Piracy? In the IRTC?

The above title refers to the reaction HNLMS Tromp got from a yacht sailing in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor. From the twitter account of the CO of the Tromp:

Encountered a small sailing yacht in the IRTC, when queried it stated “what do you mean piracy?” welcome to the real world.

I would have loved being able to see the look on the face of the crew member that made the inquiry when he got that answer.

Another nice one was the dhow that was behaving suspiciously. Turned out it was because everyone aboard was asleep.

The Japanese Refueling Decision

Check out this interesting account of the domestic political context of Japan's decision to allow its Indian Ocean refueling mission to lapse.

Chile Earthquake

I'm sure many of you guys have already heard this news. In case you have not, you can check some of the latest on the different news sites and channels. I don't have much to say at the moment other than let's keep the Chilean people in our prayers. And I hope that the international community can help Chileans as much as Haitians.

Expeditionary Warrior - Conclusion

Expeditionary Warrior: Concluding Thoughts

Assembling a seabase was a good solution to a finite campaign when lots of forces and material need to be brought ashore. After the initial movement, the seabase can be reduced to those platforms you need to support operations ashore with logistics, command and control, medical, hot chow, PX, aircraft maintenance, etc. There are conditions of security situations ashore, or a desire for a limited footprint ashore that naturally leads you to conduct operations from a seabase.

We are currently building what is lately called MPF-Transitional. It will have:

1. Selective off-load capability of cargo and vehicles, pull out the right pallet in a matter of minutes, at sea.
2. Ability to use lots of different kinds of connector boats. LCAC’s, LCU’s, riverine boats, international navies’ boats.
3. Additional Berthing. The Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) has 1,100 racks.
4. Vehicle Transfer: The VTS will allow us to transfer vehicles skin to skin at sea.

Concerns:
1. The hospital ships are going away soon, with no programmed replacements.
2. Connectors, connectors, connectors: will we have enough LCU’s, LCAC’s, raider craft, riverine craft, etc. Will they work together?
3. Incorporating other nations. Lots of other nations are building amphibs with great capabilities. We will need to be able to work with them.

Thanks a lot for reading this week. Sorry if the posts were too long; if I had more time, they would have been shorter.

Move 5 - Red Teaming

In Move 5 of Expeditionary Warrior 2010, our Red Team analysts told us how they would degrade, disable or attack the seabase.

1. It is harder to attack a seabase than it is a land base for your typical bad guy ground force.
2. The difficulty of attacking the seabase will cause opposing forces to attack the connector boats ferrying supplies and forces ashore and back.
3. OpFor will use bad weather and sea state to their advantage.
4. During HA or NEO, the OpFor will attempt to overwhelm aid distribution points, medical stations, evacuation points, etc., in order to show our inadequacy.
5. The trends of technology will make unmanned aircraft, vehicles and boats as well as anti-ship missiles smaller and cheaper.
6. Rumor or whisper campaigns counter to our efforts are more difficult to detect and counteract from a seabase.
7. U.S. forces will be continually filmed while ashore, for opportunities to show us as cruel, uncaring, inadequate, etc.

Based on these observations from the Red team, it would seem like we need to develop:

1. Seabase and connector force protection practices and craft.
2. Increase our ability to operate in rougher weather.
3. Develop international standards for connector craft.

The game will wrap up today, I'll try to collect thoughts to a conclusion post, stay tuned!

Move 4 - Stability Operations

After evacuating Americans in 2025, the country degraded into a low-intensity civil war, with opposing political parties, criminal factions and motivated radicals using violence against the government. Eventually, the government got the upper hand militarily, but still had a large refugee and infrastructure problem. The country requested help from the UN to feed refugees and enforce a tenuous cease fire.

Here comes the U.S. We have ponied up to lead the JTF under the UNSC charter. The mission is: assist the host nation’s government to assist displaced persons, create stability required to allow displaced persons to return to their homes and to allow the government to begin to provide basic services to its people again. We expect this effort to last a couple years until we can transition operations to the host-nation, UN agencies, and NGO’s.

First item, a Seabase is great, but it is expensive. Probably in a timeframe of two years, we would be looking at repairing and opening a port to allow shipping to tie-up and offload to support operations ashore.

Another point was force protection for the connectors. In supporting operations ashore for a prolonged time, you will spend a lot of resources to protect the seabase and especially to protect the connectors going back and forth to shore. Positioning the seabase farther off shore provides more security to the big ships, but also puts the LCU’s and LCAC’s at more risk with a longer transit (perhaps even out to 20 miles or more off shore). Quickly, we realized a need, not only for lots of connectors, but for lots of escort and security craft.

