On the Ray Mabus Nomination

To answer the email, yes, I am aware of the Ray Mabus nomination. Yes it will eventually be discussed, but there is a part two to the nomination, and "a rest of the story" as well.

So I will patiently wait until part 2 is announced before telling the rest of the story, including what happened there.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

In general, I tend to avoid these kinds of issues, but there appears to be a trend worth observing. Don't Ask, Don't Tell is popping up more and more recently, but what is interesting is that I am not seeing the politicians pushing the conversation so much as I see the Generals asking about it.

Commandant Gen. James Conway is polling his generals on the controversial "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

In a March 13 "P4" — personal-for message — to all 82 of his general officers, Conway asks four questions, including this one: "How strongly should we, as an institution, challenge the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy?" The other questions covered in the e-mail, which came under the subject line, "2009 UPDATE FOR THE COMMANDANT," covered priorities at a time of "dwindling budgets," seabasing and a general question about "any topic that you think is important and should influence the course and speed of the Corps."

Not sure if you noticed, but last month MG Mike Oates of the 10th Mtn Division asked a similar question on that units blog.

Would you support Congress changing the current law to permit gay Soldiers to serve openly in the Army? What are the benefits/challenges if this occurs and how would you recommend we implement the change in a professional manner if required?

My read is that the Generals are preparing for questions they expect to be asked about in testimony, and are doing what any good leader would do, taking a sample of their peoples opinions.

My guess is the Obama administration is positioning this issue for the Secretary of Defense after Gates. The first issue that must be addressed before any changes take place is that "Don't ask, Don't tell" is law, meaning even if the Obama administration wanted to change the policy, first they have to go to Congress.

Pirate Tactics Evolve Off Somalia

EagleOne has an interesting map noting how the pirate attacks appear to be shifting to the south and east, although there is still plenty of evidence that attacks are occurring frequently in the north as well. IMB has seen the pattern developing as well, and is calling for the coalition to extend its coverage area.

A maritime watchdog Tuesday urged an international naval coalition patrolling the waters off northern Somalia to extend its watch to the country's eastern and southern coasts.

The warning came amid a spike in attacks in the area. The latest attack occurred late Monday, when pirates fired rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns at a South Korean bulk carrier off eastern Somalia. The vessel managed to escape after carrying out evasive maneuvers, the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center said.

Since March 22, pirates have attacked 10 ships off eastern and southern Somalia, hijacking two of them, said Noel Choong of the piracy center in Kuala Lumpur. In contrast, he said, there was only one reported attack in the Gulf of Aden, to the north of Somalia, because of the international anti-piracy task force protecting those waters.

The problem is, there are no more ships. The international community has been able to limit the number of hijackings by creating transit lanes for convoys and organizing the shipping community.

This problem will only be solved on land.

Somali Pirates Attack German Navy

I think this is funny, talk about getting your identification chart wrong. This is like trying to pick pocket a police officer outside the police station.

Seven pirates opened fire on a German naval supply ship in the Gulf of Aden but were chased down and captured by an international anti-piracy task force, the U.S. Navy and European officials said Monday.

Meanwhile, Yemen reported that pirates killed a Yemeni fisherman and wounded two others in an attack on a fishing boat Saturday, also in the Gulf of Aden.

The expanse between Somalia and Yemen is one of the world's busiest waterways and the thousands of ships passing through each year have been plagued by pirate attacks.

In the attack on the German ship, pirates apparently mistook German FGS Spessart supply vessel for a commercial ship when they opened fire on it on Sunday afternoon, U.S. Navy 5th Fleet spokesman Lt. Nate Christensen said.

The German sailors returned fire and pursued the skiff while also calling in for support. Several naval ships — including a Greek and a Dutch frigate, a Spanish warship and the USS Boxer — sped to the area while a Spanish marine aircraft and two U.S. Marine Cobra helicopters joined the pursuit.

Five hours later, Greek sailors reached the pirate skiff, boarded it and seized the seven suspects and their weapons, including assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, the Greek navy said. The suspects were disarmed and transferred for questioning to the German frigate Rheinland-Pfalz where they remain Monday, pending a decision on whether they will be legally prosecuted, Christensen said.

That last sentence is troubling. Imagine a world where a boat can open fire on a German warship, and they have to actually stop and ponder whether or not there will be a legal prosecution of the incident.

Early Thoughts From a Long Week

I am still sorting out my notes from a very busy trip. I did a good job filling time, as I hope will be evident when people see just how many stories the trip generates on the blog. It is very interesting meeting so many people in person I had previously only knew because I had traded emails with them. In many ways, I think I am viewed as a novelty. This trip, at least in regards to most of my appointments, it was about what I am doing more than what I am saying. I also managed to stumble through my engagements without revealing any secrets, which I was worried about. I decided it was better to be confident generically, even if it meant sounding arrogant, than to do any demonstrations for free.

Thursday was a busy day, highlighted by meeting two people in particular. First was Mackenzie Eaglen at Heritage, who might be one of the most published yet 'least well known publicly' analysts on naval affairs in the entire think tank community. I had a bit of fun calling her the "13 carrier gal", although at least she makes a better case for her number of carriers than the Navy does! The other interesting person in my meetings that day was LT Anastacia Thorsson of the US Coast Guard, who has the pretty cool official title of "blogger." Drinks with Matt Armstrong and other great but "shall remain anonymous" folks that night was very productive.

My most memorable experience Thursday was morning coffee at 7am in a conference room at CSBA with Bob Work, Dakota Wood, Martin Murphy, and Jan van Tol. Two hours with that bunch and as you might imagine, I was very tuned into everything around me the rest of the day.

There are a number of ways to look at the Congressional hearing Thursday, but I am left with three impressions.

1) Gold plated warships as a fleet constitution strategy is directly aligned with political policy. Want a different shipbuilding strategy, change the political policy first.

2) The House Armed Services Committee is loaded with rookies. Gene Taylor, who I love, had a bad day because he was not ready for Dr. Thompson, who is underpaid and very good at what he does. Rep Taylor and/or Rep Akin tried to do something really smart by putting some fresh faces on the panel, but they were let down in a big way by the Congressional rookies on their subcommittee.

3) I thought the big winner was the Navy.

All of these points, and more, are addressed over at USNI, where I spent all Thursday afternoon (great time). Bill Miller allowed me to take some old Proceedings issues he had laying around, including the 1899 edition with two very interesting articles from the Honorable Theodore Roosevelt. Interesting that his speech printed in that Proceedings could almost be given today without edit.

That night I met with Tal Malven and others who shall remain anonymous. If you don't know, Tal is professor of Naval Architecture at the Naval Academy, and over beers he showed me his model collection of CVN-21 alternatives that didn't make the cut (see picture above). Beer tastes better when you chat with some people, the beer was very good on Thursday night.

Might be of interest to some, but there were Mids out in Annapolis Thursday night until 11pm. New commandant has brought a new policy. I think this is a good change. I was thought it was interesting that Mids never apparently ever go to the naval institute. My impression was there is so much history there available that the mids are either ignorant about, or don't care about.

Friday I ended up being in meetings from 8am to 6pm, all of which were private. My only regret was that dinner with family didn't work out, but I will say one thing. If you ever stay at the Army/Navy club in DC, the library in that hotel is easily one of the best kept secrets in that town. I know, sounds like geek stuff, but don't knock it until you try it.

Saturday was Government 2.0 Camp at Georgetown. Very interesting. I actually found a Navy PAO there, a civilian, who is working with the MSC. The Air Force has a social media strategy which I'll discuss when they release some new stuff this week. There were some other interesting things discussed, but social media in government is a long way from reality.

I realized three things Saturday:

1) Jack Holt is the man.
2) Addressing IT challenges is the long term solution, not the short term problem.
3) The really smart people in the groups have never managed a major government project before, meaning the social media consultants need technical consultants.

I was able to finish Thomas Ricks book The Gamble while on the trip. That is a really damn good book.

Finally, it is interesting to talk about social media as if I'm some sort of evangelist, because I'm really not. I write a blog. I know how to build online communities, but I think social media is only for organizations that know what they want. While I can help a company answer those questions, I can't answer those questions for a company.

