Force Structure in Order to Create Partnership

Now this is interesting (p.29):

The intention is for these units to steadily grow to the point at which their staffs can sustain specialized expertise in regions and countries of greatest importance and regularly detach experts to accompany units deploying to training missions abroad. In addition, the Air Force will field light mobility and light attack aircraft in general purpose force units in order to increase their ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner air forces.

And (p.30):

DoD will double its current capacity to provide [training for partner aviation forces]. This enhancement will include the purchase of light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force's 6th Special Operations Squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces such aircraft might be appropriate.

These are part of the QDR section titled Build the Security Capacity of Partner States. Now, unless I'm reading this wrong, the argument seems to be that the United States needs to purchase and operate COIN oriented aircraft in order to effectively train partner states to operate such aircraft, in both an organizational and technical sense. I find this of particular interest because I wrote my dissertation on the subject of how military organizations learn from one another; one focus was the need for transfer of tacit, practical knowledge in addition to explicit, written knowledge. This is to say that the best kind of learning is learning by doing, and learning by doing is only available from those who have already learned to do. The proposal here seems to be that the USAF ought to restructure its procurement and training (if only on a relatively small scale) in order to become a better "teaching" organization to its "learning" partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

My second thought is this: I have long wondered what the end state expectations are for the Iraqi Air Force. During its heyday, the Iraqi Air Force was a large, capable, technologically advanced force capable (theoretically, anyway) of long range strike against a variety of opponents. Given that the political situation in Iraq remains uncertain, it has never been clear to me that the US intended to rebuild this Iraqi Air Force; the threat is too great that advanced fighter aircraft sold to Iraq in two years might be used against the US (or Israel) in ten years. At the same time, whatever Iraqi Air Force is created needs the capacity to support Iraqi ground forces against both domestic opponents and foreign competitors such as Iran. I'm wondering whether the idea of re-orienting the USAF, even on a small scale, around operational training in COIN platforms indicates that US expectations of the Iraqi Air Force will be measured, modest, and defensive.

...to put this in a naval context, here's a somewhat similar passage (p.39):

U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies.

Note, though, that this doesn't seem to include the idea of operating particular platforms for the purpose of being able to instruct others in their use.

The Mistral Sale and the Russian Information War on Georgia

On December 1, 2009, the Center of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) in Moscow published a collection of essays about the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. The report is written in Russian so it is unlikely to be widely disseminated, but for English readers, the Jamestown Foundation has a two part summary of the report up (Part 1 and Part 2). The report is well done, although any who read the original Russian report will find plenty to quibble about.

The two part series at Jamestown Foundation is a good primer for the ongoing discussions of the Mistral amphibious ship sale to Russia, because there is a new twist in the sale that is directly related to Georgia.

You have probably heard by now how France has come up with a number of reasons how they justify the deal, beginning with the need to better integrate Russia with Europe. The French ambassador to the UN will not even discuss the subject with reporters there who ask questions, and there is no sign from the government that France considers the issue subject to influence from other nations. Russia also faces internal pressure regarding the sale from those who believe the industry needs the work. It is true, but the Russian government apparently has no faith in the shipbuilding sector in Russia right now. It is still unclear how the Mistral deal will help the Russian shipbuilding sector, but improving procedures and modernizing the shipyards is considered one aspect of the Mistral deal.

Meanwhile the Mistral deal is reportedly set for March according to some Russian officials, but there is more to the deal than meets the eye and the deal is not a sure thing. As it turns out, the Mistral deal is part of a larger Russian information war against Georgia.

First Caucasian Channel began broadcasting on Eutelsat’s new W7 satellite on January 15th, and it only took 2 days for Russia to complain about the channel. The channel was created by the Public Television of Georgia earlier this year with a main objective "to bring truth to peoples in North Caucasus - to Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan as well as to Russian republics in the Caucasus that fight against the Kremlin's armed forces." The channel was taken off the air after being up for less than two weeks. The station was intended to run a few weeks as a test before a long term contract for the channel with Eutelsat would begin on January 31st. The reason the station was taken off line was originally said to be technical in nature, but Eutelsat no longer says it is a technical issue, rather claiming the trial period has now expired.

On January 27 Le Figaro ran an article suggesting the reason the channel was taken down was Russia. "Eutelsat is under strong pressure from Russia to break its contract with Georgia," asserted a diplomat in Tbilisi on Tuesday. The operator Eutelsat is about to give in to the Kremlin, "which would be very serious" and, according to the Georgian diplomat, "akin to political censorship" the Le Figaro article says.

Gia Chanturia, general director of the Georgian Public Broadcasts was in Paris this weekend seeking answers from Eutelsat and French government officials. He is unlikely to like what the French tell him, because my sources both in Washington, DC and Paris have confirmed that Moscow has made cancellation of the First Caucasian Channel by Eutelsat a condition of the Mistral sale.

While I am sure there are still negotiations ahead, it is noteworthy the French government is indeed entertaining this condition of the sale - as no contract has been signed.

And that leads me back to the CAST publication. The paper leaves an impression of political and military equilibrium between Russia and Georgia, but I either misunderstood or stand in strong disagreement with that conclusion. There is no balance between Russia and Georgia as a result of the August 2008 war, and just as the United States did nothing for Georgia when Russia had troops on Georgian soil, do not expect the United States to stand up for Georgia now. The suggestion there is some sense of balance between Russia and Georgia is a myth, whether presumed, implied, or created; and the Mistral deal with all of its conditions serves as a visible reminder of that reality.

As we watch Russia leverage their unequal national power to influence France, keep an eye on eastern European countries like Poland. This will get bigger than Russia, Georgia, and France before it is all over, and the potential for long term consequences in Eastern Europe is not trivial. It is noteworthy that foreign military sales reform is an issue in the 2010 QDR. The details of FMS will be important, because it may turn out to be the difference between our allies in Eastern Europe buying quality military equipment from the US - or seeking vast quantities of military equipment from elsewhere.

Just saying... France may trust Russia, but countries like Ukraine and Poland do not. The FMS issue in the US and the Mistral deal between Russia and France will insure that Foreign Military Sales is an enormous topic in 2010 - something I discussed in the first edition of Midrats.

(Speaking of Midrats, tune in Sundays 5:00pm - today's guest is Mackenzie Eaglen on the QDR)

QDR 2010 Hi-Lights

QDR 2010 Highlights (see Robert Farley's post for link to the document)

• Two clear objectives
o Rebalance to prevail in today’s wars while preparing for future threats
o Reform DoD institutions and processes

• Defense strategy
o Prevail in today’s wars
o Prevent and deter conflict
o Prepare to defeat adversaries in a wide range of contingencies
§ 2 “MRC” construct is back, but there is the “need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations”
o Preserve and enhance the All Volunteer Force

• Rebalancing the force (6 key missions)
o Defend the US and support civil authorities at home
§ Enhancements
• Improve responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management forces
• Enhance capabilities for domain awareness
• Accelerate development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities
• Enhance domestic capabilities to counter IED’s

o Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations
§ Initiatives
• Increase availability of rotary wing assets
• Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems for ISR
• Increase key enabling assets for SOF
• Increase counterinsurgency, stability ops and counterterrorism competency and capacity in general purpose forces
• Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan
• Strengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic comms

o Build the security capacity of partner states
§ Initiatives
• Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance
• Enhance linguistic, regional and cultural ability
• Strengthen and expand capabilities for partner aviation forces
• Strengthen capacities for ministerial level training
• Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces

o Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments
§ Enhancements
• Expand future long range strike capabilities
• Exploit advantages in subsurface operations
• Increase the resiliency of US forward posture and base infrastructure
• Assure access to space and use of space assets
• Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities
• Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems
• Enhance the presence and responsiveness of US forces abroad

o Prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
§ Actions
• Establish a JTF Elimination HQ to plan train and execute WMD elimination ops
• Research countermeasures and defense to non-traditional agents
• Enhance nuclear forensics
• Secure vulnerable nuclear materials
• Expand the biological threat reduction program
• Develop new verification technologies

o Operate effectively in cyberspace
§ Initiatives
• Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace
• Develop greater cyber expertise and awareness
• Centralize command of cyber operations
• Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments
• Guiding the Evolution of the Force

o Changes directed characterized under the following trends
§ US ground forces remain capable of full-spectrum ops
§ Navy forces continue robust forward presence and power projection ops; add capabilities and capacity for working with partner navies. Rapid growth of sea and land based missile defense
§ Air Forces more survivable as 5th gen fighters join the force. Need for greater range, flexibility and multi-mission versatility in land and sea based fighter force. Addition of aircraft to the inventory appropriate to training and advising partner air forces
§ Increase capacity of special ops forces
§ More and better enabling systems—ISR, EA, comms networks, resilient base infrastructure, enhanced cyber defenses
o Program kills highlighted (in addition to 2010 budget kills—F22, DDG 1000 (truncated), FCS, defer prepo ship, stretch procurement cycle for CVN’s)
§ C17—cease production
§ LCC (command ship)—delay; SLEP existing ships
§ CGX—cancel
§ Net Enabled Command and Control Program—cancel

