Carafano on the Declining Defense Industrial Base

Took a little vacation last week, sorry for dropping off the face of the earth. Back to work now....

Here's a little ditty from James Carafano at Heritage. Though I think he's a bit melodramatic, his basic point seems beyond question. We are indeed mortgaging the future force in order to carry out current operations--and if the defense base shrinks much more, we run the risk of losing critical capacity and capability.

Bryan McGrath

Dropping the Carrier Requirement to 10, 9, and Potentially 8

The big Navy news over the past week was the rumor, as reported by DoDBuzz, that the Navy is evaluating a further reduction of aircraft carriers to nine. This is how DoD Buzz reported the story.

File this one under QDR rumors, although senior OSD officials thought about cutting a carrier from the very beginning of the QDR. Now, sources tell us that OSD may actually chop an additional carrier from the Navy’s battle fleet, a move that would take the force down to nine carriers from the current total of 11.

The Navy plans to retire the CVN-65, the Enterprise, in 2012. The resulting 10 carrier force would be further reduced by one if DoD’s rumored reduction is enacted. Skipping a future carrier purchase doesn’t save money now. Cutting one flattop from the existing force would.

Some additional information in the story.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed the Navy’s plan to shift procurement of the new CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford class carriers from one every four-and-a-half years to one every five years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost to build a Ford class carrier at $11.2 billion each; the Navy plans to buy 7 by 2038.

To be sure, there are plenty of obstacles to cutting a carrier from the fleet. For one, the Navy is required by law to maintain 11 carriers. The Navy has an outstanding request for a legislative waiver from Congress so it can retire the Enterprise, which would drop the carrier force to 10 for 33 months between the retirement and the scheduled entry of the first of the Ford class into service in 2015. Lawmakers have yet to act on the request.

There is some legislative activity to back up what is being discussed here. Section 1022 of the House Armed Services Committee Report (H.R. 2647) for FY 2010 would authorize a waiver to title 10 USC 5062(b) and allow the early retirement of USS Enterprise. This would give the Navy a temporary waiver to the requirement in section 5062(b) of title 10 to maintain 10 operational aircraft carriers instead of 11.

S. 1390 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, is a bit more specific and states:

Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, during the period beginning on the date of the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN 65) and ending on the date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy may be 10.

The Senate language makes more sense, because it allows for problems with technologies like EMALS that may delay the USS Ford (CVN 78) without new legislation. Unfortunately, delays because of new technologies may occur with the USS Ford (CVN 78).

The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled to enter service in 2015. As part of Secretary Gates announcement, CVN 79 would be procured in FY2013 (5 years later) and would presumably enter service in 2020 or 2021. CVN 80 would then be procured in FY2018 and would presumably enter service in 2025 or 2026.

The FY 2007 defense authorization act established a procurement cost cap for USS Ford (CVN 78) of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It also established a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It is unclear what the cost impact of shifting the CVN 79 procurement date one year to FY 2013 (instead of FY 2012) and the CVN 80 procurement date by two years to FY 2018 (instead of FY2016) will be, but odds are very good this will increase, not decrease, the cost of building Ford class nuclear aircraft carriers. The Ford class is already suffering cost growth, and the full extent of what the total cost growth might be with many outstanding questions is still unknown. There does not appear to be many cost saving options available due to the US economic situation. With the Nimitz class, the Lincoln and Washington were ordered together and the Stennis and Truman were ordered together, and there were cost savings in ordering the carriers in pairs.

The inflation to shipbuilding combined with tough economic times appears to make this option unavailable to either Congress or the Navy, even though the savings would be in the billions of dollars.

One thing is absolutely clear though; any reduction in aircraft carriers below current planned levels does not appear to effect new construction of the first three Ford class. As the DoDBuzz report indicates, the Navy is evaluating other ways should a decision to reduce the aircraft carrier force to 10, or 9, be made. There is a dirty little secret though, the operational aircraft carrier number will already drop to 9, not 10, long before the Ford enters service.

With an understanding the USS Enterprise will be retire in 2012 at a healthy age of 52 years old, lets look at the 10 Nimitz class aircraft carriers.

• USS Nimitz (CVN 68) was commissioned May 3, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2025.
• USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) was commissioned October 18, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2027.
• USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) was commissioned March 13, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2032.
• USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70) was commissioned March October 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2036.
• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was commissioned November 11, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2039.
• USS George Washington (CVN 73) was commissioned July 4, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2042.
• USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) was commissioned December 9, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2045.
• USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) was commissioned July 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2048.
• USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) was commissioned July 12, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2052.
• USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) was commissioned January 10, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2058.

Each Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier requires what is known as a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) after ~23 years of service. RCOH is a complex and expensive 3 year maintenance that costs almost $3 billion (see interesting analysis by Tim Colton) and is mandatory for Nimitz class aircraft carriers, as the nuclear fuel requires refueling. As of last week, the Navy paid a huge chunk of the RCOH cost for the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70). The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) would begin her RCOH in 2012 and be unavailable until 2015, the same period the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) will be retired. This is why there will actually be only 9 operational carriers.

It is important to note that with the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) unavailable from 2012-2015, the Navy will actually be down to 9 carriers already with the retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). I have not seen any detailed public discussion of this operational loss of aircraft carrier availability to 9, even public discussion in Congress was fairly weak when the questions about Enterprise were asked this year. The Navy has suggested that adjustments have been made to account for the loss of the Enterprise, but it is unclear what that means for the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). After the Lincoln emerges from RCOH in 2015, USS George Washington (CVN 73), commissioned in 1992, would then begin RCOH in 2015, roughly ~23 years after commissioning per schedule and be unavailable under current plan until 2018. Presumably after that, USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) would begin RCOH in 2018, ~23 years after commissioning, and emerge back into service in 2021. With CVN 79 expected to enter service in 2020, under current plans the Navy would then have 12 aircraft carriers by ~2020 (2 Ford class and 10 Nimitz class), with the Stennis in RHOC thus unavailable, but the Navy would still be back to the current legally mandated 11 operational aircraft carrier requirement.

One of the ideas I have heard floating around is to retire the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) early instead of undertaking a RCOH, which wouldn't influence current short term plans since USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is expected to be unavailable from 2012-2015 anyway. When the USS Ford (CVN 78) enters service in 2015, the Navy would then perform a RCOH on USS George Washington (CVN 73) from 2015-2018 and perform the planned USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) RCOH from 2018-2021. From the period when CVN 78 enters service until CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would maintain 10 aircraft carriers, but 9 would be operational available while 1 was continuously undergoing a RCOH.

In 2021, as CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would then conduct the RCOH for the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) from 2021-2024. Upon emergence from RCOH, the USS Nimitz could be retired and the Navy would stay at 10 operational carriers. In 2025, CVN 80 will come online bringing the total to 11, but the Reagan will be due for her RCOH and be unavailable from 2026-2029, and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) is expected to retire in 2027, so the true operational carrier number would again drop to 9 until 2030, when the number will return to 11 with the return of Reagan and CVN 81 entering service.

The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) will get her RCOH from 2032-2035 and the retirement of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is scheduled for 2032, so that will drop the Navy back down to 9 operational carriers from 2032-2035 if a Nimitz class was retired early, but with the return of Bush and the CVN 82 entering service, the Navy would be back to 11 by 2035. In 2036, the Navy will retire Roosevelt but CVN 83 will be in service by 2040. Washington retires in 2042 and Stennis in 2045, but CVN 84 would come into service by 2045, so with the retirement of Stennis the operational number of carriers would level at 10, dropping periodically to 9 with the retirements of Truman (2048), Reagan (2052), and Bush (2058) but presumably bouncing back to 10 with CVN 84 (2050), CVN 85 (2055) and CVN 86 (2060).

I've even heard the number 8 operational carriers bounced around, under a more aggressive retirement plan (but the plan would sell it as 9 operational carriers, by always counting carriers in RCOH as operational). In addition to the early retirement of Lincoln in 2012, the Navy would retire the Truman early in 2021 when CVN 79 enters service. This would allow cost savings in the early 2020s when the Navy must build SSBN replacements at the same time they attempt to replace the cruiser force.