A lot of people kept wondering "how do you do it at all hours of the day and night." Uhm, I don't actually... I do wake up in the middle of the night to inspect some scripts that I usually schedule, but I'm not up all night and working all day as it looks. For example, it is 6pm on Sunday and this post is scheduled to run at 6am on Monday. That is why everything looks like it runs in the middle of the night, I schedule it to go at that time. If I send an email to you in the middle of the night, it is because I am up actually doing some work, not blogging (in IT, we do maintenance in the middle of the night so we don't disrupt services during business hours). I don't sleep like normal people, although it still comes in at about 6-7 hours a night like everyone else.

I have tons and tons of stuff, but I also have lots of catch up so it will take a bit to get back to normal.

Monitoring the Coast of North Korea

For those who are keeping track, it appears there are 6 AEGIS vessels, 3 US and 3 Japanese, involved in the naval ballistic missile defense tracking and intercept capability deployed off North Korea. There are also an undetermined number of additional naval assets without BMD from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Canada operating in the region.

For the Japanese, JS Kirishima (DDG 174) is acting as the tracking vessel while JS Kongo (DDG 173) and JS Chokai (DDG 176) are currently deployed with SM-3s capable of being launched, according to Japanese news reports.

For the US Navy, the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is the only identified US Navy ship deployed off the coast of North Korea, but based on open source intelligence, there does appear to be two Pearl Harbor destroyers capable of AEGIS BMD supporting the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56).

While Gates made clear there is nothing the US can do to "prevent the launch" of the North Korean missile system, it is very much possible for the US to shoot it down.

I have not entertained the possibility of a US shootdown as likely. I also find news reports discussing the USS Chafee (DDG 90) being deployed interesting. You see, USS Chafee (DDG 90) doesn't have AEGIS BMD capability, although she is a very modern destroyer. USS Chafee (DDG 90) would only be deployed to protect AEGIS BMD ships from "other" threats.

Politically speaking, there are very good arguments to be made why we should shoot it down. I would run it by China first as a courtesy, but I wouldn't be surprised if they privately supported us in that position if for no other reason than to get a good look at our AEGIS BMD capability.

While it would be a bit of an overreach, it would send exactly the right message to both friends and foes regarding the Obama administration, essentially saying "Don't F--- with me." Under the "speak softly and carry a big stick" theory, that would set up the Obama administration to make an example of an illegal missile launch, rather than having to deal with a foreign army crisis in order to make a political statement.

It is much easier to send messages when the risks are low, but without informing the Chinese it wouldn't be a smart option.

PLAN ASBM development

I was contacted by Galrahn to read over a Chinese blog entry on PLAN's ASBM development (found here) and post my thoughts on it.
I think that before you look further, there are some other good reads on this topic. Sean O'Connor has posted one of the better summaries on this regarding to OTH radar and ASBM threat. I have also written an entry in the past regarding ASBM threat, but it's really not that well researched. That one was based on an article that stated China has solved the difficulties surrounding hitting a moving target with a ballistic missile.

I think that the blog entry I read was definitely the best researched work on PLAN's ASBM plans. It listed many research papers that were written in Chinese and published years ago. As a result of that, I cannot possibly confirm that some of the things I've read are actually accurate. The sources that I can confirm on the Internet do seem to conform to what he was stating. I think in order to continue, it would be beneficial to read some of the resources that he mentioned. The include:
Sinodefence's Space Page
Sinodefence's Missile Page
Xianglong UAV Page
Yilong UAV page
The first one is important, because you can look through the current and future development in China's space industry. It's important to look through the communication, IMINT and EO satellites that China will use in this system.
In the second link, the important missiles to look for are DF-21 and possibly DF-15. In the third link, it lists China's probably most recent venture into HALE UAV. It's about 2/3 the size of Global Hawk or maybe even smaller. We don't have any figure on its endurance, but one would guess it's much less than that of Global Hawk due to the smaller size and less efficient engine. Although at this point, I would think that PLAN would be fine with an Asian Hawk. And the final link is an entry with information on China's version of Predator MALE UAV. The stats listed on that page were actually from its ddescription in the Zhuhai airshow, so I can verify that they are accurate. The two UAVs are both developed by Chengdu AC (the developer of J-10), so my guess is that Xianglong's endurance is comparable to Yilong (around 20 hours).

Reading through those links + Sean's blog entry are important in appreciating the rest of the ASBM system. I will try to make this out in Q&A format:

1. What caused China to start develop this system?
There are two main causes that drove this project. The first one is USA's Pershing II project. I guess this showed PLA the accuracy that can be achieved through MaRV warhead and active radar guidance. The second one is the Taiwan incident in 1996 when PLA's powerlessness against USN carrier group was on full display.

2. When did the project start and where is it now?
China probably started researching on MaRV right after Pershing II was deployed in 1984. By 1991, China had finished research on MaRV. According to the blog, there was a famous research paper in 1994 about attacking fixed target using MaRV technology. In 1999's national pride parade, they showed a missile with all the basic technology needed for the missile part of the ASBM system. If we look at the current status of the satellite constellations and reconnaissance platforms, we could probably say that the system has achieved some operational capability. The entire system needed for ASBM probably will not get set up until all the space assets and UAVs are online next decade.

3. Which missile are they using and what kind of improvements are they putting in?
It looks like DF-21 is the missile that ASBM is based on. It uses a solid propellant, is road-mobile, widely deployed and also have recently been improved to DF-21C. It's range of around 2000 km would perfectly cover the areas where future conflict is likely to be fought. Its range also would cover most of the areas that China's OTH-B radar would cover. It is also large enough to carry a large warhead needed to inflict damage on carrier while also holding a more complex guidance/seeker. They have put a MaRV warhead on DF-21 for maneuverability. In order to improve the penetration capability, they have added a third stage to it to provide unpredictable movement (I think the blog described it as some kind of oscillation). They have apparently made modifications to the warhead in order to lower its radar signature. They have also added a new multi-mode seeker that apparently has an active, passive radar and infrared seeker (I'm not sure how that works). It didn't mention how the missile would counter ESM of the fleet except for improving the seeker and getting more updated info from the sources that provided it initial targeting data.

4. What are the sources that provide targeting data for this ASBM system?
The blog basically listed 5 sources and they are:

• Reconnaissance Satellites - I think you can look at the Ziyuan and Yaogan series of satellites that have EO, CCD and SAR sensors as possibilities here. They could also be talking about the FY series, which is actually expected to be a constellation of Earth Observation satellites. I think it's important that in the 18th Committee on Earth Observation Satellites plenary and workshop in 2004, they announced they would launch over 100 Earth Observation satellites. I don't know enough about this to comment on which specific satellites I think will be used for scanning ships, but the blog did mention that China has used FY-2 series of satellites to track movement of targets. Another possibility is launching many short duration, micro-Earth Observation satellites in times of conflict. It mentioned that China can launch a 100 kg satellite on 12 hours notice. In peace mission 05. They launched an experimental satellite on August 2nd for detection/science experiment work. This operated for 27 days and returned to earth on August 29th after the conclusion of the exercise.
• Elint satellites - It mentioned something like USN's White Cloud Spaceborne ELINT System. The problem I have with this is that I can't find any mention of China having similar system anywhere.
  
• OTH Radar - Has a range of 800 to 3000 km. The accuracy in targetting is around 20 to 30 km. This can be improved to 2 to 3 km with improved algorithm. OTH radar can work with the recon satellites to provide more accurate targeting info.
  
• UAV - As mentioned above, China does have a robust UAV program going right now including the aforementioned XiangLong program. As we've seen in the Zhuhai airshow, they have numerous HALE and MALE UAV projects going. The major problem currently with Chinese UAV programs is that they simply don't have many small turbojet/turbofan engine series. As a result of having to work with what they have, the major design institute in AVIC-1 can't come up with the most optimal UAVs. I think that this will change in the next 10 years, so this part of the targeting system is behind recon satellites and OTH radar.
  
• Radio post - This is problem the most confusing one for me. The blog talked about working with elint satellites (which I don't think they have) to get the location of the carrier group through communications between ships and satellites/aerial assets.
  

