But He's Asking the Wrong Question...

ADM J. C. Harvey Jr. conducted a maneuver at sea today that set off a few alarms and bells in the private circles I like to keep an eye on. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the Admiral calls for input into a big issue of his that can be examined from several perspectives. From the United States Naval Institute blog.

For the past six months, I have asked questions that can pretty much be mapped to one or more of my three primary concerns as Commander, USFF: to provide forces ready for tasking to our Combatant Commanders, to sustain those forces (including our people) so that we may fight today’s wars, tomorrow and get our ships, submarines, and aircraft to their expected service life, and to ensure our force deploys confident in their readiness to execute their missions through adhering to the tried and true standards that have benefited our Navy throughout our history.

Based on the picture of Fleet conditions I’ve developed over the past six months, I intend to transition away from predominately asking questions to letting you know my thoughts and informing you of the decisions I’ve made. The value of your comments will not diminish, quite the contrary, but hopefully this will give you a better opportunity to understand what is on my mind and the actions I am taking.

That said, one area I have significant concern with is the confusion between “taking risk” and lowering standards. As Navy made hard decisions over the past six years to meet growing Combatant Commander force demands, come off the manpower glideslope, and fund recapitalization after the “procurement holiday” of the 1990s; we began to use phrases such as “taking risk.” Taking risk was often used to describe the actions that must be taken to “do more, with less.” What really occurred in some instances was we did more, but we did it less well and we lowered our standards.

As we recapitalize the fleet, meet Combatant Commander demand, and properly invest in the sustainment of our ships, submarines, and aircraft, we cannot lower the tried and true standards which have served our Navy for over 230 years. Recent incidents - HARTFORD, JAMES E WILLIAMS, and flight discipline lapses - are just some examples that illuminate areas where we must re-educate, reinvigorate, and reinforce the bedrock importance of our tried and true standards that run the gamut from how we operate, to how we maintain, to our conduct, and the concept of accountability. As a Fleet Commander, fewer resources means that there are things we will do less, but that must not result in doing things less well. More to follow.

To ADM Harvey and many of you, this is legitimate work that should be hammered out, but I'm not going to play this game. From where I sit, my role is different and I'm under the opinion ADM Harvey is asking an important question to him, but ultimately the wrong question.

Lets back up a second and note one undeniable fact. "Do more, with less" is a subjective phrase at best and does not represent well the actual situation, instead it only reflects the situation the Navy has put itself in by the choices of the current Navy leadership. The top line budget request for the Navy in FY 2010 was somewhere around $172 billion, the highest request in our nations history.

The real question is the one ADM Harvey isn't asking, and can't ask in public. Why does the US Navy "do less with more" and continue to follow the same script of planning and procurement since the end of the cold war that got the Navy into the mess it is in today? The only fundamental difference in operations today that someone can point to is Global Fleet Stations, and even that is simply an old concept under a new name. The Navy operates today almost the same way it has for decades, with no major organizational changes in the way ships are deployed and used except that we have fewer forward bases.

It requires a great deal of spin to completely excuse the Navy leadership for their decisions that have us pondering the dangers of being less capable when the Navy has never received more from Congress and taxpayers. The Navy continues to do the same thing today that has created the trend lines that has the Navy in the position it is in today looking for new ideas on how to do the same things it is doing with less, or said another way the Navy does the same things of spend more money for super duper but ultimately less equipment and capability again, and again, and again, and again... a trend that is now almost 2 decades old... and is expecting a different result? Hmm...

"Do more" what exactly? "With less" what exactly? Less money is factually inaccurate. If "more" refers to meeting "Combatant Commander demand" then I am calling bullshit there too, because how many times did Combatant Commanders ask for Riverine in 2009? One day someone in the press is going to find out how many times that requirement went unfilled last year.

When ADM Harvey finds himself having "less" to do "more" at a time when the Navy budget is nearly $172 billion, that suggests a serious institutional problem that no amount of crowd sourcing for ideas will ever solve. The Navy has remained resistant to changing the way it does business since the end of the cold war, and now that the Navy hasn't adapted at all while shrinking over that same period of time... they are worried about doing things less well?