• Taking care of people
o Wounded warrior care
o Managing deployment tempo
o Recruiting and retention
o Supporting families
o Developing future military leaders
§ “recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer’s career”
o Developing the total defense workforce

• Strengthening relationships
o Strengthening key relationships abroad
o Evolving US global defense posture
o Improving unity of effort (whole of government approach)

• Reforming how we do business
o Reforming security assistance
o Reforming how we buy
o Strengthening the industrial base
o Reforming US export control system
o Crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy

• Balancing for a complex future (2011-2015)
o Department of the Army
§ 4 Corps HQ
§ 18 division HQ
• 73 BCT
o 45 active 28 reserve
§ 40 infantry
§ 8 Stryker
§ 25 heavy
§ 21 combat aviation brigades (13 active 8 reserve)
§ 15 Patriot battalions, 7 THAAD batteries

o Department of the Navy
§ 10-11 CVN 10 CVW
§ 84-88 large surface combatants, including 21-32 BMD capable combatants and AEGIS Ashore
§ 14-28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships)
§ 29-31 Amphibs
§ 53-55 SSN, 4 SSGN
§ 126-171 land based ISR and EW aircraft
§ 3 Prepo squadrons
§ 30-33 CLF ships (+1 MLP)
§ 17-25 command and support vessels (including JHSV, T-AKE, MLP
§ 51 RO/RO strat sealift vessels
§ SSBN’s will be part of the Nuclear Posture Review
§ 3 MEF’s
• 4 MARDIVS (3 AC, 1 Reserve)
o 11 infantry regiments
o 4 arty regiments
• 4 MAW
o 6 fixed wing groups
o 7 rotary wing groups
o 4 control groups
o 4 support groups
• 4 Marine Logistics groups
• 7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements

o Department of the Air Force
§ 8 ISR wings (up to 380 primary mission acft)
§ 30-32 airlift and aerial refueling wing equivalents
§ 10-11 theater strike wing equivalents (72 acft per wing)
§ 5 long range strike bomber wings (up to 96 acft per wing)
§ 6 air superiority wing equivalents (72 acft per wing)
§ 3 C2 wings and 5 fully operational air and space operations centers
§ 10 space and cyberspace wings

o SOF
§ Approx 660 special operations teams (Army ODA’s, SEAL Platoons, Marine Spec Ops Teams, USAF STS operational aviation detachment
§ 3 Ranger battalions
§ 165 tilt-rotor/fixed wing mobility and fire support primary mission acft

Assessment:

1. Very little here that would surprise anyone.
2. Return of a 2 MRC “like” planning construct notable
3. Recognition of “Jointness” anywhere in an officer’s career is important
4. Nuanced and hedged view of China, respect for India
5. Importance of partnerships/relationships/capacity building
6. Recognition of “international system” and special role of US in its sustainment
and protection
7. No discussion of “pre-emption”, but America’s Armed Forces “…will retain the
ability to act unilaterally and decisively when appropriate…”
8. Notable emphasis on HA/DR, mitigation of human suffering
9. Predictable emphasis on Jointness and Whole of Government approach
10. USN/USAF “Air Sea Battle” highly touted; interesting given that it has yet to
yield anything


QDR 2010 is a solid statement of priorities and approaches well-known to observers as hallmarks of the Obama Administration approach to defense and national security issues. Acquisition reform, whole of government approaches, strengthening relations with allies, and a general acceptance of the status quo vis-à-vis force levels—in addition to the continuing emphasis on “winning the war we’re in” through commitment to irregular warfare investments in training and material—these are the touchstones of this document.

Bryan McGrath

QDR Available

Andrew Exum has posted the 2010 QDR. I assume that everyone already knows this, and is too busy reading the document to post here.

In a related story, my daughter makes clear her position on the appropriate allocation of scarce defense resources:

Observing Haiti and Operation Unified Response

Two weeks ago, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) became the symbol of American power and compassion as the ship sailed offshore Port-au-Prince and began helicopter operations following Haiti's devastating earthquake. Two weeks later the situation in Haiti has improved considerably, although problems and challenges still exist.

I am not usually a big fan of Thomas Donnelly, he is kind of hit or miss with me on issues, but I highly recommend his article Mission to Haiti in the Weekly Standard. I would take it one step further than Thomas Donnelly does though. I would advise the President to consider negotiating for a Naval base in Haiti. The lease for a potential Naval Base for 99 years would be a great way to insure money in support of rebuilding the country.

We don't necessarily have to build the base immediately, rather just use the land as a place to store the billions of dollars of equipment that is heading to Haiti now in support of this relief effort. One idea might be to lease and build the base in cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and Brazil - promoting buy-in from regional partners. Shared responsibility and shared costs using a potentially less efficient but nonetheless effective western Berlin model for sustained presence. Regardless of what is decided, discussing Haiti in the long term needs to begin sooner than later.

I have been holding off all week on discussing Haiti. The result is, I have a lot to say.

Mass Information

If you are having trouble finding good data on Haiti, you are not alone. I have only been able to find 2 useful sources for good statistical information on military operations in Haiti: APAN and Blogger Roundtables. If you know of another, please let me know.

There is probably more official information on Haiti available from the DoD than any other operation the DoD is involved in, including Iraq and Afghanistan. It really is remarkable, the Twitter - Facebook - social - viral - network strategy has been very effective, and you can simply search hash tags in Twitter to see how many tens of thousands are seeing official Navy information. From a mass information distribution perspective, the US has scored an A+.

The problem is the information is mostly useless. It shows work being done, but doesn't give explanation of how mission is being accomplished. There are no public maps, no discussions of what the 22 MEU is trying to do, the 24 MEU is trying to do, or what the Navy is trying to do. "Open the port" and "deliver aid" is about as detailed as some of the information gets, except in some places.

Want to see a picture of the hardest working Navy-Marine-Coast Guard team in the world, watch Twitter or Facebook. Want to find out what is going on in Haiti? Good luck to the average American. Apparently the DoD will show the American people a video of a smart bomb hitting a building on Arab soil but won't show a map of how Marines are saving lives in Haiti. What, did the $61 million raised by George Clooney not reveal the level of interest by the American people in Haiti?

We are two weeks into the largest military operation since the Iraq War and there have been exactly zero briefings where a map was used in a press briefing with someone showing what our military is doing in Haiti. Dvidshub has been an excellent source of information, but SOUTHCOM does need to do a better job of providing public information of their biggest operation in history. Examples below.

Fuzzy Math

Rear Adm. Ted Branch, Commander, Carrier Strike Group One aboard USS Carl Vinson, gave a bloggers roundtable on Tuesday January 27th discussing operations off of Haiti. I missed it, but Navy News Service has an article on the interview, and the transcript is available here (PDF).

So far, Branch's strike group has performed 1,979 flights, nearly 1,600 of which were mission-related operations, delivering personnel and supplies. Medical evacuations made up 375 of the sorties.

