5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
RFS Yamal (BDK 156)
RFS Azov (BDK 151)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JDS Ariake (DD 109)
JDS Towada (AOE 422)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

Grand Strategy Disconnect

Thoughts on Grand Strategy

Fareed Zakaria offers a plea for a new Grand Strategy from the Obama team but isn't very concrete about what it should look like. He also says that 'in order to form a grand strategy you need to know what the world actually looks like' which is *sort* of true, but I argue is looking at things in the wrong order.

As a first step in the exercise, you need to clearly and accurately describe your goals.

This doesn't guarantee that you'll be able to achieve them - but for the process of formulating a grand strategy to make any sense, you need to know where you're trying to go.

Fabius Maximumus has an excellent set of posts on the subject of U.S. Grand Strategy, mostly indicating how the Bush Administration's notion of such a strategy was flawed - and, to the degree that the current administration retains Bush positions either explicitly or by default, our grand strategy remains so.

President GHW Bush (41), as mentioned in the Zakaria article, had to tone down the Cheney Pentagon version of a Grand Strategy based on (and designed to maintain) U.S. unipolarity and freedom of action.

The problem with the Cheney and Co. grand strategy was not that it saw the world inaccurately, but that it had unclear (or nonexistent) end goals. It didn't set forth end goals, it set forth conditional goals. It explicitly laid out a rosy vision of American power and opportunity as seen in the 1990s, and then stated that America should use this opportunity to try to prolong the period of opportunity. Fundamentally, the Cheney crew did not see the unipolar moment as a window; they rather saw it as a dynamic equilibrium, one which could be maintained with the proper effort - and they saw that state as their 'grand goal.' They wanted freedom to act, and ability to act - but they never said what for, other than circularly to say 'to retain our freedom and ability to act as we see necessary.'

Happily for us (well, sort of) the DoD has offered us just recently the Quadrennial Roles and Missions review (available here). In this report there is a hideous PowerPoint slide which nevertheless has some good information on it. I offer it below.



The DoD has given us, here, the goal set it is working with. Let's look at it.

-Homeland is Defended
-Long War is Won
-Security is Promoted
-Conflict is Deterred
-Nation's Wars are won

I'll be up front with you: I don't like this goal list. Not much, at least. I don't like it because it offers transitory accomplishments and vague conditions as what DoD has labeled 'Strategic End States.' To be fair, those end states do map 'upward' to the 'National Defense Strategy' and the 'National Military Strategy.' Apparently those are separate things. I'm not sure why. Neither, however, is a decent statement (to me) of a Grand Strategy.

Why does this matter? It matters because if you leave that anchor undone, it allows for vicious amounts of 'float' in the Strategic End States. Are those end states really what the U.S. wants and needs? Or are they the end states that the DoD has found 'fit nicely' between the 'DOD Core Mission Areas' and the higher-up strategies which they're passing along? I want to know that these Strategic End States are flowing from a coherent picture at a higher level of what the U.S. and its military are trying to do. Let's look at these in turn.

'Homeland Defended.' From what? How? With what level of success? 'Long War is Won.' What is 'winning the long war' and why is it important to us? 'Security is promoted.' Whose security? At whose expense? With what and how?
I could go on, but will stop there. It is somewhat revealing that immediately after this slide, rather than offering any vision into these strategic end states, the document immediately goes into 'DOD Core Mission Areas (JOCs)'. While this document and this authoring group were not tasked with coming up with the strategic end states or higher strategy, I'd like to know they read them and understood them. I have the strong impression, from this doc, that while they did that, even they had difficulty working the means-ends chain properly through from the top level to their JOCs/JCAs - and this is a bit of a handwave to get them past the difficult part. Essentially, while I don't take issue here with any of the document's contents, I do take issue with the fact that it seems to be disconnected from the strategic level by anything other than primitive word-matching.

Let me reel back in a moment. I don't want to sound like I'm attacking those who came up with this document. I believe (and will argue later) that the reason for this disconnect lies above the plane of this document, in the strategic concepts themselves.

What, then, is a strategic concept that works, and why don't we have one? Let's look at a past strategy - one that was coherent and definite.

NSC-68, to give a famous example, offered a concrete goal set. It saw a desired state - the continued survival and freedom of the United States. It saw a specific threat - the Soviet Union's rise in power militarily, economically, and politically. It saw a basic condition problem state - the Soviets' espoused ideology, which threatened the goal state. And then it proposed a desired enabling state - successful containment of the Soviet Union - and offered prescriptions on how to achieve that which encompassed concrete recommendations on military, diplomatic and economic initiatives.

I'm not interested in arguing the moral correctness of NSC-68. I want to point out that however you feel about it, NSC-68 succeeded. We can argue about whether it did so by accident, or by design; whether it was vital or irrelevant. But in the very small sample set of grand strategies proffered by the United States' policymaking community, its desired goals, both intermediate and final, were realized.

Bush 41's Cheney and Co, on the other hand, even if we grant them the 'survive and flourish' goal as a desired endstate, fail to connect their two conditions. Even if the United States manages to preserve its unipolar perch, how (CONCRETELY) does this lead to the survival and flourishing of the United States? There are any number of plausible scenarios where the U.S. maintains a leadership position, even a unipolar one, where it falls anyway - because as history teaches us, unipolar dominance is not a necessary condition (nor, I would argue, a sufficient one) for our survival and progress. The United States spent most of its existance not as a hegemonic power, nor even as a particularly important one on the world stage. It spent the years 1776 to roughly 1945 in various conditions ranging from insignificant to a global but not by any means hegemonic power. It survived, and flourished. Following 1945 and through 1990 or so, it continued to do so as a roughly hegemonic power - but certainly did not have nearly the freedom of action that it did in the 1990s. So Cheney and Co's fixation on freedom of action and power preponderance is a useless goal state. It is a TOOL, not a goal. And fixation on a particular tool rather than on the job isn't healthy.

In any case, the 'survive and flourish' goal is a priori overdetermined (sorry, my Poli Sci background rears its head). Given the fact that the United States was, at the turn of the century, a nearly unipolar hegemon, it would take a significant shock to the world system to destroy it or render it unable to act to survive and flourish. While such events are certainly not impossible, the very assumption of the then-current state of the system means that we should by default, and in absence of disruption, simply expect the United States to go on as a powerful and flexible nation. As a result, the lack of specification of a credible threat(s) to that situation is even more problematic.

Next post: constructing a Grand Strategy.

