Observing Haiti and Operation Unified Response

Two weeks ago, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) became the symbol of American power and compassion as the ship sailed offshore Port-au-Prince and began helicopter operations following Haiti's devastating earthquake. Two weeks later the situation in Haiti has improved considerably, although problems and challenges still exist.

I am not usually a big fan of Thomas Donnelly, he is kind of hit or miss with me on issues, but I highly recommend his article Mission to Haiti in the Weekly Standard. I would take it one step further than Thomas Donnelly does though. I would advise the President to consider negotiating for a Naval base in Haiti. The lease for a potential Naval Base for 99 years would be a great way to insure money in support of rebuilding the country.

We don't necessarily have to build the base immediately, rather just use the land as a place to store the billions of dollars of equipment that is heading to Haiti now in support of this relief effort. One idea might be to lease and build the base in cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and Brazil - promoting buy-in from regional partners. Shared responsibility and shared costs using a potentially less efficient but nonetheless effective western Berlin model for sustained presence. Regardless of what is decided, discussing Haiti in the long term needs to begin sooner than later.

I have been holding off all week on discussing Haiti. The result is, I have a lot to say.

Mass Information

If you are having trouble finding good data on Haiti, you are not alone. I have only been able to find 2 useful sources for good statistical information on military operations in Haiti: APAN and Blogger Roundtables. If you know of another, please let me know.

There is probably more official information on Haiti available from the DoD than any other operation the DoD is involved in, including Iraq and Afghanistan. It really is remarkable, the Twitter - Facebook - social - viral - network strategy has been very effective, and you can simply search hash tags in Twitter to see how many tens of thousands are seeing official Navy information. From a mass information distribution perspective, the US has scored an A+.

The problem is the information is mostly useless. It shows work being done, but doesn't give explanation of how mission is being accomplished. There are no public maps, no discussions of what the 22 MEU is trying to do, the 24 MEU is trying to do, or what the Navy is trying to do. "Open the port" and "deliver aid" is about as detailed as some of the information gets, except in some places.

Want to see a picture of the hardest working Navy-Marine-Coast Guard team in the world, watch Twitter or Facebook. Want to find out what is going on in Haiti? Good luck to the average American. Apparently the DoD will show the American people a video of a smart bomb hitting a building on Arab soil but won't show a map of how Marines are saving lives in Haiti. What, did the $61 million raised by George Clooney not reveal the level of interest by the American people in Haiti?

We are two weeks into the largest military operation since the Iraq War and there have been exactly zero briefings where a map was used in a press briefing with someone showing what our military is doing in Haiti. Dvidshub has been an excellent source of information, but SOUTHCOM does need to do a better job of providing public information of their biggest operation in history. Examples below.

Fuzzy Math

Rear Adm. Ted Branch, Commander, Carrier Strike Group One aboard USS Carl Vinson, gave a bloggers roundtable on Tuesday January 27th discussing operations off of Haiti. I missed it, but Navy News Service has an article on the interview, and the transcript is available here (PDF).

So far, Branch's strike group has performed 1,979 flights, nearly 1,600 of which were mission-related operations, delivering personnel and supplies. Medical evacuations made up 375 of the sorties.

These flights made up "the bulk of the vertical lift used" in the Navy's effort, he said.

A bit of math here. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) arrived on January 15th and the roundtable was the 27th. Assuming the numbers were through the 26th, that means an average of almost 180 flights per day with an average of ~145 mission related per day. As this began with 25 helicopters on day 1 and has ramped up to around 63 today, these suggest very impressive numbers.

Branch said the Navy as a whole has brought more than a million pounds of cargo to Haiti, including 87,000 gallons of water, nearly 162 tons of food, 345,400 pounds of medical supplies, 75 tons of support equipment and 3,300 people to help in relief efforts.

Branch's group - which consists of 12 ships deployed to Haiti, including the Carl Vinson Strike Group ships, the USS Nassau (LHA 4) and USS Bataan (LHD 5) Amphibious Ready Groups and the hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) - is expecting a lengthy deployment.

In another bloggers roundtable on Saturday January 24th, which I also missed, Capt. Bruce H. Lindsey, commanding officer, USS Carl Vinson, mentioned something that was covered in this DoD press release.

“We are probably doing 180 to 240 landings a day off of this ship,” he said. “The sailors on the flight deck and in maintenance are doing the hard work, making sure they are getting into the country.”

One of the main things the ship transports is medical supplies. Another is water -- the ship has transported more than 30,000 gallons of water. A group of sailors on his ship also created a water tree, where they took piping and created spigots, and use the supply of water from the ship to fill containers with water for those in need in Haiti.

Lindsey said sailors volunteered their time to do build the water tree and fill 5 gallon jugs with water by hand. Because of their volunteer efforts each helicopter that leaves the ship has 32 of these jugs on flight.

Noteworthy, the "180 landings" number jives with the other article, but something about this water math doesn't work. If each flight leaves with 32 5-gallon jugs, then each flight takes 160 gallons for delivery. If the aircraft carrier is supporting 145 mission flights a day from the ship, the implication is ~23,000 gallons are being delivered per day.