The dirty little secret though is that with the retirement of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) in 2012, the number of operational aircraft carriers will actually only be 9, because Lincoln is scheduled to refuel from 2012-2015, the same years Congress is making the exception for the Enterprise. Given that 9 is acceptable just 3 years from today, and will remain 9 from 2012 until CVN 79 enters service around 2020, it is not unreasonable that the QDR could make 9 the new number long term. The Navy already intends to use fuzzy math and count Lincoln as operational while in RCOH, suggesting they are meeting the legal requirement of 10, so realistically the Navy could retire both Lincoln and Truman by 2025 and still maintain a quasi legal number of 9 as DoD Buzz is reporting.

Personally, I think the whole idea of retiring aircraft carriers early is a terrible waste of resources. Beforef retiring nuclear aircraft carriers, perhaps the most flexible warship in the world, I'd like to see the Navy use the RCOH of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and turn them both into massive mobile Sea Bases, one for each coast, and replace everything from the proposed sea base aviation ships to the hospital ships in the current plans. The nuclear aircraft carrier is the most flexible warship in the world, I'd encourage Congress to capitalize on their flexibility before allowing them to be retired early. Simply using them for something other than supporting the carrier airwing will immediately save costs, and refitting them while removing fixed wing carrier aviation support will allow a lot of other crew savings. I don't know how many helicopters the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne division can put on 2 aircraft carriers, but I think it would be a useful exercise to find out.

I find it hard to believe any platform in the world could be a better Joint Sea Base enabler than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Instead of giving up such useful platforms, I'd like to see them used for something else before retired outright. It would be a tragedy of Congressional imagination to simply give up such useful platforms, indeed, it took Congressional action to insure the Navy used the retiring SSBNs in alternative ways in the 1990s - and I'd say that encouragement has paid off very well in the form of the SSGN. Hopefully, should budget require adjustment to the CVN force, Congress takes the same approach with any Nimitz class aircraft carriers suggested to be retired by this administration, and turns them into something imaginative and useful at a reduced cost instead of simply retiring them from service.

Pakistani Mods

The US is accusing Pakistan of modifying Harpoon anti-ship missiles and P-3 Orions for attacks against land targets:

Pakistan on August 30 rejected U.S. government claims that it illegally modified American-made missiles and said the accusations were part of a campaign to "malign it and its armed forces". Modifications to anti-ship missiles made them capable of hitting land-based targets and thus threatening India, The New York Times said Aug. 29. The New York Times said the missiles were sold to Pakistan by the administration of former U.S. president Ronald Reagan as a defensive weapon during the Cold War in the 1980s.

U.S. military and intelligence officials said they suspect that Pakistan has modified the missiles in a manner that would be a violation of the Arms Control Export Act in the United States, the paper said. According to the report, U.S. intelligence agencies detected on April 23 a suspicious missile test that appeared to indicate that Pakistan had a new offensive weapon.

The United States has also accused Pakistan of modifying U.S.-made P-3C aircraft for land-attack missions, another violation of U.S. law that the administration of President Barack Obama has protested, the report said.

The modified land attack Harpoons must be for the small Pakistani sub fleet; firing short range land attack missiles from a surface vessel under conditions of utter Indian naval dominance would simply be suicidal. Even then, the strategic effect of the weapons would seem to be small, given the limited range and payload of the Harpoon. I have some doubt as to whether putting a nuclear warhead on a Harpoon is within current Pakistani capabilities, although the eventual intention may be to acquire a weak second strike capability of the same character as that of Israel.

As for modifying the P-3 for land attack missions, I'm pretty curious about the utility of a slow, big propeller-driven land attack craft in any conceivable India-Pakistan war scenario. Big, slow planes do fine under conditions of air supremacy, but rather less well when enemy fighters are lurking about. Perhaps the expectation is that the P-3s will be used against Taliban forces, to similar effect as the variety of loitering aircraft that the US currently employs.

Chinese Cooperation Translates Like Transaction

Bill Gertz delivers interesting news from the recent meeting by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey Jr. in China with this weeks Inside the Ring.

Army officials are trying to put the best face on the less-than-friendly reception given to Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who got an earful of criticism from two Chinese generals during a visit to China last week.

On Aug. 20 in Beijing, Gen. Ge Zhenfeng, deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army, accused the United States of failing to respect China's interests, triggering an argument and rebuttal from the Army four-star, according to defense officials familiar with the exchange.

Then during a second meeting the same day, Gen. Chen Bingde, the PLA chief of staff, took the unusual step of allowing foreign news reporters to listen in during a photo session before the meeting when he told Gen. Casey that the United States was "challenging and violating our core national interests, and we have to react."

We have seen this kind of behavior before. There are many stories where US General and Flag officers will sit down for a cozy chat with PLA leadership and fireworks will go off. I particularly enjoyed when my fellow blogger Bryan McGrath told a story about current Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and his friendly chat with the PLA back in his days as CINCPAC.

What I found interesting though was this quote attributed to General Chen Bingde. It is very informative.

Such coverage of U.S.-China meetings normally is limited to a few minutes of photographs before reporters are shuffled out of the meeting room and doors are closed.

Gen. Chen then told Gen. Casey that the U.S. had undermined trust by selling arms to Taiwan and that Washington is only friendly when it seeks Beijing's cooperation on terrorism and piracy, but then does "anything they want, even to offend the Chinese people." He said, "I don't think that kind of cooperation can continue."

Gen. Casey stated that "it's difficult to build a lasting relationship when we start from a point that 'we have a problem and it is you.' "

That may be Casey's interpretation in public, but I think Gen. Chen's comments are pretty damaging for China; very counter to how they attempt to control the message with their strategic communications efforts as a rising power. China's soft power approach is to build currency with regional partners giving themselves an image as an alternative to the current security order in the Pacific, and in some cases globally. General Chen's comments are counter to such communication.

It goes to the idea of what transactions are taking place in regards to the global security environment. The transaction of western (European and American) grand strategy results in a common good towards global security. Western powers allocate military resources to address common threats to the global system, and the resulting security allows all nations to share the benefits from the free flow of goods and services, and as we have seen over the last decade, protection from terror attacks against western nations (which have had an economic component in the US and London).

In its essence, US and European policy is a liberal 'greater good' model of global security, particularly in maritime security towards the objective of providing a secure maritime environment for the free flow of trade. The 'greater good' of global maritime security is also a national interest of each individual western liberal economic power. The free flow of trade resulting from secure air and sea lanes has been a contributing factor to globalization.

The transaction assumes that threats to the global economic system, threats like piracy and terrorism, are common threats; shared threats by all economic powers. As a common threat the security responsibilities are thus addressed by military powers contributing collectively and taking responsibility, and the security services are managed by contributing nations. This global liberal security arrangement protecting global trade is often exercised in cooperation or through alliances like NATO.

One point here. Looking at the US and NATO military activities for Afghanistan, and even the Ethiopian military activity in Somalia, Russia has been a contributor towards the global security system where China has mostly not been. Other than a few recent UN engagements and the current pirate patrol that has come about over the last year, China has abstained from the global cooperative engagements against security threats against the global liberal economic system. Apparently some PLA Generals, like Chen, aren't ready to turn the page towards the collective security arrangements yet.

General Chen's comments appear to suggest that China doesn't really share a view of collective threats like piracy and terrorism, suggesting those are threats to the global system China should abstain from sharing the responsibility towards unless there is something to be gained militarily. I think it is striking in that China, as a nation dependent upon the global liberal trade order fueling globalization, is perhaps the worlds biggest beneficiary of the global security arrangement provided by other major powers. If China's true military intentions are truly for the ideals of global security and peace, offering assistance in threats to global security and peace specifically for national military strategy objectives like undermining the security of Taiwan seems like a strange way to demonstrate such intentions.

Chen's comments would be like Adm. Mullen suggesting the US should somehow not cooperate with Russia on terrorism or piracy issues because Russia isn't assisting with Iranian nuclear facility development. No US General or Flag officer has ever made such a public suggestion, indeed I am unaware of any G-20 national military figure ever suggesting that cooperation in fighting terrorism and piracy should be used as a negotiated good or service towards an individual nations national military strategy interest.

The stated government position that China's forward presence off the coast of Somalia is said to be contributing toward a collective good of maritime security. General Chen's comment to General Casey suggests otherwise, and unfortunately for China, General Chen's comment validates the concerns the skeptics of other Asian powers regarding China's true motivations and intentions to deploy ships to Somalia.

Thoughts on the MV Win Far Shooting

This is the official Navy news story regarding the SH-60B Seahawk that was fired upon by Somali pirates.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. local time, Aug. 26, Somali Pirates aboard Motor Vessel (M/V) Win Far, fired what appeared to be a large caliber weapon at a U.S. Navy SH-60B Helicopter from Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light (HSL) 49, embarked aboard USS Chancellorsville (CG 62).