5. How does the launching/attacking process work?
I think that in times of war, they would launch many micro-EO satellites that have short duration to increase reconnaissance in the area approaching Taiwan. Similar to US, they would have HALE UAVs to do advanced scouting in front of the war zone. The OTH radar will give the base initial idea of incoming fleet. This information would be combined with data of the recon satellites to provide a more precise and more accurate targeting data. The missile would be launched to the estimated position based on initial position + velocity, but this would obviously be off. Although, I think the movement of the carrier group will not be overwhelming. If the target is 2000 km away and the missile is traveling at mach 10 (343 * 3.6 * 10 = 10,000+ km/h) , it would get there in less than 12 minutes. During that time, if the fleet moves at 30 knots, it would move at most 6 knots or around 11 km from the original location. Still, if we add this to the initial precision problems of OTH radar + EO satellite, this could still cause the fleet to be outside the scanning area of the ASBM. In the cruising process, the missile would have to continuously communicate with the base through those new Data relay satellites (like TianLian-1 that they launched recently) to get more improve the precision. The ASBM will also likely veer off the path at this time, so it would need communication with Beidou-2 constellation in order to keep it on track. When it gets close to the target, the blog talked about 3 phases in its attack: high altitude guidance, high altitude gliding and low altitude guidance. I'm really not sure how accurate is the blog's description of the process. Its general theme is slowing down the speed of the missile as it gets closer to the target to maybe give the seeker more time to lock on to target and make unpredictable movements to penetrate defense.

6. What is the operational status of this system?
From all the past sources I've read, it seems like PLAN already considers this system to have achieved IOC. Normally, I don't read about a certain capability developed in a Chinese military magazine until after it is attained. From reading through different sources, it looks like IOC was probably in 2007 or 2008. As mentioned before, more elements in the system like UAV and satellites are getting added as time goes on, so I look at this as a continuously evolutionary process.

7. How beneficial is this system?
That I really would have no idea. I wouldn't even know how much damage would 1 missile cause on a carrier. I would think that if this system can even temporarily put one carrier out of commission and/or keep carrier groups further out from the mainland, it would've achieved its purpose.

8. Are there other launch platforms to this system?
I always thought that an-air launched version of ASBM from JH-7A is possible. There are certainly a large variety of short range ballistic missiles that JH-7A would be able to carry and provide updates for. I have not thought about launching ASBM from a SSBN, since that could easily be mistaken for a nuclear missile.

That's about it. I think a lot of resources on this are available to form an opinion.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64) (CTF-151
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)


Boxer Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Boxer (LHD 4) (CTF-151)
USS New Orleans (LPD 18)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57) (CTF-151)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) (7th Fleet)
USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
SPS Victoria (F 82)
FGS Emden (F210) (SNMG1)
Commandante Bettica (P492)
FGS Spessart (A1442)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 1

NRP Alvares Cabral (F331)
USS Halyburton (FFG 40)
SPS Blas de Lezo (F103)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (F802)
HMCS Winnipeg (FFH 338)


Combined Task Force 150

FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
PNS Khaibar (F183)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)


Combined Task Force 151

See USS Boxer above
See USS Gettysburg above
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
HDMS Absalon (L16)
TCG Giresun (F 491) (CTF-151)
HMS Portland (F79) (CTF-151)

In Theater

Ocean 6
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)
JS Ariake (DD 109)
JS Towada (AOE 422)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)

CDR Weatherly, I am ready to be relieved.

There is a topic I will rarely be able to write about, but it is a topic I very much enjoy reading about. Whether a ship runs aground off Hawaii, or a squadron is approached by unknown small boats half way around the world, the passionate attachment between a Naval officer and the role of Command at Sea is a unique bond in the Navy. As I have been in Washington DC this week, it is a topic when brought up will usually trigger a very passionate response among the many dozen retired officers I have had a chance to exchange ideas with this week. As this is a topic I will never attempt to discuss in any depth on the blog, I take every chance I get to raise the discussion from the point of view from officers I have become friends with.

Today, one such officer, Michael Junge of the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), gave the following speech as part of his change of command ceremony. This speech captures the emotional attachment between Commanding Officers, crews, and ships that has been articulated to me many times in emails and other communications received from the men and women, active and retired, who pour their heart into the responsibility and duty integrated into the privilege of Commanding one of our nations great naval ships.

Commodore, thank you for your kind words. I’ve spent months thinking about writing, and giving, this speech. But, unlike the one I wrote and gave almost two years ago - which I wrote with relish and excitement - this one I postponed and postponed, only writing the first words three weeks ago. As a result, I fully expect this to be as disjointed, fragmented, and confused as my thoughts and emotions are today.

I remember standing on the flight deck 20 months ago with Captain Pete Fanta and my predecessor, Erik Ross, and making jokes about how when taking command this ceremony is just like getting married. As a groom all you do is show up, say the right words at the right time, do what you are told.
Well…relinquishing command, in turn, is akin to being the father of the bride and giving someone you love away to a complete and utter stranger, but having all the trust and confidence that he will do everything to take care of your girl.

Like all analogies, that one falls apart if you dig to far…but I can unreservedly say that I have loved this job…for all it’s faults, problems, challenges, and infuriating times I loved it. From my first day underway with a conning officer who was, I later learned, conning the ship for the very first time…to my last night sleeping on the barge instead of in my all too familiar cabin.

Despite, or perhaps because of, what Paulette and I came to call “The Drama” I have grown, and learned, and had some amazing epiphanies, and also made some incredible mistakes. I thanked the crew yesterday for their support in a challenging tour…but want to mention a few things along the way about the crew whose command I relinquish today.

In the 602 days since I took command, this ship was out of homeport for over 320 of them with 90% of those days underway, at sea.

The most underway ship in the Atlantic Fleet for most of that tour.

With a crew who had already deployed for six of the twelve months before I took command.

The days of “where are the carriers” has definitely been replaced with “where are the amphibs” and this amphib was there, and there, and there over and over again.

One spectacular underway replenishment of a merchant vessel.

Two beer days.

Three times reporting that we were out of fresh fruits and vegetables.

Four amazing summer port calls that many other ships and crews only dream of.

Five ships freed from Somali pirates.

10 rounds in defense of the ship.

Operations with any special operations unit you can name. This crew did superb things, in difficult conditions and they deserve my thanks, my gratitude, and the gratitude of a Nation who will never fully understand what they did and how they fit into our continued freedom. And that’s OK…because if we are doing our jobs right, then no one ever remembers us.

This crew is an amazing collection of people and a study in contradictions. For all of our successes and challenges, the one thing I will always remember is that everyone who walked onboard this ship and spent more than 30 seconds with a member of this crew came away knowing that these Sailors are proud of what they do, proud of the United States Navy, and proud of USS Whidbey Island.

There are a few people I want to thank from outside the lifelines. First of all, Captain Pete Fanta, who was my first commodore and could not be here today. He let me command from the very first day. There are still squadron commodores out there who reach inside the lifelines and make decisions for those commanding officers. Captain Fanta was not one of them and he let me do my thing - even letting me make mistakes and sometimes taking the heat for me so that I could learn what to do, what not to do, and be a better Captain.

Commodore Lineberry - though only working for you for a short time thank you as well for letting us do our thing our way as we moved from the operational phase into what you see around us. You have a great staff that have been nothing but professional and helpful and I wish you the best as you deploy South on one of the most important missions our Navy does today.

Commodore Craig Kleint and Captain Michael Hill and the rest of the LSD LPD Class Squadron staff. They have done amazing work documenting the well intentioned mistakes Navy has made towards LSDs and helping provide solutions to correct those errors. It’s an almost thankless job - but valuable and slowly being recognized for how important it is.

I’d like to thank CDR George Bain, who also could not be here. In a dark time last November he lent his wit, his experience, and his support when I and the crew really needed it. His death in January was a tremendous blow to all of us and he leaves behind a world that was the better for us having known him.
Metro Machine - John Stremm, Rod Douglas, Bob Wallace and an amazing team working behind, above and around us on this massive ship who let us take a short pause for this ceremony.

Command Master Chief Kevin Morgan and his wife Anne - bedrock support and sage advice. Master Chief - Even though BMC has done a great job and we transferred you to ACU2 for all the right reasons, I have missed talking to you every day since you left.

Chaplain Charles Luff. He carried peppermint lifesavers with him everywhere he went and was an inspiration to everyone on our deployment.
Our Scan Eagle detachment - four slimy contractors and four IA’d Sailors who helped us make history.

LCDR Dave Zielinski and LCDR Tony Duttera - the face of Amphibious Squadron TWO. Both class acts and officers I hope to serve with again.