It made sense to keep your higher level medical support on ship. We put our JTF commander on shore with a small HQ, but kept many C2 functions on ship.

We used the MPS and Army pre-positioned stocks to build up forces ashore and refugee camps, etc. We planned on resupplying the forces ashore primarily by shipping for the two year operation. We figured 90% or more of your supplies could be forecasted well enough, so that the slow speed of shipping would still be acceptable. Certainly in the beginning of the operation, the MPF ship you loaded two years ago in Blount Island is what you get, but perhaps a few months into the operation, your cargo ship can be specifically loaded in the U.S. or elsewhere to support your unit. Still, we liked the concept of keeping a light footprint on shore, and keeping your “Iron Mountain” of spare parts and supplies on ship. It’s just tough to make it work.

The MPF-Future (MPFF) has an “extra” big-deck amphib (LHA/LHD) with enhanced aircraft maintenance facilities. In addition, the LHA/LHD and MLP of the MPF-F will provide thousands of berths, so you could fly-in the Marines or Soldiers and truly base them on a ship, and ride or fly ashore to conduct operations.

Consideration was given toward taking a whole MPF squadron out of action to support this kind of stability operation. Is it worth it to take the MPF squadron and the ability to outfit a rapidly deployed force out of action to support a stability operation for which you really only need a portion of the MPF stuff? Again, selective offload of cargo is vital.

Finally, an extended land campaign is not a core competency of the Marine Corps, (please ignore current land war), so it is difficult for us to plan a two-year operation supported from ships, we’re not necessarily set up for that, MPF is not necessarily designed for that. The MPF-Future will have a capability to sustain operations ashore from the seabase for a prolonged time, but so far that concept is briefed, but not bought. Even if we do develop the MPF-F, it is an expensive way to support prolonged operations ashore of multiple MEB’s or BCT’s. But it might be best if you need to reduce your footprint ashore for security or infrastructure reasons.

We realized very quickly, we need the Army and we need a port. Marines have an attention span of about 6 - 7 months, so we don’t set up the chow hall or PX until the second rotation of Marines. The Army is much better at thinking in long-term deployments of large forces. Am I actually asking for a Soldier’s help?....Got to go to sick call tomorrow.

Our First Catch of the Day...

Exciting stuff:

The littoral combat ship Freedom seized a quarter-ton of cocaine in the Caribbean on Monday in its first encounter with smugglers during a “trial deployment” to the 4th Fleet area of operations, according to the Navy.

When U.S. and international observers spotted a “go-fast boat” outside Colombian territorial waters, the Navy said, Freedom launched its MH-60S Seahawk helicopter, which flew over the drug runners and prompted them to dump their drugs overboard. The boat turned and crossed into Colombian waters, where the Colombian navy took up the chase.

Information released by the U.S. Navy on Tuesday did not make clear whether the drug runners had ultimately been arrested. But the Navy did say the Freedom’s crew pulled the dumped bales of cocaine from the water and will keep them on board as evidence in case prosecutors try to bring the smugglers to trial.

New Blog of Interest

I want to give a shout out to Mark Slagh who has a new online project, the Secure Nation blog. They are only into it with 5 entries so far, but this looks to be a new blog worth keeping an eye on. About the blog:

Secure Nation is a communal blog about US national security and defense. To begin addressing such a broad topic, we gathered a community of contributors with a vast scope of experience, piece-by-piece: former Army Rangers, technology professors at Harvard and Georgetown, and government administrators alike.

The stories and opinions of these correspondents regarding their time in the armed forces, government service, or private sector are insightful and compelling for the future of defense and security. We hope that this exciting group of people will engage public interest by discussing security and defense in the broadest sense, and that this blog will generate accessible, innovative thinking and discussion on the issue.

If you want to become a part of the community and contribute regularly to the daily posts and content, please get in touch. If you have an idea for a post, please share it. Every article is open for comments as well; we hope these comments sections will enable substantial interaction among long-term and casual contributors.

Secure Nation was founded by Mike Slagh, a naval officer and student at the Harvard Kennedy School and is sustained by a variety of dedicated contributors whom keep the conversation alive every day.

We care deeply about the Wounded Warrior Project and the EOD Memorial Fund. Should this blog for any reason attract sponsorship or paid advertisements in the future, all proceeds will be evenly distributed between these two foundations. In addition to the original perspective it will hopefully bring to the public discussion of national security and defense, Secure Nation exists to raise awareness for these foundations.

