RMN Gets a Submarine

The latest WIFR has a good article on the Royal Malaysian Navy's acquisition of its first submarine (no link, unfortunately). The first of two Scorpene class boats, KD Tunku Abdul Rahman (named after the Father of Malaysian Independence) arrived in Malaysia in early September after working up in France. Of particular note in the article was the discussion of the manner in which the Royal Malaysian Navy went about developing a submarine service cadre. Officers trained in several submarine schools and with a variety of navies, including the RAN, the Marine Nationale, and the Turkish Navy. Learning submarine ops from scratch is difficult, time consuming, and dangerous, and so the RMN essentially "borrowed" the experience of other navies. The Royal Malaysian Navy also undertook to learn submarine rescue ops from the USN, among others.

The purchase of the two Scorpene boats is part of a general Malaysian naval buildup and modernization. It's not immediately clear if additional boats will be ordered, but Tunku Abdul Rahman and her sister will undoubtedly provide the RMN with a domestic capacity for submarine service training, in addition to their patrol duties.

Blog Note

If you are using Google Wave and have done any collaboration with me on a blog topic in the past, please let me know. I have a theory that Google Wave can help me produce better content that looks at larger research quality information and organize it better for a blog format, and I like testing my theories.

Right now, virtually everything I have that I want to discuss is part of a large, multiple page PDF document and there is simply too much for one person to break down effectively. I guess I am looking to build a private collaboration model using Google Wave with some in this community to examine these documents and help break them down into presentable ideas for a blog format.

Volunteers with Google Wave should email me, not contact via comments.

Why? After seeing this post by Abu Muqawama, I can see the potential of a similar problem creeping up on me, particularly as I do more writing for periodicals, research papers, and books...

But as a technology guy I would rather adapt in real-time and figure out how to use similar techniques for managing the various types of writing than to let style differences catch up with me and diminish the overall quality of content regardless of medium. This is particularly important as my life begins to return to a routine (something I dearly miss right now) instead of the constant and frequent sudden changes that have driven my world in the last 3 months.

More on Sea Fighter

In Defense News (subscription) earlier this week, Chris Cavas wrote an article discussing the future of Sea Fighter (FSF-1). It looks like the ship will never be more than a technology demonstrator, which is what it was designed to be. With that said, this part really annoyed me a bit.

The congressional provision in the 2007 defense authorization bill's conference report called for the Navy to "add weapons (offensive and defensive)" to the Sea Fighter.
The weapons capability would also mean the ship would have to operate as a commissioned, Navy-manned ship, as civilian-operated ships owned by the government do not have combatant capabilities.

But the Sea Fighter simply didn't make a very good warship, Kelly explained. "It's a very lightweight ship. It's a catamaran, not designed as a fully operational, all-weather platform. It is a test platform to prove technology," he said. "The ship was never de-signed to be an operationally deployable vessel."

Beyond that, there simply wasn't enough money, in the Navy's view, to turn the Sea Fighter into a fighter with a punch.

"Weapons have not been in-stalled due to Sea Fighter suitability issues for deployment, lack of funding, and restrictions associated with the civilian crew," Kelly said. "Based on the funding provided, the Navy is meeting the objective to improve Sea Fighter capability and upgrade aviation and damage control and firefighting capabilities."

Congress provided $23 million for the upgrades, but the refit will probably run closer to $26 million.

When the problems the fleet is actively dealing with at sea include simi-submersible submarines and skiffs used by pirates operating up to 1000 nautical miles from Somalia, the Navy looks outright silly with this line of reasoning. If the ship is better suited as a technology demonstrator, that makes sense. That a $3 million price gap is too much for the Navy to meet a Congressional mandate? Come on, that shouldn't fly with anyone.

The key here is "operationally deployable vessel" which points to the idea of self deployment, a non-negotiable aspect of US Navy operations today. Never mind how this is a selectively applied mindset when it comes to minesweepers and PCs, and how a small vessel like Sea Fighter (FSF-1) should be given the same mindset. Hmmph.

The point of commissioning the Sea Fighter (FSF-1) was so that the Navy would take serious the opportunity to develop operations of small vessels outside traditional operational parameters. This was bigger than technology, this was about operations. The idea being to push the envelope of networked forces at sea in a new direction, and developing the logistics requirement for such operations, was never a popular idea. As Congress has consistently given the Navy a pass when they discard Congressional mandates the Navy doesn't like, it isn't much of a surprise the Navy discarded this Congressional mandate.

My question is what said here is valid?

• Does being a catamaran mean a ship is not designed a fully operational, all-weather platform?
• Are small ships incapable of being operationally deployable vessels?
• Are smaller ships nothing more than technology demonstrators?
• Is $3 million really a valid cost issue to refuse to install weapons?
• Is the civilian crew a critical component of Sea Fighter that cannot be filled by naval personnel?
• Are Congressional mandates selective, in other words, we can use the money for "this but not that?"

When it comes to the Sea Fighter (FSF-1), the US Navy's answer to all the above questions appears yes. I'm not sure I agree, but I have no problem with the ship being a dedicated technology demonstrator even if I have all kinds of problems with the fundamental underlying reasoning the Navy is using to come to that conclusion.

The rigid rejection of developing small platforms to meet the low end requirements will, in my opinion, long term be why the US Navy is exploited by smaller, flexible enemy forces at sea in the future. It will filter into everything, not only reducing the total number of ships the Navy has to operate, but influence the experience of Commanding Officers who for the most part will never know Command at Sea until after they have served 20 years. The lack of LT and LCDR Commands will be a factor during the next war, particularly if the adversary faced has officers experienced in Command earlier in their career. Given most potential adversaries are developing large quantities of smaller vessel networked organizations at sea, that last is a non-trivial issue.

Happy Thanksgiving

To all reading this from places around the world far from home--Happy Thanksgiving and thank you for your service. Someday soon, you will enjoy Thanksgiving with your family--and while you will gladly do so--something about the memory of Thanksgiving dinner with your buddies will never leave you. Savor it.

Bryan McGrath

Wanted: Big Amphibious Ships

There were two news items earlier this week discussing naval powers looking at big amphibious ships. The first is Russia, who is currently enjoying the visit by the French amphibious vessel Mistral. The Russians have an interesting way to put the capabilities of the Mistral in context.

Russian officials have said they were planning to make their first arms deal with a NATO country by buying a French ship like the Mistral — a 23,700-ton (21,500-metric ton), 980-foot (299-meter) vessel able to carry more than a dozen helicopters, or land forces, hospitals or refugees, among other things.

It is the "Swiss army knife" of military ships, said Bruno Daffix, spokesman for the French Defense Ministry's export and sales agency.

The head of the Russian navy has said that, within 40 minutes, a Mistral-class vessel could put as many troops in Georgia as it took the Russian Black Sea Fleet to land in 26 hours during the nations' August 2008 war. Russia, Georgia and Ukraine all have Black Sea coastlines.

The last paragraph is intentionally provocative, but it takes a great deal of training and preparation to be accurate. While there is obvious improvement in the Russian Navy with more frequent forward deployments, I have not seen anything from the Russian Navy that suggests a level of preparation that would allow for such a rapid operation. Capability is a hell of a lot more than just equipment, and I don't see how simply acquiring a Mistral class vessel will give Russia this capability.

Like many, I have a high opinion of the Mistral class despite some rather obvious weaknesses. With that said, it should be noted that everyone from Saudi Arabia to South Africa to Turkey and now Russia has been rumored at one time or another to buy a Mistral class from France. As there have been no exports yet, I remain a bit skeptical.

But that isn't really the big news on the amphibious ship front. The big news comes from Japan.

The nation's Maritime Self-Defence Force is reportedly planning to construct a new 284 metre long destroyer capable of transporting 14 helicopters, 4,000 people and 50 trucks.

The purchase is part of a wider military build up in which the Defence Ministry has sought funds to purchase around 40 F-35 fighter jets which will become the future mainstay of the nation's air force, according to Kyodo News.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is projected to cost around £61 million (nine billion yen) and is currently being developed by the United States, with Britain and Australia as founding partners.

Japan's decision to expand the role of its military despite its pacifist post-war constitution is a reflection of growing concerns surrounding military tensions with regional neighbours.

In plain and simple terms: China. This is a policy the US will welcome, because the more Japan and China balance themselves against one another, the easier it is for the US to be a stabilizing factor in the Pacific. Two regional powers that are skeptical of each other is much better than one regional power in geopolitics.