ADM Harvey's concerns on the Navy lowering standards and doing things less well is misplaced when directed at the blogosphere - he needs to take his issues straight to Congress. Being unable to do things well is fundamentally a self inflicted wound to the Navy by Navy leadership, and when the current CNO brags in his stump speech about the utility of using destroyers in humanitarian assistance roles or big amphibious ships in engagement operations with small coastal navies globally; are the rest of us supposed to be surprised that capabilities might not be as good as in the past? Don't even get me started on training - because while we train our sailors to do their job, I very much question whether we do as the other services do and train our officers to think for themselves. Are officers graded before deployment on how adaptive they are, or whether the calls come in correctly on their ship? The Navy grades to a script and promotes based on checking boxes with very little deviation tolerated, and what... expects to be anything other than an inflexible organization resistant to changes; likely to perpetuate patterns both good and bad through generations of officers; or is surprised to be incapable of adapting when faced with a crisis not trained for?

The Navy has bowed to the alter of AEGIS to produce nothing but the largest possible ships of the battle line, will not even tolerate discussions about submarines that aren't nuclear, and will sacrifice everything to stay with only big deck aircraft carriers - the three most expensive types of vessels in the modern maritime era. The Navy has allowed the Marine Corps to build the most expensive sea traveling tank in history with the EFV - only to realize the requirements of 2 decades ago for the system disappeared about 2 decades ago. Don't even get me started on the MV-22 and its associated "at all costs" approach to requirements.

The sea service spends more money on aviation than on actual ships, and oh btw, throws every capability that is actually used in the current wars into the NECC - a capability that gets almost no actual support from either the ships or aircraft fleet forces of the Navy. The Navy has almost no ships to fill the role of Nelsons cruisers and doesn't understand why ship handling skills might not be optimal. The Navy has not adapted at all suggesting they are not concerned at all that the number of ships in the fleet is shrinking. ONRs job is to rapidly field equipment to the fleet, but won't even let go of Streetfighter despite a law passed in Congress. Oh btw, laws passed in Congress regarding the Navy are casually ignored - without consequence. The Navy puts more people ashore than at sea in a theater of war - then boasts the fact in pride without reflecting the potential associated problematic issues? When piracy breaks out - the constitutional basis for a United States Navy - the US Navy tells the shipping companies to go deal with the problem themselves? Nine years after invading Afghanistan and with a clear understanding that opium trafficking at sea globally is heavily influencing conditions in that country, how effective has the US Navy been in contributing towards that aspect of the war effort? This is the same Navy building a barely armed $600 million, 3,000 ton, shallow draft, speed boat chaser and Navy leadership is worried about doing more with less? The LCS is the personification of "less capability for more money" but Navy leadership lacks the courage to kill a bad implementation of a good idea. Why does the Navy build ships with "littoral" in the name when the Navy has exactly zero concept of operations developed towards littoral warfare? Why does the Marine Corps and Navy have different definitions of the phrase "littoral warfare" if they are the same service?

At the end of the day, the top leadership of the US Navy and US Marine Corps leaves an impression to observers both in and out of the Department of the Navy that they are no different than the typical Chinese businessman - always first and foremost looking to save face. It is an attitude that gets passed on to the subordinate, and perpetuates a cycle. When was the last time the Navy made cuts to shore based Flag and Staff Commands? How many redundant commands of redundancy commands exist within the Navy? If they exist - I bet they all exist ashore. How many more decades on top of the previous six will the Marine Corps hang on to forcible entry amphibious assault before recognizing that they will never do a forcible entry amphibious assault again like Normandy or Inchon?

Do more with less? Are you kidding me? The Department of the Navy is doing less with more and no one in Navy or Marine Corps leadership is held accountable.

This is just an observation and it may or may not be accurate, but if you ask me ADM Harvey sort of perpetuates the bigger problem with this blog post. As a subordinate in the role of Fleet Forces Command, ADM Harvey is being asked to meet a set of requirements that are impossible to meet with the resources being provided him - a direct result of the decisions made by his superiors. He must execute this impossible task without the ability to second guess the obvious poor decisions in resource allocation of his superiors. As a result he passes impossible requirements down to the next level, and the cycle will be perpetuated throughout the fleet without a solution found.

When the leadership at the top provides less with more, it will not suddenly change into more with less at some level below the top. The inflexibility of leadership at the top towards adapting to the post cold war 21st century insures that trend lines will remain constant. Want to change the trend lines, make decisions that will change the trends.