When a blogger who has never served a day at sea questioned my ability to command a number acquaintances, but mostly strangers, rapidly defended me. Boston Maggie, Neptunus Lex, Galrahn, Commander Salamander, Eagle1, Sailor Bob, Georgia Girl, MustangLT and a whole host of others - thank you all and I am grateful that a messy drama like that brought so many new and valuable friends into my life.

Christina Wray and Penney Soboski - two amazing women who balanced busy homelives with demanding jobs as Whidbey Island’s ombudsmen. Thank you for everything you did behind the scenes to take care of the families we left ashore when we were at sea. Without you, your dedication, and your care this job would have been far more challenging.

BMC Garrett - thanks for stepping in as Command Master Chief and I hope to see your name on the Senior Chief list.

XO, thanks for getting the difference between “at, near, and about”. I wish you, Julie, and your ever growing family the best as you finish this tour and move on to your future.

Mom - thanks for spending time with the girls while I was gone. It will take some getting used to with you visiting a little bit less now with me home and Saylor in Annapolis.

Finally, Paulette, Ella and Eva. I have missed you these past two years more than you will ever know. And I know you missed having me at home. As we discussed over and over again, we made the decision to geo-bach this tour for all the right reasons. It still sucked. While I am saddened to be leaving command, that sadness is eclipsed - completely and wholly - by the joy I have that I will once again be home with you three (and Lenny, Jane, and Goldie) each and every night - not just a few weekends each month.

Kirk - congratulations on coming to command. You are the absolutely right person for this job and I could not think of a better person to be turning command over to. I envy you being able to take Whidbey Island, put her together and take her back to sea again.

Eighteen years ago this month I reported to my first ship. Sixteen years ago this month I qualified surface warfare officer. Fifteen years ago - almost to the day - I left that first ship. At least one shipmate from that time is here today, as are a number of others who helped me along the way. It has been a winding, challenging, interesting road to get here and I am curious to see what comes next.

In closing…I want to leave you with the New Years greeting one of my favorite authors used this past year:

May your coming year be filled with magic and dreams and good madness. I hope you read some fine books and kiss someone who thinks you're wonderful, and don't forget to make some art -- write or draw or build or sing or live as only you can. And I hope, somewhere in the next year, you surprise yourself.

CDR Junge, thank you for the mention. As a blogger who has never served a day at sea I want to thank you for sharing this with the readers of Information Dissemination. We wish you success for your new assignment, and hope that you continue to remain a reader within this community as obligations allow. The USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) and her crew has statistically, spent more days at sea than almost any other Atlantic fleet ship. That metric is not, as some would assume, a reflection of technology.

That is a statistic that reflects the skill and professionalism of the officers and crew.

Submission: Working Paper on HNLMS Evertsen

From a long time blog reader overseas. All comments in red were his notes, and I have ultimately decided not to try to shape this article, rather post as received for review.

This is a Working Paper (the first actually) from the Maritime Doctrine and Tactics Centre first published in November 2008. It took me until now to get a copy, because it was much more popular than the MoD expected. Though it isn’t available online the Paper explicitly states that “working papers are based on not-classified information and are meant for the maritime community (military and civil) in the broadest meaning of the word”. That must be true, since I’m a civilian like you and my interest is purely personal and they have sent me it after I requested the Paper.

He provides the following translation for discussion.

Food for life
Working Papers are works in progress about interesting maritime subjects, but are not mature enough to become a doctrine already. They are, by definition, not ‘finished’ products and incomplete. They are also an open invitation to you, the reader, to give comments and discuss the subject with us. (e-mail of the writer is supplied)

This Paper is about the support from HNLMS Evertsen for the World Food Programme (WFP).

Capabilities
HNLMS Evertsen is an LCF class frigate and optimised for operations in the highest spectrum of warfare at sea. The ship can engage with combattants in ASUW, AAW and ASW simultaneously. Crew, armament and internal organization are geared towards these tasks. Total reach of sensors and weaponry is between 2-80 seamiles.

They had a mandate to stop a pirate attack towards any ship with minimal violence. (It means that if push came to shove they had a mandate to sink any pirate vessel attacking any other vessel, not just WFP ships) They were also allowed to operate in Somalian territorial waters.

Pirates and (maritime) pirates use small caliber guns (including RPG’s) and small but fast vessels.

Conclusion is that the standard configuration of sensors and weaponry is not suited for the most likely dangers.

Force Protection (FP)
A team of the Unit Intervention Mariners (UIM) was place aboard, they specialize in anti-terror operations and are capable of opposed boardings.
They were put on the vessel that was being escorted, together with the standard ‘guard’ team from the Evertsen.
The FP-team was put on board of the vessel by fast roping from a helicopter, because:

• fast
• good training
• show of might towards crew and possible pirates

Combination of land tactics and maritime tactics
The crews of the Evertsen and the FP-team were able to integrate specific land and maritime tactics. The FP-team on board the escorted vessel secured it with a Patrol Harbor routine, with observation posts around (on the edges of) the ship. It was being treated as a floating island. The gunmen on board the Evertsen use the principles of the Close Quarter Battle. The fusion of both tactics was a complete success. Having the UIM to follow and see in action, took the normal crew to a higher level.

Logistics
An out of area operation with limited support and a high degree of uncertainty about next departures and arrivals. Food had to be bought at the spot, because standard (the usual) suppliers didn’t deliver in Africa. This was very expensive. The delivery of a water treatment installation was also impossible.

And because of the sudden deployment the crew had to provide for certain ballistic protection themselves for the .50 shooting positions, so they bought steel plates, sand and sand-bags.
It might be wise to upgrade the onboard medical facilities to “role 2” for such mission. The accessibility of these is measured in days.

Does it have to be a frigate?
Isn’t an LCF (Zeven Provincien Class is “ Luchtverdigings en CommandoFregat” in Dutch) overkill (“overdimensioned” would be a more literal translation of the Dutch word used)?
The LCF isn’t overdimensioned for this mission, it’s just not dimensioned for it. Overdimensioned would imply it would be suited for the mission if some capabilities would be scrapped. That is not true. Sensors and weapon systems have restrictions at short range. Therefore they had to improvise with watchposts and shooters on board.
Kan a minehunter do the job? No, it’s too slow, doesn’t have enough crew, has too little fuel. It has too little durability for the job.
But it can be an AOR or a LPD. And although the mission underlines the business case for the OPV’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Dutch_Navy_offshore_patrol_vessels it has a ridiculous sensor suite for a ship without any ASUW or AAW duties with sensors that have a range of up to 140 seamiles, but the suite also has specific elements for irregular warfare, such as small boar attacks and swimmers, which is good but they are €31,5 million a piece) the mission also shows that the other large (big?) surface combatants (ships) must be adapted to do these types of mission.

Conclusion
Enhance the abilities for self-protection:

• make structural firing positions for small calibre weapons that guarantee self protection for 360 degrees
• get enough ballistic protection for these positions
• make sure that all boardshooters (the dedicated shooters on board) can operate from all firing positions (so no designated positions for shooters)
• enhance the shooting capabilities (how well they can hit their targets) of the complete crew with small caliber weapons
• get a system for moving targets, to practice firing exercises at sea
• Develop a scenario for the simulator so the board shooters can be trained in nearby-ship-security and can practice the ROE’s

Professionalize boarding teams even more:

• provide a basic training for the normal ‘guard’teams members of ships. Let the Unit Interventie Mariniers provide this training
• Use the NMIOTC in Krete

Log/Med recon:

• do a logistical and medical recon before such a deployment

Interesting I think.

HASC Hearing Too

I too attended the HASC subcommittee hearing this morning with Galrahn.  Unfortunately for me, I was unable to attend the part which is always much more informative - the schmooze and beer bull sessions afterwards.  I look forward to reading his reportage on what he and other highly informed folk had to say outside the hearing.

I was struck by a couple of points that were made and a general trend.  The general trend of questioning and testimony was at what I might call a 'functional' level.  There was very little grand strategy involved.  Despite Dr. Barnett's attempt to introduce general strategic pictures and point out the need for specific choices to be made at that level in his opening testimony, the discussion centered mostly on particular programs, particular concerns about acquisitions and the like.   This is not meant as an indictment of the process; the members present were serving both their committee and their constituents' interests throughout.  However, while everyone seemed to wholeheartedly agree that 'hard choices' would need to be made, and 'hard decisions' taken, very few of the participants struck me as concentrating their thinking at that particular level of the discussion.

