COSCO would act as an arm of the PLA during times of tension, how long could a Yuan be supplied to operate around Pearl Harbor? In the context of CDR Kraska's futuristic analysis, how does lawfare and maritime regulation contribute to PLAN operations of conventional submarines around Hawaii? A lot to think about.

Strategic Communications and Soft Power

While the article focuses on a military act, it is really the strategic communications element discussed in the article that poses the greatest threat in the scenario. Part of the solution is the integration of information systems as part of the overall cooperative strategy. There is something to be said for transparency, and while I share several concerns expressed in this article regarding Maritime Domain Awareness (ironically also written by CDR Kraska) in this months Proceedings, an advantage of sharing information is that partners share data in regards to threat assessments like a ballistic missile launch. In the case of a Chinese ballistic missile launch, integrated BMD sensors throughout the Pacific by partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia with the US greatly reduces the chances that China could launch such a missile and be convincing regionally in denial.

Something else though. The loss of an aircraft carrier with 4000 killed would unquestionably represent an enormous blow to the US, but the question I have is whether it would significantly shift the balance of naval power in the region? I don't think so, because I believe in major war the power at sea lies with submarines, not aircraft carriers. With that said, that leads to another point... would submarines be allowed to conduct unrestricted warfare on commercial shipping bound for China under the scenario introduced in CDR Kraska's article? The answer to that question is more than just a military consideration, indeed it is a strategic communication question.

One of the most common discussions regarding smaller warships is what they would do during major war hostilities. My first answer would be that they would be used for the interdiction, indeed to capture (not sink) enemy shipping. The STRATCOM battle with China is a lot easier to win when naval forces capture enemy vessels, and a lot harder when naval forces sink enemy vessels. If pirates were sinking ships and killing sailors on a more regular basis off Somalia, that threat would be seen in a completely different way than it is today where very few people are being killed, and no major commercial ships are being sunk. It is unlikely to be any different in wartime, and if China is limited to sinking enemy shipping while we are capturing enemy shipping, they will lose the global STRATCOM position. It should be of concern, because China is the nation building the large fleet of small vessels that can be dispersed to capture enemy commercial vessels.

Something to consider.