But back up a second... 284 meters? What? The Wasp class is 257 meters, and the often discussed British CVF is expected to be 287 meters in length. In other words, Japan is looking at a Helicopter "Destroyer" that will be larger than every naval ship afloat today except a Nimitz class carrier, and only barely shorter than a British CVF should that vessel ever be built.

Only 14 helicopters? 4000 people? A one ship battalion landing team platform? The design is going to be interesting for sure.

More on the Noisy Jin

Updating my earlier post on the Jin class SSBN, Jeffrey Lewis has a much more detailed discussion of the likely technical capabilities of the Jin, and of where the Jin stands in relation to US and Russian SSBNs. Lewis argues that the Jin's closest approximation is a Soviet Delta I, which would make it substantially louder than an Akula or anything that the USN deploys. Check it out; Lewis also has several groovy graphs.

Sea Fighter (FSF-1) Turns Ugly

Many were asking for a new picture of Sea Fighter (FSF-1), and the community delivers.


Wow that thing needs a paint job. I think she has gone from the idea of cool to the visualization of ugly. Effectiveness is what matters though.

ONI: Chinese SSBNs Much Noisier than 1970s-era Soviet Boats

Or at least that the conclusion that they've reached at FAS:

China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is noisier than the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago, according to a report produced by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

I haven't had a chance to read the original report, so can't assess whether that's a completely fair summary. This suggests, however, that China's survivable second strike capability isn't very survivable at all, and that as a practical deterrent the Jin class isn't all that much better than the Xia. The effectiveness of the Jin as a deterrent against the United States is further limited by the fact that the effective range of the JL-2 SLBM would force the Jin to sortie well beyond Chinese home waters in order to threaten the continental US. Of course, targets in South Korea, Japan, Hawaii, and elsewhere would be well within the JL-2's radius.

As Yankee Sailor noted a while back, "it's not all about us." The Jin class aren't a terribly compelling deterrent option against the United States, but they do lend prestige to the PRC, and remains relevant to China's deterrent relationship with India and Russia.

Hmm

You know, that might be CDR Salamanders most thought provoking post ever.

At the USNI Blog.

McAfee Releases an Excellent Report on Cyber Warfare

McAfee has released the Fifth Annual Virtual Criminology Report subtitled Virtually Here: The Age of Cyber Warfare. The Foreword by Dave DeWalt, President and CEO, McAfee, Inc., sets the stage.

The annual McAfee Virtual Criminology Report has traditionally focused on the methods, targets and behavior of cyber criminals. And yet, as we put together the 2007 report, numerous experts pointed out that nation-states were not only spying on each other in cyberspace, but also developing increasingly sophisticated cyber attack techniques. Since that report was published, we have seen the concept of cyber war debated more often in the face of mounting attacks and network penetrations that appear to be motivated by political objectives instead of financial gain, making it a stretch to characterize them as cybercrime. We decided to revisit the possibility of war in cyberspace in this year’s report.

Experts disagree about the use of the term “cyber war,” and our goal at McAfee is not to create hype or stoke unwarranted fear. But our research has shown that while there may be debate over the definition of cyber war, there is little disagreement that there are increasing numbers of cyber attacks that more closely resemble political conflict than crime. We have also seen evidence that nations around the world are ramping up their capabilities in cyber space, in what some have referred to as a cyber arms race.

If cyberspace becomes the next battleground, what are the implications for the global economy and vital citizen services that rely upon the information infrastructure? What should those of us outside the military do to prepare for the next wave of cyber attacks?

Finding answers to these questions was not easy because much of this discussion is only happening behind closed doors. We believe this veil of secrecy around cyber warfare needs to be lifted.

There is little doubt that the impact of cyber war will extend beyond military networks. As our dependence on Internet technology grows, so does the need for thoughtful discussion on political conflict in cyberspace. This year’s Virtual Criminology Report highlights the complexities and potential consequences that arise when political conflict goes online. Our hope is that the report will help encourage and frame a global dialogue on protecting our digital resources from the scourge of cyber war.

The report is not groundbreaking stuff for cyber security experts, but it is easy to read and very useful for everyone else. In my opinion, this report does a great job of building a broad contextual understanding of cyber warfare for the broadest audience possible. Another aspect of the report that I think is helpful is how it explores the uncertainty surrounding the role of the private sector in cyber warfare between nation-states.

Naval War College Online Discussion

An interesting development. Two thoughts. This is another example of why I think Rear Admiral Wisecup is different than previous NWC Presidents.

Second, Jeff Cares continues to be a one man influence enterprise in the Navy discussion, despite rarely adding his own content.

Accidental Civilian Deaths on the Rise

Charli Carpenter has earned some well-deserved attention with this post, which argues that the balance between the intentional killing of civilians and the killing of civilians as "collateral damage" has undergone a profound shift since the 19th century. The percentage of civilians killed intentionally has dropped substantially as a percentage of total civilians killed during war. This, perhaps, is not surprising, as the laws and norms that regulate war have taken an increasingly dim view of the intentional targeting of civilians. It's actually more complicated than that (rules have changed over time), but it's fair to say that a strategic bombing campaign deliberately targeting civilians, such as the United States and the United Kingdom carried out against the Axis powers in World War II, is now nearly unimaginable. The more surprising finding, however, is that the absolute number of civilians killed unintentionally (as part of other military operations) has grown substantially since 1945, and continued to grow after 1990. This is remarkable, given the steady drop in the number of inter-state wars across this period. Thus, while fewer civilians are being killed intentionally, more are being killed accidentally.

Dan Drezner notes another puzzling aspect to this trend:

Second, this bump in collateral damage also took place during a revolution in precision-guided munitions -- which, in theory, was supposed to reduce the likelihood of collateral damage.

The theory goes like this; PGMs obviate the need for saturation bombing of a particular target area by making it possible to destroy a single building or installation without destroying the rest of the neighborhood. I can think of at least two reasons why PGMs might not have produced a reduction in accidental civilian deaths. The first is that planners feel more comfortably ordering attacks in heavily populated areas when they think that they strike with precision. The collateral damage rises because of the general hubbub of civilian life (people walking past the Serbian Ministry of Intelligence when it happens to get hit), and because of PGM malfunctions and innaccuracy. The second reason is intelligence; PGM strikes depend on reliable intel about targets. The most accurate munitions in the world will produce collateral damage when they are fired at the wrong target, or at a civilian target that is inappropriately deemed hostile.

I suspect that another reason for an increase in collateral damage is casualty aversion. Casualty aversion increases the use of air attacks, and forces rules of engagement that focus more on soldier safety than on civilian survival. I wonder, though, if changes to more casualty-averse ROE increases collateral damage, or simply shifts civilian deaths from "intentional" to "collateral". For example, civilians will die in both a Soviet raid of an Afghan village in 1984, and a US raid of the same Afghan village in 2009. In the latter case, some of these civilians will die because of the inherent difficulty in distinguishing insurgent from civilian in dangerous situations, and because of the general fog of war. In the former case, civilians will die because terrorizing the village is part of the point. The civilians are dead either way (although hopefully fewer are killed in 2009), but the deaths are redefined from "intentional" to "collateral."

Indeed, this last question is relevant for evaluation of the argument as a whole. If civilian casualties are simply being redefined from "intentional" to "collateral", then the implications are somewhat different than if collateral damage is increasing independent of intentional killing. The shift could still be problematic, because redefining civilian casualties as accidental allows governments and individuals to elude legal responsibility for killing. However, it's less troubling if the overall numbers of civilian killings are on the decline.

LCS Manning

I tried to post this as a comment to Galrahn's post below, but I am apparently computer literate enough to be a contributor but not a commenter.

-------

G--fantastic analysis, especially the identification of "manpower as module" concept. I've been watching with some amusement the proliferation of "I told you so's" in the blogosphere attending to the recent Navy announcement that LCS 1 will deploy with 20-25 "extra" people. These folks look back to the FFG7 design days and the manpower claims made then--only to be proven unworkable in the fleet. They say that LCS was headed in the same direction, and that the Navy's "reversal" is a testament to their prescience. I disagree.