These flights made up "the bulk of the vertical lift used" in the Navy's effort, he said.

A bit of math here. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) arrived on January 15th and the roundtable was the 27th. Assuming the numbers were through the 26th, that means an average of almost 180 flights per day with an average of ~145 mission related per day. As this began with 25 helicopters on day 1 and has ramped up to around 63 today, these suggest very impressive numbers.

Branch said the Navy as a whole has brought more than a million pounds of cargo to Haiti, including 87,000 gallons of water, nearly 162 tons of food, 345,400 pounds of medical supplies, 75 tons of support equipment and 3,300 people to help in relief efforts.

Branch's group - which consists of 12 ships deployed to Haiti, including the Carl Vinson Strike Group ships, the USS Nassau (LHA 4) and USS Bataan (LHD 5) Amphibious Ready Groups and the hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) - is expecting a lengthy deployment.

In another bloggers roundtable on Saturday January 24th, which I also missed, Capt. Bruce H. Lindsey, commanding officer, USS Carl Vinson, mentioned something that was covered in this DoD press release.

“We are probably doing 180 to 240 landings a day off of this ship,” he said. “The sailors on the flight deck and in maintenance are doing the hard work, making sure they are getting into the country.”

One of the main things the ship transports is medical supplies. Another is water -- the ship has transported more than 30,000 gallons of water. A group of sailors on his ship also created a water tree, where they took piping and created spigots, and use the supply of water from the ship to fill containers with water for those in need in Haiti.

Lindsey said sailors volunteered their time to do build the water tree and fill 5 gallon jugs with water by hand. Because of their volunteer efforts each helicopter that leaves the ship has 32 of these jugs on flight.

Noteworthy, the "180 landings" number jives with the other article, but something about this water math doesn't work. If each flight leaves with 32 5-gallon jugs, then each flight takes 160 gallons for delivery. If the aircraft carrier is supporting 145 mission flights a day from the ship, the implication is ~23,000 gallons are being delivered per day.

But the Captain also said the ship has transported only around 30,000 gallons of water, so the implication would appear inaccurate. Further making the point is how the Navy has made it publicly clear how the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is capable of producing 100,000 gallons per day, but has not said exactly how much potable water the carrier is actually producing and delivering per day. If 100,000 gallons of water isn't being delivered, making the point it can be produced is pointless. Based on the details in the bloggers roundtable and in the Navy News Service reporting, something doesn't add up.

In the interview Capt. Lindsey says "we have passed almost 20,000 gallons to the Haitian people" with 5 gallon jugs using the water system on Carl Vinson. Well, by my math that is 4,000 gallons per day, at best. If each flight leaves with 32 5-gallon jugs, then each flight takes 160 gallons for delivery - but for 4,000 gallons that math would mean there are only 25 flights carrying water per day (out of 19 helicopters). What?

If it is only 30,000 gallons as of January 24th, and the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) arrived on January 15th, that is only an average of 3,333 gallons per day. It would also suggest that as of today, January 29, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is yet to deliver even 50,000 gallons of potable water to Haiti despite being on station for 2 weeks, and despite the capability to produce 100,000 gallons per day in support of HA/DR.

CS-21 elevated HA/DR to a core strategic mission for the Navy, but something went wrong. The contribution of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has clearly been with the 19 helicopters, in other words, aviation and mobility support which has no doubt been vital to the effort. With that said, the HA/DR material contribution of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is hardly sufficient in any way, in fact Haiti has exposed a major capability gap in the Navy's HA/DR material delivery of water. It also highlights the total coordination failure of SOUTHCOM.

If the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) can produce at least 100,000 gallons of potable water per day, why did the Red Cross charter 43 flights to deliver 660,000 gallons of bottled water at a time when medical supplies were in enormous demand, and the aircraft carrier off the coast could have produced more than twice that amount over the same period of time? How many amputations occurred because of this blunder of coordination? How many people died?

The aircraft carrier has delivered a little bit of food, a little bit of medicine, but no heavy equipment and no shelter - it arrived on scene without excess of that stuff on ship. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has managed an average daily delivery of only around ~3,333 gallons, which is nothing when in support of 1,000,000 - 2,0000,000 in need. If we assume the need is 1 quart per day per person, the requirement is for 250,000 to 500,000 gallons per day to support the water needs of the people. Do the math - 3,333 gal/250,000 gal = ~1.3% of the gallons necessary to meet the requirement is being delivered, despite a stated capacity of the ship to produce the water requirement for ~400,000 people with 100,000 gallon production capacity.

Keep in mind, delivering an average of 3,333 gallons includes the bonus of having extra helicopters on the ship.

One clear lesson early in the Haiti operation to me is that the capacity of a US nuclear aircraft carrier is sufficient to meet water requirements in support of large HA/DR, but the capability of a US nuclear aircraft carrier to meet the requirement, even with a surge of helicopters, is no where close to sufficient. If the potable water can be produced, but not delivered, it is not a capability - it is a capacity. There is clearly an enormous systems gap suggesting something is needed to turn capacity into capability.

Another problem is the inability of SOUTHCOM to coordinate the use of the aircraft carrier for water production. There are probably legitimate challenges and reasons, but they do need to be examined closely. Based on the numbers provided in the blogger roundtable interviews, SOUTHCOM's support of water production by the aircraft carrier was only able to deliver 1.3% of total potential water production capacity. If those numbers hold up, I think that would be by definition "spectacular failure" in the context of a disaster where the official Haitian government January 28 numbers are 112,392 dead and 196,501 people injured.

The whole group of 12 ships has only delivered 87,000 gallons of water per Admiral Branch's comment on January 27th. The Bataan ARG arrived on January 19th, and the Nassau ARG arrived on January 23rd. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has an excess water production of 100,000 gallons per day, meaning that at maximum efficiency the full capability would have delivered 1.4 million gallons potable water to date. The USS Bataan (LHD 5) and USS Nassau (LHA 4) each produce 200,000 gallons potable water per day. The USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) produces 96,000 gallons of potable water per day. The USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44), USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), and USS Ashland (LSD 48) all produce 63,000 gallons of potable water per day each. Just those ships are capable of producing 848,000 gallons per day potable water - enough water to meet the needs of everyone in Port-au-Prince every day.

Do the math based on the number of days each ship has been on station. At maximum efficiency the US Navy ships off Port-au-Prince could have produced 5,589,000 gallons of potable water to date, and instead has delivered 87,000 gallons potable water. That means in water production through the first two weeks, if these numbers are accurate, the Navy has been delivering 1.5% of maximum capacity for potable water production.

The need for water has been met after two weeks, at least according to this Bloomberg report. This is almost certainly due to the water production capacity now on the ground in Haiti. The same report goes on to note all the needs that haven't been met. Unless the numbers provided by Captain Lindsey and RDML Branch are wrong (and they could be as there are no official numbers anywhere else - the information problem discussed above), SOUTHCOMs management of water logistics for Haiti to date would appear to represent a tremendous military blunder, at best.

It leads to several questions. Has the US Navy been capable of supporting the delivery of more potable water produced from ships than was done the first two weeks? Has SOUTHCOM used naval forces effectively in HA/DR? Does the Navy have a major gap between potable water production on ships (like CVNs, LHAs, LHDs, and LPDs) and potable water delivery from ships?

Is the US Navy organized properly to respond to major natural disasters? Look, if the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has indeed only delivered ~3,333 gallons of water per day average, there is a serious gap between capacity and capability that needs to be addressed. 100,000 gallons of water will weigh about 420 tons plus the container weight. Here is a question sure to drive some crazy..., is there a future mission module solution here? Offload the water to LCS/JHSVs from CVNs and have those vessels run around supporting delivery? If the Navy is going to elevate HA/DR to a core mission of strategy, this is a legitimate discussion.

This water logistics situation looks like a SOUTHCOM fiasco. I'm tempted to call this runway centric Air Force myopic bullshit approach to Haiti over the last two weeks a 1st class leadership fuckup, but it remains only a working theory until they put out the official numbers. SOUTHCOM needs to reveal the data that tells the story why water has been flooding in on the vital US flights while the massive Navy water production capacity was left virtually idle in port. A lot of people died because water was flown in instead of medicine. You think CNN is focused on Haiti now, just wait until Anderson Cooper figures out who is to blame for his 10pm complaints over the last two weeks.