No rounds of ammunition struck the SH-60B. The SH-60 crew did not return fire. No personnel injuries resulted from the incident.

Win Far is a Taiwanese-flagged vessel that was pirated April 6. During the past 135 days it has been used as a "mother ship" to conduct other known pirate attacks, most notably the U.S. flagged Maersk-Alabama in April.

The helicopter was conducting a routine surveillance flight of M/V Win Far currently held at anchorage by Somali pirates south of Garacad, Somalia, when the incident occurred.

During the flight, aircrew observed activity but could not ascertain they were fired upon until their return to Chancellorsville and review of Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) video, which recorded the incident. The helicopter was approximately 3,000 yards from Win Far when it was fired upon.

Two images of the incident are given (see here and here), and a short video of the incident was posted on Flickr here. I am undecided what I think of this. Given the apparent inaccuracy over the last few years of Somali pirates when operating any weapons, I am not sure a Somali pirate could hit the broad side of a barn standing still in an open field at 3,000 yards with a full magazine. It is therefore hardly surprising that a Somali pirate couldn't shoot a moving helicopter from a ship at sea from 3,000 yards. It is also unclear (to me) what kind of weapon was used, although it looks like a rifle of some kind, that appears to not have the range to hit the helicopter when aiming directly at it at an incline. Lets keep in mind when viewing the imagery, the FLIR gives us a good picture, but objects are not as close as they may appear.

With the exception of a MANPAD, I am unable to think of a weapon I would be too concerned about from a Somali pirate at 3,000 yards, and last I heard pirates don't have MANPADs. I am also not familiar with a weapon system on a SH-60B that can kill a single pirate without causing collateral damage from 3,000 yards, so the suggestion that the Navy needs to shoot back under this scenario also seems a bit unrealistic.

So other than identifying a Somali pirate who has clearly had no professional training with his weapon, thus is nothing more than a hired idiot with a rifle (literally), did we really learn anything? In a way, we did learn one thing. Pirates will be aggressive once they take a ship and have hostages. All that does is, based on the way the pirates shot at US Navy assets during the Maersk Alabama incident, confirm what we already know.

As far as pirate tactical evolutions I have stated I am concerned about, I do not see this incident as representative of those concerns. The only detail that surprised me was to learn this is the first time pirates have shot at our helicopters. I would have guessed they did it all the time, although based on previous comments by US naval leaders in the area, it doesn't sound like we get very close to the pirates who have already hijacked a ship that often, so previous opportunities to shoot at US forces would have been scarce.

Webb Follows Through

The debate whether to move a nuclear aircraft carrier to Mayport, FL has been consistently challenged by Virginia Senator Jim Webb, who is opposed to losing a CVN in from his home state of Norfolk. Typical political stuff right? Well, Webb's argument has been that the money could be better spent, and follows a line of thinking that strategic basing on the East Coast is not as convincing an argument as it is on the West Coast. It should also be noted that Senator Webb has supported funding to dredge Mayport to allow CVN access, which means the decision to base a CVN in Mayport will continue in the future.

The strength of Senator Webb's argument has been that the money should be used for other things, specifically Navy shipyards. It is no wonder then he is touting the decision by the GAO to investigate the funding shortages of the Navy shipyards.

The Government Accountability Office has agreed to investigate the shipyards, operated by Naval Sea Systems Command, after a July 13 request by Webb and seven other senators. The Navy confirmed in May that it had a $1.3 billion backlog in work and upgrades for its shipyards, part of broad funding problems earlier this year.

Webb and other Virginia lawmakers were concerned that if the flow of money dried up to Hampton Roads-area shipyards, the business would have to lay off their skilled employees for lack of work. After a visit Friday to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Webb said he also was worried about what he called “the yard’s aging facilities and its worn-out infrastructure.”

“The GAO’s commitment to investigate the material condition of our nation’s four naval shipyards is a necessary first step to ensure that we are allocating resources adequately and responsibly,” Webb said in an announcement. “The Navy’s four public shipyards play an essential role in enabling the fleet’s operational availability and mission success.”

While it is easy to buy into Senator Webb exercising control in this case to support his political agenda, it is very difficult to ignore that he has a good point. The GAO and CBO have been highlighting with consistency the financial problems the Navy is facing, and analysis from just about everywhere continues to point out ship depot and maintenance activities at the Navy shipyards are critical to sustaining the existing fleet to their full service lives. This goes beyond the widely reported INSURV issues, it specifically addresses problems related to dealing with unexpected damage like what happened to USS Port Royal (CG 73).

I for one would much rather see the funding for Navy shipyards shored up before worrying about whether Mayport needs a carrier. The Mayport issue is more political for both Virginia and Florida than it appears strategic from the Navy's point of view, while the shipyard funding issue is absolutely vital to sustaining the fleet.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Thach (FFG 43)


Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)


EU NAVFOR

HNLMS Evertsen (F805) (flagship)
FGS Bremen (F207)
FGS Brandenburg (F215)
FS Lafayette (F710)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)
HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F310)


Combined Task Force 150

PNS Tipu Sultan (F185)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
HMAS Toowoomba (FFH 156)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)


NATO Allied Mission Protector

HMS Cornwall (F99) (flagship)
HS Navarinon (F461)
ITS Libeccio (F572)
TCG Gediz (F495)
USS Donald Cook (DDG 75)


Combined Task Force 151

USS Anzio (CG 68)
PNS Badr (D184)
ROKS Daejoyoung (DDH 977)
TCG Gaziantep (F-490)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
KD BM 5
INS Talvar (F40)
INS Brahmaputra (F31)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Maanshan (FFG 525)
PLAN Wenzhou (FFG 526)
PLAN Qiandao Hu (A886)
USS James E Williams (DDG 95)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dextrous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Kent (F78)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS San Jose (T-AFS 7)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Harusame (DD 102)
JS Amagiri (DD 152)
RFS Admiral Tributz (DDG 552)

*Russian forces in the region also include the tanker Boris Butoma and a rescue tug ‘SB- 99’.

Fun For the Kids

This is outstanding. Explicit lyrics and all, love it. In order to get it, you may need to see the first video, a new song produced by Andy Samberg's The Lonely Island. This is your explicit language warning.

This spoof by a group called JOPA, which I hear stands for the Junior Officer Protection Association, is very well done. Big props to the folks on the USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) for the creativity here, it's excellent.

Those who never lived in a MTV generation aren't expected to get it, so move along.

Mullen On "Strategic Communication"

This is from Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Quoted in full.

It is time for us to take a harder look at “strategic communication.”

Frankly, I don’t care for the term. We get too hung up on that word, strategic. If we’ve learned nothing else these past 8 years, it should be that the lines between strategic, operational, and tactical are blurred beyond distinction. This is particularly true in the world of communication, where videos and images plastered on the Web—or even the idea of their being so posted—can and often do drive national security decisionmaking.

But beyond the term itself, I believe we have walked away from the original intent. By organizing to it—creating whole structures around it—we have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking. It is now sadly something of a cottage industry.

We need to get back to basics, and we can start by not beating ourselves up. The problem isn’t that we are bad at communicating or being outdone by men in caves. Most of them aren’t even in caves. The Taliban and al Qaeda live largely among the people. They intimidate and control and communicate from within, not from the sidelines.

And they aren’t just out there shooting videos, either. They deliver. Want to know what happens if somebody violates their view of Sharia law? You don’t have to look very far or very long. Each beheading, each bombing, and each beating sends a powerful message or, rather, is a powerful message.

Got a governance problem? The Taliban is getting pretty effective at it. They’ve set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders. Part of the Taliban plan to win over the people in Swat was to help the poor or displaced own land.

Their utter brutality has not waned, nor has their disregard for human life. But with each such transaction, they chip away at the legitimacy of the Afghan government, saying in effect: “We can give you the stability the government cannot.”

No, our biggest problem isn’t caves; it’s credibility. Our messages lack credibility because we haven’t invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven’t always delivered on promises.

The most common questions that I get in Pakistan and Afghanistan are: “Will you really stay with us this time?” “Can we really count on you?” I tell them that we will and that they can, but when it comes to real trust in places such as these, I don’t believe we are even in Year Zero yet. There’s a very long way to go.
The irony here is that we know better.

For all the instant polling, market analysis, and focus groups we employ today, we could learn a lot by looking to our own past. No other people on Earth have proven more capable at establishing trust and credibility in more places than we have. And we’ve done it primarily through the power of our example.