A ship's maiden deployment was moved up some 18 months (I believe). The full-up ASUW module was not complete, and so a variant of it will deploy--along with the people to support it (as has been the scheme of maneuver from the beginning). But the CoComs wanted VBSS and Maritime Security capability on the platform (imagine that--driving the Maritime Strategy into the mix) , and so the Navy is flexing to provide it--AND THE PEOPLE TO MAN IT. So what do we have here? Is it evidence that the Navy was low-balling manning in a nefarious plot to hide costs? Or is it that the way the Navy wants to man the ship is actually the way they are manning the ship. Put another way--just what in the announcement doesn't comport with what we believed would be the way the ship was manned? What was the manning associated with a Maritime Security module? There isn't such a thing, you say? Well there is now. The flexibility and adaptability of the LCS concept is unfolding itself right before our eyes, yet some would rather engage in picayune "see how smart I was" debates about manning. The Navy is (I believe), courageously attempting to adapt in real time--something even the most loyal navalists among us would not grant it as one of its strengths.

Could the Navy eventually wind up adding billets to LCS? Yes, it could. Should it at least have some time in which something other than the R and D budget and the shipbuilders are taking care of maintenance to refine exact manning needs based on manpower analyses conducted with actual data rather than good guesses? Yes it should. Is there a chance that we might all just for a second, suspend our abiding negativity and superiority and give the Navy a chance to work its way through what Galrahn has with great insight described as a time for new ways of thinking and operating? Yes we should. The Navy's collective IQ quite possibly rises with each retirement--and the longer I'm retired the more valid I find this possibility.

Bryan McGrath

The Year of 'Payload Centric Warfare' Force Structures

A decade ago when the Streetfighter debate broke out, there was a smaller debate discussing 21st century ship design that got lost somewhere along the way. The focus of that debate was on the littorals and the Streetfighters, but one of the important ideas that carried over was the concept of focusing on payloads when developing 21st century waships.

That eventually led to technology development of modularity, and with that the concept of payload quietly became a comfortable, familiar idea but absent the Naval Postgraduate School SEA LANCE study (26MB PDF here), the conversation regarding payloads never really materialized into serious intellectual analysis. While SEA LANCE concentrated on towed payloads, conceptually the idea focused on increasing payload flexibility options for new ships. It really was a novel way of thinking, very much ahead of its time.

As I finally emerge from too many weeks of obligations, I have had time to think about what I see as an emerging Payload Centric Warfare capability developing momentum inside the US Navy today. This isn't a new capability, the US Navy has always enjoyed the large payload capacities of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships, and this decade the Navy has exploited the utility of high speed vessel transport capacity allowing the Navy to move relatively large payloads with smaller vessels at high speed. The definition of "Payload" I am using here doesn't directly apply to the MSC, as I refer to payload as a warfighting and peacemaking capability, not as a term substituting for cargo.

When naval officers discussing LCS say "everything you know about how to operate, maintain, fight, and survive has to be rethought," they are right. It is actually much bigger than LCS. Traditional line of thinking in the military has long paired form and function as a symbiotic relationship, but in this era of warfare, we have learned they are not. US convoys in Afghanistan aren't getting hammered by mobile vehicles or heavily fortified platforms, rather the most dangerous weapon system leveraged by the enemy to great effect is manpower without body armor or backpack. The reason that man is lethal against our platforms is because the enemy is able to leverage the environment to exploit the emerging 21st century principles of war on the battlefield better than we currently are.

Attack, Speed, Maneuver, Control, Flexibility, Precision, Surprise, and Communications are the principles of war that are achieving the most successful results on the 21st century battlefield, and I note they are the principles of war being integrated into the emerging AirSea Battle doctrine the Air Force and Navy are working on. Read that Air Force Times article, read this paper (PDF), and observe the concepts advocated while noting who the authors are and where they are serving in the DoD today.

The Littoral Combat Ship news this week being discussed here and elsewhere glanced over a key point. In the 21st century, emerging weapon systems and technologies are not the only payloads for naval ships; manpower has become a critical payload to peacemaking the maritime domain in the 21st century. What was lost in the analysis, including my own, is that the Navy didn't add manpower to the LCS, manpower became the module of the LCS. The distinction is key. Ships that are not flexible enough to separate form and function are becoming relics of the last era of naval warfare, and that idea has not set in among many who are observing the direction of the Navy today - and I think the LCS discussion this week can be examined as evidence of that point.

This year has been remarkably quiet, and as a Naval blogger, somewhat boring to discuss actually. For all the promises by the new administration for an open dialog, the Navy has become a closed book when it comes to public discussion of the ideas being developed. There have been multiple force structures debated, discussed, and wargamed this year as part and separated from the QDR development process, and yet only one force structure and doctrine concept from the Naval community was ever discussed publicly. Influence Squadrons, at its fundamental core, was conceptually the idea of regionally distributing platforms capable of Payload Centric Warfare for cooperative engagement and capacity building purposes during peacetime, and going under and over the sea to penetrate A2AD networks in war.

Another idea that emerged this year that no one has publicly discussed yet, but I believe will get some attention in public when discussed in detail, is the force structure produced this year by the Naval Postgraduate School often called the New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM). What I like to call Streetfighter Part Deux, Captain Hughes and others at the Naval Post Graduate School have produced an evolution of the Streetfighter concepts first promoted a decade ago. At its core is a Payload Centric Warfare concept that distributes warfighting and peacemaking capabilities into networks of smaller systems to swarm and overwhelm A2AD networks.

The force structure concept that is emerging as one most likely to make it into the QDR is the "boxes" force structure concept. The "boxes" concept emphasizes open architecture combat systems on warfighter centric platforms like CruDes and Subs, flexible payload space on everything else, and emphasizes a distributed, joint operations doctrine. Note again the emphasis of Payload Centric Warfare where "boxes" are filled with common combat systems and open space is utilized for flexibility.

The common theme among these naval force structures discussed during this QDR year is the flexibility towards platform payloads. It is also noteworthy that none of the force structure debates this year ever discussed frigates, primarily because cold war era frigates do not have the flexibility to separate form and function. The view of naval warfare inside the strategic planning and policy bubbles are rapidly evolving, but the LCS announcement this week highlights how the Navy has a long way to go towards building public support to conceptually embrace a broader vision of flexible payloads that, as of today anyway, appears to be viewed with skepticism when packaged in the form of the LCS.

Somali Piracy Continues Expanding

To help understand the point, right click the image to the right and open in a new window. Every icon on the map represents a hijacking this year, and you may be able to make out the month to observe the patterns. The big yellow arrow... lets examine those three in order going from right to left.

BW Lion attacked on 11/9/2024

Somali pirates have launched their furthest attack in the Indian Ocean thus far, according to the European Union Naval Force (EU Navfor).

The attack on the VLCC ‘BW Lion’ was launched by pirates in two fast attack skiffs 400 miles northeast of the Seychelles and 1,000 miles east of Mogadishu.

“Automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades were fired. With increasing speed and evasive manoeuvres, the master managed to evade the attack. No casualties were reported,” EU Navfor said.

NELE MAERSK attacked on 11/10/2024

Danish shipping and oil group A.P. Moller-Maersk's container ship Nele Maersk was attacked by pirates off the Somali coast on Tuesday but evaded them unharmed, a company official said.

"They were approached by white skiffs of the kind Somali pirates often use and believe they were shot at," a Maersk spokesman said. "The ship sped up, made some evasive manoeuvres, and was able to escape."

FILITSA hijacked on 11/11/2024

Somali pirates said Wednesday that they had seized a container ship with 22 crew members on board after a five-hour chase across the Indian Ocean, reflecting both an increase in pirate activity after the end of monsoon storms and signs of increasing boldness among the hijackers.

The African Seafarers’ Assistance Program, based in Kenya, identified the vessel as the Filitsa, Reuters reported. Andrew Mwangura, a spokesman for the program, told Reuters that it was sailing under a Marshall Islands flag and carrying chemicals to South Africa from Kuwait.

There is absolutely no way skiffs can operate that far out to sea without a mothership. Clearly the mothership continued to operate for three days before the pirate band was able to hijack a ship. At 1000 nautical miles, it would would be very difficult to get a warship out that far in less than two days from the escort area in the Gulf of Aden, and nothing smaller than a Burke in the US Navy could do it in 2 days due to logistics over that distance.

Also note, that big red icon labeled October just to the left of the three Novembers I am pointing to with the yellow arrow..., that was the Chinese bulk carrier DE XIN HAI hijacked back on October 19th. There have been at least 20 attacks originating from Somalia in November so far, including five in the last 48 hours and most of those attacks are now in the Indian Ocean, where no convoy system exists.