The Navy's current slogan is "A Global Force for Good." As I am reading through the first articles on that blog, it is interesting that we see a blog of civilian academics, post graduate college folks, and businessmen who seem to be starting from that slogan as a foundation in writing about military affairs from their civilian perspectives.

Young Americans discussing public diplomacy, technology, and the military? I love blogs like that.

Move 3 - Non-Combatant Evacuation

Move 3: Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
From the wargame: Expeditionary Warrior 2010

The situation ashore has deteriorated. The assassination of the opposing political party’s leader has thrown the host nation into an armed conflict between the government and the opposing party. The embassy has requested military assistance to evacuate non-combatants.

The combatant commander has assembled a seabase composed of Joint High Speed Vessels, a Mobile Landing Platform, MPF ships (T-AKE and LMSR’s), and a MEU on a 3-ship ARG. Once we decided who’s in charge, we conducted the NEO. In the game, we decided that command and control functions would remain on ship. Amphibious big decks have great communications capabilities and flag staff spaces, so they were very useful for this move.

The majority of American and allied nation citizens that are to be evacuated live near the coast, so evacuating by sea, as slow as ships may go, was seen as a good option. This also reduced crowding in the few airfields that are still serviceable after a few seasons of flood.

A couple ships we will have in 2023, the Joint High Speed Vessel, and the Mobile Landing Platform were invaluable in conducting the NEO. The JHSV was used to ferry evacuees to a nearby port with a working airport. The MLP was used in much the same manner. The JHSV can carry a few hundred (in seats and troop berthing) for a matter of hours. The MLP can carry upwards of 1,100 for a matter of days (troop berthing) if it didn’t already come full of Soldiers or Marines.

During the NEO, we didn’t see as much a need to play nice with others as we did in the previous HA move, we saw the NEO as a clear mission that U.S. forces would conduct, and we would be in charge of the evacuation of U.S. citizens.

Another invaluable tool for the NEO was the ability to connect the shore to the ship, and not have to rely on a serviceable port. We are operating from a multi-billion dollar seabase with state-of-the-art aircraft and communications, and the most useful tool was the 65 year old LCU! It’s tough to carry people on an LCAC, and it’s tough to carry thousands of people on helos. LCU’s to the rescue!

In general, the seabase was very useful in the NEO, but it was a stepping stone in the evacuation process. You can’t just impress the evacuees to be a new crew of the ship, we’ve eventually got to get them home, and the evacuees will probably want to go faster than 15 knots across the ocean. So using the seabase’s ships as ferries and a base of operations was valuable, but it didn’t complete the whole mission by itself, we’ll need to get the evacuees to an airport.

Stay tuned, tomorrow we will conduct stability operations from a seabase.

Move 2: Humanitarian Assistance

Move 2: Humanitarian Assistance

For background information on Expeditionary Warrior 2010, go to: https://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/ew.cfm. Sorry, only accessible for CAC users, we’re working on it!

Move 2: Humanitarian Assistance, 2022. After a couple years recovering from the 2020 severe flooding, the host country is hit again with an even more severe rainy season, requiring the international community’s help.

To answer a comment about the Marine Corps in 2022: The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is currently experimenting with something called Enhanced Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations. Basically, in EMO, the lowest level independently operating Marine Corps unit will shift from a reinforced battalion, as we see in a Marine Expeditionary Unit, to a reinforced company. MCWL is experimenting with the additional comms, fire-support and transportation that will be needed to support platoons operating 40 miles from a ship, and 10 miles from each other. A Company Landing Team (COLT) is pretty cool, because it creates a small amphibious operations capability that could fit on one ship, potentially increasing the reach of U.S. forces around the world.

Another answer to a comment: There will be partners, and there will be other countries with competing interests. We have discussed the difficulty in relief operations if someone like an Iran, Russia, China, Venezuela brings a cargo ship or frigate and says, “We’re here to help.” The basic answer from the ambassadors, admirals and generals helping the game is: “It depends.”

The wargame is looking into the advantages and disadvantages of using a seabase in various scenarios, Move 2 requires a humanitarian assistance operation.

First of all: it’s all about relationships and agreements. The Embassy is key in starting an HA operation, the first thing the seabase commander needs to do is check in with the embassy. The HA operation needs to be run as truly a supporting operation to the host nation, and not a “we’re in charge” kind of operation.

Environment, to run HA, we need a benign environment, with no threat other than a few criminals and looters. HA won’t be effective if we need to attack the village before we bring in water. This is applicable from a seabase or not, but it was an interesting nugget from the gray hairs in the room.