The voyage of the Great White Fleet told the world that the United States was no longer a second-rate nation. The Marshall Plan made it clear that our strength was only as good as it was shared. The policy of containment let it be known we wouldn’t stand for the spread of communism. And relief efforts in the wake of natural disasters all over the world said calmly and clearly: we will help you through this.

We didn’t need a public opinion poll to launch that fleet. We didn’t need a “strat comm” plan to help rebuild Europe. And we sure didn’t need talking points and Power- Point slides to deliver aid. Americans simply showed up and did the right thing because it was, well, the right thing to do.

That’s the essence of good communication: having the right intent up front and letting our actions speak for themselves. We shouldn’t care if people don’t like us; that isn’t the goal. The goal is credibility. And we earn that over time.

Now I’m not suggesting we stop planning to communicate or that we fail to factor in audience reaction, perceptions, or culture.

I recognize the information environment today is much more complex than it was in 1909, or even 1999. As someone who “tweets” almost daily, I appreciate the need to embrace the latest technologies. But more important than any particular tool, we must know the context within which our actions will be received and understood. We hurt ourselves and the message we try to send when it appears we are doing something merely for the credit.

We hurt ourselves more when our words don’t align with our actions. Our enemies regularly monitor the news to discern coalition and American intent as weighed against the efforts of our forces. When they find a “say-do” gap—such as Abu Ghraib—they drive a truck right through it.

So should we, quite frankly. We must be vigilant about holding ourselves accountable to higher standards of conduct and closing any gaps, real or perceived, between what we say about ourselves and what we do to back it up.

In fact, I would argue that most strategic communication problems are not communication problems at all. They are policy and execution problems. Each time we fail to live up to our values or don’t follow up on a promise, we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are. And make no mistake—there has been a certain arrogance to our “strat comm” efforts. We’ve come to believe that messages are something we can launch downrange like a rocket, something we can fire for effect.

They are not. Good communication runs both ways. It’s not about telling our story. We must also be better listeners. The Muslim community is a subtle world we don’t fully—and don’t always attempt to understand. Only through a shared appreciation of the people’s culture, needs, and hopes for the future can we hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative.

We cannot capture hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must listen to them, one heart and one mind at a time—over time.

I’m a big fan of Three Cups of Tea by Greg Mortenson. In fact, I had the opportunity this summer to help him open up a new school for girls in the Panjshir Valley. Greg believes that building relationships is just as important as building projects. “The enemy is ignorance,” he told me, “and it isn’t theirs alone. We have far more to learn from the people who live here than we could ever hope to teach them.”

He’s right. We are only going to be as good as our own learning curve. And just the simple act of trying, of listening to others, speaks volumes all by itself.

I know strategic communication as a term of reference is probably here to stay. Regrettably, it’s grown too much a part of our lexicon. But I do hope we take this opportunity under the coming Quadrennial Defense Review to reexamine what we mean by it. Strategic communication should be an enabling function that guides and informs our decisions and not an organization unto itself. Rather than trying to capture all communication activity underneath it, we should use it to describe the process by which we integrate and coordinate.

To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate. I also hope we learn to be more humble, to listen more. Because what we are after in the end—or should be after—are actions that speak for themselves, that speak for us. What we need more than anything is credibility. And we can’t get that in a talking point.

If you haven't read Three Cups of Tea by Greg Mortenson, you should. I was lucky to get a free copy of his book while at the Current Strategy Forum earlier this year, and after reading it I donated to his charity Pennies for Peace as a way of thanking him for such an excellent book.

To respond to Mullen I would add only one thing. The United States is one of the best in the world at 'strategic communication' to other major economic and modern military powers, and at minimum that includes the G-20 members and the EU states not specifically a member on the G-20. That doesn't mean they may like what we say or do, but as Mullen notes acceptance isn't the point; the point is major powers understand what we are saying and doing. The clarity in communications between the US and other major powers has been a major factor in the sustained peace between major powers since the end of WII.

It seems to me the key point is:

"Our messages lack credibility because we haven’t invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven’t always delivered on promises."

What is the promise to Afghanistan that the US must deliver on? Is it a goal of the Obama administrations policy? Those goals are as unclear to me today as they were under the Bush administration. What are those goals? I am just curious, because I do question whether our national promises and policy objectives are compatible.

On Shifts and Information Distribution

With a hat tip to Zenpundit and Critt Jarvis.

What I find interesting about the shift is how most of the tools driving this space online are still relatively immature. I say that because it takes programming most folks still can't do and reporting services rarely found even at a cost for content producers to truly understand their audience, and target them both efficiently and directly. I am not talking about distribution, broad distribution is easy, but direct delivery is getting more difficult. I believe the next phase of the current evolution in Web 2.0 will be for content to include security on demand, the ability to easily negotiate with security filters safely while retaining security quality at the consumer level for the purposes of insuring that relevant information is available on demand. Currently, that is not the case, broad brushes paint over social software networks, so often productive content is blocked when disruptive content is targeted.

Consumer distribution of social software content will become viral as technologies mature, probably when RDF arrives in the mainstream. If the security foundation of distribution isn't addressed sufficiently before that time, the global firewalls of the global business community will become the new form of global information censorship. The way many businesses operate content filters today - sometimes absent a full understanding of the shift already in motion and often unaware of protocol options (not to mention the built in limitations of filtering software itself) - promotes a trend of censorship in data distribution that only creates greater challenges in IT shops to balance access with security while insuring business productivity.

Human behavior drives information flows. In the US, if content isn't available on Kindle (this one is - for free btw), accessible via mobile phones, or isn't optimized for the tools most utilized by the mobile information consumer then the information isn't competitive in distribution.

I've been thinking about information distribution in the context of a ships crew, in particular I began thinking about it when I was on USS Freedom (LCS 1) last November. I've been wondering if we are approaching a point where mobile communications of every individual chief and officer within a ship - not just on-demand vocal communications but also data communications to mobile devices - becomes necessary in order to support the Navy's desire to reduce crew sizes in order to maximize efficiency and response.

A Moment of Sober (ha!) Reflection

This is a purely frivolous post, but I wanted to thank the crew of DDG 55 for reminding me that as an American civilian, my liberty is being watched over by a Navy in which the good ships USS Stout and USS Porter can (and, more importantly, do) meet up on the high seas as they pass and arrange a beer session for later when both are in port. This kind of coincidence and diligent attention to the important things tweaks my amusement gland.

Thanks from this civvy to both crews, and may the beer be worthy of your ships.

Post-Victory Posturing

Jerry Jones has a very interesting article in the Spring 2009 NWCR on the course of post-World War I naval negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States. The RN and the USN emerged, with the internment of the German High Seas Fleet, as the two most powerful navies in the world. Dreadnoughts remained the most important currency of naval power, although the submarine had announced its presence with authority in the latter half of the war. The sticking points of the negotiations were the balance of power between the USN and the RN, and the disposition of the German High Seas Fleet. Wilson was initially in favor of returning some portion of the High Seas Fleet to Germany, in order to provide a counter to the Royal Navy. The British wanted the High Seas Fleet destroyed, while the French and others were in favor of distributing the German fleet (and the Austrian) among the Allied belligerents. These positions were essentially consistent with the war aims of the US and the UK; the United States favored the quick rehabilitation of a democratic Germany, while the UK (and France) favored the semi-permanent hobbling of German military power. The scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow rendered the question largely moot, although a few German battleships survived.

Jones focuses on the posturing between the US and the UK over naval construction during the early part of negotiation. Having just fought and won a war against Germany in order to prevent naval parity, the British were unhappy to simply give it up to the United States. The United States remained displeased by the UK's wartime embargo against Germany, a wished in the future to have the capacity to force such a blockade. In spite of his idealistic vision of post-war international politics, Wilson was not immune to balance of power considerations. Although the United Kingdom's violation of US freedom of the seas wasn't as violent or egregious as the German, it still remained a difficult pill for the US to swallow. The notion of war, or even vigorous armed competition, between the US and the UK was not as absurd as it appears through hindsight; this was well before belief in the relevance of the Democratic Peace had taken hold. Both Britain and the US understood war to be a possibility, if not in the sense that it was immediately likely.