These four attacks in particular, two of which were successful hijackings, are representative of the expanding regional challenge that unhindered piracy in the Indian Ocean represents. What began as a littoral crime is now taking place way out in the deep blue, suggesting pirates have developed seafaring skills and capabilities that are allowing them to expand their striking range. Compounding the problem, it can take hours to get an aircraft out that far, meaning ships are on their own for extended periods of time without support. Despite government efforts from the worlds economic powers contributing naval ships for escort and investment by the maritime community, the evidence continues to suggest that only mother nature has been effective in curbing piracy, despite the presence of over 30 warships!

For the United States, both CENTCOM and AFRICOM are now tasking warships and aircraft towards the anti-piracy effort, and yet both attacks and hijackings continue at a high rate. Naval presence and scouting with aviation has increased both awareness and information while cooperation has increased both industry countermeasures and international information sharing. The data highlights strong efforts have been made, therefore what is broken is not effort or intent. For me it is abundantly clear that what is broken is the political policy driving the strategy to deal with the problem.

With Army Generals in Afghanistan now pointing out that Al Qaeda has almost entirely shifted out of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Somalia, Somalia should be treated as an emerging asylum for the global jihad with intent to attack the United States. It is unreasonable to suspect Al Qaeda movement and activity in Somalia only to additionally assume they will ignore the incredible effectiveness of piracy originating from Somalia. The tactics, training, technology, and revenue streams surrounding the Somali piracy problem suggests an ideal environment for further expansion of Al Qaeda capabilities and techniques, and the absence of any containment off the coast of Somalia is an invitation to future disaster for western nations that depend on trade at sea. The ranges involved in recent attacks highlight that containment must be examined as the next step, because if the global community does not move to contain the expanding problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean, we are playing with gasoline in one hand, and a flamethrower in the other.

The Obama administration needs only to look at recent history to see what the powder keg Somalia can become for US Presidents. With both diplomatic and military options available, and as international support in both Europe and Asia shift towards greater action to get a grip on this problem, the Obama administration has a window of opportunity that should be realized while it exists, and before the powder keg explodes in someones face.

Seafighter (FSF-1) Back at Sea

Seafighter has been hiding for a long time getting repairs and upgrades, but I got a tip from a Ham radio operator today that FSF-1 was at sea today chatting with the Coast Guard on VHF 16.

I for one look forward to seeing what the Navy has done to the little ship. If it was up to me, I say we send it with the next Strike Group that deploys straight to the Seychelles with some UAVs, a make shift prison cell, some heavily armed Marines, and a non-restrictive RoE.

The Navy Goes Wargaming...

Such an interesting development.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Newport is soliciting proposals for Feasibility Studies for the Execution of a Massive Multiplayer Online War Game Leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI).

I found this part interesting.

It is anticipated that the number of players will be between 50 and 1000. Players will be drawn from a pool that includes military officers, government civilians, and government contractors. It is expected that players will be generally knowledgeable but not necessarily be Subject Matter Experts. The game will be unclassified; however it will not be open or available to the general public. Respondents should be prepared to address game play within a restrictive information assurance environment.

And the details.

The game is non-deterministic and will be played in three moves that are related to, yet still distinct from, each other. It is conceivable that insights gleaned from game play during Moves One and Two may be used to modify Moves Two and Three respectively. Respondents should plan on some level of effort being dedicated to being part of the game controller team during game play, and to making changes to the scenarios of subsequent moves. Each move is anticipated to last between one to two weeks of calendar time, with one to two weeks of calendar time between moves for game controller activities.

Move One - Protecting the Sea Lanes: Move One is designed to get the players engaged in the game - collaborating and thinking strategically. Players attend a major International Anti-Piracy Conference being convened under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. Players, representing various anti-piracy stakeholders, sign up as members of various working groups which are tasked with addressing aspects of the piracy problem. Once formed into teams/working groups, the players will have tasking to address activities related to military and operational coordination, information sharing, and the operational role of the regional coordination center. The complete player tasking is contained in the attachment. What the players produce: working as part of collaborative teams, the players will produce n-# of multimedia responses to the tasking they receive, where n-# corresponds to the number of teams. Assignment of players into teams: To the maximum extent practical, it is the intent that game controllers allow the teams to self organize and self manage. Thus, it is conceivable that a distribution of team sizes will exist, including some that are very small and some that are very large.

Move Two - Attacks at Sea: The scenario is multiple near simultaneous attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa. Players would be self selecting and self organizing into collaborative teams of either Red (pirates) or Blue (US and Allied response). It is conceivable that players may have the option of signing up to be part of a third party as well, representing e.g. NGOs, other governments, etc, but this has not yet been determined.

Players will be provided with a menu of Red forces to work with, Blue forces to work with, constraints on how much of each they can use, and a description of the targets. This will be government furnished information. The attachment has more complete details. The first action belongs to Red, who is tasked with developing a plan of attack, with a deadline. The players would then produce n-# of multimedia responses, where the response describes their plan of attack. Once the Red plans of attack are submitted, then Blue takes over. Blue teams may respond to as many of the Red plans of attack as they wish. Blue's output consists of n-# of multimedia responses, where the response describes their plan of defense/counter-attack to the various Red attacks.

Move Three: The game continues with a final move consisting of a range of scenarios that are logical outcomes from Move Two. These scenarios include, but may not be limited to: . Conducting a hostage rescue ashore . Conducting a hostage rescue at sea . Dismantling pirate base camps . Disrupting the pirate support infrastructure ashore and/or overseas . Helping the Somali Transitional National Government and Puntland officials restore order and the rule of law . Developing a viable indigenous Somali Coast Guard . Providing humanitarian assistance . Others, potentially based on insights gleaned from play in Moves One or Two

Teams will have the option of selecting which scenario(s) to play. The format of game play will mirror that of Move Two, this time with Blue owning the first action and Red having the response. The players would produce the same output as in Move Two, i.e. n-# of multimedia responses consisting of a plan of attack (for Blue) and a plan of response or counter-attack (for Red).

In other words, if you are looking to fight the future fleet of China, you should stick with Harpoon 3. For the most part, I think games can be overrated as teaching tools. I am a bit biased though, keep in mind I have work experience in the gaming industry so know it from a different side than players. With that said, I do believe a few things gaming and simulation can teach includes strategic thinking, organizational pattern recognition, and communication skills on many levels.

It is an interesting development, but all it does is take wargaming to the home PC. I personally think no simulation will ever be good enough to replace the value of having everyone in the same room, but I'm old fashion that way.

Proposition

I'm finishing up an article on the Battle of the River Plate for WIFR, and I'd like to run a proposition by ID's readership:

The essential questions of the Battle of the River Plate ought not to be "how did the British cruisers do so well against a German pocket battleship?" but rather "how did a glorified German heavy cruiser do so well against a trio of British cruisers?"

This is to say, my argument will be that Graf Spee performed more than adequately as a combat vessel, and was lost primarily because of failures of German intelligence and command. Thoughts?

Question of the Day

Piracy off Somalia, particularly in the Seychelles, is very active again. This morning, the Maersk Alabama was attacked again, although this time the security team on the ship shot back.

The question is, what is the next step? There are no improvements in the government. Al Shabab has not slowed down. The Naval coalition off the coast is larger than ever, and more expensive than ever even as ships are hijacked and ransoms are paid.

Is it time to look diplomatically at recognizing Somalialand and Puntland independence? Should military operations be escalated to the shores? Should there be a blockade of the known pirate cities?

The current policy is to ignore the complete lack of progress. Is this a good policy, or is the timebomb ticking?