The Canadians Kick Ass

When Haiti first happened I raised the question who would play the role of Indian during the Tsunami. The answer is Canada. If the numbers cited above are accurate, there is evidence the US Navy has been less than efficient with their Navy vessels supporting operations in Haiti. The same cannot be said about Canada.

Not sure if you heard, but on the same night George Clooney raised $61 million for Haiti, one of two telethons took place in Canada, and between the two telethons Canadians have raised $20 million in donations for Haiti - which the government has pledged to match.

Canada currently has 1,400 soldiers, sailors, and air crew on the ground or off the coast, a number expected to reach 2,000 by Sunday. Canada has two ships, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330) and HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282), one Sea King, six Griffon helicopters, one C-17, one C-130, hundreds of vehicles, and a military field hospital operating in support of Haiti (source). Most of their work has been centered around the city of Jacmel, a town of 40,000 south of the earthquake epicenter that was devastated. There is an airport there, and it has been opened. Because the radar equipment was completely destroyed, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330) is running air traffic control from sea.

HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282) had been operating in Léogâne where the Canadians set up a military field hospital. Léogâne is where the 22nd MEU has now set up operations. HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282) left Léogâne on Wednesday for Jamaica to pick up supplies, fuel, and the 165 Canadian soldiers from the Royal 22nd Regiment, known as the Van Doos.

When you look at how much the Canadians have been able to do with just two ships, it is quite remarkable and a reminder that alternative force structures bring a lot of flexibility to operations. The Canadians are trying to link a road (that remains blocked) from Léogâne to Jacmel. The ports in both cities are closed, and without that road the people live off aid the Canadians provide and the support of airfields like the one the Canadians opened in Jacmel.

This is one of the Canadian Navy's finest hours. I noticed a poll where 66% of the Canadian people believe the government response to Haiti has been "Just Right." All that poll tells me is 34% of the Canadian people don't know excellence when they see it.

HA/DR Littoral Ink Spots?

The US Fleet Forces Command blog has an interesting post up discussing Haiti that includes an email from Captain Dominic DeScisciolo of the USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). It is a must read, as again it highlights how much good a ship can do. Well, not any ship, but a well resourced ship.

Peacetime challenges and activities require manpower, and it is absolutely clear when reading Captain Dominic DeScisciolo's email that he is maximizing the capability of his ship in this mission. I'm not saying others aren't, but I am saying that as the Coast Guard has proved, a ship with qualified, motivated sailors can do a heck of a lot if resourced well enough to accomplish the mission. A cruiser is obviously resourced well enough with manpower to do exactly that. A Famous class cutter, with 100 personnel, is also resourced well enough to go ashore and make a difference. Something to think about.

Challenges Ahead

The biggest challenge ahead is the increasing potential for rain, which can bring with it all kinds of medical challenges and potential epidemics. There are reports of suspected cases of measles in some parts of the earthquake area. More than 40% of the population has never had a measles vaccination. Malaria and other diseases are also potential problems down the road, none of which is good for a country moving into tent cities.

Despite some reported security problems, the security situation in Haiti remains very good. There are reports of UN and US Marine patrols at night in several places of the earthquake zone. Security is a serious issue that cannot be taken lightly though. The need for food is so high for so many that without security, distribution remains impossible.

The response by the United States is something I believe every American can be proud of. It has not been perfect, it never is, but we also do not see disasters of this scale and scope very often. The Navy will learn from this, of that I have no doubt. I feel nothing but a great sense of pride in seeing America respond to Haiti, and feel well represented by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines on the ground in Haiti doing the work in representation of folks like me.

Question of the Day

How much does this (PDF) cost?

Interesting news of Chinese participation in Gulf of Aden

I saw that Xinhui on CDF posted this today and I think it's worth repeating.

First of all, you can see this article

UNITED NATIONS — China has agreed to cooperate with a coalition of naval forces combating rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia, a top Norwegian official said here Thursday.

Norwegian foreign ministry official Carl Salicath made the announcement on the first anniversary of the establishment of the so-called Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).

He said China and a coalition of multinational forces -- including from NATO, the European Union and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces -- engaged in anti-piracy operations off Somalia "have agreed on a mode of cooperation."

"The Chinese delegate heralded this as a very important step forward. I absolutely agree with him. This will make the patrolling more efficient," Salicath, who chairs the CGPCS, added.

The Norwegian diplomat expressed hope that other nations with naval forces in the area would follow China's lead in cooperating with the multinational anti-piracy naval coalition.

Late last month, a top Chinese naval official proposed setting up a permanent base to support ships on an anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, raising the idea that China could build foreign bases elsewhere.

In an interview posted on the Chinese defense ministry website, Yin Zhuo -- an admiral and senior researcher at the navy's Equipment Research Center -- said such a base would bolster China's long-term participation in the operation.

Yin's proposal came after a Chinese cargo ship and its crew of 25 were rescued from Somali pirates, following the payment of a 3.5-million-dollar ransom to their kidnappers.

China has sent four flotillas to the region since the end of 2008.

The CGPCS brings together Australia, Belgium, Britain, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United States, Yemen, the African Union, the European Union, the International Maritime Organization, NATO and the Arab League.

About 130 delegates several countries and organizations attended Thursday's CGPCS meeting.

"We think that we have achieved a lot during that year but of course there is a lot to do in the years to come," Salicath said.

He said a major achievement was that the vast majority of vessels plying the dangerous waters off Somalia were now following so-called "best management practices" put forward by the group last August.

These include:

= minimizing external communications to essential safety- and security-related communication;

= Increasing lookouts/bridge manning; securing and controling access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear room, and all accommodation /internal spaces;

= Making sure that all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck and using dummies at the rails to simulate additional lookouts and creating a water curtain around the vessel to further deter boarding.

= Considering using razor wire/physical barriers around stern/lowest points of access, commensurate with crew safety and escape.

= Providing night vision optics for use during the hours of darkness and using light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been detected.

Captain Paul Chivers, chief of staff of the EU naval operation code-named Atalanta off Somalia told reporters that although "the number of (pirate) attacks has gone up considerably in the Somali basin, the number of successful attacks has gone down."

Meanwhile UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, in remarks delivered to the meeting, said that despite a decline in the rate of successful pirate attacks, "piracy continues to expand further out to sea, at times more than 1,000 nautical miles from the coast of Somalia."

"These developments highlight the limits of an exclusively sea-based approach and emphasize the need for the international community to continue to deal with the issue of piracy in a comprehensive, cohesive and broad-based approach'," Pascoe added.

Xinhui posted an article from SCMP that had the following:

China has won approval to lead the co-ordination of international anti-piracy patrols off Somalia - an unprecedented expansion of its historic deployment of warships to the Indian Ocean.
The effort will also see China send its warships to permanently patrol a sector of the special transit corridor through the most dangerous part of the Gulf of Aden. The pledge means that China needs to send more than the three ships it keeps deployed off the Horn of Africa to protect vital trade routes linking Asia to Europe.

PLA Navy officials reached agreement last week over its expanded role with major international navies at a meeting of the so-called Shade grouping in Bahrain, officials at the meeting said.

Shade, or Shared Awareness and Deconfliction, has been jointly headed by European Union forces and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces.

More than two years old, Shade meets monthly to maximise co-ordination and communication among the 40-odd navies now protecting shipping off the Horn of Africa.

While some nations operate as part of international flotillas under the banner of Nato, the EU or the CMF, some operate independently, including China, India, Russia, Malaysia and Iran.

Currently only Nato, EU and CMF ships patrol inside the corridor.