In my own research, I discovered several instances of USN admirals expressing concern over the idea of dispatching battleships to assist the Grand Fleet following US entry into WWI. At least one admiral argued that the Royal Navy would attempt to contrive some sort of confrontation between the USN and the High Seas Fleet, leaving the former in a weakened post-war state. It turned out, of course, that the battleships of the USN were largely irrelevant to the outcome of WWI, but that its destroyers would make a significant contribution to the First Battle of the Atlantic. The USN would eventually deploy a squadron of older coal-firing dreadnoughts to the Grand Fleet, as concerns about a lack of fuel oil prevented the dispatch of the USN's most modern units. I'm forced to wonder, however, whether anyone in the USN believed that USS Delaware was expendable, while USS Pennsylvania was not...

In any case, Jones draws several lessons from the episode, the most interesting of which is that diplomacy, naval power, and collective security are tightly tied together. Reaching a mutually agreeable settlement regarding the eventual balance between the United States and the United Kingdom was critical to efforts to create and maintain a viable post-war balance; uncontrolled competition between the two (and Japan) would, in all likelihood, have led to a much quicker degeneration of the post-war status quo, and might have created serious difficulties down the road for US-UK collaboration. As it was, the RN and the USN resented each other bitterly into the late 1930s, to the extent that political authorities had to pull teeth in order to create officer exchange and liaison programs. These difficulties slowed the development of ASW expertise in the USN. The situation might have been much worse if the RN and the USN had continued to take War Plan Red seriously. While the US almost certainly could have "won" a naval race with the UK in the 1920s, our overall security would have suffered, just as Germany was, on balance, weakened by its pre-war efforts to match the RN. In terms of modern naval construction, I think that the lesson would be that procurement cannot be conceived of separately from grand political strategy, alliances, and strategic doctrine. A robust conception of national security is required in order to provide a logic for naval procurement; the former should precede the latter, although in practice strategy is often forces to accomodate itself to force structure, rather than the other way around.

My Response to the Salamander

CDR Salamander has a take on my earlier post from last night. He emphasizes a point that I want to clarify I agree with - specifically that there are many, many factors involved in decisions to consolidate and generalize. I completely agree. Multiple contributing factors would still not explain the outright broad rejection of specialization when NCW, a touted foundation of naval doctrine, is supposed to (by design) offer the Navy the benefits (like lower cost) of specialization and the Navy has rejected specialization almost in total.

I disagree with his take regarding the 'mirage' of network-centric warfare. I think NCW holds incredible promise, but needs to be approached with expectations that networks in the Navy will be complex primarily because they will be most effective for local coordination, as opposed to a complex global picture. The biggest difference between the analogies used in Parameters and the way the Navy has implemented NCW is that the Navy is building resiliency with the expectation that catastrophic disruption will occur, while the financial system was built with expectations they knew everything. Resiliency is a major factor why the Navy favors generalization over specialization, but it doesn't explain the rejection of specialization.

I would note the E-2D is one of the best examples today where the Navy has built a platform that can substitute itself as a local network provider when satellite disruption or other catastrophic disruption occurs. The development of local network providers for fleet forces is a resiliency in the network chain the financial system didn't have. In the financial system, many small banks survived without much damage, but they weren't coordinated at all to any degree to act as a buffer even though collectively they had the capital to do so. In many ways, the SSGN may potentially reveal the power of NCW as well, but the limitations of bandwidth and real-time reliable communication with distributed deployables have had to be addressed. In the future, it is entirely possible a SSGN could potentially coordinate several dozen devices over great ranges without relying on communication technologies from orbit or elsewhere, but that bandwidth tech has not matured sufficiently for submarines to be a local provider to thus realize that promise of NCW. Despite all the emphasis of the attack submarine force to integrate into the rest of the fleet thanks to network innovations, the submarine force has rejected even small levels of specialization, even when there are good reasons like sea control of the Arctic.

I think for surface warfare, NCW is the critical enabler for the Navy to specialize in the mission sets the Navy is tasked in the 21st century, and both BMD and Littoral Warfare represent two specific examples where specialization is required to be successful.

BMD requires multiple high end radar, coordination, and weapon components distributed over vast geographic distances able to communicate in real time to be successfully conducted. Littoral warfare requires greater quantity of specialized vessels to be effective. The generalization approach has forced the Navy to use the same shoes for both paths, even if it is more expensive and is knowingly less effective. It is stupid though, because is it more likely the US is going to be attacked by a ballistic missile today or attacked through some means of widely available commercial maritime technology? I'd say the likelyhood the US would be nuked by a ballistic missile is lower than the likelyhood a ship would sail into port with a nuke onboard. Neither are high probability, but just saying.

It is often suggested I am somehow against large multi-mission ships like the Burke because I oppose building more today, but my position isn't a knock against the ship class, rather I believe 62 is sufficient quantity of the multi-mission capability the Burke addresses unless they are being built to specifically replace existing CGs. The resources needed to build only a handful more Burkes at around $2 billion each could easily be used by the Navy to build specialized ships of significantly higher quantity, and NCW would allow the Navy to utilize these specialized ships to maintain competitive advantages over challengers in warfare areas that are truly challenging.

The US Navy's current large multi-mission platforms are capable of being leveraged to support specialized platforms, and I believe the result would significantly offset the weakness of the specialized ships while increasing the total strength of the fleet. That would suggest the Navy is tapping the power of the network, but there is no example anywhere wants to do that. By 2012 there will be 84 AEGIS ships able to provide significant support to specialized ships on the back of NCWs promise, but the only 'specialized' type ship the Navy intends to field that this AEGIS force could support is the LCS.

The LCS! Jeez. Forget the mission modules, because the ugly truth of mission modules is that they must conform to the platforms, so lets look at the platforms. The LCS platform is speed and space. Space because it needs to be everything to everyone and speed because it needs to be fast in performing its function of getting to port so it can become everything to everyone when necessary. The platform is designed so it can be everything to everyone; that is not specialization, that is a manifestation of the generalist - everything can be made to fit - attitude in the Navy's approach to maritime strategy. The specialization of the LCS is in the modules, but the modules are limited and always will be because the Navy decided to make their trucks (the LCS) small and while making all the race cars (destroyers) enormous. I have said for years the Navy got that backward with Seapower 21.

I think the Navy should at least make an attempt to use existing assets and capitalize on what is possible with NCW by starting small, specifically starting in the Littoral. For the price of the 2 Burkes expected in the FY2011 budget, the Navy could probably build at least 24 1000 ton specialized littoral warfare ships to augment the 12 Littoral Combat Ships that will have been funded through FY 2011. Since the LCS is a logistics nightmare anyway, working with 1000 ton ships shouldn't create an extra logistics burden. Put a LCS and a pair of corvettes together and call it a squadron. Then put a few squadrons with a Burke and call it something else - and see if NCW increases presence and actionable capabilities in today's threat environment.

I bet the results will be good, and those results will be greater than the loss of just 2 more Burkes. NCW is more assured in quality at the low end, so why not specialize at the low end to exploit and explore NCWs potential.

The Specialization of Generalization in Today's Navy

Caught in the Net: Lessons from the Financial Crisis for a Networked Future by Gautam Mukunda and William J. Troy (PDF) in the Summer 2009 issue of Parameters is a brilliant read, one of the best articles I have read in awhile examining the relative strengths and weaknesses of Network-Centric Warfare. This is a long quote, and I apologize, but it is necessary.

The Duke of Wellington described “[t]he whole art of war [as] getting at what is on the other side of the hill, or, in other words, in deciding what we do not know from what we do.” Even for Wellington such deductions were inherently uncertain, and it is this uncertainty that makes war as much art as science, with success dependent on the commander’s “intuition and genius.” War is, and always has been, an exercise in decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Modern military platforms (such as aircraft, ships, or tanks) and military formations (from infantry companies to carrier strike groups) seek to mitigate the effects of this uncertainty by, among other approaches, using redundancy and generalization. They guard against unanticipated events by devoting resources to back-ups, contingencies, and self-protection. The fog and friction of war push today’s force, as they pushed all of its predecessors, toward generalization. The force deals with the unexpected, so its individual components retain the ability to succeed at a variety of tasks, rather than focusing on performing a single mission with the highest degree of effectiveness. Today’s military specializes to a degree but has to compromise and retain broader capabilities due to uncertainty. These compromises are inherently inefficient. Yet today there is no other choice, because seeing the other side of a hill, and coordinating to deal with the enemy there, remain imperfect at best.