For example, the size of the fleet was brought up several times.  Mr. O'Rourke did (in my estimation) a stellar job of presenting factual data to the committee, as his brief with CRS directs.  I look forward to reading those parts of his testimony that the committee chose to enter directly to the record in order to conserve time.  However, that data is being collected to be used - and in my opinion, should be used - to support strategic choice decisionmaking before the dickering over budget levels and program sizes or status begin.  Again, to flagellate a deceased equine - what are we trying to do?  Why are we trying to do it?  How do we intend to achieve it?  Nearly all of the discussion I heard this morning centered on the third question.  When it did stray towards the 'what' it tended to do so strictly as a risk and/or budget tradeoff question - more on this in a bit.

Dr. Barnett presented a fairly clear strategic point of view.  Although it was not as fleshed out as his books are, or as I would like to have heard (obviously) he identified a threat environment - the periphery, failed and weak states, and the access points from blue-water to the littorals - as a basis for his recommendations.  Dr. Thompson and Adm. Houly, on the other hand, seemed intent on concentrating on the 'threat' of a smaller fleet size.  When pressed on the current downward trends of that fleet size, Dr. Thompson stated that this process supported his preference for a 'multi-mission capable' fleet.

He did not, in my opinion, address the natural conflict between 'multi-mission capable ships' and the entire reason the fleet is shrinking - more expensive platforms built in smaller numbers.  He and Adm. Houly did address the need for a 'high/low' mix, but mostly by namechecking it - there was little 'meat' in their discussion of what such a 'high/low' force would look like, what it would do, and how much it would cost.

I should step back here and state that I am no doubt asking far too much of a 105-minute Congressional hearing.  I should think that the requests for further information and requests for private discussions that several of the members made to the witnesses will bear much more fruit in terms of deeper discussion - and I regret that I won't be able to be a fly on those walls.

There were two specific issues that came up which struck me.  At one point, Adm. Houly (I believe) was describing the LCS program as a program intended to address the fact that the current Fleet is not well structured to accept risk, and that engineering risk out was the driving paradigm.  This, in turn, results in pressure for requirements creep and overengineering.  He mentioned that the LCS program was deliberately intended to force the Navy to accept a greater deal of operational risk in order to break the logjam of increasing requirements and shrinking numbers.

At that point, the Chairman (Mr. Taylor, D-MS) sharply pointed out that from the notion of 'accepting risk' to the notion of 'disposable ships' and thence 'disposable crews' was too short a distance for his taste, and that as a Congressman and a parent he was flatly against those notions.

The problem is that there are many, many kinds of risk.   There are strategic and budgetary risks in the acquisition process.  There is tactical or operational risk to a particular unit.  There is tactical or operational risk to a plan.  In this case, I do believe that Adm. Houly and Chairman Taylor were discussing the same type of risk - the acceptance, by the Navy, that the LCS ship would be forced to go in harm's way in order to perform its missions without the same panoply of defensive and interdiction measures available to the 'high' end of the fleet.

This, no doubt, was what sparked the Chairman's response.

The problem is that we are (in my view) at a point where the strategic risks we face are growing in direct response to the attempted reduction in operational unit risk and acquisition risk.  Put simply, as many others have done before me, we're at the point where our preferences for risk are one of the primary drivers of the cost, complexity and consequently the low numbers of available platforms.  The conflict that produces is that while attempting to lower the risk to individual units, we are increasing the risk of being unable to achieve our strategic objectives (if we even know what those are) and, in fact, are seeing a lowering of the likelihood that we would be able to achieve operational goals for these platforms.  It was brought up that we don't yet have an operational concept for the LCS, and that calling the program a failure before we have a chance to develop one is foolish savings.   If the LCS' operational concept is to provide a certain amount of coverage of the littoral battlespace (as a force), and increasing requirements for the individual units mean that we don't acquire enough units to provide that coverage, we risk being unable to perform that mission properly at all.

An Army colonel I knew once told me that as an officer, he couldn't think of his job as ensuring that his soldiers didn't die - because soldiers do die and only God could decide that.  He saw his job as ensuring that the fewest of his soldiers went into harm's way and risked death as possible - while ensuring that he achieved his mission goals.  Because if he failed to achieve his mission goals, any soldiers of his that had perished - or those from other units that would perish to do the job he failed to do - would be wasted sacrifice.

I'm not qualified to speak, myself, on combat command and the risk management thereof - I've never been a military officer, and have no experience with this critical form of decisionmaking.  But as an analyst, I am trained to look at systemic and strategic risk - and to point out that eventually the payoff curves for personal and strategic risk will cross.  As the former drops, the latter rises - and I think trends say that we're closing in on that point.

Again, this is in no way because our Armed Forces are not willing to make sacrifices to do their job.  Far from it.  It is because we are getting closer to asking them to do an impossible job with the assets we are giving them - and we need to either change how we get them those assets, or change the job we are asking them to do.

Whoop, gotta run.  More later when I have keyboard time.

HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Hearing

I attended the HASC hearing this morning discussing the requirements for the future capabilities of the United States maritime forces. As one who usually watches the video or listens to the audio, I was struck by how much one can miss when you aren't there. The reporters can start the discussion with their articles and I'll come back then, but a few things.

The opening statements were good. Dr. Loren Thompson impressed me. He is a serious expert on aviation issues, but has never really struck me as highly informed on naval issues. Today, he had a really good day. There were a few of those 'fireworks' moments where it looked to me like Dr. Thompson was trying to throw Dr. Barnett in under the bus, particularly when Dr. Barnett told some stories about the origins of LCS dating back to his time when he worked for Cebrowski. Interesting notes to come back to later on that.

Dr. Loren B. Thompson (pdf)
Chief Operating Officer
Lexington Institute

Rear Admiral William Houley, USN (ret) (pdf)

Mr. Ron O’Rourke (pdf)
Senior Naval Analyst
Congressional Research Service

Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett (pdf)
Senior Managing Director
Enterra Solutions, LLC

The star of the testimony, in my opinion, was RADM Houley who in my opinion can't write enough of his ideas down. I know a bunch of you sub guys read here, and I see the 10,001 submarine blogs, but for the most part you guys are all about what you can't say.

We need more submariners who WILL say what they are thinking, and RADM Houley did exactly that. It was refreshing because it almost sounded new, even though it wasn't actually new.

My favorite moment was during Thomas Barnett's opening statement, which I thought was really good. Dr. Barnett said something along the lines of "I want allies with million man armies and I want them to be ready to kill people," which is strategically exactly right.

Well, what the audio and video won't show is the reaction by Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree (D), who looked to me like she was about to either feint or have a heart attack when Barnett said that. It was a priceless moment of facial expressions as she struggled to cope with the idea he was expressing. Honestly, I'm still laughing writing about it here. It was only afterward I was reminded that she is co-sponsor in the creation of a new government organization.

The Department of Peace. But the irony is, her question was one of the best asked, at least I thought so. Too bad the panel never got a chance to weigh in due to time.

A lot more to come.

UNCLOS: The Coast Guard Weighs In

Admiral Thad Allen has posted some very interesting material on his blog, iCommandant. Last week, in testimony before the Alaska House State of Affairs Committee, RADM Gene Brooks, USCG provided precisely the sort of specific, targeted analysis that helps clarify the debate surrounding UNCLOS ratification. By way of background, Admiral Brooks directs Coast Guard activities involving Alaska and the northern Pacific, has commanded two cutters, and holds a law degree from William & Mary. His testimony is concise and worth reading in its entirety.

On Sunday, I asked whether the advantages of UNCLOS were worth losing the flexibility we currently enjoy under customary international law. RADM Brooks directly addresses that question. While he packs a good deal into his seven pages of testimony, a few main points jumped out at me:

1. Because the Convention codifies both extensive freedom of navigation for all, and expansive economic protections for coastal states, the U.S. - as a major coastal state - enjoys an excellent combination of economic advantages and military flexibility under UNCLOS. This combination is potentially better, and certainly easier to maintain, then what would be available under customary international law.

2. By establishing a 12-mile territorial limit, and allowing law enforcement activities and transit outside that area, UNCLOS limits the extent of “safe havens” for drug traffickers and other criminals. Moreover, this law-enforcement advantage is strengthened off our own coasts by an additional 12-mile zone where we may enforce our laws concerning customs, immigration, and the environment.