I think this is partly due to China's growing confidence in patrolling and also cooperating with Western navies, partly due to the recently pirated ship that cost $3.5 million for release and partly due to China's desire to be seen in a more constructive role. My read is that PLAN was simply not comfortable in operating with Western navies in the beginnings, because it did not want to loose face in front of the more experienced navies of the world. Now that it had some time to work with other countries, it is less afraid of getting embarrassed. Recently, we saw a third 054A deployed to Gulf of Aden to join the 3 ship flotilla (consisting of 2 054A and a replenishment ship) already there. This is clearly part of PLAN's move to assume more responsibility in the region. I personally think this is a great thing. It really is about time that China starts to pull its weight in multi-lateral cooperative efforts around the world. Some people would view this as a growing China threat to US naval dominance. That will happen regardless. China will expand and modernize its navy in order to protect its rapidly growing economy and political status. How can it be a bad thing to see it really contributing to a multi-national effort and being a "responsible stakeholder"?

Of course, what this means is that China will have to keep building those 054As to be sending them here. The 3rd pair of 054As (569 and 571) just recently joined service and I'm sure they will be sent here pretty soon. The 4th pair probably will also join service by the end of the year. You are probably looking at a rotation of 1 051B (167), 2 054 (525,526), 8 054A, 1 071 (998) + replenishment ships. If we consider 3 flotilla rotation (each pulling 4 months per year), then they'd be able to maintain 4 frigates + a replenishment there at any given time. That would also be enough of a commitment for China to join SHADE.

Libya Complains

Germany is suffering a touch of blowback for its naval deal with Israel. A critical letter was released by Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Alqadhafi, who, according to FP, is increasingly influential in shaping Libyan foreign policy. There's no indication that the Germans plan to take this complaint seriously, although I wonder if the naval cooperation might become a major anti-German jihadist talking point.

By the Numbers

Not sure if you noticed, but the Small Wars Journal has a pre-decisional draft copy of the QDR up. I'm not going to analyze too deep, simply wait for the real thing next week. But...

Do the math. The QDR sizes the Navy fleet as follows.

10 - 11 aircraft carriers
84 - 90 large surface combatants, including 19 - 32 BMD-capable combatants
14 - 28 small surface combatants
29 - 33 amphibious warfare ships
51 - 55 attack submarines
4 guided missile submarines
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons
30 - 34 combat logistics force ships
17 - 24 command and support vessels (including JHSV)

If we assume 6 ships per MPS, and add the top number in each listing instead of the bottom number, the result is less than 300 ships. I highlight, but again, everything is unclear until Monday.

My Hero of Haiti

A fantastic read and must save document regarding Haiti. In the words of Col. Buck Elton, who in my opinion is responsible for more lives saved in Haiti than anyone.

Sea Base Tech

There is plenty of sea base tech in Haiti to observe. Task Force 48 is currently using amphibious ships to move materials back and forth from Guantanamo Bay to Port-au-Prince, but expects High Speed Vessels (the old Hawaii ferry's) and shallow draft barges to take over in the near future.

Lots of sea to shore activity, over and on the sea.

Haiti is what can be done by a nation that is a maritime power.

But even with all of that Sea Basing activity, I can't help but think about how down in the Gulf of Mexico, an important technology is being tested.

Click the image above for better resolution. More about the tech here and here. Next month they will move out to sea for trials.

QDR and Budget Season Questions

With the FY2011 budget and QDR expected to be released next week, there is almost no point discussing the speculation beginning to pop up in draft versions the media has obtained. A good example is this Defense News article, which is certainly a topic worth diving into - if we weren't only a few days from seeing the real thing.

I am one of those who believes this QDR will end up prompting more questions than answers. Over the last several years, those in defense policy have continuously stressed the environment of uncertainty. It has left me with the impression the real uncertainty that exists is specific to the inability for anyone to articulate with any degree of credibility a matching of defense budget to global environment. I have serious doubts that the QDR will address this issue with enough credibility to steer budgets, once again leaving a disconnect between budget allocations and stated defense policy.

On Sunday, CDR Salamander, Eagle1, and I will be discussing the upcoming QDR release with Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security at The Heritage Foundation on Midrats. Next week I'll be at AFCEA/USNI West in San Diego - which is also devoted to the QDR. With any luck, there will be some clarity in the QDR to guide debate... Luck is fleeting.

A few observations...

Aviation

It is absolutely clear the Joint Strike Fighter has lost popularity with Navy leadership over the last year. After reading the InsideDefense article from Tuesday titled CNO Downplays NAVAIR Ownership Costs Report where ADM Roughead responds to the NAVAIR JSF cost report conclusions that the F-35 costs will be 40% higher than F/A-18 fighters today with his "It will have no bearing on anything we're doing with our budget" comment; it is absolutely clear to me the F-35C will be kicked down the road a bit. When the CNO says a $100 billion cost increase of a program doesn't have any bearing on budget, something is up.

While kicking the F-35 has limited impact on the Navy at this time, it raises serious issues with the Air Force. The F-22 was basically dropped because the F-35 was going to come online sooner. Now the F-35 is having all kinds of problems that are leading to delays and higher costs. Do the math... Gates is going to end up not building F-22s in trade of not buying F-35s. For the wars, Gates has been a great source of leadership. When it comes to the long term direction of defense equipment budgeting for all of the services, I do not believe Gates will be remembered well.

The F-22 was canceled when production costs were stable for a program that is, by all definitions, a globally lobbied military-industrial complex on a scale beyond any program in history - ironically the same complex Gates pretended to stand up against with the F-22. The JSF program has become too big to fail, and the Air Force will very likely end up buying F-35s in a few years that cost as much as F-22s today.

It is unclear what his might mean for the Marines. The MV-22 makes a lot of sense when complimented with the F-35B, but without the F-35B the MV-22 is too expensive and beyond the needs of the Marine Corps. The F-35B is also a serious issue internationally, particularly to the British but one might imagine interest all over the world in the future. The stakes are high, but the cost continues to grow higher. While the F/A-18 represents a Plan B for the F-35C, there is no Plan B for the F-35B. This program needs good news, and none has come from the direction of Lockheed Martin in awhile.

Shipbuilding

Is there such a thing as a good investment in any ship built on the Gulf Coast right now? The LPD-17 problems are troubling. Everyone is to blame for the problems, and it is unclear where the solutions will come from. It is my impression that nothing short serious executive leadership will fix the shipbuilding problems of industry, and I have serious concerns if Ray Mabus is that executive. Congress does not inspire, the Navy does not inspire, and Northrop Grumman's reputation has been flushed in the shipbuilding toilet over the last decade.

It has been 2 years since the Navy had a shipbuilding plan, and every single "21st century" surface warship design has been a mess. DDG-1000, LPD-17, and two different Littoral Combat Ship designs have been less than inspiring, well over budget, or based on very questionable requirements. What will the Littoral Combat Ship do exactly? Which war is the DDG-1000 going to operate in the littorals during? Will the USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) be the first of her class to complete a full 6 month tour without requiring a few weeks in a Middle Eastern seaport for repairs?

Congress has made it law that new ships require Nuclear power. The Secretary of the Navy wants a Great Green Fleet. The President of the United States advocated nuclear energy in his first State of the Union Address. The Navy is the only government department to field nuclear energy in several decades, and has spent the last year discussing a reduction of the two types of naval vessels that use nuclear power: aircraft carriers and submarines.

China

We are in a defacto cyberwar with China today, and China is conducting cyber espionage on virtually every major US business every day. I look forward to seeing the QDR address this, or not.

Nobody wants to discuss it, because nobody in the open source really knows what is happening, but there is work at every major Chinese shipyard right now and it is not clear what most of those shipyards are building. We do know a few things. We know orders for commercial ships have not been there over the last 12 months, and the shipyards are building something. We know that just as the Chinese have big plans to build aircraft carriers, they have big plans to build all kinds of escorts. We know the 988 is soon to be deploying to the Gulf of Aden, the first expeditionary ship to undertake a long deployment from China.

We know China is building lots of submarines. We know the Maritime Strategy never mentioned China. Will the QDR? In what context? Should we be calculating our force structure based on what China is doing? If we do, what does that say about us?

At what point does the economic relationship between China and the US rise to a QDR level national security strategy concern?