NCW’s most enthusiastic proponents, however, envision a future military comprised of much more specialized units connected by the network. The network will help produce “information dominance” through its ability to rapidly combine data received by many different nodes into a coherent picture of the battlefield. American forces then can be “smaller, lighter, [and] more efficient” because they are made up of specialized units that cooperate to produce effects that previously required much larger forces.

A force made up of such specialized units would be smaller and lighter, and faster and more agile. Instead of combining mass these units would combine their effects and even “self-synchronize”—work together without direction from higher authority. Specialized units have advantages if the network truly allows them to cooperate seamlessly, but each single unit has less cross-functional ability and less reserve capacity to deal with unanticipated contingencies. Specialized units do one thing and do it well. If they encounter a task they cannot accomplish, they use the network to hand it off or get support. Given the same amount of resources, a specialist will always outperform a generalist at the task on which the specialist is focused. The network would provide a clear enough view of the battlefield that these specialized units could reliably be in the right place at the right time. An army made up of tightly networked groups of specialized units should thus be able to outperform a traditionally organized one given the same resources.

The idea that networked specialists can outperform generalists is not a product of the information age. It goes back, in fact, to Adam Smith’s description of a pin factory in On the Wealth of Nations. Smith described how the workers at a pin factory produce thousands of times as many pins as the same number of people would if they worked individually. This productivity is possible because each employee specializes in one step of the process. The employees in Smith’s pin factory were networked by their communication inside the factory. Information technology simply allows networks to diffuse across the globe.

Sophisticated modern networks, linked by computer systems and flows of trade goods, have resulted in an enormous increase in world productivity, much of it derived from firms’ greater ability to specialize in a global market. This is the tantalizing promise of NCW—the potential to vastly increase capabilities without a concomitant increase in resources.

Unfortunately, networks of specialized units can also be vulnerable to unforeseen or unforeseeable disruptions. Even networks that seem highly resilient can fail abruptly and catastrophically when they suffer unanticipated shocks. Just as the globalized world economy shows the potential benefits of networks and specialization, the worldwide financial crisis demonstrates their dangers.

The US Navy has claimed itself as a leading military service integrating Network-Centric Warfare into their doctrine, and many legitimately accept this claim based solely on the efforts the Navy has made to integrate its ships into a network. Unfortunately for those who believe the Navy is a NCW proponent, what the Navy is doing is more akin to ForceNET, not NCW. For almost two decades the network integration of existing and new naval assets into the network has taken what was a service of distinct ships and turned that collection of ships into a coordinated and connected fleet, but it is important to note the only benefits that anyone can truly cite are in Command and Control. There are dozens of topics that have been discussed regarding the wide range of effects this integration effort has done to the doctrine of the Navy, indeed the connectivity has changed the very nature of what Command at Sea is in irreversible ways. I will leave it to Naval officers to decide whether the positives outweigh the negatives as it relates to leadership, but I believe the result has been generally positive at the operational level.

There is no evidence at all that the Navy has made any significant effort to field specialized units and leverage NCW to gain more capability through specialization as NCW proponents envisioned. If anything, the more integrated the Navy has become with NCW, the more generalization has become an institutional priority. In fact, despite NCW and its promises, specialization has been shoved in its own box of general capabilities. The ugly reality, based on action, is that in the Navy specializations are neglected and treated with bias primarily because of their specialized skill, and the promotion boards have historically reflected it. Lets examine this in detail.

Naval Aviation

Now that the Navy has integrated NCW potential into a common air picture, almost every naval aviation asset has become part of a common system. The P-8 is based on the Boeing 737, perhaps one of the most common airframes in the world today. Roles for Intercept, Strike, and Electronic Warfare are delegated to the F18 common air frame, a generalist model of doing everything with the same platform. The only other airframe not expected to retire soon still flying off aircraft carriers is the E-2/C-2 airframe, an airframe flexible enough to realistically be a Common Support Aircraft (CSA) for carrier based fixed wing ASW and Tanking if the Navy wanted. The Navy even uses the same general airframe for both the Romeo's and Sierra's being fielded to fill RW requirements.

Despite the expectations that Network-Centric Warfare should allow for more specialization, naval aviation has taken a direction of solid generalization. The F18 is a great aircraft, but it isn't particularly dominant in any of the roles it services for the Navy. Obviously there are many factors involved in these decisions to consolidate to common airframes, but wasn't NCW supposed to enable more capability with less quantity by allowing the Navy to specialize? Wasn't the promise of NCW supposed to allow the Navy greater specialization, resulting in individual capabilities that were superior to those of opponents? Did naval aviation forget to capitalize on this promise of NCW? Hmm...

Surface Combatants

The great naval surface warfare idea of 2009 is the same great naval surface warfare idea of John Lehman, 20 years ago: build the big multi-mission Arleigh Burkes. The Littoral Combat Ship is rightfully questioned in the way David Axe presented the other day, the hull is specifically a massive generalization of possibilities without having the necessary characteristics to make it a specialization in any specific area of warfare. Indeed, the way the SWOs look at Network-Centric Warfare in their approach to new ships, one will not find specialization anywhere as a future priority. Regardless of the promise of NCW to allow more specialization, mission specific ships like MCMs and MCHs are retiring as quickly as can be done. Regardless of any claim made by surface warfare, the institutional direction of surface warfare outright rejects the promises of NCW to allow for specialization within the network, tapping into only the minimalist potential of NCW while claiming to master the rewards.

Amphibious ships are no different. The LPD-17 is 24,000 tons because it had to have absolutely every possible addition to be generic enough to support every possible Marine Corps requirement. When the Marines decided to remove the well deck on the LHA(R) for USS America (LHA 6), it was a decision to move towards specialization. No surprise then that this year the Marines testified in front of Congress that the well deck will be added to future LHA(R)s as soon as possible, because just the removal of the well deck turned the LHA(R) into too much of a specialization for the Marines to overcome shortcomings in necessary sealift throughput. Under the theory of Network-Centric Warfare, the Marines should be able to field sealift ships to augment any loss of throughput over the shore, or said another way, become more specialized in that capability at a lower cost allowing them to reap the rewards of the network.

Apparently not. Just like the Navy, when positioned to specialize with NCW, the Marines instead opt for generalization and refuse to invest into the potential of NCW. When it comes to ship design for the United States, the network potential heavily invested in and intended to add resiliency and specialization to our maritime military capabilities is seen as a risk to be institutionally opposed rather than as a reward to be realized.

Submarines

The direction of submarines is no different. The Virginia class block III now includes as part of the design silo systems very similar to the converted Ohio class SSGNs. The intention is to insure that every submarine can include these capabilities for SOF deployment, cruise missile strikes, and any number of other ingenious capabilities the Navy comes up with to fit into those tubes. In other words, instead of a highly specialized attack submarine, the Navy is building generalist submarines that do everything. It is rumored that the future SSBN(X) will take a modular form as to support either the SSBN or SSGN role depending upon which payload is required, again morphing from a specialized platform into a generalist platform.

The generalization trend of submarines goes hand in hand with the enormous costs of the platform. It is entirely possible for the Navy to build a cheaper submarine nuclear attack submarine specialized for Sea Denial or ISR or SOF, but instead the submarine community builds nuclear attack submarines that can do all at the same time if necessary. US submarines are the best in the world by far, but they are also becoming so generalized that affordability is a legitimate concern.

Transition to Operations

The influence of generalization on the fleet platforms above, on, and under the sea transitions directly into the generalist attitude the Navy takes in performing mission function. For example, has anyone been following the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) as it conducts the East African Partnership Station? Earlier this month the ship was with the Mauritius Coast Guard, a Coast Guard under the command of the local police authority that fields 9 small boats and 2 small unarmed aircraft. The US Navy has become so generalist with its attitude towards mission profiles like maritime security cooperation that sending a 9,000 ton destroyer to train with friends like Mauritius seems to make sense... to someone.

I must be missing something, because I think sending a 9000 ton destroyer to build maritime security cooperation with a nation that fields 9 little coast guard boats is an embarrassing reflection of the attitude that promotes generalization in the Navy, something of an arrogance that the fleet can meet any obligation regardless of how little the US Navy may have in common with the specific requirements and tasks to be done. Come on.. the New York Port Authority has more in common with the Mauritius Coast Guard than the US Navy does. It doesn't seem to register that the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) represents an investment nearly 10% the total annual GDP of Mauritius, and yet the ship is on a mission specifically to build mutual understanding, trust, and a working cooperative relationship based on common objectives? Usually cooperation is built on what folks have in common, not with a massive visual demonstration in the form of the worlds most advanced warship that reveals just how little you actually have in common.