Advantages of the seabase in HA: A HA operation will require a lot of heavy equipment. Water purification, power, road building, other engineering equipment is all heavy. Ships are great for transporting heavy stuff, and LCU’s, and LCAC’s to some extent are great for taking that heavy stuff ashore, where a port facility might be damaged. (Like Haiti in 2010)

Basing your HA operation from a seabase reduces your footprint ashore, which is good to reduce the support required ashore, and helps your security situation as well. (During tsunami relief in Thailand, the US forces kept only a couple dozen on shore at night.)

But there are disadvantages to a seabase too: A seabase is slow to respond, in comparison to human suffering. A seabase will not be there in time to be a first responder and tend to the dying or bleeding. In fact, a seabase may not even be there to prevent suffering or death from a lack of water or food in the first 72 hours. During the wargame, we looked at a week to ten days as a reasonable window in which we could respond to a disaster with a seabase. So, the seabaase won’t be there first.

Another disadvantage to a seabase is a reduced effectiveness if the ship-to-ship connectors cannot mate up to all ships in the base. Currently, the Army and the Navy both have ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore connectors, as well as our own service MPF ships. The connectors need to work together. Maybe only buy one LCU for the whole DoD, or one LCAC; commonality, incredible concept.

In 2022, we assumed MPF ships have a ramp (Vehicle Transfer System) that they can roll vehicles to another ship or floating dock. We also assumed a ship called a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) exists. An MLP will be able to accept the rolling vehicle from the VTS/MPF ship, and will have a lot of deck space for docking LCAC’s and LCU’s. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/mlp.htm

This link might answer some ship and connector questions:
http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/

Move 3 coming this afternoon. We are ramping up across the range of military operations, so all you gunfighters can stay tuned.

ACSC

I'm at the Air Command and Staff College today, explaining why the Air Force should be abolished. Fun times; full report hopefully tomorrow.

Move 1: Steady State Assistance

For background material on Expeditionary Warrior 2010, refer to https://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/ew.cfm.

To answer a question from an earlier blog about “What is a seabase?” and “How does this work with MPF?”

A seabase is a collection of ships and capabilities at sea. It basically provides an airfield, a port and a logistics base through the collection of ships and other tools. So in real terms, you put some MPF ships together with a carrier and LHA/LHD, add some well deck capability with LPD/LSD’s and there you have a seabase. Now anyone who has been a part of a Navy surface combatant group knows that at times it is easier to swim to another ship than it is to get a ride there, or have a phone call with someone on another ship. So you can see quickly, that a key element of a successful seabase is ship to ship, and ship to shore connectors. In addition to that, you will need to surgically extract the cargo you want from the densely packed MPF ship. So when the MPF ship goes to support a humanitarian assistance operation, you will want to leave the armored vehicles, but take out all the tents, generators and water purification units. It is projected that in 2020, the time for Move 1 of the wargame, the U.S. will have a selective cargo offload capability, as well as improved connector capabiities.

So in Move 1 of the wargame, the U.S. and its coalition partners are supporting a nation like many in the world. There is little to no infrastructure, the national government has little or no ability to improve the lives of its people or provide basic services, and laws mean very little. The reason the seabase was deployed to the area was to support the government to rebuild infrastructure and prevent disease following an unusually severe rainy season.

A seabase is good for humanitarian assistance because it reduces the footprint ashore and the amount of support you need to bring ashore for yourself. That’s great, and it was proven in the aid provided to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.

For the seabase capabilities we envision for 2020, we are planning on the ability to pull the bulldozer and generator out of the hold on the MPF ship, and deliver them with an LCU or LCAC. We don’t have that capability yet, but we’re working on it. Currently, when you unload the MPF ship, you need to unload it all until you see the equipment you want, then you need to put all the stuff back in the same order.

The seabase is not a great answer to everything however. In Move 1, we want to provide a persistent presence ashore to assist rebuilding and disease prevention. A seabase is not really great for that, you can’t really build situational awareness or relationships while you are 40 miles or more off shore. A seabase was seen as being a good platform to deliver heavy equipment, and some logistics capabilities not provided in the host nation, like refined fuels, medical supplies, etc.

Move 2 and 3 tomorrow, keep sending your questions.

Seabasing nuggets.

Expeditionary Warrior 2010 is a joint, multinational wargame designed to test the concepts of seabasing. Refer to: https://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/ew.cfm

Sitting through the obligatory classes prior to the seabasing wargame. To save you the few hours and the line to the head during breaks, here are a few nuggets:

-Seabasing is a national capability. The Corps gets is feathers ruffled when we hear this, but the fact is the Army has significant equipment already pre-positioned and they are buying some Joint High Speed vehicles, to connect MPF ships and ports.