US/China relations + PLA transparency

I just have some random thoughts from the last couple of days with Obama's visit to Asia and all the news releases with PLAAF’s 60th anniversary. There have been a lot of new articles recently about the deterioration of the US-Japan relationships with the DPJ sweeping into power. One of the bigger issues we hear recently is the relocation of the Futenma air bases in Okinawa. And I’m sure that many others know the issue better than I do on this, but it seems like the Okinawans are calling for all US troops to leave the island. I know it’s a very unlikely scenario, but how would loosing an air base like Kadena affect USAF operations in the PacRIM (especially in Taiwan scenario)?
Of course, President Obama also visited China on this trip to discuss a series of issues. Climate change and currency valuation are probably the two biggest items on Obama’s agenda. I think for the former, China will continue to accept more responsibility, because it really is in its national interest to do so. We have basically seen the Chinese green energy industry explode in the last couple of years. Even though it has not made any firm promises on targets, it is actually making a lot of progress in every area. I think the Politburo will soon realize that they are already on pace to achieve targets that Western countries expect of them and actually accept some kind of commitment. Even so, I’m not sure if they will figure this out before the all important Copenhagen talks. In the area of currency valuation, I think Chinese leadership will totally miss the ball on this one. Even though it’s probably for their own good to let RMB appreciate, they will probably stubbornly tie their currency to USD longer than they should. With all of the public and private sector debts, it’s hard to imagine USD having anywhere to go but down. If China wants RMB to have some kind of role in a future world reserve currency, it would be much better if it can speed of the process of becoming a floating currency. On the flip side, if China let their currency rise, then it would not have to purchase as much treasury, which will force more purchase by the FED and accelerate the decline of USD. So while US wants China to let its currency rise, it also might not like the resulting affect. The right thing for China to do is probably let its currency rise. And the right thing for USA to do is to get its spending in order, cut down its debt and raise interest rate. However, neither side looks like they are willing to do the right thing.

On the security side, I think we all know by now what the biggest issues are on both side. I have always found the Chinese complaints over F-16 sale to be kind of funny. I am not entirely sure what the order backlog is like for F-16s, but I believe the following countries are still in the midst of receiving their F-16s: Turkey, Pakistan, Greece, Poland, Iraq and Morocco. Even if the F-16 deal gets approved and signed by next year, it will probably take until 2014 before the F-16s get all delivered. We recently heard that the next generation Chinese fighter will be ready in 8 to 10 years. I really don’t think this F-16 deal will help ROCAF as much as most people think it will. The concern I’ve always read from the Chinese military insiders is that they consider F-16 to be an offensive platform. If that’s the case, a deal can still be done without the latest multi-role weapons like JDAM and SLAM-ER.

The major US complaint over China is obviously the issue of transparency. In the past week, PLAAF made some announcements that were surprising to many people in both the transparency and the content. The deputy commander of PLAAF said that China's 4th generation fighter (5 generation for America) is expected to test flight shortly and also take about 8 to 10 years to enter service. In comparison, J-10 first flied in 1998, delivered to the PLAAF Flight Test & Training Base for evaluation in 2003, had first regiment regiment established in 2004, but still was not considered by Chinese media to have entered service until 2006 when they had already established 2 active regiments. F-22's production version first flew in 1997, commenced Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in 2003 and achieved FOC in 2007. If China's 4th generation fighter has a similar time line to J-10 and F-22, it would take about 8 years to go from first flight to service entrance. The first flight would have to happen in the next 2 years to achieve that 8 to 10 years promise. The interesting part is that Kanwa, which is well known for its flawed coverage on PLA, claimed that the 4th generation program had no chance of making its first flight in the near future. The funny part was that an expert from Chinese Air Force Command College replied by saying that PLA would never make an open announcement without believing that it will happen. I personally agree with latter, because it really is very unusual for PLA to make such an early announcement on a project that is so strategically important. Also, I have also read enough rumbling through my Chinese sources to believe that 2018 is probably when the 4th generation plane enters service.

I actually even found a US newspaper covering this story. That article picked up this story from a recent Aviation Week entry. I guess the big question now is why Pentagon was so wrong in its predictions, because it actually said China will not have any 5th generation fighter by 2020. As I read this article, I even myself shaking my head reading these parts.

In April, Adm. Wu Shengli, the navy chief, listed supercruising fighters among equipment that his service needed. Notably, all the other equipment on his wish list looked quite achievable by the end of the next decade, matching the timing that the air force now suggests for the fighter.

-----big gap-----

When Wu raised the prospect of a supercruising fighter, an easy answer seemed to be an advanced version of the J-10. That looks less likely now that He describes the future concept as a full generation ahead of the J-10.

“I believe the Chinese have a difficult road if their design is tied to the J-10,” says a U.S. Air Force officer involved in the development of the F-35. “Significantly reduced signature requires more than coatings. It requires an integrated design philosophy with the right shaping, the right structure and the right surface coatings.”

It's pretty well known in China that CAC is not only working on the J-10B project, but also is the main contractor for the next generation project. When the admiral made his statement, I find it hard to believe that the US military actually thought he was talking about an improved version of J-10 or J-11. Much of information on existing PLAAF projects are available online and Huitong's site even does a great job of putting everything together in place. If someone from the Pentagon bothered to check out his section on J-10B, which I can verify to be fairly accurate, they'd know that J-10B has already flied and would be in service years before the end of next decade. They are separate projects. In fact, J-10B must happen before the next generation project, because many of the subsystems will first be tested on J-10B. Here is another part that reflects pretty badly on the US intelligence community:

In his July 16 speech, Gates said that even in 2025 China would have but a handful of fifth-generation aircraft.

The Pentagon seems to have no clue on the progress of China's next generation project or its induction size. I've personally read enough sources to believe that this CAC design will have a small production run like F-22. There will be another next generation design that will form the lo-end of a hi-lo combination (like USAF is doing with F-22 and F-35), but that will come later. I've always found it interesting that the Pentagon seems to have trouble identify the number of each type of aircraft in service with PLA, because they have access to all open sources, secrets sources and the most comprehensive satellite images. I personally commend Scramble for doing a great job in identifying all of the Chinese air bases, order of battle and the plane type in each of the bases. In many cases, Scramble ORBAT is updated before even the most enthusiastic Chinese military forums catch hold of a new regiment conversion.

On a similar note, I saw that the ASBM story has landed on Bloomberg this morning. The most interesting part is here:

China’s ballistic missile “portends the sophistication of the threats that we’re going to see,” Roughead said in an interview earlier this year.

China has ground-tested the missile three times since 2006 and conducted no flight tests yet, Navy officials said.

‘Limited Capability’

General Xu Caihou, China’s No. 2 military official, played down the weapon’s significance.

“It is a limited capability” to meet “the minimum requirement of” China’s national security, Xu, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, said in response to a question following an Oct. 26 speech in Washington.

The fact that General Xu basically confirmed this weapon should tell you how far along it is. I think this is another development that took way too long to be identified and should've been taken more seriously when everyone was focused on the submarine threat. And with the ASBM story making rounds, the just as important story of the long range LACM deployment is almost totally disregarded.

In conclusion, I think that a lot of transparency complaints that the Pentagon throws at PLA are valid, but it is also unacceptable that the Pentagon would be caught off guard in so many cases. There are enough resources out there that can be researched to form much better conclusion on the progress of the Chinese military.

Freedom Deployment Requires Additional Sailors

An interesting article at Navy Times highlighting the addition of 20 sailors to the upcoming deployment of USS Freedom (LCS 1). There is much contained in the article worth discussion and consideration. Lets begin here:

"One of the things we’re looking at is crew workload. We’re monitoring it, and it was deemed prudent that we should bring on a separate team for that [maritime security operations] boarding team capability," said Capt. Mike Good, the program manager for LCS’s mission modules.

Cmdr. Don Gabrielson, Freedom’s Blue Crew commissioning commander, who has since moved on to a position on the Joint Staff, anticipated criticism of the Freedom’s taking extra people. It might be seen as an early concession that the ship can’t operate in the real world with the small crew for which it was designed, but that’s not so, he said.

"People are going to say, ‘Hey, this is more people than they said they’d need. They’re lying to us!’" he said. But just as an LCS will take aboard custom equipment to hunt submarines or mines, so too does it need custom gear — in this case, sailors — for a visit, board, search and seizure team, he said.

Additional details of the deployment also provided:

In addition to the extra sailors, Freedom’s “tailored” surface warfare package will include two 33-foot rigid-hull inflatable boats for its VBSS sailors; its two Mk 46 30mm guns mounted on the multiuse boxes atop the superstructure; an armed MH-60S Seahawk; and “quite a collection of boarding team equipment,” Good said, including flak jackets, small-arms weapons, grappling hooks, and specialized gear for at-sea boardings.

Freedom will not take a Fire Scout unmanned helicopter or any of the maritime robots it’s designed to carry, nor will it carry the Non-Line-of-Sight missiles designed to be part of its surface mission package. That weapon, being developed with the Army, is still being tested.

The article has a lot more, including a mention of the January 16, 2024 commissioning date for USS Independence (LCS 2). Lets start at the top.