Marine Corps

Building amphibious ships has become very expensive, and the quality of the product produced is in doubt. The EFV almost has all of its problems worked out, but the mission it was designed for may not be applicable in the future maritime environment. The logistics of the EFV is completely unreasonable when examined against its operational profile. The MV-22 requires long range escort beyond that of available helicopters, but the F-35B is in doubt. The UH-1Y and AH-1Z programs have been slow going and has taken on cost increases, but are beginning to show signs of very positive results. The Harriers are old. Sea Basing was nothing more than a concept in PPT, until Haiti became the textbook Sea Basing operation right from the PPT presentation. The Marines are expanding manpower but losing expeditionary platforms to move Marines forward, and at the same time the Navy is reducing manpower on ships even as the Navy takes on more manpower intensive operations during peacetime. How will the Marines use the MRAP after Afghanistan when it is clearly too heavy for the ARG? Will the next Marine Corps vehicle be tracked or wheeled? What will the next generation heavy lift aviation platform look like?

Am I honestly supposed to believe the QDR is going to address these questions, or will it simply add more questions to the ones already being discussed? I've aimed my expectations low, and am ready to be pleasantly surprised.

My QDR Questions

Below I've outlined what I think are the pressing issues I expect the QDR to address:

How does the QDR measure force size and force structure? Under what scenario is the US expected to operate that leads to these force size and force structure measurements?

Does the QDR account for the frequency of using military power appropriately? We are fighting 2 wars in Asia, balancing power in the Pacific, standing up AFRICOM, supporting ballistic missile defense in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, and with excess capacity - responding to one of the largest natural disasters in my lifetime in Haiti. Other than BMD, this short list of priorities doesn't address national security concerns that might include Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, Israel, or Iran.

How is the issue above addressed from a joint perspective? How is the issue above addressed from an international cooperation perspective?

How does the QDR address modernization towards the future? Will it recommend building legacy systems in quantity, shifting towards new systems in quantity, or take an quantity R&D approach to systems instructing short builds in various trials of quality?

What does the QDR add and subtract?

How does the QDR treat ballistic missile defense? Is it a strategic priority like nuclear deterrence?

How does the QDR address acquisition reform and deal with increased costs in both manpower and equipment?

How does the QDR line up with the QDDR?

UFOs, Ballistic Missiles, and Other News Around the World

Heard the one about the UFO seen from NewFoundland? Check out the picture in the story. One might think the Canadians were watching the new French M51. Seems odd to me though. While the time would match up, that is a heck of a distance to get such accurate photography.

In other news, North Korea looks to be preparing for their next ballistic missile launch. Not surprising, they traded artillery fire last night.

Have you noticed Somali piracy has slowed down quite a bit in the new year? It must be coincidence the level of violence inside Somalia has risen considerably during the same time. They are different issues, but there are interesting patterns and relations that can be measured and compared. For example, even after the Monsoon season was over last year, piracy didn't increase immediately and very few contact incidents were reported at sea. At the same time, the level of violence in Somalia was very high. It is a repeating pattern worth observing.

Singapore has taken over command of CTF-151.

Tonight is the State of the Union. The Nation is still fighting 2 wars in Asia and has this enormous humanitarian operation underway in Haiti, all of which are heavily reliant on the work of our nations Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians. It is very telling the only defense related issue leaked so far regarding the State of the Union is "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."

The Obama administration is more like the Bush Jr. administration than the Clinton, Bush Sr., or Reagan administrations in my opinion, and it is easy to highlight why. Political issues are emphasized with more importance than the serious issues that are directly influencing the country.

Latest from PLAN

First, we have some updated photos of Varyag. You can see that they are getting ready to install the AESA radar panels that you see on 052C. You can also see that they are setting up a mast to install the Sea Eagle Volume Search radar that you see on 054A.






Here are some other photos we see from a recent magazine.









We also got some news recently. It was said that 998, China's only 071 LPD, will be in the next flotilla sent to Gulf of Aden. It looks like PLAN is intent on testing out all of its new goodies in an extended deployment.

We also got some news regarding to HQ-16 SAM that is found on 054A. The original article is as follows:

中国海军某新型舰空导弹－－绝对新型。
-
1999年7月，某新型舰空导弹项目正式立项，明确采用新的发射技术。有趣的是，新型导弹的命名，是把当年 周总理命名的那型导弹后面的两个阿拉伯数字颠倒了。
2007年底，某试验海区。该新型舰空导弹首次进行舰上实导射击试验。2008年某月，定型试验，7天打7 发，全部命中。创造了中国海军舰空导弹第一次成功拦掠海飞行小目标，第一次成功拦截多目标，第一次成功拦截 超音速火箭靶弹的记录。
2009年10月－11月，570舰搭载该型导弹到海上靶场，发射多枚导弹。这是该型导弹首次在海军作战舰 艇由舰员操作进行实弹射击。

If we ignore some of the exaggerations about first, we can get the following:

• Project started in July of 1999
• Started conducting shipborne live firing testing for the first time at end of 2007
• In 2008, they conducted 7 tests in 7 days and hit all the targets
• Successfully intercepted small sea-skimming target. Successfully intercepted multiple targets at the same time and intercepted supersonic target
• From October to November of 2009, 570 carrying HQ-16 returned to the test ground to fire off more missiles.
  

Question of the Day

Look at this picture, what question immediately comes to mind?



Is the crane on USS Fort McHenry 9LSD 43) broken or something?

HT: leesea

China vs Google Goes Political

Remember China vs Google? This is not a small thing, previous discussed on the blog here and here. There are three developments worth noting.

The Compass blog at Real Clear World asks the question: Could the WTO Tear Down China's Great Firewall? That would be interesting. We have long discussed the lawfare approach of China in terms of territorial rights and environmental issues to target US national security interests, but in this case the US is attempting to use an international institution against China. Well worth reading and consideration. This is probably a threat that will never be followed through, but noteworthy nonetheless.

The China Daily op-ed "Internet freedom" and "smart power" diplomacy is important, and I was pleased to see CHINFO pick it up this morning. Noteworthy - the editorial mentions the CNO in making their case. Think these guys are focused on the sea?

In a strange twist, the Obama administration has required SourceForge to block IP addresses from Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Very odd. I firmly believe disconnectedness defines danger, and this policy and its associated sanctions are stupid. Connectivity to the rest of the world, and to each other, is preferable to disconnected approaches online. These sanctions won't work, and will probably backfire.

After all, nothing can stop China from creating a SourceForge mirror site, and letting countries blocked in the US access the same software from servers hosting software there. It would make the US government calls for free speech online and "Internet Freedom" resonate as hypocrisy around the world, and in particular China.

We really need better ideas than disconnected solutions when addressing policy online, because restricting open source marketplaces online due to economic sanctions is idiotic governance, and counterproductive to the interests of the United States.

Israel, Germany Expand Naval Procurment Deals

According to Defense News, Israel and Germany are close to cutting a deal on an additional Dolphin class submarine, and on two stretched A-100 corvettes. The latter has been in the works for some time now. Interestingly, the deal depends on German financing (up to a third of the total price) and on US permission to use part of the annual military aid budget on acquisition of the ships. The corvettes will provide the core of Israel's future surface capability, while the additional Dolphin will, upon delivery, give the IDF a total force of six submarines. The German interest in financing would be to hold together its moribund ship-building industry while maintaining good relations with the Israelis. Merkel and Netanyahu apparently hammered out the details in a summit meeting last week.

Incidentally, the Defense News article reports that the two Dolphin class submarines contracted for in 2005 will be delivered in 2012.

More Think Tank Gouge

Another report recently released that I've been reading is Iran's Evolving Threat from the Center of Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman does a really good job with this report, very thought provoking although in some cases I would like better sourcing detail.

Also, Tuesday morning is the big QDR press conference at CSBA, which usually means reports will be up on the website shortly after.

Too much work, reading, and research to post tonight. Keep one eye on Haiti, the Europeans are beginning to arrive by sea. Those who - like me - believe there will be huge lessons learned may want to keep track of deploy dates for the various specific ship types. If you know what date a capability is deployed to Haiti, you have a theoretical basis for what the strategic speed of response is globally.