3. Since we are not a party to the multilateral UNCLOS, we must assert our rights through bilateral treaties and customary international law. While we doubtless have major advantages over other states in forming CIL and in negotiating with other nations, RADM Brooks believes we are severely handicapped in these negotiations because we have rejected UNCLOS. As he puts it: “the fact that the United States is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, when the overwhelming number of our international partners are parties, has occasionally put us in a difficult negotiating position” both in UN bodies and bilaterally. In other words, even if the U.S. decides to opt out of the UNCLOS regime, that decision will have unintended consequences impacting other relationships and institutions to which we have already committed. This is an interesting point: he uses the International Maritime Organization as an example, but there may be others.

RADM Brooks provides examples that show a law-enforcement emphasis: pollution controls, fisheries conservation, drug interdiction. But these tie back into what I see as his strongest argument: UNCLOS allows for a far more efficient maritime security environment by allowing us to work with others instead of shouldering the transaction costs of creating, defending, and administering our own system. Given the multiple challenges facing the sea services, and a world of limited resources, this is not an argument to be lightly pushed aside.

It may be better to settle for second-best rules and save the costs of enforcement (or direct those costs to specific questions such as, hypothetically, whether one may conduct surveillance activities in another state's exclusive economic zone). I don't share the Admiral's optimistic view of international bodies' decision making, with its block voting and biases, but this is a good start toward addressing the costs of locking ourselves into an imperfect system. And these arguments at least acknowledge that UNCLOS is not a panacea.

Letter to Secretary Gates on DDG-1000

The irony is, the Senators and Congressman are being factually correct in this letter, and the Navy would love people to beat up their elected officials for this. Indeed, the Navy's entire "stay silent" strategy has been to hope that by saying nothing good about the DDG-1000, Americans ignore that the Navy is breaking virtually every single rule of acquisition that would normally be put in place to protect taxpayer money. The Navy is counting on Americans, in particular bloggers who tend to favor sensationalism, to be ignorant to what the Navy is doing when in fact all budget numbers that have been released show the DDG-51 replacement program is at least the same cost as the DDG-1000 program being cut, assuming no cost overruns make it even more expensive.

March 20, 2024


The Honorable Robert C. Gates
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates

As you know, last year’s Department of Defense Appropriations Act provided partial funding for the third DDG-1000 and directed the Navy to budget for the remaining funding requirement in FY10. Congress expects the Navy to adhere to this direction; therefore, we write to urge your support for full funding of the DDG-1000 program in the FY10 President’s budget, and request that you continue a thorough and transparent review and evaluation of the Navy’s proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program and restart DDG-51 production.

We remain very concerned about the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan. Despite several months of Congressional and Department of Defense requests for further analysis, the Navy has yet to provide sufficient justification in support of the proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program and restart DDG-51 production. We continue to await an in-depth comparative analysis of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000. The Navy’s failure to provide such a detailed cost analysis strongly implies a lack of supporting documentation of the Navy’s position and undermines our confidence in the merits of the Navy’s plan to truncate the DDG-1000 program. Congress must have this information before acquiescing to a change of this magnitude.

Supporting the DDG-1000 program will enable the Navy to leverage $11 billion in already invested research and development funding. The ship has been designed with significant growth margins including power, cooling, space, and weight to enable rapid enhancements to meet evolving threats in the existing hull. We believe that continued production and delivery of DDG-1000 class destroyers is essential to the long-term stability of our shipbuilding program and the timely delivery of needed capabilities to the Navy.

With respect and appreciation, and thank you for considering this request.


Sincerely,


Edward M. Kennedy
Jack Reed
John F. Kerry
Sheldon Whitehouse
Nikki Tsongas
Patrick Kennedy
Michael Capuano
James McGovern
Michael Michaud
Paul Hodes
Richard Neal
James Langevin
Stephen Lynch

It is a quark that the only new shipbuilding program on cost and schedule is the DDG-1000. I still can't find anyone outside those directly involved in industry building the DDG-1000 who believes the program will actually stay on budget, anyone that is, except the Navy folks who testify in front of Congress under oath! You can't make this up...

I know it is unpopular to say, but if it was me, I'd build at least 4 DDG-1000s while moving with all haste into designing a brand new 10,000 ton future surface combatant (FSC) and a CG(X) intended to provide theater BMD.

I know, that choice sucks, but the sad reality is the shipbuilding plan is such a total disaster the DDG-1000 is the least painful way to support industry and transition towards a future plan. If you want to know who to blame, find the very top Admiral in the armed services and examine his record...

or simply ignore accountability, analysis, justification for decisions, and tell your political leaders to make defense decisions on a gut feeling, kind of like what the Navy is doing with the DDG-51. I'm sure in hindsight taxpayers will feel really good about those many billion dollar 'gut' decisions they advocate for in defense. Actually, the Navy is counting on exactly that.

The Navy Buys USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)

The Navy has purchased another Littoral Combat Ship, the USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). From the DoD Contract announcement today.

Lockheed Martin Corp., - Maritime Systems & Sensors, Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a contract for LCS FY09 Flight 0+ ship construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support. As this award represents Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time. LCS Class ships are networked, agile, and high-speed surface combatants with versatile warfighting capabilities optimized for littoral missions. LCS is optimized for flexibility in the littorals as a system of systems that are both manned and unmanned, and mission reconfigurable. LCS focuses on three primary mission areas: Littoral Surface Warfare operations emphasizing prosecution of small boats, Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare and Littoral Mine Countermeasures. LCS also possesses inherent capabilities to execute other missions such as: Joint Littoral Mobility; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint Special Operations Force support; Maritime Interdiction Operations; Homeland Defense; and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection. Work will be performed in Marinette, Wis. (63 percent); Moorestown, N.J. (12 percent); Washington, D.C., (11 percent); Clearwater, Fla., (4 percent); Baltimore, Md., (4 percent); Arlington, Va., (3 percent); Brunswick, Ga., (2 percent); and Eagan, Minn., (1 percent), and is expected to be completed by Dec. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-2303).

Note the actual cost is not released. Chris Cavas raises a few points in Navy Times.

The contract award announced March 23 uses funds appropriated in fiscal 2009, although the contract re-uses the hull number of the 2006 ship. Such a practice is unusual, in that the hull number is also considered an account identification number for bookkeeping purposes.

Revised acquisition costs for each of the first two ships have yet to be revealed by the Navy, and discussion of the new contract costs for LCS 3 and LCS 4 won’t be revealed until after the next round of contract awards, to be conducted for the fiscal 2010 ships, according to a Navy spokesman.

“The amounts will be released when the fiscal 2010 competition is over,” said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a spokesman for the Navy’s acquisition team.

The Navy plans to ask for three more LCS ships in the 2010 budget request, with two ships going to the competitor offering the best terms.

All the new LCS ships are referred to by the Navy as “Flight 0+” ships, with minor modifications over the initial, Flight 0, ships.

This really is creative contracting by the Navy. Apparently it is very easy for the Navy to avoid the cost discussion regarding the Littoral Combat Ship, they simply don't tell anyone how much it costs. I also note there is no mention whether this is a cost plus or fixed cost contract. With a phase II contract in the mix, I wonder if it matters?

Can someone fill me in. If both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics know they are going to build at least 2 ships, why do we expect cost savings on the third ship?

can we at least get an update by someone what a Flight 0+ Lockheed Martin LCS is? What are the changes?

Monday Reading

Dr. Martin Murphy specializes in maritime irregular warfare. His Summer 2007 Naval War College Review article Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, A Suitable Role for a Navy? (PDF) is probably one of the best articles regarding maritime irregular warfare written on the internet. Last week his new book was released called Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism. I haven't read it yet, but would love to hear from anyone that has. This book is #1 on my must read list, previously held by Thomas Ricks The Gamble which I should finish this week.

David Meerman Scott writes a blog called Web Ink Now. I have followed David Meerman Scott for as long as I can remember for my own professional purposes, but I was pleasantly surprised to see he had recently engaged with the US Air Force regarding their social media implementation. His comments are noteworthy:

I was impressed with how deeply the smart people at the Air Force have thought about social media and how quickly they have jumped in. I hope that people from all organizations, particularly executives in large corporations who are often fearful and dismissive of social media, can learn from Colonel Caldwell and the examples here.