First, the addition of 20 crew makes sense, in fact it is a validation of several theories of naval warfare promoted on this blog regarding the necessity to put more manpower at sea on motherships to deal with the 21st century irregular warfare challenges facing the Navy. Two fully crewed RHIBs, an MH-60S, and twenty sailors heavily armed sounds exactly like the capability the Navy needs today. Add a bit of ScanEagle scouting and I want that capability for fleet ops. I would bet the Navy is looking at it in a similar way.

I think ~100 is going to end up being the final number for the LCS, and I am comfortable with that. One of the often overlooked elements of "Hybrid Sailors" is that experience is a requirement. It means more chiefs, more experts, and more productivity per sailor. It also provides an opportunity for the Navy to test a flatter organizational model on a Navy ship. We know that flat organizations are more efficient, and I also know that smaller crews are fundamentally different environments that promote different standards for teamwork, where concepts like 'leader' and 'follower' can sometimes be interchangeable when there is mutual respect for capacity and capability of members in an organization. A lot of people are skeptical ~100 crew would be enough for the LCS, but I am not one of them. I believe in the end we will see a flat organizational model emerge among the "Hybrid Sailor" crews, because whether the SWO community (retired and active) likes it or not, all that extra school and experience when combined with the right attitude and tight knit environment will produce a higher quality sailor; and network of sailors.

But there is also a problem that comes out in this article. Cmdr. Don Gabrielson gets really defensive here, so much so it stands out as a major section of the news article (fairly or not). The original hype for the Littoral Combat Ship set such high, unrealistic expectations that the blow back from critics has itself matched the hype and intensity of the original supporters. Folks like Cmdr. Don Gabrielson now find themselves in the middle of two extremes and come off as immediately defensive.

The problem isn't the ongoing intensity and unrealistic expectations of supporters and critics, rather how everything has become a zero sum game with the LCS. First it should be highlighted that the ship is meeting a primary justification of the ship: flexibility. Modularity represents an interesting technological concept, but the purpose of modularity was to achieve flexibility. In the case of the "tailored surface warfare package” the ship is flexible enough add the sailors and equipment necessary to field the capabilities desired for this deployment. Regardless of hype or imperfection, flexibility is exactly what the Navy wanted from the LCS and is exactly what they have. This is good, as it is a reminder that just because something isn't 'just right' it doesn't have to be 'wrong'.

There are many unproven assumptions surrounding the Littoral Combat Ship concept. Unproven doesn't mean incorrect, but it does mean more testing and development is necessary to be credible. My advice to people like Cmdr. Don Gabrielson (and I get it he is in a completely unfair position here) is to stop answering critics AND stop advocating justification, and instead promote the Littoral Combat Ship for exactly what it is: a learning opportunity for integrating new technologies and operational concepts. The LCS is achieving exactly what it should by being flexible enough to provide "tailored" modules and being adaptive enough to support emerging requirements. It is OK for the Navy to simply accept flexibility alone as a justification, and instead of answering critics, look forward towards what does and does not work in the field. After all, a lot of the LCS will remain new even after the deployment, and the deployment itself may end up being a real bust... so lets stop betting the farm on unproven theory and get into process of testing to determine what does work.

The LCS, and the LCS modules, are not zero sum and need to stop being treated as such by both supporters and critics. The LCS represents a rare opportunity for surface warfare to innovate, but it will completely fail if the opportunity is used instead to justify or validate unproven concepts without rigorous testing and development.

On Being A Captain....

A ten-year old nails it; sent to me by a friend who was a pretty fair Captain himself....

Bryan McGrath

PG School Aids in Domestic Counterinsurgency

Fascinating article here from this morning's WaPost on an effort by local authorities in Salinas, CA to combat a growing gang-violence problem using the tenets of the proliferating cottage industry of counterinsurgency. Deep in the heart of this approach are faculty and students from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), some of whom have operational experience in counterinsurgency.

A couple of things strike me about this initiative. First, I've never been a fan of the Naval Postgraduate School. Nothing personal, just a sense that it would be better for both the Navy and the society it serves if we sent those officers out into civilian universities to gain graduate degrees. I'm sorry if this opens a huge can of worms here--and I assure you, I won't be drawn any further into the argument. All that said--this is indeed an important initiative and something NPS can be justifiably proud of.

Second--this also seems like a logical application of counterinsurgency theory--which at ITS heart seems to me to contain a great many tenets of what has come to be called "community policing" or in some circles the "broken windows" approach. When I think about the problem of gang violence in America--and then think about what I know of modern counterinsurgency theory--there seems to be a good match here.

Finally, while there may be a good match HERE, I don't think there's a good match everywhere. I grow increasingly pessimistic about the success of a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, believing that the existence of a functioning civil society--at a very basic level--is the fundamental requirement for the application of COIN techniques. I question the broad existence of such a society in Afghanistan, and I believe that the Apostles of COIN are overselling the prospects for its success there.

So there you have it---one shot, two victims (NPS and COIN). Fire away.

Bryan McGrath

WWII Japanese Subs Studied Off Hawaii

I ran across this article in my reading this morning (Hat tip: Instapundit), and it seriously updates my understanding of the state of Japanese submarine technology in WWII--which was admittedly scarce to begin with.

One of the subs (I-201) was capable of 20 knots submerged and had a rubberized coating to counter sonar. The other (I-14) was significantly larger and carried TWO manned aircraft that could be deployed from a deck-launched catapult.

Apparently, both of these submarines were captured at the end of the war and then ultimately sunk--with speculation that the scuttling was designed to keep the technology from falling into the hands of the Soviets. Servicemen who had been part of the sinking operation helped provide modern day researchers with locating information in their search.

I'd be interested in knowing the state of OUR technology at the time; whether what we got from exploiting the Japanese technology actually helped move ours along or whether we were more advanced at the time.

Bryan McGrath

Janes: Bringing Back the Kirovs

I came across this Janes article and I began wondering what exactly would be the point. Then I remembered the US Navy has recently been discussing building their own 24,000+ ton battlecruiers, and Russia already has some...

The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) is to reactivate two laid-up Kirov-class (Project 1144) battle cruisers, according to statements attributed by Russian media to the country's deputy defence minister.

Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin reportedly said that the Ministry of Defence has decided to renovate and modernise its heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser (tiazhyeliy atomniy raketniy kreiser/TARK) units Admiral Lazarev (ex- Frunze ) and Admiral Nakhimov (ex- Kalinin ).

The 24,300-ton ships were commissioned into the Soviet Navy in 1984 and 1988, the second and third vessels in a class that eventually numbered four. Col Gen Popovkin made no mention of the lead ship, Admiral Ushakov (ex- Kirov ), which entered service in 1980 and was decommissioned in 2004, appearing to confirm earlier reports that it is to be scrapped.

The RFN currently has one ship of the class in service, Pyotr Velikiy (ex- Yuri Andropov , ex- Kuibishev ), which was launched in St Petersburg in 1989 and commissioned in 1998.

Janes reports this because this is the first time an official statement can be linked to a specific person, but the rumors of reactivation have been out there for about 2 years now. Those rumors have been the Russians wanted one battlecruiser to be the flagships of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Black Sea Fleets respectively.

With that said, I remain skeptical. First of all the nuclear fuel on these ships has likely expired, or is close to being spent. The process of replacing the reactor fuel, if not the entire reactor, is going to be very expensive. Reactivation of these old battlewagons could easily run $1.5 billion each, and that kind of money isn't just laying around. The record of the Russian shipbuilding community restoring old ships is not very good, and it is complicated by a lack of confidence in the shipbuilding industry as a whole right now.

Now, it could be that recapitalization of these ships is a domestic pitch as the Russians turn to Europe to build new ships. That isn't necessarily a bad approach, indeed it would be politically favorable IF the Russian economy recovers as has been suggested in 2010. Also, there are new radar systems and land based interceptors the Russian Navy has not fielded at sea yet, and these platforms are large enough that they can be adapted to do exactly that. This is still taking an industrial and Russian political view at the restoration of the big battlecruisers, but what about from a strategic view?

The Russian Naval strategy is not to fight the battle of the North Atlantic circa 1980, rather to reestablish presence for Russia in the seas surrounding Asia including the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, and Arctic Ocean. Do these battlecruisers advance that strategic view? Potentially, yes.

