Reconfigurable and Customizable - But Communication is the Key

If you are looking for clues regarding what Navy force structure is likely to look like in the upcoming QDR, then this months issue of Seapower Magazine has a must read article on Page 12 titled Irregular Warfare (that link is not for mobile devices). Well done Roxana Tiron and the Navy League for this very informative article, because as of right now it stands as the most important citation regarding the future of the US Navy. Despite the title, the article really has little to do with "Irregular Warfare" directly and instead discusses how the Navy is taking a broad approach to fleet constitution to address the range of challenges the Navy faces in the world today.

A couple weeks ago I discussed emerging force structures under discussion right now, and in particular I hinted that the "boxes" structure in particular appears to be the prevailing theory for fleet constitution. The Seapower Magazine article informs us to some degree the line of thinking with that approach. I'm focusing on this section of the article, but to understand the full context I highly recommend reading the article in full.

Destroyers, large deck amphibious ships, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and High-Speed Vessels (HSVs) all have good-sized flight decks and fairly large, open spaces that are reconfigurable, Burke said. And all can play a role along the wide spectrum between low-end irregular warfare and high-end asymmetric or conventional warfare.

"The fact that they have these open spaces that are reconfigurable or communications suites that are modular, all that contributes to that ability to be agile," he said.

As far as the spectrum of warfare is concerned, "the HSV is probably the ship that is most geared toward the low end; the LCS is a step up; the amphib is a further step up; and the DDG [Arleigh Burke-class destroyer] is even a further step up," Burke said.

"Although they all have capability in a variety of areas, they do have a sweet spot, if you will, and in some cases that sweet spot - it could be very narrow. What we try for is keep them really broad."

Burke cited the DDG as one of the best examples of a multimission platform. It can help with relief operations, perform missile defense operations or prove critical to taking down pirates off the coast of Somalia, he said.

"It is large enough to have a helicopter. It has a very capable radar that allows it to see missiles, but it also allows it to have the wherewithal to fight ships on the ocean, and it has a pretty significant communications capability," he said.

Burke also stressed that the Navy's aircraft carriers should not be viewed as Cold War symbols, but rather as platforms with "big versatility." Carriers can perform anything from launching combat operations to assisting in humanitarian relief efforts.

In essence, the Navy is designing a battle fleet constitution that emphasizes open architecture combat systems, flexible payload space, and distributed operations. Together, these attributes call for self deployable ships with common combat systems and open payload space.

Small "boxes" = JHSV + LCS

Medium "boxes" = CruDes + SSN

Large "boxes" = LDP-17 hull + SSGN

X-Large "boxes" = LHA/LHD + CVN + MPF

In all but Cruisers, Destroyers, and Attack Submarines, the boxes will carry loads of open payload space. All but JHSV and MPF (at both ends of the payload spectrum) are armed. The Cruisers, Destroyers, and Attack Submarines will carry flexible weapon batteries with VLS or VPT, and in the case of SSNs, reconfigurable torpedo rooms are coming with the next evolution of the Virginia class (Tango Bravo comes home).

The Navy is fundamentally shifting the way fleet forces are used towards a reconfigurable and customizable payload capability that tailors to the Combatant Commanders requirements. This design will be coupled with the development of the AirSea Battle doctrine, a doctrine that will attempt to merge network-centric warfare theory with mobility to create flexibility. There is a lot to like about what is under development when viewed as a whole, but I still have several questions regarding what I believe will be holes in the theories, and one major concern.

In everything I have read, heard, discussed, or been lectured regarding the future of the US Navy, I sense the Navy developing a new set of principles of war that include Unity of Command, Unity of Effort, Objective, Attack, Speed, Maneuver, Control, Flexibility, Precision, Surprise, and Communications. Of what little I know, I find it all very smart.

At the end of the day though, assuming all of this comes together for the QDR as is being advertised, everything hinges on the last principle of Communications. The Navy can do almost everything they are planning to do - only as long as they address the enormous problems and challenges ahead with communications. Everything they want the future to look like hinges on communications, and it is the one area the Navy is furthest from its necessary destination.

When I say that I think the LCS needs to be a communication node enabler for the battle fleet, and that the Command Ships rumored to be cut from the future force are going to be sorely missed, I'm not kidding. If you think the price of the LCS is the biggest problem facing that project, just wait until the communication problems throw a monkey wrench into the module development. That will come just before everyone in navy leadership gets really pissed off because unmanned systems development stalls due to poor communications planning.

The Navy needs a new communications strategy to make all of these new ideas work, and they needed that strategy yesterday. Those non-routable, MB/KB, SATCOM centric sea based network links back to the ever increasing shore based infrastructure aren't going to cut it, but no one appears willing to tell the boss where the limits of technology exist under the current system. SATCOM is really not very hard to jam you know, so battle group commanders need to learn to love NCTAMS - and its limitations. Until a naval battle group network at sea can scale COTS like IEEE 802.16 just to pass an email, all these 21st century ideas will flop in total failure.

No worries though, I suspect the first example will be the LCS. Its just a hunch, but I suspect communications is the main reason why the LCS is deploying without any unmanned systems. Just saying...