Talking About Somalia and Piracy

EagleOne and Noah cover the details of the blogger roundtable today with Admiral McKnight. Feel free to read the transcript (PDF) of the conversation, but I assure you it was much more painful to participate in than read, and based on the email I've received from those who have read it, the transcript is painful to read.

Be sure and read Noah's article all the way to the end and hit the link, he links back to EagleOne who is covering tactical evolution of piracy off the coast of Somalia, exactly the concern I expressed yesterday over at the USNI Blog.

For the record, the image is stolen from EagleOne, although ID regular Ken Adams was who produced it. The transit lanes for the convoy system are being adjusted on Feb. 1, 2009 further away from the Yemen coast to avoid the fishing flotillas the old lanes were near. Fishing boats and pirate boats look the same, so the international coalition is making adjustments in what I'd bet is an attempt to reduce false alarms.

Heritage Foundation Builds a Fleet

The Heritage Foundation has released a report titled Quadrennial Defense Review: Building Blocks for National Defense. The key point that enables the report is the requirement for 4% of GDP spending. Quoted are the parts specific to the Navy. First the summery.

The U.S. Navy's primary responsibility is to defend freedom of the high seas, including protecting sea lines of communications. It shares responsibility with the Marine Corps for projecting power from ship to shore in the littorals.

First, the Navy needs to be a blue-water navy. This means that the fleet must include a balance of major surface and subsurface combatants, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines. The most prominent capabilities of this balanced fleet will remain:

• Controlling the surface of the oceans in broad areas,
• Controlling the air space over these areas, and
• Conducting anti-submarine warfare.

These capabilities enable the U.S. to project military power to distant regions, including Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. They also permit the U.S. to protect vital trade routes.

Once the Navy has established a forward presence in distant littoral areas, which is permitted by its blue-water capabilities, it should partner with the Marine Corps to project power from ship to shore. This will require further balancing the fleet to include amphibious ships, with supporting aviation systems and landing vehicles, littoral combat ships, minesweepers, and maritime prepositioned assets beyond those required for the blue-water fleet.

Ultimately, besides the photo above, this is all the detail provided to explain the position.

Shipbuilding was not a priority during the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Annual procurement has fallen to just 5.3 ships per year. A lack of funding and the increasing costs of ships under construction have combined to ensure a low rate of shipbuilding that cannot sustain the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for a 313-ship fleet. In addition to the strategic ballistic missile submarines, the fleet includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships, amphibious ships, attack submarines, converted Trident submarines, and miscellaneous other ships.

The Navy's future force structure is the minimum size needed to secure U.S. maritime interests, but it lacks the proper internal balance and sufficient funding for the necessary shipbuilding rates. Specifically, it shortchanges aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines in favor of littoral combat ships. The U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers, and that number should increase to 13 over the longer term. The number of cruisers and destroyers should increase from a projected 88 to 100, and the number of attack submarines should rise from 48 to at least 60. This should be facilitated, in part, by reducing the projected number of littoral combat ships from 55 to 20.

Further, the QDR should at least consider recommending that the Navy proceed with DDG-1000 procurement instead of extending the construction of DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers by ensuring that the DDG-1000s will have both air and ballistic missile defense capabilities. However, this approach will leave the cruisers with the Navy's primary air and missile defense missions. The QDR should also include a serious discussion of America's shipbuilding industrial base and how to maintain its strategic competitiveness throughout the next two decades.

I read this article as a proverbial middle finger to littoral warfare. I also think it is quite bold to state the Navy is a blue water force and if you don't like it, shove it. It is the first time I've observed a report suggest the Navy cancel the Littoral Combat Ships in favor of more battleships and submarines. These are certainly unique opinions, you have to give them that.

The question I found myself asking is in what strategic environment would one find this be the desired fleet constitution? Seems pretty obvious to me, Heritage Foundation apparently believes war between the US and China is coming. How else can this be a QDR vision?

I don't need to give my opinion, they read here enough to already know what I think. What say you?

Send the Sea Fighter to Somalia

This April Sea Fighter (FSF 1) is expected to emerge from the repair shop with a fresh suite of point defense weapons and other upgrades/repairs. According to some media reporting, including the Navy's own fact file on the ship on the official US Navy website, Sea Fighter (FSF 1) may be commissioned as a Navy ship. The $20 million dollar upgrade was an earmark from former California representative Duncan Hunter, who believed small, faster vessels will be important in the future fleet for dealing with irregular warfare challenges. For what has become a cost around $100 million dollars since construction, Sea Fighter (FSF 1) displaces around 950 tons, roughly three times smaller than its more capable cousins of the Littoral Combat Ship. $100 million dollars for a first in class ship? There is a catch, the ship was built to commercial standards as a technology demonstrator.

The High Speed Vessel model has proven very successful for humanitarian operations and other low intensity, non warfare related naval activity, but is being adopted in the form of the Littoral Combat Ship to begin addressing challenges for naval forces in the high intensity, complex environments of the littorals. The problem is, everything is still theory. With costs to the LCS program quickly approaching $30 billion and the LCS program giving the impression it could soon be a fast track acquisition process in the near future, $30 billion becomes expensive theory.

So why not send the prototype Sea Fighter (FSF 1), which is reportedly being commissioned into the US Navy anyway, to Somalia and attached to Task Force 151? There is no question the capabilities of Sea Fighter (FSF 1) are limited, apart from addressing very small boat operations this platform comes absent any high intensity warfare capability whatsoever. That isn't trivial, irregular warfare can rapidly and without warning evolve towards hybrid warfare, meaning conventional weapon systems can be introduced into a conflict scenario and create problems. The unexpected use of anti-ship missiles by Hezbollah in their war against Israel is an often cited example.

But there are also good reasons to do it. Sea Fighter can be useful in helping the Navy understand the logistics costs and requirements that they will need for our future littoral ships like LCS, and give some indication regarding the requirements and expectations regarding what a small crew, high speed vessel can do against irregular challenges like piracy.

Capabilities under and over the sea have advantages over capabilities on the sea in naval warfare, aircraft and submarines are simply more agile, more lethal, and are more difficult to counter than ships are in direct war confrontation. However, I believe that sustained presence on the sea will trump presence under or over the sea in dealing with irregular warfare challenges in the littorals where the Rule of Engagement becomes more restricted under the requirements to give more attention to detail in identification of friend and foe.

Combined Task Force 151 is currently made up of three ships:

USS San Antonio (LPD 17) - a 25,000 ton flexible air, sea, and land capable platform with 3 helicopters, several small boat crew, Marines, military police forces, Coast Guard detachments, and command and control capabilities that allow us to coordinate with international naval forces in the region.