As the US is looking at ways to develop larger warships capable of providing credible radar systems for ballistic missile defense at sea, the Russians may be looking at their own large cruisers as a cost effective way to deploy some nuclear powered ballistic missile radar sentries themselves. The Russian military strategy is expeditionary in nature, meaning downsizing the Army and building up non-commissioned officer corps to make land forces more flexible and deployable, but it also includes a proactive view towards future technologies that allow Russia to compete in sea, space, and cyberspace against the US and a rising China while expanding Russia's soft power capabilities. The recapitalization of the old Kirov class as nuclear powered ballistic missile defense platform may be exactly the kind of capability the Russians see as a viable, cost effective evolutionary approach to play catch up to western ballistic missile influence systems that to date, are far more advanced than what Russia has.

Nothing like a big ship with plenty of power to build new technologies form. It doesn't hurt that they can carry almost any payload, and has plenty of size to be adaptable. While restoration would likely be very expensive, it would still cheaper than building new large battlecruisers.

Fleets in Being

Interesting post from UltimaRatioReg:

When built, Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat. Slightly larger than her more famous sister, Bismarck, KMS Tirpitz displaced more than 43,000 tons. She was 824 feet long, armed with eight 38-cm (15”) guns, and had exceeded 31 knots on trials. The British had tried desperately to destroy her before she was even completed, and between the RAF and Royal Navy, many air, surface, and subsurface attacks had been only moderately successful, and had often paid a heavy cost for their efforts....

It has been estimated that the “fleet in being”, of which Tirpitz was the centerpiece and eventually the only significant unit, tied down ten times its own combat power in Royal Navy battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. Many of these powerful warships were desperately needed in other theaters of war, most notably in November/December of 1941 in the Pacific.

First a technical quibble; the idea that Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat can't be allowed to sit uncontested. Debates on the relative capabilities of WWII battleships are about as helpful as arguing about the merits of Lennon vs. McCartney, but advocating for Tirpitz is about as sensible as defending the idea that Ringo was the most important Beatle. She was large, yes, but inferior to foreign contemporaries in many respects, including armor, main armament, and anti-aircraft protection. Had Tirpitz encountered a North Carolina or South Dakota class battleship, or even a King George V on equal terms, there's no question I'd rather be on the Allied vessel; recall that Prince of Wales, even crippled by teething problems in her main turrets, inflicted more damage on Bismarck than she received at the Battle of Denmark Strait.

As to the "fleet in being" as purely historical concept, the "10 times" figure seems pretty hyperbolic, especially in reference to fall 1941. First, the German Navy had several major units in addition to Tirpitz (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau both remained operational, as did two pocket battleships and three heavy cruisers) which in fact limited the number of warships the British could deploy to the Pacific, but by nothing approaching a factor of ten. The only fast battleships that the RN had, apart from Repulse and PoW, were King George V, Duke of York, and Renown. The slower R, Queen Elizabeth, and Nelson class ships were effective in the Med, and as convoy escorts, but were thought to be of limited utility in either the Pacific or in the role of commerce raider chaser. Thus, the RN didn't have a tremendous advantage over the forces available to Germany; indeed, to confirm advantage the USN deployed Washington and North Carolina to the Atlantic for the first six months of US participation. So while it's true that the Allies maintained heavy forces in the ETO because of the German units (and battleships, of course, aren't the entire story), it's important not to overstate the leverage that the Germans earned from their "fleet in being".

The other issue was the Italian Navy. We tend to remember the Italian Navy as a joke, but in 1941 it was a force to be reckoned with. Even post-Taranto, the Italians possessed three modern fast battleships, as well as a number of older units that had been effectively updated. The RN did not dominate the Med in 1941; if the German Navy hadn't existed, the forces thus freed up would more likely have been used against the Italians than in deterrence of the Japanese. The continued presence of several powerful French units, and the possibility that Vichy might join the Axis, also limited the Royal Navy's ability to deploy to the Pacific.

Thus, the idea that the German Navy represented a major drain on Allied resources isn't quite wrong, but there's a significant danger of overstating its impact. The Royal Navy seemed overstretched in 1941 because it was genuinely overstretched; it was utterly incapable of fighting the Germans, Italians, and Japanese all on its own. This matters, because the Tirpitz example leads URR to ask:

Could a burgeoning Chinese Navy become a “fleet in being”? What implications does that hold for the United States? In each historical example, a “fleet in being” that threatened vital interests was countered by one of two approaches. The first was the dedication of naval combat power in excess of that which such a “fleet in being” could bring to bear, ensuring a reasonable chance of victory. The second was an attack (pre-emptive in some notable cases) on that fleet from the air while the critical elements of that fleet were in harbor.

For this parallel to make sense, we would have to posit additional naval powers that would stretch the USN beyond its breaking point. The German Navy was ineffective in the face of British superiority in the absence of the Japanese and Italian navies; the "stretching" of British forces was strategically useful only in that it left the Royal Navy unable to fight effectively in other theaters. The Royal Navy was also demonstrably inferior in naval capabilities to the coalition of Japan, Italy, and Germany. There is no comparable modern counter-coalition to the USN, unless you imagine simultaneous hot wars against China, Russia, Japan, and the EU. Thus, until the United States faces the potential of such a coalition, I doubt that it's helpful to think in terms of pre-emption; overwhelming superiority will do.

Anti-Piracy Reaper

Check out this pic. Looks like we have an anti-piracy pod.

EU Piracy Policy Topics To Be Raised Next Week

There are two articles discussing EU evaluations of piracy options looking into 2010. The first is the need for more frigates. This one is from DefenseNews.

"The EU has committed three or four frigates, in 2010 but we probably need between six and 10 to cover that vast area," Gen. Henri Bentegeat said at a news conference following a meeting of the EU Chairs of Defense Staff (CHODs). He insisted that there was coordination between the EU and NATO naval assets in the area and "certainly no duplication."

As for progress on developing military capabilities at the EU level, he said it was "hard to tackle shortfalls in a time of economic crisis" but stressed that "countries cannot afford to go on focusing on national priorities without giving more thought to European cooperation."

The EU was formed for reasons of economics, but is coming around to seeing the link between security and economics. That last sentence would normally be noteworthy, but it is a General not a politician making the statement.

Spain wants more than just ships though, they are discussing the necessity for the EU NAVFOR to change tactics.

Spain wants EU naval forces to blockade three Somali ports used to launch pirate attacks against ships in the Indian Ocean, Defence Minister Carme Chacon said Wednesday.

She said Spain will call on European Union foreign and defence ministers to concentrate military efforts on blockading the ports at a meeting next Monday and Tuesday.

"We know that it is from these three ports that most, if not all, 'mother ships' used by pirates reach up to one thousand miles away from the coast -- as they did yesterday -- and carry out kidnappings far from the coast," she told RNE public radio.

Chacon also said the pirate gangs "have ties to sophisticated law firms in London," and she called for the international community to do more to track ransoms given to pirates to release hostages.

Two critical points here. The UN already allows operations by foreign navies in territorial waters of Somalia, so there is a legal foundation to build a case for such tactics. With that said, a blockade is going to require a lot of ships and is a lot different than simply escorting convoys.

But the main point is the last one, specifically following the money. Pirate attacks originating from Somalia are up, particularly in the Seychelles area in the Indian Ocean. It is only a matter of time before the next major incident, and it is unlikely to be as spectacularly handled as the Maersk Alabama incident.

Latest 054A and Carrier model pictures

This week has been pretty much been dominated by news about the air force. On top of the pictures and news I have already shown above, there have also been a lot of pictures coming out showing the latest toys of the air force. However, I think it's important to show the progress of the navy since that is still going on.

The first set below shows the the status of the island on both Varyag and the Aircraft Carrier model. It looks like they are about to put an APAR like the one on 052C on Varyag (or maybe they will put multiple face to give complete coverage). It's actually kind of strange for them to MFR on a carrier, because I really don't expect it to carry a long range SAM like HHQ-9 on there. I was more expecting HQ-16 with associated sensors like a Sea Eagle volume search radar with several Orekh FCRs to illuminate targets. It's possible that the data from APAR would be used to provide additional volume search and targeting data for escorts as well as for itself. If that was true, it could confirm CEC already existing with PLAN.