CNAS Goes To Sea

The Center for New American Security (CNAS) has released a new report Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World.

Contested Commons is an edited volume featuring five chapters and a capstone piece on the future of American power in the sea, air, space and cyberspace. Authors include CNAS Fellow Abraham M. Denmark, Dr. James Mulvenon, Frank Hoffman, CNAS Military Fellow Lt Col Kelly Martin (USAF), Oliver Fritz, Eric Sterner, Dr. Greg Rattray, Chris Evans, Jason Healey, and CNAS Senior Fellow Robert D. Kaplan.

Chapters include:

The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World
By Abraham Denmark and Dr. James Mulvenon

The Maritime Commons in the neo-Mahanian Era
By Frank Hoffman

Sustaining the Air Commons
By Lt Col Kelly Martin (USAF) and Oliver Fritz

Beyond the Stalemate in the Space Commons
By Eric Sterner

American Security in the Cyber Commons
By Dr. Greg Rattray, Chris Evans and Jason Healey

Power Plays in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Commons in the 21st Century
By Robert D. Kaplan

200 pages of light reading no doubt.

Observing USNS Comfort in Haiti From Space

Jan 21 satellite image of Port-au-Prince from NASA. Note ship locations, and how easy it is to spot USNS Comfort (T-AH 20).

It is almost time to start talking about initial observations of activites. I think the challenges of Command, Coordination, Communications, and Cooperation are the key elements of focus, but there are obviously others.

From a broad view I think what we are learning in HA/DR is on par with what we are learning about war from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. While I compile my list, what are some of your observations so far?

Several Recovery Charters

Many details in this article discussing a number of ships heading to Haiti. The private industry is lining up for the contracts coming out as part of the recovery efforts.

Another Day, Another Shipbuilding Failure

In R&D and SCN funds to date the taxpayer has now spent over $19 billion in the Seapower 21 force structure of CG(X), DDG-1000, and LCS - and that money has bought us 3 DDG-1000s and 4 Littoral Combat Ships. Only 2 of the seven ships are actually on the water, which means there is still considerable room for cost growth.

Is there any Navy program in US history where so much money has been spent for so little in return? Just think, nobody was fired for this; instead they were promoted.

What a mess.

Early testing by the U.S. Navy showed that Lockheed Martin Corp's first Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) did not meet Navy stability requirements and revealed problems with its combat system, according to a new annual report by the Pentagon's chief weapons tester.

Neither the Lockheed ship, a steel monohull design, nor a competing aluminum-hulled trimaran design built by General Dynamics Corp , was expected to "be survivable in a hostile combat environment," said the report prepared by the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

Details on the Lockheed Martin version of the LCS are as follows:

The Pentagon's chief tester cited concerns about the stability of the first Lockheed LCS ship and about its TRS-3D radar.

The report said early air target tracking tests revealed deficiencies with the performance of the Lockheed ship's combat system and could "seriously degrade the ship's air defense capability unless corrected."

Plans to repeat the tests were thwarted when the radar power system failed repeatedly and the cause of the failures had not yet been identified, said the report.

It said the Lockheed ship also could face stability problems when fully loaded, which meant it could "sink sooner than expected," the report said. The Navy plans to install external tanks to effectively lengthen the ship's stern and increase its buoyancy before it deploys for the first time.

Let me see if this makes sense to you, because I admit it doesn't make much sense to me. We have a ship that when fully loaded, has stability problems. That same ship is overweight. Now we are going to add more weight to the end of the ship to address the buoyancy issue? What happens when you add weight to the end of a ship, particularly a ship that is already overweight?

I have nothing nice to say anymore when it comes to shipbuilding. I just don't believe what leaders say anymore because no one has any credibility. Lots of talk; nobody cares. We know something is either broken or corrupt, because no one has been held accountable for consistent and ongoing leadership failures in Navy shipbuilding for nearly a decade now. The Navy breaks the law and Congress does nothing. The Navy misses on costs by 300%; no consequences. Mississippi may not be capable of building ships without serious problems anymore; but industrial base capacity has been low for years now, what do you really expect? Shipbuilding numbers have been low because number of ships doesn't appear to matter to the Navy. When you don't build many ships, experience can be lost. The Navy shipbuilding budget is clearly not a system that functions in the interest of the country nor the Navy as an institution.

Gene Taylor is great, I love the guy, but holding Wednesday's hearing the way he did was politically stupid. It is one thing to hear opinions from the industry, but is it really smart for Congress to have a hearing with a panel where the Lockheed Martin consultant is the only person who can give an opinion on sea based ballistic missile defense? Eric Labs and Ron O'Rourke are not allowed to give opinions to Congress in their jobs at CRS and CBO.

Think about it, the House held a hearing Wednesday about Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense and the only guy invited who can give an opinion - Loren Thompson - has worked for Lockheed Martin as a consultant, and shocking, Lockheed Martin is making billions regarding Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense. I might be mistaken... but aren't those billion dollar AEGIS BMD contracts sole source contracts? Loren Thompson was able to freely promote the Lockheed Martin solution and never once offered alternatives to the Lockheed Martin solution.

Good for him he got paid, but a rhetorical question if I may... How much does a company like Lockheed Martin have to pay to be the sole opinion in front of this Congress on an issue like, say - AEGIS BMD? I think the point has been made. That hearing did not leave an image of confidence in the system.

Do you really think the Lockheed Martin LCS has a serious problem? If so, you have more faith in the system than I do.

Speaking of Press Statements

Like I said earlier, expect plenty of press statements.

Like this one. Also, pictures here.

Reconsider Sea Basing?

The Brookings Institution with an interesting Navy related post today.

Forward... From the Sea into Haiti

When you look at what is unfolding in Haiti, there are many theories regarding the bulk movement of materials to shore following disaster, crisis, or war being tested from just about everyone, including the Marines to a small degree.

There will be winners and losers in the bulk delivery to shore debate as a fallout of Haiti, and those winners and losers will be political, strategic, operational, intellectual, and industrial. We're about to find out who thought of everything, who knew better, and which systems are both flexible and expeditionary with the strategic speed necessary to support the demands of major crisis.

I think everyone will be interested in this press release. Expect several more like it over the coming days. Another validation that in the 21st century, quantity still trumps quality at the lower operational spectrum for naval forces.

Observing Recent Interesting Comments on the Hill

I was watching some video over at the House Armed Services Committee, disappointed at the video quality of Wednesday's BMD hearing actually since it appears to miss a good deal of the first part of the hearing.

Dr. Eric Labs (pdf)
Senior Analyst
Congressional Budget Office

Mr. Ronald O’Rourke (pdf)
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Congressional Research Service

Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D. (pdf)
Chief Executive Officer
The Lexington Institute

For those of you who don't follow these hearings, a few points. Chellie Pingree seems like a nice lady, but she needs to spend a month at Bath Iron Works. While I don't think the shipyard is in any danger with or without a strong Congressional leader, in year two she still seems like a deer in the headlights. Her district is why she is on the committee, I get it, but it's hard to be that clueless if they are generally interested in seapower. Don't make the woman argument either, because Susan Collins is sharp as a tact on the topic of shipbuilding and the Navy.

My favorite freshman on the Seapower subcommittee though is Rep. Eric Massa, a fellow New Yorker. Start watching this video at about 18:10 and let it play. Great questions until about 22:10, when he gets a bit sarcastic (and I laughed) asking Loren Thompson if we should put the 3 Seawolf class and 3 DDG-1000s together to form some synergy for bastard shipbuilding programs. I enjoyed the implied point. Supporting only 3 Seawolf class subs is expensive, and supporting only 3 DDG-1000s will be expensive too. At about 23:00 the topic of Mayport comes up, and Loren Thompson unloads with the economic argument. Rep. Massa follows that question up with a LCS question to Ronald O'Rourke, and all I'll say is some might be interested in that discussion. It is worth watching the rest of that video to the end with Gene Taylor's closing questions and comments.