USS Mahan (DDG 72) - a ~9,000 ton Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer capable of providing area air defense, land attack, major anti-shipping attacks, with an attached sonar but no helicopter facilities. 30+ knot speed allows this vessel to be very responsive in the convoy corridore that has been established by international partners for protecting shipping and has small boat detachments. The Arleigh Burke class is one of the most heavily armed warships in the world.

HMS Portland (F79) - a ~4900 ton Type 23 Royal Navy anti-submarine frigate that supports a single helicopter, has top speed greater than 28 knots, and has endurance for about 7800 nautical miles. The Royal Navy deploys boat teams from Type 23 frigates and the platform has a long history of sustaining long term operations in the littorals against drug runners and other smuggling activities.

The least expensive of the two US Navy platforms is actually the 25,000 ton LPD-17 which costs roughly $1.7 billion, compared to a new (but more capable than Mahan) Arleigh Burke class ship that costs $2.2+ billion dollars. Sea Fighter isn't perfect, it certainly can't carry the unmanned platform load of the larger LCS but it does have some capabilities for carrying equipment. Like they say with the LCS, the ship is built and we have it so why not use it. At most a slight redesign to build in NVR and the addition of something similar to the simple weapons suite of the LCS, Sea Fighter (FSF 1) would run somewhere in the neighborhood of $150 million dollars.

We intend to buy 8 Arleigh Burke class destroyers at a minimum of $2.2 billion each over the next 6 years. For the same money we could field 80 Sea Fighters (FSF 1) and 10 T-AKEs at $500 million each to support that force. We currently have 62 Arleigh Burke destroyers, is an investment for 8 more Arleigh Burke class destroyers really the right move for the high end heavy surface fleet today, or would the money be used more wisely to do something remotely similar to building 80 smaller platforms in the cost range of Sea Fighter and 10 additional T-AKE logistics ships to support such a force in addressing the irregular challenges emerging in the littorals?

Discussing the Pirate Fight

I'm trying to get the hang of the USNI Blog, still feeling my way around so I can develop a pattern and some consistency regarding what to write.

My latest column channels the COIN debate discussing complex maritime environments.

French Foil Attack on 150,000 DWT Oil Tanker

On Tuesday Somali pirates attempted to hijack the 150,000+ DWT crude oil tanker African Ruby. Unfortunately for the pirates, the French were in the neighborhood.

The French navy on Tuesday foiled an attack on a cargo ship in the pirate-infested waters off Somalia and arrested nine men allegedly trying to board the vessel, the military said here.

The French frigate Le Floreal received a distress call from the African Ruby and dispatched a helicopter which spotted two high-speed skiffs with armed men on board, a military spokesman said.

The chopper fired warning shots and the nine men on the skiffs were later detained, he said, adding that the interception took place in international waters off Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of northeast Somalia.

This marks the seventh action taken by the French against piracy since the French raid that arrested pirates last April. Check out the photo album of the incident at Fred Fry's place.

Eagle1 has more, including a link to a picture of the African Ruby. Now that is a big ship.

The High Cost of Cheap Ships

If someone suggested the Navy had moved USS Independence (LCS 2) to Area 51, I'd probably give it serious thought. This ship is in a witness protection program somewhere in Alabama no where to be seen, and there is no news (supposedly).

But we do have a contract announced today worth pondering.

General Dynamics—Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine, is being awarded a $37,750,000 basic ordering agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) on the Littoral Combat Ship, USS Independence (LCS-2). The orders to be issued will encompass services which support the total PSA effort which include, but are not limited to, program management, advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, and preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List. The orders will also encompass material and labor to perform the PSA for LCS 2, all testing, including post repair trials required to verify the accuracy and completion of all shipyard industrial work, non-standard equipment when approved, and technical manuals for non-standard equipment. Work will be performed in San Diego, Calif. (53 percent); Norfolk, Va. (24 percent); and Mobile, Ala. (23 percent), and is expected to be completed by Dec. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-09-G-2301).

Maybe this means the ship will soon find the sea.

HMS Daring Live Blogging

The News in Portsmouth is live blogging HMS Daring including some commentary, videos, and imagery. Pretty interesting stuff.

Something else caught my eye regarding the Royal Navy. Check out the TAURUS 2009 deployment. The Royal Navy has assembled an international expeditionary strike group.

HMS Bulwark (L15)
HMS Ocean (L12)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMS Somerset (F82)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
RFA Mounts Bay (L3008)
RFA Lyme Bay (L3007)
RFA Wave Ruler (A390)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)

There will also be 2 unnamed Trafalgar Class submarines part of the group. The deployment will begin in February and end in August with the strike group traveling all the way to Singapore before turning around.

Observing the Salvage of US Airways Flight 1549

A little photo album from the salvage operation in the Hudson.

It is Always About the Battleship

My latest column is up over at the United States Naval Institute Blog. I attempt to channel Julian Corbet, Bob Work, and Lord Nelson to discredit the myth that the Iowa class battleship is the greatest battleship in US Navy history as part of my never ceasing crusade towards balance in US Navy fleet constitution strategy.

Enjoy!

Yuan submarines are in service

The Yuan class submarines, also known as 039A, have been described as an important part of China's growing submarine threat. The first Yuan's photos started popping out in 2004 and it joined service in probably 2005 or 2006. The second Yuan's photos started coming out in 2007 and we saw a slew of photos in 2007 and early 2008. But just as we started to see a new variant, 039B, we stopped seeing pictures again. So, now we get a photo of what appears to be 3 Yuan and 1 039G in a flotilla. Each submarine flotilla has 4 submarines (I think). So, it appears that a fourth 039A hasn't joined service yet, because it would make sense for the first 4 039A to be in the same flotilla. Here is the photo.

It appears that this is a variant of 039G rather than 039G1 from the arrangement of the limber holes. Consider that all 3 039G was in East Sea Fleet, it makes sense that this flotilla is in 039A.

So, it definitely seems that 039As are in service and would be playing a big role in any kind of Taiwan scenario.

Observing RW in CVW-9

According to Navy Times, we have 75+ aircraft deployed on one of our aircraft carriers. CVW-9 is setting a new standard.

When the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group left Jan. 17, the Navy began testing a new air wing configuration that features two MH-60 Seahawk helicopter squadrons, rather than one.

Previously, carrier air wings typically deployed with 12 helicopters, which included a squadron and a small detachment, while a small command element remained back on the beach. The rotary-wing aircrafts’ missions were often limited to search-and-rescue and logistical missions.

