Joint Maritime Operations - Relief and Reconstruction

This post continues the Developing Joint Maritime Operations series by examining relief and reconstruction as a category of military activity within the context the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. From section 5 in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0.

Relief and reconstruction activities seek to restore essential civil services in the wake of combat, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster. Like security, they may be required in conditions ranging from military occupation to counterinsurgency to a humanitarian crisis. They conclude successfully when routine local government and commercial activities are able to meet the economic and health needs of the affected communities or when other agencies are able to take over the relief and reconstruction effort.

Absent effective local law enforcement, relief and reconstruction activities may require concurrent security activities, and often must be integrated with nonmilitary efforts, both governmental and nongovernmental. Preparation for this mission must therefore consider two cases, one in which significant civilian relief assets are present, the other in which they are not. Joint relief and reconstruction activities may involve significant contractor support; such support will have to be integrated with the other actions of the joint force.

Historically, military forces have shown little concern for the civil damage resulting from combat. That began to change in the last century as the continued conduct of combat increasingly fell hostage to the recovery of battledamaged lines of communication and support facilities such as roads, rail lines, ports and airfields. Similarly, failure to attend to essential civil needs in occupied areas invited popular resistance, suppression of which might require the diversion of precious combat forces.

To those concerns must be added the psychological impact of untended collateral civil damage, not only on the affected population, but also, broadcast by ubiquitous visual media, on the American public and the international community at large. Such untended collateral damage can undermine the legitimacy of U.S. and partner actions. At home, a natural disaster can have the same impact, producing a similar demand for the mobility, logistical assets, command and control, and organized and disciplined manpower which, in many cases, military forces alone possess.

Relief and reconstruction activities conducted during battle differ in several important respects from those conducted during prolonged military occupations, and those, in turn, from peacetime operations aimed at assisting communities in the wake of manmade or natural disaster. Perhaps the key variable is the security conditions within which relief and reconstruction must be conducted. Where no significant security threat exists, or where local law enforcement capabilities suffice to maintain public order, relief and reconstruction becomes primarily a logistical and engineering problem. In such cases, typical of natural catastrophes and post-conflict environments in which hostile forces have accepted defeat, military forces rarely will be alone in mounting relief efforts, and their most important contribution may be to assist other organizations in such areas as transportation, communications, logistics, and emergency health care.

Such benign conditions are unlikely to coexist with combat. Even where care has been taken to minimize civil damage, combat inevitably destroys civil facilities and disrupts social services, particularly in dense urban areas. Meanwhile, the temporary suspension of civil law enforcement risks unleashing looting, vandalism, and other manifestations of public disorder. Unless brought promptly under control, such conditions can make relief and reconstruction virtually impossible. In turn, delay in re-establishing essential social services can feed the disorder, exacerbate the security problem and, in the extreme, incite the growth of organized resistance.

That said, while security may be a prerequisite for the ultimate success of relief and reconstruction activities, it cannot be a precondition for undertaking them. Both to engage local civil populations and preempt resentment and resistance, efforts to restore essential civil services and encourage the restoration of peaceful daily routines must begin as quickly as possible after organized resistance has ended. In the context of continuing operations, in short, security and relief and reconstruction go hand in hand.

The preeminent objective of relief and reconstruction conducted during combat will be to maintain offensive momentum or defensive integrity. While that by no means precludes efforts to ameliorate the conditions of civil populations, those efforts must be carefully prioritized to avoid reducing pressure on a still undefeated enemy. In counterinsurgency operations, the tension between these competing objectives can become acute, and joint force commanders must constantly reassess and adjust the balance between relief and reconstruction efforts aimed at supporting continued combat and those aimed at improving the conditions of the population.

Where combat against organized resistance has ended or never existed, military relief and reconstruction activities typically are a stopgap measure to preserve life and property until civil and commercial efforts can be organized and brought to bear. In some cases, however, particularly in less developed areas, the interval between an initial response by joint forces and the deployment of sufficient civil relief resources to replace them can be prolonged.

Nevertheless, it is essential that military forces begin partnering with other federal agencies and local authorities as rapidly as possible, especially when nongovernmental organizations are involved. Except in the case of relief and reconstruction incident to combat, straightforward command relationships rarely will exist, and the greater the number and variety of participating agencies, the greater the risk of misunderstanding and disputes. Military commanders must be able to tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity and inefficiency as the price of successful cross-agency collaboration. They likewise must allocate sufficient resources and effort to overcoming this challenge. Effectiveness therefore will put a premium on close and continuous liaison and communications.

The employment of joint forces in relief and reconstruction activities, unless carefully monitored and controlled, easily can begin to degrade combat readiness. Commanders responsible for such operations must be alert to signs of such degradation and take measures to sustain or restore the combat proficiency of the units involved.

The Navy does this, in fact did it in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom. While it is easy to point to the NECC and discuss Naval Construction, Diving Operations for harbor salvage and clearance operations, or focus on Riverine squadrons for intrastate trade - there was also a massive blue water mine operation conducted to open up Iraq for economic activity and trade. We discussed the Oil Terminals and the associated security operations, so no need to repeat that exercise here.

The Navy has an outstanding record in relief response, indeed the vast majority of amphibious operations the Marine Corps cites are responses by amphibious ships to natural disaster. Responding to natural disasters has become a specialization of the sea services, including the Coast Guard following hurricanes in the US, and additions including the JHSV will enable even faster responses in the future.

Some considerations for improvement might examine recent experience. Following the Russia-Georgia war, several members of Congress called for the Navy to send the hospital ships to Georgia to support relief and recovery following that military action. In the end it was decided that it would take too long for the hospital ships to get there, thus reduce the influence to be gained with that response. It raises an interesting question, should hospital ships be deployed upon the breakout of hostilities to be enable the US a militarily neutral political and diplomatic response?

Every country is different, and every situation is unique. In the Pacific natural disaster in the Philippines has given the Navy plenty of practice in relief and reconstruction activities following the annual Typhoon season. The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) has responded to cyclones in the Philippines more often than the ship has made a port call in Australia. The Navy's Joint Typhoon Warning Center has developed a high reputation among weather watchers in the media. As the Navy is the primary source for information about storms in the Pacific, perhaps 7th Fleet should have assets regionally positioned during Typhoon season ready to respond is a better model than tasking carrier strike groups?

Of all the sections in the CCJO, when it comes to reconstruction of civil services the Navy plays only a secondary role, but the story of relief globally is the history of the US Navy. Everyone has heard of the Great White Fleet, but how many realize that while the Great White Fleet was returning home through the Mediterranean Sea the Navy responded to the great earthquake in Messina, Sicily? If you have never read it, American House Building in Messina and Reggio by LCDR Reginald Rowen Belknap (yes, that Reginald Rowen Belknap) is a great historical record of US Navy relief operations. A PDF download of the book is available for free.

It is actually a fantastic story of US Navy relief operations with a lesson directly applicable to this discussion. Two cities were built. One city used local materials and construction techniques, while the other used imported materials and imported techniques. One of the cities survived the local environment while the other did not, and had to be rebuilt twice. As long as the Navy knows and understands the lessons of their history in providing global relief, the Navy will be well prepared for the future of relief operations.

While it can be said in terms of engagement, it also applies here. The Navy is the Global Force for Good and relief is a primary reason why.