Consider the analogy. This is like the Marines in Twenty-nine Palms strapping motorcycles to the back of their tanks, driving up to Santa Monica, pulling the motorcycles off the tanks, and instructing the Santa Monica Police bicycle patrol how to do law enforcement on the Promenade and expecting a cultural understanding to spontaneously occur as a result of the interaction based entirely on the human desire to attempt mutual understanding. I'm sure the good folks on USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) gave their very best effort, and it is entirely possible they found a way to overcome the challenges and build a relationship there, but I have serious concerns regarding the folks in leadership who came to the conclusion this was how the Navy puts its best foot forward in a cultural exchange and cooperative engagement.

The Navy takes a similar approach to naval medical diplomacy and proactive humanitarian deployments, sending LHDs and T-AKEs to provide medicine and health care. It is a very generalists approach, because if the Navy seriously considered these activities a long term strategic role, wouldn't it be much less expensive and much more productive to charter a vessel and convert it into a dedicated shallow port humanitarian ship?

Square Pegs, Round Holes

The problem is, the Navy takes the same attitude towards specialization when it comes to warfare requirements, but believes that their specialization in generalization can meet any requirement. Take for example small war littoral requirements at sea, which have been to date requirements for RHIBs, helicopters, and manpower. Well, in the minds of today's Navy leaders, the Burke is the mothership to support RHIBs, helicopters, and manpower; which is why the US Navy chases down little skiffs with 9,000 ton destroyers in anti-piracy operations.

The Philippines, Columbia, and Somalia all represent places of activity that require specialization in the maritime domain to be effective against the unique challenges faced there, but the big well funded part of the Navy is too generalist to give any meaningful assistance at sea or make a significant contribution to the activities in these places in general. The maritime activities in the Philippines, for example, are pushed off to SOF who uses a MSC charter for MSO. In Columbia the NECC makes infrequent rotations, so SOUTHCOM relies heavily on Army mariners while the Combatant Commanders request for additional supporting assets goes ignored (a problematic topic that somehow never gets brought up in public Congressional testimony for some reason). Off Somalia, well, the US Navy chases speedboats with ships not less than 9000 tons, but it's just piracy so no one cares.

There is no plan anywhere to build a ship optimized to address littoral threats, after all, the LCS is by design generalized (thus very expensive) in order to address some specific littoral threats, relying of coarse on the network to make up the platforms shortcomings in each specific warfare specialization. I have no idea how the Navy expects NCW + generalization to translate into specialization, because that isn't how Network-Centric Warfare is either stated or expected to offer benefit to the Navy. Doesn't matter though, because the Navy states they will build 55 of them and it will all turn out OK... or something like that.

The public face of Navy leadership today suggests the general consensus is that all of this generalization is OK, probably because generalization is all today's Navy officer has ever known. As the Navy has built itself through the 80s and since the end of the cold war, the specialization of generalization has become the requirement and direction resulting in massive, multi-mission capable warships. The natural result of wanting the most general capability out of each platform has been the enormous increase in the cost of all assets. Indeed, there are remarkably few examples over the last 20-25 years where the US Navy has undertaken a ship designed for a unique specialization to any requirement. A well known example of an effort towards specialization is the DD-21 with NSFS, which turned into a massive effort to add more generalization as a means of adding resiliency to the platform itself (instead of leveraging the network for the resiliency), and the result was the most expensive surface combatant one could imagine.

The Navy's integration of Network-Centric Warfare as an institutional directive has been almost entirely absent the benefits of specialization NCW was intended to provide the force. Indeed, we know that rejection of specialization is an institutional problem in the Navy, because all one has to do is look at how the Navy treats specializations - those units get dumped into the giant generic box called the NECC or pushed off to SOF - and when it comes to the NECC the Navy under funds the specializations and fails to provide any specialized support for all these specialized units.

In theory NCW is supposed to enable the Navy to become better specialized in meeting a wider range of challenges by leveraging lower cost, optimized assets. The total asset package is then protected from potential vulnerabilities through a networked approach. In reality the Navy has never even tried to leverage NCW by adding specializations, which is the way NCW was intended to add benefit.

So I ask the question, when will the Navy attempt to leverage the benefits of Network-Centric Warfare? Should the Navy even try? Is the networked maritime battlespace a risk to be guarded from, or a reward to be leveraged? So far the Navy only knows NCW as factor that adds risk to collective individual assets rather than a strength to the collective, individually specialized assets. Without leveraging the rewards of NCW and specialization, the high cost of generalization will continue to stretch the fleet.

The Sun Declares War on the Gordon Brown

Writing about Afghanistan today, this article in The Sun (every Americans favorite British tabloid) has a pretty powerful picture and a handful of combustive questions and sharp statements for the Whitehall crowd regarding Afghanistan policy. It might be one of the boldest statements in journalism that questions an official government war policy I have seen since 9/11, and probably the strongest use of journalism in terms of questioning war policy since the Falklands.

Former President Bush was hit over the head pretty hard several times in the tough 2005-2006 timeframe for Iraq, but I don't recall ever reading anything that gets anywhere close to the tough nature of that article on any major media publication. Keep scrolling, keep reading...

Those are shells, not bullets, and that picture is a powerful image.

What the MoD Does Best

Which is to hide the truth and cover own ass. See Michael Yon, but make sure you have time, the quality is often so good it can interrupt a work cycle in a bad way.

The Human Side

I have to link that discussion. It is too important not to bookmark on this blog.

An Afghanistan Surge I'd Love To Believe In

This sounds like wishful thinking, BUT... if Obama pulled this one off...

On August 11, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) kicked off its largest military maneuver in decades. About 50,000 troops, drawn from each of the seven military commands, were deployed by "rail and air transport" to unfamiliar territories far from their garrison training bases. The goal of the exercise was "to improve [the PLA's] capacity of long-range projection", reported the official Chinese news agency Xinhua...

In this case, the PLA is thinking of long-range projection - that is, sending troops out of Chinese territory for special purposes. The one territory that needs troops and where Chinese soldiers could be deployed is Afghanistan.

With its latest exercises, China could be winking at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States - both of which are presently engaged in Afghanistan - saying, we have troops, they are trained, and we could send them over.

I'll believe it when I see it.

Work on Varyag

Varyag has been moved to the dry dock for a while, not really sure what exactly has been going on in there. Now, it looks like they have started work on the island. It looks like they cut out part of it. Compare what it looks like now,

compared to July 30th

The Monster Myths of the CVL Concept

My thoughts on the idea a CVL vs CVN debate even exists over at the USNI Blog.

Thoughts on the Russian Mistral

Rob touched on the subject, but I want to weigh in on this too. The announcement that Russia intends to purchase a Mistral class amphibious ship is almost as remarkable as the announcement that part of the deal is to build more Mistral class ships in Russia. Defense Tech clearly missed the significance both in terms of industry and military strategy in regards to this development, although I imagine Norman Polmar will weigh in with some unique insights - as he often does.

From an industry perspective, a Mistral class built in Russia would immediately become the largest warship built from scratch outside the US or Europe in decades. I think that is pretty significant, in particular it suggests the Russian military has lost all confidence in its own shipbuilding industry. You also have to give DCNS a lot of credit here, Russia has historically been willing to spend money on its military even in times when their economy lags, so the Russian market holds enormous potential for the company (as well as Thales, potentially). Russia will also win big if they can produce Mistral class vessels in Russia, because Russia will be able to tap into the well educated and highly trained shipbuilding workforce of Europe to rebuild their fleet, in particular a project manager and modern skilled workforce that can replace the older and less skilled or experienced with modern tools professional workforce in Russia. It is hard to see this as anything other than a huge win for both DCNS and Russia from an industry perspective.

From a strategy perspective, this aligns the direction of the Navy with the stated national military strategy of Russia to downsize the land Army and become more expeditionary in nature. Under Putin Russia has continuously had eyes on the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and the African coast as places where Russian influence holds potential with sea power. In 2000 after becoming President of Russia, one of the first things Putin did was put the Navy to sea in preparation for a Mediterranean Sea deployment. Unfortunately for his ambitions to promote Russian influence with sea power, K-141 Kursk happened during workups for that deployment, and the Russian Navy had 6 terrible years picking up the pieces of that tragedy.