The new wing configuration has two full squadrons for a total of about 19 aircraft, with their leadership aboard, all under the carrier air wing and strike group commander. These helicopters are heavily armed and will take over missions such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and supporting SEALs or other special operations troops.

My list might be outdated. I am guessing the RW squadrons are HSM-71 "Raptors" and HSC-8 "Eightballers". Other squadrons for CVW-9 are listed below.

VFA-154 “Black Knights” (12 F/A-18F)
VFA-146 “Blue Diamonds” (12 F/A-18C)
VFA-147 “Argonauts” (12 F/A-18E)
VMFA-323 “Death Rattlers” (12 F/A-18C)
VAW-112 “Golden Hawks” (4 E-2C)
VAQ-138 “Yellow Jackets” (4 EA-6B)

Read the whole article, it suggests where JCSCSG is heading and why there might be more helicopters than usual.

I have plans to speak with RADM McKnight on Thursday, and if my read of the tea leaves is good, we are going to see some real creativity being used by the Boxer and Stennis Strike Groups once they replace the East coast folks in the near future.

Report: More Amphibious Ships in New Shipbuilding Plan

The amphibious ship is the dreadnought of the modern era at sea, at least when looked at from the perspective of prestige globally and how virtually every major naval power is adding amphibious ships to its list of capabilities. Some have called the emerging 21st century era the Expeditionary era. While I don't think expeditionary warfare must mean amphibious warfare, the flexibility of amphibious ships in tackling modern maritime requirements is unmatched by other platforms, which is why I share the General's pause for optimism.

From Key To Future Seabasing Efforts Conway: Marines Need Amphibious Ships, Prepositioning Vessels by Zachary M. Peterson, Inside the Navy (subscription).

“There’s a new Navy shipbuilding program out there that I don’t think has been made public yet, so I won’t talk about it,” Conway told reporters Jan. 23 at a breakfast in Washington. “It gives me pause for optimism on the subject of amphibs.”

The commandant may have been referring to yet-to-be-released ship force structure numbers anticipated to include a higher number of amphibious ships. The numbers are expected in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard’s Naval Operations Concept, which was supposed to be released last year but has been held up due to the inclusion of the force structure numbers.

Marine and industry sources tell Inside the Navy an amphibious fleet larger than 33 vessels is expected in the document.

This move would put the future force structure of the US Navy into alignment with maritime strategy in my opinion, but it also means something has to give. If we give to amphibious ships, we take from somewhere else.

The most likely scenario is we reduce the number of nuclear aircraft carriers to at least 10, potentially fewer. The next most likely scenario is fewer submarines, which accepts risk at the high end of war. While submarines are smarter platforms for the future Navy than DDG-51s, more DDG-51s will win that debate.

We will have 62 DDG-51s for almost 2 more decades, the difference between 62 and 70 DDG-51s is purely an industrial consideration to the shipyards, not strategic to the Navy, so in keeping shipyards working it is not necessarily a bad thing. CG(X) is the most important ship in development, and someone in the Navy needs to be saying this as often as possible. We know it won't be built on the DDG-1000 hull, and we know it will probably use many technologies developed with DDG-1000. We also know CG(X) will be the centerpiece of the Navy's ballistic missile defense priority as we move into the 21st century. The more CG(X) is discussed, the better in my view.

The least likely scenario is the LCS buy is reduced from 55, although that would be where I would start cutting current plans. While the LCS is not a wasted effort, the platform has capabilities worth replacing the mine ships with even at a cost of $550 million. However, it doesn't solve many existing littoral warfare challenges even if others claim it does. We are still missing that small combatant, what I think should be ~600 tons and cost $100 million, a ship built to do the dirty work in the littoral.

Regardless, more amphibious ships is a great start. Using the Seapower 21 analogy from last night, the Navy has decided big surface combatants were a bad idea, and has gone with more amphibious ships (which can be big motherships) instead. This move is perfectly aligned with maritime strategy, and news worth being optimistic about in my opinion.

La De Da La De Da

While our political leaders are seriously about to spend 1 trillion dollars so that banks can give out loans to an American population buried under a mountain of debt, there are some serious events taking place in the world that might make conserving a rainy day fund a good idea.

The Taliban has apparently taken over the Swat district of Pakistan, and has set up everything from a provisional government to a court system. According to Nightwatch, 80% of the police have abandoned the district and 180 schools have been closed. The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan is winning, and in the near term, a struggle for power in Islamabad is looking more and more likely every day.

Following the complete pullout of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, the Somali government has fallen. The only word consistently used to describe the transition taking place is uncertainty.

While no one is, nor should, take Russian naval activity as a threat, it may get peoples attention that Russia announced today intentions to start building a naval base in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia region this year. The establishment of a permanent naval base in that region would all but insure Georgia will never get that territory back, although it might prevent a war with Ukraine when the Russians are asked to leave Sevastopol when the current lease expires in 2017.

Finally, do you know where the F-22s are? While not related to this, still noteworthy the Air Force picked the post inauguration time to forward deploy. I guess they expected some noise, and have instead given the North Koreans something to talk about.

Correct the Mistake of Seapower 21

Is there a group think idea in the blogosphere? I think so, I've seen it in other places too, so it isn't unique to the blogosphere, but what bothers me is that the idea doesn't really make a lot of sense when given serious consideration... at least for me.

It is often suggested the Littoral Combat Ship is a ship in search of a purpose. I think that statement is false, the Littoral Combat Ship is an imperfect mothership design for delivering unmanned vehicles to forward theaters to support MIW, ASW, and ASuW. Regardless of anything else that has been said about the Littoral Combat Ship, that mission requirement exists, and the necessity to provide unmanned platforms supporting MIW and ASW littoral challenges is very important to the future Navy. The LCS can do that job.

That is why I don't believe the LCS is in search of a purpose. I think people have adopted that position, but I see it like this. The Navy has mission profiles in search of a ship to meet the requirements in the field, and the Navy is assigning the Littoral Combat Ship to address those requirements even though the LCS is a bad fit. That is a different problem than suggesting the LCS is in search of a purpose.

I continue to wonder if the Navy has any intention of doing a final cleanup of Seapower 21 now that they have begun the process of truncating the DDG-1000. While Seapower 21 has been criticized as a failure of strategic thinking, in hindsight I think they got the strategy aspect more accurate than has been given credit, and ultimately failed to get the details right. Seapower 21 said we need an arsenal ship, which we got with the SSGN. Seapower 21 said we needed a cruiser replacement, which will be CG(X). Seapower 21 said we needed a new surface combatant to address 21st century challenges. Seapower 21 said we needed motherships for delivering unmanned systems to forward theaters.