After being entertained by what little of what was available, I scrolled down a bit and watched the hearing held on Wednesday, January 13, 2024 of the full Committee meeting that received testimony on China. The guest list included:

The Honorable Wallace C. Gregson (pdf)
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense

Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN (pdf)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Mr. David B. Shear (pdf)
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mostly dull stuff actually, until Congressman Randy Forbes gets the microphone. There are some games being played here by Mr. Forbes with the numbers, nothing major, but the point is really good. Congressman Forbes also appears to have a good staff, because they have given us 5 great minutes on YouTube.

Transparency indeed.

Sell Baby Sell

ADM Harvey is easily the most accessible Admiral in the Navy, and in my mind may be the best Admiral in the fleet today. Leads from the front with purpose and conviction, and ducks nothing. As I privately told Bryan after a previous discussion on the blog involving ADM Harvey, he really should be next CNO in my opinion.

This time, he wants your ideas for Operation Unified Response.

My advice is simple. This is a teaching moment.

Communication is important. Explain your operations generally with selective detail. Start with a simple explanation why Haiti is important strategically to the United States, but transition quickly to discussing operations - maybe even a bit of tactics. Help the audience watching the Navy today, which happens to be a lot more American people than usual, understand the way Naval power brings capacity and capability to an overseas operational theater. Explain the value to the country in broad context, but don't dwell on that or people will lose interest. The folks already understand reasons of compassion why the Navy is in Haiti, so explain what and how naval power is such a difference maker in Haiti. Use maps, Icons of ships and planes, but K.I.S.S.

How do the pieces of the fleet deployed to Haiti fit together? It isn't hard for folks to figure out why the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is so useful, but they may not understand the value of a ship like USS Normandy (CG 60). Explain the tools and unique capabilities of the sailors who will open up a destroyed port. What is the value of Blue/Green teams?

I've never met a Navy officer who couldn't use PPT, unfortunately. The Navy should give a briefing with huge pictures and maps of Haiti operations that outline the work being done by every ship in theater taking place off Port-au-Prince, how it ties into what the UN and NGOs are doing, and when the briefing is over - post an enhanced video of the briefing on YouTube.

Right now there is an audience; sell baby sell. As a political strategist would say, never miss opportunity in crisis. A Military Strategist would say it different, and his words apply to right now because right now detailed information would be a service instead of a sales pitch.

QDR Talk

Bryan and I will be getting together here for some QDR discussions. If there is any interest, we can do an Information Dissemination beer night...

Coast Guard Praise

There is a great deal of praise for the US Coast Guard coming from...

The White House Blog. Well deserved in my opinion. ADM Thad Allen's blog has been updated with the full list of Coast Guard forces supporting operations in Haiti.

Regular updates from the Official Coast Guard Blog.

Finally, a photo gallery here.

Opening the Roads in Haiti

Click the map to the right to open. The yellow is the road from Port-au-Prince west to Carrefour, west to Gressier, southwest to Leogane, and southeast around the epicenter to Jacmel.

North Port-au-Prince is where the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division is operating, starting from the airport to the north and working south. The roads highlighted in yellow are the priority roads that are being opened with engineering equipment from the airport.

USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) sent teams ashore at Killick Haitian Coast Guard base in the Port-au-Prince suburb of Carrefour. There have been reports of obstructions on the main road #200 throughout Carrefour. There were an estimate 400,000 people in Carrefour before the earthquake.

USS Bataan (LHD 5) is supporting Marine operations off the large area of Leogane, very near the epicenter of the 7.0 earthquake. 80% of the houses in the greater Leogane have reported to have been destroyed by the earthquake. The town and greater surrounding area supposedly had around 130,000 people before the earthquake, but the early estimates of dead in the area by NGOs first working the area is 25,000-30,000, yet to be confirmed. Several NGOs have a medical station or relief distribution station set up there, and the UN had a base there.

The Canadians are already ashore and working in Leogane. Another Canadian group is in Jacmel. After the earthquake there was a report the road from Leogane to Jacmel blocked with landslides at 18°23.938’ -72°38.277’ (just north of the turn off to Trouin and Baudin). The Canadians intend to open that road to connect Jacmel to Leogane. There is a small airfield in Jacmel, and the population of Jacmel is around 40,000, making it the 4th largest city in Haiti before the earthquake.

Presumably the Marines intend to open the road from Leogane back to Port-au-Prince, and open roads to the surrounding suburbs of Leogane, Gressier, and Carrefore. That won't be easy, for example the bridge at Dufort, about 10km west of the epicenter, is reported to be down.

There are additional naval forces globally responding to Haiti as follows:

Netherlands
HNLMS Pelikaan (A804)

Canada
HMCS Halifax (FFH 330)
HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282)

Italy
MMI Cavour (550) (arrival 29th)

France
FNS Siroco (L 9012)
FNS Francis Garnier (L 9031)

Mexico
Hospital ship Huasteco
ARM Papaloapan

Spain
SNS Castilla (L52) (arrival after 29th)

Venezuela
2 naval transport vessels?

Brazil
1 ship?

--

Notes

It is very noteworthy that no ship of the Royal Navy has been dispatched to Haiti, considering the interests the British claim in the Caribbean Sea. How much longer before the MoD asks the Admiralty to take the red and blue colors out of the White Ensign? That would be a joke, if it was funny.

The KMZ file I used in Google Earth for the map above can be obtained from Google here. It is updated following the earthquake and has a few overlays of interest. A browser embedded version of the viewer can be found here.

Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots

My latest article over at the United States Naval Institute blog.

Haiti Earthquake Impact on America in Context

The State Department told NBC news on Tuesday that there are still 5,500 missing Americans in Haiti. What the article does not mention is that no Americans have been pulled out of rubble alive in 2 days, and the odds of finding more survivors is very low.

Missing does not mean dead.

There are still no fixed estimates how many people were killed in the earthquake, but the UN is now saying they have already buried 50,000 bodies. That does not count the many thousands who died and are buried inside collapsed buildings.

I have not seen any estimates of how many of the estimated 250,000 wounded in Haiti were American, but there were an estimated 45,000 Americans in Haiti at the time of the earthquake.

For context, there have been 4,373 American citizens killed in the Iraq war, and 962 Americans kill in the Afghanistan War.

With such an incredible loss of life, is anyone still curious why I have believed from the beginning this will be an enormous political challenge for the Obama administration? They are doing a great job, but cannot afford at any point to appear politically distracted from an event that potentially might represent the largest loss of American life in decades.

China Potentially to Expand Indian Ocean Presence

This would be an enormous development if it happened, and would represent the biggest baby step in US-China military relations to date.

It will also bring out the claws of China hawks warning of sustained long term Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, which is exactly what it would represent.

Remember when the Chinese floated the suggestion they needed a base in the Indian Ocean. This would represent one more logical reason from their POV.

Gates Nixes Cammies

The question of what uniform(s) get worn at the Pentagon comes up every few years or so. History tells us that wearing of uniforms was rare during and after the war in Vietnam. Cap Weinberger brought them back in 1981 or so. Much of my DC time in the Navy was spent in Summer Whites or Service Dress Blues, with Khakis verboten. Now, most of the Navy spends its time there in Khakis.

Just after 9-11 and in what was probably not a bad idea for the time, the wearing of Cammies (BDU's, whatever they're called) proliferated. The nation was at war, and the wearing of more war-like uniforms reinforced (theoretically) the concept that everyone at the Pentagon was there to support the folks pulling triggers.

Now, SECDEF Gates has put the kibosh on the wearing of cammies by his staff. This doesn't apply to everyone at the Pentagon, just his staff. Good for him. I was never a big fan of cammies at the Pentagon (don't even get me started on flight suits) and I hope this causes the Services to fall into lockstep. I'm not a big fan of meaningless gestures, and I always saw the move to cammies as just such a show. If I had it my way, the Navy would wear Service Dress Khaki there year round--a uniform with a tie appropriate for meetings out of the building, and one in which the wearer could take the jacket and tie off and open the collar back at the office.

Bryan McGrath