But the Captain also said the ship has transported only around 30,000 gallons of water, so the implication would appear inaccurate. Further making the point is how the Navy has made it publicly clear how the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is capable of producing 100,000 gallons per day, but has not said exactly how much potable water the carrier is actually producing and delivering per day. If 100,000 gallons of water isn't being delivered, making the point it can be produced is pointless. Based on the details in the bloggers roundtable and in the Navy News Service reporting, something doesn't add up.

In the interview Capt. Lindsey says "we have passed almost 20,000 gallons to the Haitian people" with 5 gallon jugs using the water system on Carl Vinson. Well, by my math that is 4,000 gallons per day, at best. If each flight leaves with 32 5-gallon jugs, then each flight takes 160 gallons for delivery - but for 4,000 gallons that math would mean there are only 25 flights carrying water per day (out of 19 helicopters). What?

If it is only 30,000 gallons as of January 24th, and the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) arrived on January 15th, that is only an average of 3,333 gallons per day. It would also suggest that as of today, January 29, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is yet to deliver even 50,000 gallons of potable water to Haiti despite being on station for 2 weeks, and despite the capability to produce 100,000 gallons per day in support of HA/DR.

CS-21 elevated HA/DR to a core strategic mission for the Navy, but something went wrong. The contribution of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has clearly been with the 19 helicopters, in other words, aviation and mobility support which has no doubt been vital to the effort. With that said, the HA/DR material contribution of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is hardly sufficient in any way, in fact Haiti has exposed a major capability gap in the Navy's HA/DR material delivery of water. It also highlights the total coordination failure of SOUTHCOM.

If the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) can produce at least 100,000 gallons of potable water per day, why did the Red Cross charter 43 flights to deliver 660,000 gallons of bottled water at a time when medical supplies were in enormous demand, and the aircraft carrier off the coast could have produced more than twice that amount over the same period of time? How many amputations occurred because of this blunder of coordination? How many people died?

The aircraft carrier has delivered a little bit of food, a little bit of medicine, but no heavy equipment and no shelter - it arrived on scene without excess of that stuff on ship. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has managed an average daily delivery of only around ~3,333 gallons, which is nothing when in support of 1,000,000 - 2,0000,000 in need. If we assume the need is 1 quart per day per person, the requirement is for 250,000 to 500,000 gallons per day to support the water needs of the people. Do the math - 3,333 gal/250,000 gal = ~1.3% of the gallons necessary to meet the requirement is being delivered, despite a stated capacity of the ship to produce the water requirement for ~400,000 people with 100,000 gallon production capacity.

Keep in mind, delivering an average of 3,333 gallons includes the bonus of having extra helicopters on the ship.

One clear lesson early in the Haiti operation to me is that the capacity of a US nuclear aircraft carrier is sufficient to meet water requirements in support of large HA/DR, but the capability of a US nuclear aircraft carrier to meet the requirement, even with a surge of helicopters, is no where close to sufficient. If the potable water can be produced, but not delivered, it is not a capability - it is a capacity. There is clearly an enormous systems gap suggesting something is needed to turn capacity into capability.

Another problem is the inability of SOUTHCOM to coordinate the use of the aircraft carrier for water production. There are probably legitimate challenges and reasons, but they do need to be examined closely. Based on the numbers provided in the blogger roundtable interviews, SOUTHCOM's support of water production by the aircraft carrier was only able to deliver 1.3% of total potential water production capacity. If those numbers hold up, I think that would be by definition "spectacular failure" in the context of a disaster where the official Haitian government January 28 numbers are 112,392 dead and 196,501 people injured.

The whole group of 12 ships has only delivered 87,000 gallons of water per Admiral Branch's comment on January 27th. The Bataan ARG arrived on January 19th, and the Nassau ARG arrived on January 23rd. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has an excess water production of 100,000 gallons per day, meaning that at maximum efficiency the full capability would have delivered 1.4 million gallons potable water to date. The USS Bataan (LHD 5) and USS Nassau (LHA 4) each produce 200,000 gallons potable water per day. The USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) produces 96,000 gallons of potable water per day. The USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44), USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), and USS Ashland (LSD 48) all produce 63,000 gallons of potable water per day each. Just those ships are capable of producing 848,000 gallons per day potable water - enough water to meet the needs of everyone in Port-au-Prince every day.

Do the math based on the number of days each ship has been on station. At maximum efficiency the US Navy ships off Port-au-Prince could have produced 5,589,000 gallons of potable water to date, and instead has delivered 87,000 gallons potable water. That means in water production through the first two weeks, if these numbers are accurate, the Navy has been delivering 1.5% of maximum capacity for potable water production.

The need for water has been met after two weeks, at least according to this Bloomberg report. This is almost certainly due to the water production capacity now on the ground in Haiti. The same report goes on to note all the needs that haven't been met. Unless the numbers provided by Captain Lindsey and RDML Branch are wrong (and they could be as there are no official numbers anywhere else - the information problem discussed above), SOUTHCOMs management of water logistics for Haiti to date would appear to represent a tremendous military blunder, at best.