Had Seapower 21 said big motherships and small surface combatants, instead of the big DDG-1000 surface combatant design and the small LCS mothership design, I think most people would agree the Navy would be in good shape even if we were seeing cost overruns on the small combatants.

I still believe that is the way ahead. The Navy should build 26 Littoral Combat Ships to replace the minesweepers, spending money on MIW is a good thing in the emerging 21st century maritime environment. After that, I think the Navy needs to refocus its unmanned systems strategy by building bigger ships to accommodate the likely increase in weight and size we will see in future unmanned systems. I also do not see how the aluminum LCS, with a bridge surrounded by glass, unable to support larger weapon systems, and too expensive to field in reasonable numbers can be a serious solution for the littoral warfare challenges sure to be faced over the next 3 decades. Assigning that requirement to the LCS is not the answer, building a combatant for the 21st century, a true armed and survivable combatant that can sustain presence off foreign shores, is the way ahead for matching the force structure of tomorrow to the maritime strategy for the 21st century as outlined by the Navy today.

A "Now Media" Model for Information Control

The key to information control is to leverage the ability to bypass filters when moving information, and dominate the information space with a specific message by building mass and momentum. By dominating the information space on any given topic, by controlling content nodes in a network to insure a singular idea gets the broadest possible endorsement, conformity can be created even among those who disagree. The result can be information control, and the question I ask my readers is whether this is a military capability?

Like George W. Bush before him, Mr. Obama is trying to bypass the mainstream news media and take messages straight to the public...

The White House also faces legal limitations in terms of what it can do. Perhaps most notably, it cannot use a 13-million-person e-mail list that Mr. Obama’s team developed because it was compiled for political purposes. That is an important reason Mr. Obama has decided to build a new organization within the Democratic Party, which does not have similar restrictions...

Still, sensitive to ruffling feathers even among fellow Democrats wary of Mr. Obama’s huge political support, Mr. Obama’s aides emphasized that the effort was not created to lobby directly or pressure members of Congress to support Mr. Obama’s programs.

“This is not a political campaign,” Mr. Plouffe said. “This is not a ‘call or e-mail your member of Congress’ organization.”

Instead, Mr. Plouffe said the aim was to work through influential people in various communities as a way of building public opinion.

With potentially 13 million marketing managers, the intent described is to use "now media" outlets to create information dominance on any specific issue, thus establish information control over a subject by running information operations to shape public opinion towards specific ideas.

This is essentially the application of "now media" strategic marketing with political ideas instead of products. According to the article, it doesn't sound like they have fully developed the process, but I think Obama has some rather brilliant folks working for him in the new media space, they will figure out how to make this effective.

There are ramifications for content contributors like the media under this model. Anyone not integrated into the communication network flow is also excluded by it, thus loses relevance. This will have serious impact to professional journalism, and anyone choosing independence in the media industry will struggle from being disconnected from the content flow unless they have their own network. Disconnectedness defines danger, and being disconnected from the content flow of an organized information network flow that large will be dangerous to people in the information business. They can say whatever they want, because they will simply not be heard. This is at least how I have seen it work.

This is why anyone interested in free speech is stupid as hell to even consider any form of fairness doctrine, because the more mediums disconnected from the online information networks that can be eliminated, the less resistance there is to the information control model using "now media". It would appear some in journalism recognize the danger.

“Historically the media has been able to draw out a lot of information and characterize it for people,” he said. “And there’s a growing appetite from people to do it themselves.”

The approach is causing some concern among news media advocates, who express discomfort with what effectively could become an informational network reaching 13 million people, or more, with an unchallenged, governmental point of view.

“They’re beginning to create their own journalism, their own description of events of the day, but it’s not an independent voice making that description,” said Bill Kovach, the chairman of the Committee of Concerned Journalists. “It’s troublesome until we know how it’s going to be used and the degree to which it can be used on behalf of the people, and not on behalf of only one point of view.”

If done effectively these type of information operations will be seamless, and no one will quite understand how cats are being herded.

You see, they are wrong when they suggest in the article this has never happened before, it has just never happened to this scale, and even then this has only been effective (that I am aware of) against virtual world communities. Without giving too much proprietary information away, this technique has been applied against gamers to herd cats and get them to do what the gamemasters want them to do, but there is careful effort done to disconnect who is delivering the messages and the message source. The influence obtained through information dominance, which is the carefully crafted distribution of information from large content contributor nodes in an information network to build mass (agreement in numbers) around a single idea, would herd a majority of the 'cats' thus allow gamemasters to exercise an agenda for the game seamlessly without the player feeling manipulated.

I think when you have 13 million nodes in an information network able to create momentum with that kind of mass towards a single idea to shape a political view, that has the potential to be part of a military capability. The New York Times is describing a method of conducting an information operation by government against its own people to shape political views, and it becomes more effective if one can use leverage like the fairness doctrine to disconnect other mediums from the content flow.

Oh, you don't see it that way? The media will, when anyone (public or private sector) can bypass the media that normally acts as an information filter and then dominate the message with mass (which is what 13 million nodes represents), you have the toolkit for an information control network. While that may sound devious, in reality it is simply an evolution of the same techniques that have been utilized in other mediums as they emerged, from radio to TV to even how newspapers drove public opinion in politics during the early times in this country. There are only two things new here, the medium and the political desire to remove other mediums from the content flow with initiatives like the fairness doctrine.

Many people in the military believe new media is important, they just don't understand how or why. Ask yourself, is 13 million nodes in a human network all pushing the same political idea to influence public opinion a military capability? When used to drown out political ideas and push a single idea, the answer could be yes. History teaches us that any political weapon in the information space will be used against political opponents, so to suggest otherwise as the article does is to ignore history.

Information networks have power. Any content producing organization that has a message as part of doing business should ask themselves a question. Is your information connectivity a node, or part of a network?

Do you think this a military capability? In our society, as long as newspapers, periodicals, radio, television, and other mediums are disconnected from the network and are not regulated regarding content, the answer is no. In countries where regulation of content exists on those mediums, and they can be manipulated to control information to conform to the information of a network, the answer is yes.... in my opinion.

Why Barry Goes to Messina

The USS Barry (DDG 52) will be one of many international warships pulling into port in Messina this week. The purpose of the visit is to remember the humanitarian mission to Messina following the earthquake of 1908 that killed an estimated 75,000 and destroyed 91% of the structures in the city.