I do wonder if this is in part a reaction to the conflict in Georgia. I disagree with CNO Gary Roughead in regards to some of his shipbuilding decisions, but last summer when he ordered USS McFaul (DDG 74) into the port of Batum, Georgia he pulled a modern day 'Commodore Perry Goes to Tokyo' with that gunboat diplomacy, and it had to set off alarms in Moscow. Some may not have appreciated what he did, but I thought it was a brilliant exercise in naval diplomacy. Traditionally, naval diplomacy has been a critical element in sustaining peaceful relations in times of tension, and in hindsight I think sending USS McFaul (DDG 74) had exactly that effect. Teddy Roosevelt would have been impressed.

It is important to note that even the ineffective activities of the Georgian coast guard had to get the attention of Russian naval commanders, and in a way, one can look at the desire to purchase a Mistral as the combination of the Russian Navy applying lessons learned in the Georgian War and recapturing naval tactics forgotten from the Soviet era.

Let me explain. In the cold war, Soviet Union naval tactics depended a great deal on long range bombers and submarines, but an often overlooked but critical aspect of Soviet naval tactics was the heavy utilization of helicopters. While helicopters in the cold war Soviet Navy were heavily utilized for ASW warfare or AEW, the option to put attack helicopters always existed for scenarios including North Atlantic amphibious operations from big deck Soviet helicopter carriers. Russia had problems enforcing sea control off the coast of Georgia during that conflict last year, indeed the Georgian Navy (Coast Guard) was able to get to sea, even get close enough to attack a major task force of Russian ships operating in the Black Sea, something many people probably think is unthinkable in a modern age.

Hardly, fog of war is a constant of littoral warfare. The Black Sea Fleet had numerous fast missile attack craft, but due to political concerns those missile FACs were forced to operate under restrictive rules of engagement, which as we Americans should understand by now given Iraq and Afghanistan, is a major factor in all limited and/or small wars. Russia couldn't afford to fire ASMs, because the geopolitical consequences of hitting a Turkish (or Ukrainian) ship would have been enormous for Russia. Ultimately, the Black Sea Fleet lacked the necessary asset to control the littoral seas of that conflict; that asset being helicopters.

Russia was reminded in the Georgian conflict that helicopters, not fast missile boats, are the littoral commanders of the sea in the 21st century. This is why I am less troubled by the Type 022 China is developing than some folks, because as a naval tactician, I'd rather be facing the threat of a dozen Type 022s than a dozen helicopters in the South China Seas, although the prospect of facing both at the same time is quite unappealing. In the littorals, a helicopter is an ISR platform with a limited, but reloadable strike capability, while a fast missile boat is a strike platform with a finite heavy payload and only a limited ISR capability. Without the ISR helicopters could provide in the restrictive RoE environment of the Black Sea, the Russian Navy ultimately operated at higher risk, despite the fact the Russian Navy had enormous potential for raw combat power.

In small wars in the maritime domain, ISR is king, which is why the USS Bainbridge operated ScanEagles instead of helicopters in dealing with Somali piracy, and why I believe the US Navy must emphasize as part of a distributable network the combination of UAVs, helicopters, and RHIBs as the unmanned/manned component necessary to achieve littoral dominance. Fast Missile Boats in the 21st century maritime small war is a second class option when compared to the combination of a good endurance patrol gunboat, capable boarding teams, modern naval helicopters, and UAVs.

As an amphibious platform that can support attack helicopters, the Mistral class not only would have allowed Russia to control the seas with helicopters, but would have allowed Russia to do what their current amphibious force cannot do, specifically capture a port from the sea. The inability of the Russian Navy to capture Batum from the sea was what allowed the USS McFaul (DDG 74) to sail right into Georgia under the eyes of the Russian Navy. If you recall, the USS McFaul (DDG 74) originally wanted to sail into the port of Poti, but the Russian Army raced and seized the port to keep the ship out. The US Navy didn't go into Poti until after hostilities had ceased.

The Russian military strategy makes it clear that Russia will attempt to transition from primarily a heavy land army into an expeditionary force that can be mobilized to forward places. This is hardly a questionable concept, virtually every US military strategy analysis in the 90s suggested that was what the US should do, and as we have ended up fighting terrorism globally, indeed on almost every continent, the analysis in hindsight looked wise. Given how important the role of helicopters has always been to the Russian Navy, and how helicopters are the king of 21st century littoral warfare (the record of helicopters vs FACs is something like 43-1 btw), I think the decision to buy Mistral class ships is very much in line with Russia's stated military strategy and traditional Russian maritime strategy.

A Significant Step for Unmanned Aviation

This is another gem of an article from Defense Daily (subscription only). Reporting from Empire Challenge 09 (EC09) exercise, the article discusses software developed by Northrop Grumman that allows a modified E-2 to communicate with unmanned systems, as the system to system level, for actionable control and command sequencing.

Think through what this means in terms of evolutions in unmanned aviation towards its logical conclusions...

"The ability to collect and share real-time ISR at the theater and the tactical level quickly and accurately is crucial to ensuring battle commanders have the enhanced situational awareness required for successful mission completion," Tom Vice, vice president of Battle Management and Engagement Systems division for Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems sector said. "During Empire Challenge, we successfully demonstrated how manned command and control aircraft can direct and manage unmanned aircraft to enhance image collection and target identification. We will take what we've learned through this collaborative exercise to continue to mature our ISR capabilities to ensure our warfighters have the mission critical information they need when they need it."

One key element to the success of this interoperability was an E-2 Hawkeye developmental test bed. The test bed is based on the robust capability of the U.S. Navy's E-2 Hawkeye mission computing system which enabled it to successfully operate the Electrical Optical (EO) sensor onboard both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to requests from ground commanders. Using machine-to-machine command interfaces, the E-2 test bed was able to cue each UAV simulator to provide imagery of both static and dynamic ground tracks for target identification. The image request messages were transmitted via machine-to-machine interfaces, replacing the need for voice and manual chat resulting in an increased response time, Northrop Grumman said.

This really is interesting technology with incredible potential when you think about it, because not only is it increasing the efficiency of the unmanned constellations in the airspace in areas where access is assured, but the system to system architecture contributes significant infrastructure for evolution towards robust capabilities necessary to operate unmanned systems in airspace where active denial is taking place.

The virtual Joint STARS integrated the Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) architecture providing constellation management along with UAV control and multi-level security capability sets which enabled the platform to demonstrate an expansion of its current ISR role to include automated UAV image collection and development of target quality solutions to support strike engagements, the company added.

Sensor imagery received from the UAVs via Joint STARS was provided to an image analyst who examined each image and determined which should be included in the image product library (IPL). Images in the IPL were used to populate the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Once threats were identified, the E-2 test bed managed airborne attack assets, including F-18s and EA-6Bs, to conduct precision strike missions against those threats, based on Joint STARS ground tracks and correlated imagery supporting threat identification. The net effect of this ISR sensor tasking and command and control network was a reduction in both the 'kill-chain,' the time it takes to find, identify, and engage a target, and the operator workload required to accomplish the task, according to Northrop Grumman.

Empire Challenge 09 included unmanned systems like the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-8B Fire Scout, and the MQ-5B Hunter. In the article, Northrop Grumman attempts to buzzword the solution for irregular warfare, but once we get to the point of reliable interaction between manned aviation systems and unmanned aviation systems, it is only a few short steps before we see integrated manned and unmanned platforms as strike packages for high intensity conflict.

In theory, a future naval strike package might include a EA-18, 4 F-35Cs, and an E-2D supported by USAF JSTARS controlling multiple assets including Global Hawks, Reapers, and a squadron of UCAS. In such a package against a peer competitor, under conditions where satellite communications may be jammed or otherwise unavailable, the JSTARS and E-2D rapidly pull data from the recon assets and distribute targeting commands to UCAS assets, under the air protection of the JSFs and supported by the Growler. You can pull up any number of fictional strike packages as an example, but the point is the opportunity to exploit the peer-to-peer network nature of operating at the tactical level within a confined sky battlespace extends operational options, and greatly increases the potential to utilize unmanned aircraft even when active denial of communication networks exists. In theory, leveraging this software and existing LOS network technology, this positions the Navy towards ForceNET at altitude with unmanned technology, and even if the sky is an electron soup commands could be issued efficiently to an unmanned aviation vehicle.

This is a step from the irregular warfare space that currently dominates UAV thinking, a battle space where active denial of communications and airspace doesn't exist; towards the use of unmanned aviation assets in high intensity conflict scenarios where active denial does exist. We may not be there yet, but I see this technology by Northrop as a huge step forward for unmanned aviation.