There is tons of value in social media for the military services. I have one thing to add though. In my mind anyway, one would expect I am part of the target audience for the Air Force, primarily because I am interested in what they are doing. While I do follow the Air Force Live blog, it is updated so infrequently it doesn't rank very high in my 'must read' category. While the Air Force may know what they want out of social media, it is not clear to me they have fully developed a game plan to get what they want out of it. I also wonder who their target audience is, because it could be that it is not readers here, although that would seem very strange to me. Maybe it is just me, but PACAF Pixels is the most interesting Air Force blog right now. I'm picky though.

This essay titled US Multilateralism: G-2 Must Precede G-20 written by John Komkov at The Bellum: A Stanford Review Blog is a very interesting read. It easily could be the most interesting, thought provoking thing you read about the G-20 conference. Australian PM Kevin Rudd's comment is interesting.

Dr. Steven Metz has some observations from a recent Department of Defense symposium that discussed the future strategic environment twenty years out. In a Small Wars Journal update titled Trends, Threats, and Expectations he came to an interesting conclusion.

This led me to predict at the symposium that 20 years hence, the U.S. Army's role in promoting American security will decline precipitously.

My problem with Dr. Steven Metz's conclusion is that I don't believe he is getting the geography right. This is the core of what led him to his conclusion:

The Army's core function has always been to seize and control territory. That made sense during all of human history to this point since threats were geographic in essence. They arose from an identified place, and if we could control that place, we destroyed or minimized the threat. But if you buy the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security.

First, I don't buy into the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography even while I agree with him that enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere. Anywhere is still somewhere, and somewhere has geography. Clausewitz said "the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." Even if we are not seizing or controlling territory to hold it, we may seize and control territory to deny it from our enemy. This is not a radical change, but it is subtle. While I don't think Dr. Metz is off by much in his analysis, I do hope someone uses the QDR to rethink how we develop force structures, let me explain.

The New York Times reported last week that the Pentagon was rethinking old doctrine on the 2 war metric for force structure. Sounds good to me, I hate the 1-4-2-1 and 10-30-30 metrics, they never made sense and we never really built our military to support those metrics, as Iraq and Afghanistan have proven.

When I look at ground forces, I note the current Army plan is to have 70 combat brigade combat teams and 212 support brigade combat teams by 2013. The Marines will have about 7 total MEBs, and MEBs are much bigger than BCTs. We currently have 4 Airborne and 2 MEBs (at a time) that are forcible entry. 6 of around 77 of our combat brigades are forcible entry, and only 2 have heavy equipment. That is less than 8% of our total force ready to take action, and the ratio of heavy to light is 1:2.

For context, in WWII the US had 90 total divisions, 13 were Marines and 5 airborne. In other words, during WWII nearly 19% of the total US military force had forcible entry capability, and of that the heavy to light ratio was over 2:1.

I don't care if we have a one war standard, a two war standard, a long war standard, or a total war standard, the fact is, we have a 6 brigade standard for war without allies. In my opinion, that is where the QDR discussion begins for setting strategic expectations for the Army, because if we are going to deliver "well-directed blows" as part of our strategic defense, the Army needs to be more mobile than it is today.

Finally, Captain Cynthia Thebaud, USN, Commodore for Destroyer Squadron 60 aboard the USS Nashville did a bloggers roundtable recently regarding the African Partnership Station. The USNI Blog and David Axe both have good reading up regarding the Navy's activities off West Africa. David Axe is heading that way, so if you have a few dollars to spare, support independent journalism by donating to David Axe for his trip. He will probably be the only member of the media who covers the Navy's soft power engagement to Africa, meaning if you believe in more soft power for Africa, donate.

Photo Caption: PACIFIC OCEAN (March 17, 2024) An SH-60B helicopter stands by on the flight deck of the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) after making an emergency landing due to poor visibility. McCain is one of seven Arleigh Burke-class destroyers assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15 and is permanently forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Byron C. Linder/Released)

April Will Test the Success of the Somali Piracy Fight

With the arrival of Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE to the Horn of Africa region, the number of nations now actively fighting piracy off the coast of east Africa has reached its highest level of participation yet. The list of countries now includes the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Greece, India, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, China, and will soon include Russia, Japan, and South Korea.

In essence, that leaves only 6 nations of the top 20 global economic powers listed by GDP not currently involved in anti-piracy operations off Somalia. Australia has a ship deployed to the region, although Australia's naval presence is in the Persian Gulf supporting Iraqi interests. Of the top 20 economic powers, only Brazil, Mexico, Belgium, and Indonesia have yet to commit a naval vessel to the Somali theater, but with Indonesia successfully conducting anti-piracy operations in the Straits of Malacca, not to mention helping when they can off Somalia, their full time presence is not justified for Somalia. Belgium is expected to contribute to the EU Atalanta deployment later this year, leaving only Brazil and Mexico among major economic powers to sit out the international effort among the top 20 economic nations based on GDP. With 18 of the worlds 20 top nations by GDP committed, representation of international commitment is 90%.

Using the 19 nations that make up the G-2o, only Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa have not committed any ships to the Somali piracy issue. The EU makes up the 20th member of the G-20, so with their commitment it can be noted 75% of the G-20 has committed to the anti-piracy effort.

What the statistics highlight is a rare unified international political commitment against piracy, and there are more than 2 dozen warships active in one of the various international and unilateral efforts active towards the protection of commercial shipping to prove the commitment is real. Despite this rather extraordinary political and military commitment, it should be noted that pirates are still enjoying tactical success at sea. With the 4th hijacking of a commercial ship this year occurring earlier this week, piracy in the region is still very high and despite the massive number of international warships patrolling the seas, hijackings are double in 2009 compared to the same point last year. Like all statistics, this one doesn't tell the full story.

In the first quarter of 2008 there were 13 incidents but only 2 hijackings by Somalia pirates. So far in the first quarter of 2009, there have been 33 pirate incidents off Somalia, but only 4 hijackings. This weekend an Indian ship was hijacked, then released 8 hours later. Earlier this week the Turkish Navy protected one of their ships from attack. The US Navy reported an incident this week of two attacks, one against the Bison Express and the other against the MV Sea Green, resulting in the capture of 6 pirates. The pirates were later released due to lack of evidence. I'm not even counting the hijacking of an Iranian dhow reportedly illegally fishing in Somali waters. There are 8 more days left in Q1 of 2009, if 6 attacks occur the number of piracy incidents will be up 3x higher than last year, despite the greater naval presence, and assuming no more hijackings this quarter the total will still be double over last year during the same quarter.

What makes this particularly interesting is that Q1 is historically low number of attacks due to bad weather, and this year there have been plenty of high seas to match the bad weather condition, but it has not stopped the number of incidents increasing.

As we approach April it is important to keep in mind that this is when the sea conditions have historically improved, and the number of pirate incidents has gone up. In 2007 for example, there were only 6 incidents in all of Q1, but there were 4 in April of 2007, one a successful hijacking. In Q1 of 2008 there were 13 pirate incidents as previously mentioned, but in April of 2008 there were 21 incidents for the month, 2 of which were successful hijackings. In other words, next month historical trends suggest that pirate activity off the coast of Somalia will increase substantially if they follow historical trends.

That suggests that next month we will find out to what extent the enormous coalition of naval forces is having an impact on piracy off the Horn of Africa. With good luck, the courts in Kenya will be very busy.

This is why NATO intends SNMG 1 to spend most of the month fighting pirates. The planning for number of warships involved in the security operations is developed using historical trends.

Approaching the waterline in Mexico

Many recent reports would lead you to believe that the Mexican government is about to collapse. Yes, the violence along the border has been staggering, but the idea that Felipe Calderon is on the verge of losing control couldn't be farther from the truth. In fact, the opposite is true. Calderon is squeezing the cartels to the point where they have begun fighting each other for increasingly limited turf and the government is feeling the backlash.

It's important to note that the violence does not represent the cartels' death throes, especially since corruption isn't going to disappear overnight in a country as poor as Mexico. The more apt comparison would be to a cornered animal.

There has been a surge of arms heading south across the border. Interception of heavy-caliber automatic weapons is becoming common. Even shipments of grenades and rocket launchers are popping up. With both sides pushing and neither willing to cede, bloodshed is only going to increase. As places like Juarez look more like Anbar than a depressed border town, the shadow of terrorism is already appearing. From The Hill:

Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), whose district borders Mexico, said that while the situation is bad, it could easily get worse.