For a year from 1909-1910 the US Government and American Red Cross spent $450,000 and $150,000 respectively to rebuild houses in Messina and Reggio devastated by the earthquake and tsunami. In a years time, the US Navy built 1900 houses and 271 other structures in the cities to provide shelter to local residents. In total the structures built by the US Navy provided housing for over 12,000 residents, and these structures became the fixed structures the city was rebuilt around, as after a few years "The American Village" was one of the only rebuilt areas that didn't have to be 'rebuilt' again.

The Russians and British Navy's get much of the credit for the response shortly after the earthquake, but make no mistake, this is one of the high marks of the voyage of the Great White Fleet. However, it wasn't the Great White Fleet contribution that had the most impact, it was the rebuilding effort that quietly followed.

This is not a well known story, but with soft power finding new momentum in the US Navy, the Navy would be wise to review the lessons of Messina and Regina because most if not all of the lessons from that activity 100 years ago apply very well today. Few people realize that in 1909, the Italian government actually relinquished national sovereignty to an American camp inside Italy as the US Navy built what became known as "The American Village." As one of many international villages rebuilt for the estimated 60,000 residents who survived the natural disaster, The American Village was remembered as the most successful project, mostly due to the wise use of treated wood and efforts put into building foundations for the brick structures.

To read the account of the American rebuilding operation itself, check out American house building in Messina and Reggio; an account of the American naval and Red cross combined expedition, to provide shelter for the survivors of the great earthquake of December 28, 2024 (1910). Available in digital format from the University of California libraries, it is an excellent first hand account regarding naval soft power a century ago. This story is one of many brilliant accounts of the whole story, a largely unknown story about the US Navy that might be the most successful example of naval specific soft power in US history.

SECNAV Discusses LCS

Geoff Fein of Defense Daily (subscription only) had an article on Friday that used liberal use of quotes from Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter. All of the following quotes were in response to questions regarding the Littoral Combat Ship program.

"It's unfortunate there were [overly] optimistic estimates that were given," Winter said. "We still have very clearly a vessel here which is a small fraction the cost of other surface combatants, and which provides a degree of flexibility by way of its modularity that will enable us to adapt it to a very uncertain future mission mix, and also let us evolve the system in a very significant way."

"Yes, we canceled two, but the objective of that was to put the program on a proper disciplined development track," Winter said. "Our objective here is not to buy two or four LCS. Our objective here was to buy 55 LCS, and making sure we were on a path that would give us good value and a product that we wanted for that fleet. [That] was going to be more important than just trying to move ahead given the uncertainties we saw at the time."

"When people start realizing and understanding some of the capabilities that are accomplished by this ship and some of the flexibilities associated with it, and we will learn more, and we'll be able to understand and be able to modify [it] ," he said. "That's okay, because the system was designed to afford that type of capability."

"The system is designed to accomodate different modules, different capabilities. It provides access, support, volume, speed...and within those parameters there is a hell of a lot that can be done," he said.

"And the combination of the air component capabilities, the fact you have a good-sized flight deck and hangar in both variants, as well as the ability to deploy small boats, gives you some tremendous potential from the standpoint of amphibious operations, which is a core Marine Corps interest area."

"Modifications will come by way of the modules, and in the same way we convert from surface warfare to anti-submarine warfare operations to mine warfare...the idea of putting on modules to enable amphibious warfare seems a logical extension of these capabilities," Winter added.

"The modularity is a huge factor. Yes, it's good that this is a very shallow draft, high-speed vessel. That is an enabling feature for littoral operations," he said. "From the basic enabling capability there are features that are important here. But the real benefit I think is going to come from the whole modular construct, and the ability to not only carry but deploy capability both in the air and in the water."

I think this is the right tone regarding the ship. Note the metric regarding the LCS he places the most emphasis with is modularity. I also think it is a good thing that every time the SECNAV has discussed the LCS lately, he has emphasized there is still a lot to learn. I tend to agree with the tone and intent of these comments, despite my concerns regarding the LCS.

Modularity is the most important aspect of the platform itself, but I believe Hybrid Sailors and Train To Qualify represents the most important aspect of the overall program.

There are a ton of lessons to learn not only about the platform itself, but also the concept of operations. I think we will see these lessons begin to emerge as part of the discussion late this year. For those looking where the conversation might start, keep an eye on the combat system, because there will be a push to go with a single combat system among all LCS models. If you aren't aware, the GD and LM versions of the LCS each have a unique combat system, which at the time may have been a good idea, but isn't anymore.

Observing the Critisism of the Navy Blogosphere

VADN J. C. Harvey, Jr USN OPNAV, found his way over to the United States Naval Institute blog over the weekend and left some very interesting comments. Information Dissemination is the largest naval blog in the United States and potentially the largest unofficial naval specific website on the internet, it would be irresponsible to assume he is not speaking directly to me, the other blog authors, and contributors in this community.

With respect to your comment concerning participation in the blogosphere and the upcoming milbloggers conference, let me speak pretty plainly - most of the blogs I’ve dropped in on and read on a regular basis leave me pretty cold. Too many seem to be interested in scoring cheap, and anonymous, hits vice engaging in meaningful and professional exchanges. There is also a general lack of reverence for facts and an excess of emotion that, for me, really reduces the value of the blog. Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype may be entertaining for some, but just doesn’t work for me.

My best example of a truly worthwhile blog, worthy of our time and intellectual engagement, is the Small Wars Journal. The tone is always professional, the subject matter is compelling and the benefit from participating is significant.

All that said, here I am - I recognize the reality of the blogosphere and the potential that exists for worthwhile exchanges that enhance our professional knowledge and overall awareness. My intent is to continue to participate when I can and where I see I can make a contribution to a professional exchange, but my view today is that the bloggers generally see their activity as far more meaningful than I do right now. I do, however, remain hopeful.

I think it is a very good thing we are seeing some honest criticism of the blogosphere, feedback is hard to get. As I have mentioned in the past, my target audience in the Navy is at the 0-6 level and down, not up to level of VADM Harvey. This may sound strange, but I'd take one 0-5 reader over any three Admirals reading the blog. Why? Because if one of the bloggers here happens to be suggesting something intelligent, my experience has been the 0-5 is more likely to consider the thought than an Admiral is.