It leads to several questions. Has the US Navy been capable of supporting the delivery of more potable water produced from ships than was done the first two weeks? Has SOUTHCOM used naval forces effectively in HA/DR? Does the Navy have a major gap between potable water production on ships (like CVNs, LHAs, LHDs, and LPDs) and potable water delivery from ships?

Is the US Navy organized properly to respond to major natural disasters? Look, if the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) has indeed only delivered ~3,333 gallons of water per day average, there is a serious gap between capacity and capability that needs to be addressed. 100,000 gallons of water will weigh about 420 tons plus the container weight. Here is a question sure to drive some crazy..., is there a future mission module solution here? Offload the water to LCS/JHSVs from CVNs and have those vessels run around supporting delivery? If the Navy is going to elevate HA/DR to a core mission of strategy, this is a legitimate discussion.

This water logistics situation looks like a SOUTHCOM fiasco. I'm tempted to call this runway centric Air Force myopic bullshit approach to Haiti over the last two weeks a 1st class leadership fuckup, but it remains only a working theory until they put out the official numbers. SOUTHCOM needs to reveal the data that tells the story why water has been flooding in on the vital US flights while the massive Navy water production capacity was left virtually idle in port. A lot of people died because water was flown in instead of medicine. You think CNN is focused on Haiti now, just wait until Anderson Cooper figures out who is to blame for his 10pm complaints over the last two weeks.

The Canadians Kick Ass

When Haiti first happened I raised the question who would play the role of Indian during the Tsunami. The answer is Canada. If the numbers cited above are accurate, there is evidence the US Navy has been less than efficient with their Navy vessels supporting operations in Haiti. The same cannot be said about Canada.

Not sure if you heard, but on the same night George Clooney raised $61 million for Haiti, one of two telethons took place in Canada, and between the two telethons Canadians have raised $20 million in donations for Haiti - which the government has pledged to match.

Canada currently has 1,400 soldiers, sailors, and air crew on the ground or off the coast, a number expected to reach 2,000 by Sunday. Canada has two ships, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330) and HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282), one Sea King, six Griffon helicopters, one C-17, one C-130, hundreds of vehicles, and a military field hospital operating in support of Haiti (source). Most of their work has been centered around the city of Jacmel, a town of 40,000 south of the earthquake epicenter that was devastated. There is an airport there, and it has been opened. Because the radar equipment was completely destroyed, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330) is running air traffic control from sea.

HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282) had been operating in Léogâne where the Canadians set up a military field hospital. Léogâne is where the 22nd MEU has now set up operations. HMCS Athabaskan (DDH 282) left Léogâne on Wednesday for Jamaica to pick up supplies, fuel, and the 165 Canadian soldiers from the Royal 22nd Regiment, known as the Van Doos.

When you look at how much the Canadians have been able to do with just two ships, it is quite remarkable and a reminder that alternative force structures bring a lot of flexibility to operations. The Canadians are trying to link a road (that remains blocked) from Léogâne to Jacmel. The ports in both cities are closed, and without that road the people live off aid the Canadians provide and the support of airfields like the one the Canadians opened in Jacmel.

This is one of the Canadian Navy's finest hours. I noticed a poll where 66% of the Canadian people believe the government response to Haiti has been "Just Right." All that poll tells me is 34% of the Canadian people don't know excellence when they see it.

HA/DR Littoral Ink Spots?

The US Fleet Forces Command blog has an interesting post up discussing Haiti that includes an email from Captain Dominic DeScisciolo of the USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). It is a must read, as again it highlights how much good a ship can do. Well, not any ship, but a well resourced ship.

Peacetime challenges and activities require manpower, and it is absolutely clear when reading Captain Dominic DeScisciolo's email that he is maximizing the capability of his ship in this mission. I'm not saying others aren't, but I am saying that as the Coast Guard has proved, a ship with qualified, motivated sailors can do a heck of a lot if resourced well enough to accomplish the mission. A cruiser is obviously resourced well enough with manpower to do exactly that. A Famous class cutter, with 100 personnel, is also resourced well enough to go ashore and make a difference. Something to think about.

Challenges Ahead

The biggest challenge ahead is the increasing potential for rain, which can bring with it all kinds of medical challenges and potential epidemics. There are reports of suspected cases of measles in some parts of the earthquake area. More than 40% of the population has never had a measles vaccination. Malaria and other diseases are also potential problems down the road, none of which is good for a country moving into tent cities.

Despite some reported security problems, the security situation in Haiti remains very good. There are reports of UN and US Marine patrols at night in several places of the earthquake zone. Security is a serious issue that cannot be taken lightly though. The need for food is so high for so many that without security, distribution remains impossible.

The response by the United States is something I believe every American can be proud of. It has not been perfect, it never is, but we also do not see disasters of this scale and scope very often. The Navy will learn from this, of that I have no doubt. I feel nothing but a great sense of pride in seeing America respond to Haiti, and feel well represented by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines on the ground in Haiti doing the work in representation of folks like me.