The following contribution from Prof. Robert C. (Barney) Rubel, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, comes as a response to the discussions on the blog regarding CS-21 that began with Bryan McGrath's original post Scrap the Maritime Strategy.
It goes (almost) without saying that a strategy that cannot be executed due to lack of resources is defective. Bryan McGrath's assessment of the deteriorated financial straits of the United States, and their impact on CS21 should thus be given serious consideration. Indeed, a while back I listened to a brief from the Fleet Forces N3 that described Navy's global efforts to execute CCS21 that concluded with the punch line "..and our dwell is 1 to 1." That meant that for every six months a sailor is at sea, he or she only gets six months in home port. This certainly brought back memories of the "hollow Navy" of the post-Vietnam years that was running its wheels off (I made three cruises in 2 1/2 years). The imposition of the "600 Ship Navy" in the Reagan defense buildup helped reverse the decline. According to some, the '80s Maritime Strategy was the result of direction to figure out how to justify the planned investment in the Navy. I think there was more to it than that, but indeed, that strategy was underpinned by resources.
Let me admit that, as the director of the Naval War College's research and gaming effort that led to the development of CS21, I outlawed any discussion of force structure because it was my belief that if we brought it in, there would be no strategy. Principally, my outlook was based on the controversy, then existing, over the "3/1 Strategy" that VADM John Morgan had put forward. His arrangement of four circles in a Ven diagram implied that there were some mission areas that demanded forces and platforms that might not be suitable for fighting major contingency operations (MCOs). Admiral John (Black) Nathman, then Commander Fleet Forces, moved the three subsidiary mission circles so that they were fully contained within the large MCO circle. This, in his view, denoted that the Navy ought to build only high-end, general purpose combatants that would do engagement and policing as collateral duties. The strategic problem was figuring out which of these mutually exclusive views was correct. If we had gone into the strategy development process at that level of analysis, all we would have gotten out the other end was unresolved controversy or perhaps imposed conservatism. So, in a platform (and thus resource) free environment, we gamed, researched, consulted and argued for nine months and produced five options that Bryan and his team resolved into CS21 (brilliantly, in my view).
CS21 implies more than it actually says. For one thing, it implies that Morgan, not Nathman, was right. Globally distributed, mission tailored forces should rely on cheap platforms such as HSVs and converted MSC ships that support the real main battery, sailors. High end credible combat capability ought to be concentrated in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. What the Navy should not do is use Nimitzes, Ticos, Burkes, Virginas or perhaps even San Antonios for maritime security duty outside the two concentration points. Moreover, given the ongoing analyses at the Naval War College concerning what constitutes credible combat forces, especially in Northeast Asia, I don't think anyone has done a proper analysis of what kinds of ships in what quantity the Navy really needs to execute CS21. If they did, they might find that it could be executed within the expected budgets. In that sense, CS21 does indeed prescribe resources. One thing I have learned over the years is that corporate culture rules with an iron fist and even obscures, to its members, a clear view of what is going on. If the Navy abandoned some of the assumptions most near and dear to its collective heart, it might see that it can actually execute CS21, albeit with a force that looks a bit different than the one that is reflected in current budgets.
There is another angle on CS21 that ought to be considered: whether intended or not: it is a strategic communication with the rest of the world, one that appears to have been highly influential. CS21 says that it is the global system that is the source of economic well-being and it is the corporate responsibility of all navies to work together to protect that system from disruptions. The navies of the world read that and believed. CS21 is in no small way the world's maritime strategy now. The 80's Maritime Strategy was also, if you believe some folks, a strategic communication that caused the overspending that brought down the Soviet Union. In neither case were any specific resources involved, although because it was coupled with the Reagan buildup, the 80s MARSTRAT had some indirect resource support. CS21 could be said similarly to be backed up by the election of President Obama (the Nobel Peace Prize not hurting the impact). The point is that the principal effect in both cases was generated by the document itself and its perceived link to actual US intent. If we back off CS21 now, what do you suppose will happen to USN and US credibility in the minds of naval leadership around the world? What if we had, in say 1985, backed off the MARSTRAT because we didn't think we could get to 600 ships? Seems to me that recanting CS21 now would be like telling the Taliban we are indeed pulling out at a certain date.
Frankly, tucking our tail between our legs and cowering in the corner because we allowed Wall Street bankers to run amok is a recipe for the kind of strategic decline the Chinese and others both believe is happening and wish on the US. It is true that Navy budgets cannot accommodate some new version of the 600 Ship Navy, but that's not what we need now. On the other hand, we can accommodate enough anti-ship missile-packing SSNs and supporting forces to keep the Chinese from forcing us out of the seas of Northeast Asia, enough power-projection firepower to thwart Iranian designs on the Persian Gulf area, enough Marines and their transport to rapidly get US power ashore in unexpected trouble spots, and enough sailors operating off cheap ships to catalyze the global maritime partnership. Moreover, if the incipient Air/Sea Battle partnership with the Air Force works out, we get even more dominant more efficiently. That combination of ingredients will maintain the US Navy's command of the seas and do what CS21 calls for: defend our homeland, allies and the system. Tonnage used to be the determinant of naval power, today I think it is intelligence; not the spy stuff, but the corporate ability to out-think opponents, influence friends and neutrals and achieve internal coherency. None of that will be achievable if we measure ourselves by the amount of gray structural steel we can put in the water.
Lets maintain our strategic composure for a while and give CS21 time to work. One of the products of trying to execute to this point is that we have a great empirical data base we can take to Congress and tell them that if they want the strategic benefits CS21 is meant to deliver, this is what it will take. But the Navy has to find a way to get comfortable with a new look that can be shown to be derived from CS21's precepts. OOPs! I just got it backwards, didn't I? I started with a strategy based on the nation's long term interests and figured out what resources we would need to execute it. I forgot, I ought to game what I think I can get from Congress and then develop a strategy that will justify it. Guess I will always be naïve.
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