“The goal of the cartels is to make money,” said Cuellar, who sits on the House Homeland Security committee. “If they can smuggle in drugs and human cargo, then certainly they can smuggle other things in, other devices to cause us harm.”

Before the cartels were being pinched, talk like this could be attributed to fear-mongering. Today it looks like a credible concern. All of this has implications for the maritime threat environment that is conspicuously missing from the current discussion.

With so much pressure on land routes, the arms, human and narco-traffickers are inevitably going to try and exploit sea routes on both coasts. These routes create tangled international considerations that are not present in the conflict as it stands now. Sea-based trafficking is traditionally the forte of the Columbian cartels. Who will control this space as traffic spills over? The Columbians could look to increase their margin and at the same time be less reliant on a perilous Mexican environment by smuggling the goods on their own. Conversely, Mexican cartels might not tolerate being pushed out of the cocaine game and assert themselves in a place and manner never necessary before.

Far from the margins is FARC, a dangerous Columbian revolutionary organization that has been around since the 60s. FARC has known ties to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Castros in Cuba, Basque separatists in Spain as well as the Mexican cartels.

There’s no way to know how this will all play out or how many of these factors will come to bear. At a minimum, we can assume enforcement efforts on land will push the traffic into the water. Both the Navy and Coast Guard should be ready to deal with this surge alongside the Mexican navy. I’m positive plans are in the offing, but part of those plans should involve a large deterrent show-of-force similar to what took place during the Haitian rebellion in 2004.

The U.S. feared a mass exodus of migrants taking to the sea during the protests before Aristide was deposed. A slew of Coast Guard cutters were ordered there and formed a ring around Haiti’s half of Hispaniola. Well within sight of the coast, the presence deterred any attempt at mass migration.

If a similar tactic is taken in the Mexican border situation, the sooner it happens, the more effective it will be. The cartels are likely planning for an increase in maritime trafficking. It will take some time to build-out their fleet of vessels, more if they lean towards semi-submersibles, less if they opt for the traditional go-fast, cigarette boat type. The farther they go down either road, the more committed they’ll be to the maritime approach, and less likely to reconsider this option.

If the cutters had not arrived in Haiti until after an exodus had begun, it would have been an unmanageable situation with Haitians and yolas everywhere, many in distress. Stopping or aiding those already at sea would have limited their ability to slow the tide. In the same way, if the cartels pass the point of no return in preparing for increased waterborne trafficking the effectiveness of deterrence will be almost nil. At that point we’ll already be on our heels and responding to their moves.

If, on the other hand, we can muster a hefty show-of-force soon enough, we may be able to keep the war on these cartels contained within confines that we determine. It will also remain a trilateral engagement with the Mexicans, the cartels and us, avoiding the complications of interdiction at sea, like waiting days for SNOs or DOJ evidential requirements.

In our favor, the mechanisms for a formidable show-of-force are already in place. JIATF is a strong and diverse body. Diplomatic and naval arrangements with Mexico are very strong especially with the recently ratified Merida Initiative in place.

The time to engage is now before the floodgates are opened.

Interloper among you

Hi everyone. I'm the newest new contributor at ID. I'm really excited to be a part of the discussion that goes on at this site. Since I first stumbled upon ID I've been thoroughly impressed with the strategic focus of commentary here.

I join you as an interloper of sorts since I am a member of the Coast Guard, an E-5 public affairs specialist to be exact. Since, in some instances, I act as a spokesperson for the service I think it's necessary to explicitly state that my contributions here are my opinions and mine alone. If you have any questions about this you can read my profile blurb, the story I wrote here, read about the policy on Coastie bloggers, or you can just email me. I'm more than happy to have that discussion.

With that said, I love to write and I have plenty of opinions so I think ID is a good fit. I hope you find my topics interesting and if you want to know something about the Coast Guard just ask. If I don't know the answer I'll know how to get it.

One last item...if you have jokes about the superior service I chose to join, please feel free to let loose, pile on and get them out of your system.

Cheers!

Dan Bender, PPP (proud puddle pirate)

Some Thoughts on UNCLOS and Customary International Law

Last Monday, the Boston Globe published an editorial supporting ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The authors, CAPT Melissa Bert of the Coast Guard and Mark Schlakman, had fantastic timing: UNCLOS has been very much in the news. In August, 2007, Russia placed its national flag on the seabed near the North Pole, setting off feverish discussions concerning sovereignty and transit rights in the Arctic. And, of course, China made UNCLOS the centerpiece of its complaints concerning activities recently conducted by the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea.

The United States has not ratified the Convention, although we are a signatory. Consequently, international law requires that we not act so as to "defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty. But, subject to that broad and largely unenforceable prohibition (found, appropriately, in yet another treaty that we have signed but not ratified), the U.S. is free to act independently in maritime matters, subject to customary international law (CIL) and our other bilateral and regional treaty commitments.

Given that context, the editorial makes one point that got me thinking:

"In the absence of [the Treaty’s] legal framework, history is replete with examples of rogue nations unduly restricting maritime access and encroaching upon others’ interests, potentially compromising military operations, disrupting commerce, and flouting accountability for environmental degradation.

"So far, 156 countries and the European Community have ratified the treaty. Some critics assert that there is no compelling reason for the United States to ratify the treaty because it already adheres to its provisions under customary international law. But this approach is fraught with peril. Customary international law is constantly evolving and does not offer the stability and predictability afforded by the convention.”

This strikes me as essentially correct, but for one detail: the United States, and not a rogue nation, is the entity most capable of influencing this "constantly evolving" field of the law. It simply isn't clear that, for the U.S., stability and predictability come without costs. Let me explain.

There's been some discussion of CIL in the comments, but it's probably helpful to describe what it is and how it's created. Essentially (and leaving out the Latin), all international law is grounded in state consent. Sometimes states accept a new rule by ratifying a treaty; sometimes they "accept" the rule by consistently acting as though they (1) believe a rule exists that is (2) legally binding. Furthermore, once the international community, taken as a whole, creates a norm of customary law, that rule becomes binding on all states, not merely those whose behavior proves the rule. So if states started consistently acting as though surveillance were prohibited in other countries' exclusive economic zones, eventually a rule of law would develop prohibiting such surveillance. And that rule would be binding on everyone. Deciding what is and is not a norm of customary international law is a tricky, fact-intensive business susceptible to manipulation. It's also a good deal of what legal academics and judges on international courts do for a living. But, clearly, the states in a position to act (read: those with a maritime presence) are those whose behavior will be most influential in shaping new and existing norms.

Moreover, there's an exception to this process: if any particular state consistently acts in contravention of an emerging customary rule, it may become a "persistent objector" to whom the new rule, once established, will not apply. But remaining a persistent objector is expensive, especially at sea. One needs to regularly do all the things other states cannot or will not do: transit disputed straights, engage in disputed testing, conduct surveillance where other states are unwilling to do so. One central advantage of U.S. sea power is our ability to carry this burden and effectively assert our rights as a persistent objector. Indeed, we may be alone in this capability.

Captain Bert and Mr. Schlakman make several arguments about the content of the treaty. But, those points aside (and they are important points), one clear result of our joining the treaty would be an end to this flexibility we enjoy under customary international law. In addition, no treaty is comprehensive: there are always interpretive questions. Under UNCLOS, those questions will be decided by international bodies where we have a voice, instead of by custom, where we have a veto.

I understand and respect the impulse to discuss UNCLOS as a set of rules, and debate whether those rules do or do not make sense. That’s an extremely important discussion. But signing on to any set of rules comes with a price. In this case, the price is precisely that we would no longer be governed by customary international law, and would lose something of our interpretive veto. This price may very well be worthwhile, but we should at least look it squarely in the face. Whether lost flexibility is a fair price for stability and a “place at the table” is a fact-specific question, and has important strategic ramifications. I’d be curious to hear the views of experts. But the trade-off itself is too often missed.

Looking at China's recent behavior, I can’t help thinking that other present and future maritime powers may be nudging us toward joining the UNCLOS regime not because of the treaty’s actual content, but merely to pin us down to some concrete and comprehensive set of rules, rather than allowing us to, in essence, create our own.