The pictures below are both from HuangPu shipyard. The first two shows the 4th 054A to be built in HuangPu shipyard. The last two shows the 3rd 054A from HP shipyard and it has just finished its sea trials. It has received the number 571, which means it will join the South Sea Fleet. The 3rd 054A from HD shipyard will then receive the number 569 and also join the South Sea Fleet (if we go by the standard PLAN procedure in commissioning new ships). That means 4 054A will be in South Sea Fleet, 2 054A + 2 054 will bein East Sea Fleet and no 054A will be in North Sea Fleet. It does make sense for the 4th pair of 054A to go to NSF, but we will have to wait and see. It is the neglected fleet in PLAN.

Proactive Asian Security

This news article from Monday is a geopolitical shock wave in Asia, perhaps one of the more interesting and long term important developments involving the security arrangements in Asia in some time.

India and Japan "expressed their commitment to contribute to bilateral and regional cooperation," according to the Defence Ministry's official release, issued at the end of the Tokyo meeting between visiting Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony and his Japanese counterpart, Toshimi Kitazawa.

Japan and India will boost their mutual efforts in peacekeeping and disaster relief, the release said, as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum, which fosters constructive regional dialogue.

"The two countries also recognized their mutual interest in the safety of sea lanes of communications and welcomed recent reinforcement of cooperation in the field of maritime security between the two defense authorities, as well as the inauguration of the Japan-India Maritime Security Dialogue, which was held in India last month," the release said.

This is an interesting development as it points to how Asian powers are viewing balance of power. India looks at Pakistan and China, then discovers Japan. Japan sees China, and discovers India. The maritime relationships between Japan and India have been developing over time, and this is a natural next step. As a point, this is an example where maritime relationships expand cooperation.

Obviously we are talking about baby steps, but forward movement is still forward movement. This is very much in line with what Robert Kaplan at CNAS has discussed as it relates to the US Navy as a balancing force between emerging regional powers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The activity in China to develop pipelines in Burma and Turkmenistan are directly related to energy security, not economics. With the largest Navy in the Pacific Ocean (Japan) now cooperating with the largest Navy in the Indian Ocean (India), both of which are economic competitors of China, one can see why the investment in land pipelines is very much in the interest of China even as it costs a hell of a lot more than moving energy by sea.

A final point. This is also a sign that the Asian economic powers are taking their security into their own hands. There are no signs of US fingerprints here, even as we would very much like to have a seat at the table. It is not inaccurate to note however that 3 decades of stability and cooperation in Asia that the US has helped maintain is a contributing factor to this development. As nations rise economically, this is a natural side effect.

Victory at Sea

I expect that this will interest virtually no one, but today I'm live-tweeting the Victory at Sea marathon being screened in honor of Armistice Day on WETA.

Atomic Obsession

I had the opportunity earlier this week to diavlog with John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, on his new book, Atomic Obsession. Mueller's argument is that the importance of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated in several ways; popular culture has exaggerated the effect of individual nuclear weapons, historians and political scientists have exaggerated the importance of nuclear weapons to Cold War stability, and policymakers have wildly overhyped the threat of a terrorist group employing nuclear weapons. The book is readable and quite good, and although I would quibble with elements of the historical argument I think the skepticism about a nuclear terrorist attack is dead on. As Mueller argues, the "1% doctrine" is a somewhat sensible way of thinking about the necessity of preparedness for high lost, low probability events, but at some point the events are of such low probability that it's a waste of time to build policy around them. In this section, we discuss the role that arms control efforts might play in eventual nuclear abolition; Mueller is skeptical.

Middle East Naval Blockade

The next flash point in the Middle East is starting to heat up. When Saudi Arabia gets to the point they are willing to use military power outside of their own country, the situation must be a lot worse than the daily news suggests. See this YouTube video for a pretty good update on the situation in Yemen.

This is the latest significant development.

Saudi Arabia has imposed a naval blockade along the Red Sea coast of northern Yemen in an attempt to cut off supplies to Houthi fighters along its border with Yemen.

The kingdom's warships were ordered on Tuesday to search any ship suspected of carrying weapons or fighters near the Yemeni coast, a government adviser said, as Riyadh vowed to continue its offensive against the rebels until they pull back from the border area.

Despite a warning by Iran to keep out of Yemen's affairs, Prince Khaled bin Sultan, the Saudi deputy defence minister, pledged to keep up the military offensive against the Houthis on Tuesday, as he visited Saudi troops in the kingdom's southwest Jizan province.

This could be the beginning of the active, open use of military force in the political standoff between Saudi Arabia and Iran that has been simmering for years. I also wonder if this will have any effect on the human smuggling that takes place between Somalia and Yemen?

The continued growth of Islamic militant movements in the Horn of Africa region cannot be ignored in the Afghanistan calculations. It does the US and allies no good to throw resources into Afghanistan if the violence that threatens global economic instability is spilling out into one of the busiest economic highways in the world (Gulf of Aden).

How does the active engagement of Saudi military forces in the south influence the calculations of Israel in dealing with Iran? Also, keep an eye on the Saudi Air Force, the best trained of the Saudi military forces. The level of their engagement is a measuring stick for how serious the situation is from the Saudi Arabian perspective.

South Korean Navy Engages the North

As Bryan noted yesterday morning, the South Korean Navy and the North Korean Navy had a bit of a border skirmish at sea yesterday morning. Early reporting isn't always accurate, but there are already some interesting details worth noting.

From what has been reported in the press, we know that a South Korean Chamsuri class patrol vessel engaged an unidentified North Korean patrol boat in a gun battle. The sequence of events leading up to the shooting goes something like this.

At 11:27 a.m, the North Korean patrol boat violated the NLL, venturing south of the disputed sea border. The South Korean Navy issued three verbal warnings to the North Korean ship beginning at 11:22 a.m. after noticing that the patrol boat was crossing the NLL.

After waiting a few minutes, the South Korean Navy issued two more warnings as the Norht Korean vessel moved more than a kilometer passed the NLL. At 11:37 a.m the South Korean Navy vessel fired warning shots about 10 minutes later, to which the North immediately responded. The battle immediately erupted at around 11:37 a.m. near Baegryeong Island and lasted about 2 minutes.

The South took about 15 shots from the North, which fired 50 rounds. The South responded with around 100 rounds, and the North Korean vessel fled back across the NLL reportedly after taking heavy damage and on fire. Unconfirmed reports suggest the North had 1 killed and 3 wounded in the engagement. There was no one injured on the South.

As one might expect, tensions are high after the incident, and the South has sent two more patrol boats to the border area this morning.

A few observations.

The North responded to warning shots as if they were an attack. This could mean they were looking for a fight under any conditions, but could also mean there is a training issue with the North Korean Navy and they simply didn't know the difference between warning shots and the real thing. The North Korean Navy doesn't exactly have modern equipment nor is it well trained, while the South Korean Navy has both modern equipment and is one of the best trained Navy's in the world.

Even though the North and South are technically at war, and have been for decades, rules of engagement still played a key factor in this fight. 5 verbal warnings, then warning shots, before engagement. The South Korean JCS said something about the fight not being at close range, but the Chamsuri class patrol vessel only has two Bofors 40mm guns as a main weapon, probably L/70 (a guess, don't have my books with me and correct me if I'm wrong) which have a max range out to around 5 miles. In fights within 5 miles of a target at sea, are helicopters more or less vulnerable as littoral strike platforms?

Modern littoral warfare is no more or less different than littoral warfare for the last several centuries, as it still comes down to who fires effectively first and usually, whose gun is more effective. For me, this is yet another example where the lessons of littoral warfare highlight that protection from missiles (Stealth/RCS) is secondary to protection from guns at visual range (armor), and crossing the T is hardly out of style because bringing the most guns to bear on target is still critical to winning these kinds of fights.

Before pointing out that Standard Missiles, ESSMs, or Harpoons would work in this situation, check your chart first, and someone tell me which Admiral, or Captain, is sending a large warship into those waters during periods of potential hostility. South Korea has major naval assets, and you will not find them in those waters. Someone tell me what ship the US Navy would use in waters like these, which are found everywhere around the world. When giving it serious thought, I think we either need a lot more armed USVs, or need to rethink our approach to littoral warfare. This thing was over in 2 minutes, way too late for air support.

There are always political intentions behind these kinds of incidents, but it looks like local control for escalation was given to the South Korean CO of the patrol boat. While it is unclear whether the North was looking to create an incident, even as everyone has been predicting one would happen (STRATFOR, NIGHTWATCH, etc), that warning shots were responded to directly as a sign of hostility is important. After all, North Korean isn't the only aggressive Navy in the world with poor training.