The criticism hits on several points, first regarding being anonymous. I use a nickname, but the Navy knows exactly who I am and hit that link, you can to. I intentionally came out from behind the cloak to insure I was not anonymous on the USNI blog. While Yankee Sailor doesn't make a big deal of who he is, I have done a really terrible job keeping any secrets, and quite frankly he has too. Feng and The_Custodian are both anonymous by request. The_Custodian is in contact with CHINFO, so he is not anonymous with the Navy. As for Feng, his reputation as an analyst of the PLA Navy is well known among many professionals and has been long before either he or I began blogging. This is one of many good examples (PDF) where his credibility transends an anonymous nickname.

The second point is relevance of facts. Couple points on this. First, it isn't unique to see an Admiral question the facts, Admirals constantly question the facts of both CRS and GAO. The irony is, those organizations show their homework, the Navy does not. I welcome fact checking, the question is where can I find such a service?

I get it that VADM Harvey, and I am absolutely sure you can add VADM McCullough among others when it comes to Information Dissemination, see what is suggested on this blog as "Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype" and quite frankly, I won't apologize if it looks that way to them. To be blunt, a lot of the official statements we see coming from Admirals in the Navy today qualifies as "Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype" so this is hardly a unique phenomenon to the blogosphere. What is the blogosphere supposed to say when the Navy goes before Congress and suggests the DDG-1000 can't employ the Standard missile, then a casual look in the FY09 budget reveals the Navy is paying for Standard integration for the DDG-1000. Which is more offensive, "Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype" under oath in Congress or when it is written by an alias on a blog?

VADM Harvey makes a good point regarding professional contribution. I welcome anyone from the Navy, Congress, Think Tanks, or Industry who wants to contribute an article that counters something written here, I will publish however they desire. If someone would like to call me out specifically for an error I have made as part of that process, you won't offend me and I'll run the complaint as is. Unlike a lot of folks in the Navy discussion, the authors here write in full knowledge they are engaging in a debate and ideas will be contested. As the owner of this blog I always welcome the addition of accurate information, and we will correct any inaccurate information we post. When I sat down with Admiral Frank Thorp, he made it clear he wants the most accurate information about the Navy in the public. He asked if I would help insure accuracy in information. I told him I would, and my word is good.

But here is an unavoidable truth. No one from the Navy has ever contacted me to suggest information I am presenting is inaccurate, but both the industry and members of Congress have. If the Navy is frustrated about the accuracy of information on blogs, then quit conceding the conversation to others; engage it. It isn't like the authors on the blog are hard to reach, the email address is posted on the top of the blog.

Finally, VADM Harvey says something in the comments at USNI I'd like to address.

I take as gospel the ideas of Samuel Huntington in his seminal Proceedings article of May, 1954, National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy. In this article, Huntington highlighted the absolute necessity of the service to develop the national support for securing the resources, human and material, required to carry out the service’s missions.

This is a brilliant observation, one I completely agree with. If you are unfamiliar with what Samuel Huntington wrote, I quoted it here last August. I added some observations and suggestions, and I believe my comments apply as much today as they did then. I also quoted Huntington's advice to the Navy in 1954 from that article, and I think it applies to the Navy 2008 just as much as it did to the Navy in 1954.

Observing the Influence of Loren Thompson

Dr. Loren Thompson is what I would call a Defense Industry Analyst, I read his perspective as shaped by and for the defense industry. That is not an insult, although I could see how some will read it that way. His recommendations root in industry, not strategy, so when he gives a warning about industry related problems, the problems are real.

Lex recently noted that back in December, Dr. Thompson gave some interesting advice to the Aerospace industry.

The second step is to show some imagination in leveraging any insights you have about how relevant audiences get their information.

If you don't sponsor blogs then maybe you should, and if you do sponsor blogs maybe you should upgrade them, or make more of an effort to attract people to them.

Do you have a network of people who respond to internet postings about the sector, or do you just let postings get answered on an ad hoc basis where misconceptions are often allowed to go unchallenged?

Do you have a mechanism for pitching ideas on a regular basis to cable outlets, or think tanks, or organized labor -- the kind of mechanism that builds up relationships over time?

You get my point -- you need a campaign that is something more than the same old ideas.

I was reminded of this when I noticed advertising from the aerospace industry on Dailykos. Good for Dr. Thompson, good for the AIA, and good for Kos. By definition blogs are where people go to get 'more' information on a specific subject, and the kos folks specifically are not exposed very often to legitimate information about the defense industry. The reasons are both many and legitimate, but mostly it comes down to few on the left side of politics in this country spending much time researching the subject until recently.

I note it is encouraging this pattern is changing. I have no idea if the AIA advertising will make a difference, but I do think it is interesting. Manufacturing in the US is in steep decline, and the economic stimulus package in discussion in Congress will not curb that decline. Most Americans want to see our country make stuff, but it isn't easy to see how to turn things around.

Upgrading our shipyards and supporting the industries like aerospace that are having success is step one in keeping a status quo. The defense side of manufacturing is one of the only aspects of manufacturing keeping manufacturing in the US from drowning, but with defense cuts coming it is unclear how much of that industry will survive long term.

These are real challenges for Congress, and explains why the DDG-1000 survived FY09 when by any measure other than industry, it shouldn't have. DDG-1000 has become a Congressional jobs program more than a Naval surface combatant program. With almost a million jobs having some touch to the DDG-1000 program in all 50 states, not to mention the program being critical to the only two shipyards able to build large surface warships, something has to give. The same scenario applies to the F-22 program, which is getting momentum for more money in Congress.

The question is, what should we do when major defense programs become major job programs from the perspective of Congress, and during rough economic times, make it prohibitive for the services to plan and spend reduced budgets wisely with Congress forcing the services to pay for these programs?

I think Congress and the Obama administration missed a real opportunity with the stimulus package bill. By shifting these big money defense items that are essentially job programs to the stimulus bill, the administration could then reduce the budgets of the services without creating a crisis with the defense industry. The F-22 and DDG-1000 are really good systems, no question they are beyond anything competitors have, but they are tremendously expensive and tied to too many jobs to effectively cancel outright. The Army and Marines have similar programs, but which to move is for someone else to suggest. Such a move would address the real challenge involved with reducing the defense budget, which is dealing with the reality it takes long term planning to do because radical change leads to shockwaves thus massive layoffs, which is always bad both economically and politically.

New Royal Marines Offshore Raiding Craft

Defense Professionals a story today about the Royal Navy's armored RHIB. It goes back to the discussions we have had lately about protection vs speed. I think the Royal Navy understands that low intensity peacemaking activities like fighting pirates and inspecting tankers in the Northern Persian Gulf requires more armor, protection, and survivability than the weapons used to sink someone elses Navy. I agree with this approach.

Royal Marines from 539 Assault Squadron put on a display of their latest up-armoured and up-gunned Offshore Raiding Craft in the choppy waters of Plymouth Sound yesterday, Thursday 22 January 2009.

The Marines, whose traditional role has always been to maintain law and order on the high seas, put the new mid-console variant of their Raiding Craft, known as the 'racing car' of the amphibious fleet, through its paces at speeds of more than 20 knots.

The Royal Navy has a large amphibious fleet and the Raiding Craft represent the smallest and most manoeuvrable elements of this fleet. Their role is to allow Royal Marines from the fleet to close with the enemy either at sea or on land. With the latest upsurge in piracy this role could not be more pertinent.

But protection is just as important to maritime equipment as it is to equipment used in the land environment, especially when undertaking dangerous engagements such as intercepting potential pirates. And the new craft have been designed following experiences in southern Iraq, when Marines came under attack from local insurgents, with improved armour and more firepower added.

The story goes on and covers just about every angle. Interesting approach.

When Guessing Become News

The speculation regarding the intercept of an Iranian owned ship in the Red Sea is growing, and not due to any additional facts. The new twist to this story is that the US Navy ran a covert op, which is interesting. I wouldn't bet on it.

The interception of an Iranian arms ship by the US Navy in the Red Sea last week likely was conducted as a covert operation and is being played down by the US military due to the lack of a clear legal framework for such operations, an American expert on Iran told The Jerusalem Post on Saturday evening.

International media reported that an Iranian-owned merchant vessel flying a Cypriot flag was boarded early last week by US Navy personnel who discovered artillery shells on board.

The ship was initially suspected of being en route to delivering its cargo to smugglers in Sinai who would transfer the ammunition to Hamas in Gaza, but the US Navy became uncertain over the identity of the intended recipient since "Hamas is not known to use artillery," The Associated Press cited a defense official as saying.

The most likely scenario us that the ships master allowed the boarding party on the ship, and did not expect them to find any weapons on board. The reason why that is the most likely scenario is because the ship was essentially released and allowed to continue on, and will supposedly be searched by Egypt before the ship is allowed through the Suez canal. If it was a serious incident, or a 'covert op' as is now being claimed, we wouldn't know anything about this incident at all.

What I see here is Israeli media that can't get good information out of CENTCOM, and is now guessing to keep this in the news. Can't get information about ongoing operations from CENTCON? Get in line. CENTCOM doesn't like sharing information with the Pentagon because the Pentagon is a leak machine, so it is hardly surprising people in the Pentagon have no idea what is going on. It also isn't surprising CENTCOM isn't releasing any details, they never do. When Admiral Gortney held his press conference at the Pentagon a few weeks ago, that briefing ended up being a wealth of information. Why? Because it was the first time we got real details about what is happening in the 5th Fleet AOR in months.

What is the story here? The CTF-151 flagship is doing a CTF-150 function, which isn't surprising because CTF-150 is more important to the interests of the US than CTF-151. The other story is the media is getting paranoid because CENTCOM doesn't run around talking about operations while still underway, like the Pentagon will for example. Being patient and understanding first reports usually get it wrong is about all we can do while we see what this story is really all about.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

Five Good Reads on Friday

Admiral Stavridis has a Fourth Fleet review on his blog worth a look. I am particularly impressed with the statistics given regarding Continuing Promise 2008.

I've been wanting to post a link to William S. Lind's On War #285 for at least a month now. If you read it, you may find it to be one of the most thought provoking things you read today.

Eagleone highlights China Plays maritime chess from the Japan Times Online.

Observing the details of the 26 MEU and CTF-151, even as USS San Antonio (LPD 17) acts like a CTF-150 ship. Meanwhile, CTF-152 gets a new warship.

I've talked about evangelists on the blog. The Navy doesn't have one, but I think the Army does. I think Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling is like a young 21st century version of A.T. Mahan. Thomas Ricks has Yingling's latest open discussion sure to remind the Army why he is both an asset, and a threat... just how Mahan was seen when he was seeking instatutional change in the Navy over a century ago.

GULF OF ADEN (Jan. 17, 2009) An HH-60H Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the "Tridents" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron (HS) 3 takes off from the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD) 17 during a vertical replenishment with the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199). San Antonio is the flagship of Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class John K. Hamilton/Released)

Evolution, One Revolution at a Time

Sometimes a story stands out because someone says something very smart. This is a good example.

The U.S. Navy flight-tested Raytheon Company's Standard Missile-2 target detecting device. The SM-2 Block IIIB flight marks the lowest-altitude intercept to date using the new device, which enhances the SM-2's ability to detect and destroy threats.

The missile was fired from USS STERETT (DDG-104) during combined combat system ship qualification trials. The test flights included additional SM-2 Block IIIA, SM-2 Block IIIB, and SM-2 Block III missiles. The missiles engaged multiple targets under stressing conditions representing a variety of threat scenarios.

"These tests demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of SM-2 as it continues to evolve," says Ron Shields, Raytheon Missile Systems Standard Missile program director. "The SM-2's ability to employ this new target-detecting device against challenging targets enhances the missile's usefulness to the warfighter."

zen.

Good job to the Navy for getting a good photo, love it. Would have been more interesting had they told us how low the altitude was for the intercept. Probably best they didn't.

The Navy news article on this story is really good.

"I am extremely satisfied with the gun's performance," said Sterett's Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Brian Eckerle. "It has really performed exceptionally under the taxing demand of firing 582 rounds."

In addition to direct engagement systems, Sterett's Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities were tried, as were chaff countermeasures and the SPY-1D(V) air search radar. However, the centerpiece of the CSSQT was the live firing of 7 SM-2 missiles against air and ground launched drone targets.

Test objectives for the events, in addition to certifying Baseline 7.1R for tactical use in the fleet, included operability tests of the SM-2 Block IIIB Missile, which contains an infrared (IR) seeker head assembly in the guidance section. The missile has the ability for dual mode terminal homing and can start homing on RF energy, switching to IR homing if necessary for a successful intercept.

In a true testament to the warfighting ability of Aegis Baseline 7.1R, Sterett simultaneously directed four SM-2 engagements to prosecution, and the test was an enormous success. CSSQT was highly anticipated as a critical milestone toward the development and testing of future weapons capability for the next generation of surface combatants.

This represents further evolution of existing systems, good stuff here. I am particularly pleased to read an article like this and note the use of live ammunition in training, including ASW training if you can believe it. To me, this is another example of how the Navy outside of Washington is doing really good things. If we could only fix the issues that seem centric to Washington.