-The current 30-yr shipbuilding plan just released with the QDR will realize an amphibious fleet of 29 - 33 ships as the years go by. Both the Navy and Marine Corps agree that it takes 38 ships to lift 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). To further complicate matters, current USMC units have more vehicles than the tables of organizations of 10-years ago; it won't all fit on the ships, even if we did have 38.

-USMC (and Army) equipment has gotten much heavier and larger in the past 10 years, and will continue to do so. This will make amphibious ships too heavy, and with the larger vehicles needing to be in the upper vehicle stowage areas just to fit, the ships are too top-heavy. As a telling illustration:

Old Vehicle: M151 Jeep: 3,000 lbs.
Currents ships designed around: M998 Soft-door HMMWV: 5,000 lbs
Currently used on the ground: Up-Armored HMMWV: 7,600 lbs
Future vehicle, Joint Light? Tactical Vehicle: 22,000 lbs

Current Helo ships are designed around: CH-46: 13,000 lbs
Future Helo: MV-22: 47,000 lbs

Current V/STOL attack aircraft: AV-8b: 25,000 lbs
Future V/STOL attack aircraft: JSF (F-35): 46,000 lbs

This is a huge problem that we haven't really been faced with in combat operations yet. How to fit current Marine forces on a ship? There are a few smart guys crunching the numbers to examine the Gear Left On the Pier (GLOP).

The first move of the game comes this afternoon, we'll see how this seabasing thing works.


-

Expeditionary Warrior 2010

Follow me this week as I participate in the wargame Expeditionary Warrior 2010. A multi-national, joint wargame sponsored by the Marine Corps to test the tools and tactics of seabasing. The game is set in 2025, with the Navy and Marine Corps team we expect to have then.

The game will go from Feb 21st to the 25th. I'll post to keep you updated to game moves, there will be about two moves a day.

AirSea Battle

Andrew Krepinevich has a new report out this week for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments titled Why AirSea Battle?

The report discusses the critical role that the US military’s power-projection operations have played in providing for the security of the United States and its allies since World War II. The report then goes on to describe military modernization efforts by China and Iran designed to deny the United States the ability to sustain military forces in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf. It concludes by arguing that a new Air Force-Navy AirSea Battle concept is needed to preserve a stable military balance in these two primarily aerospace and maritime domains.

"The US must adapt its power projection forces—along with corresponding changes in its military capabilities and force structure—or face the prospect of losing military access in these two key regions," concludes Krepinevich. "The importance and urgency of finding a new approach is reinforced by the priority afforded to AirSea battle in the Quadrennial Defense Review released on February 1st."

Direct link to the report (PDF). I am going to read it a few times before commenting. AirSea Battle is a popular current "inside baseball" subject - popular enough to be specifically cited in the QDR, but it is still very much unclear if the final product becomes anything more a new wine in old barrels.

I will continue to be out much of this week, but this week as I am unavailable LtCol Roger Galbraith, Director of Public Affairs at Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Marine Corps Base Quantico will be blog posting from Expeditionary Warrior 2010.

Government in a Box

I'm currently at the International Studies Association in New Orleans. In about an hour, I'll be sitting on a roundtable with Dan Drezner, Stephen Walt, Charli Carpenter, William Winecoff, and Joseph Nye on the topic of the influence of academic blogging on policy. In lieu of more substantive posting, here's an interesting exchange on the "government in a box" concept that has some relevance for the comments Bryan made earlier

Video of USNI/AFCEA Panel (Work/McGrath)

Here's a link to the panel the Undersecretary and I did in San Diego. I am indebted to USNI and AFCEA for the invitation, and to Secretary Work for his graciousness. The discussion starts at about the 6:00 mark.

Bryan McGrath

The Falklands Or Las Malvinas?

According to the BBC, Argentina has announced that all ships passing through its claimed territorial waters (so that includes the Falklands) must have a new permit.
The reason for this is British plans to drill for oil, an operation that is set to begin next week. The oil-field off the Falklands is said to have a capacity of 60 billion barrels.

The Argentine government has already prevented one ship, the MV Thor Leader, to sail for the Falklands. The government said the vessel had supplies on board for oil drilling.
Currently the oil rig Ocean Guardion is on its way to the islands and should arrive tomorrow, the 19th. Some claim the rig has been shadowed by Argentine aircraft.

At this moment I wouldn't expect a 2nd Falklands War, because the risks for Argentina are too high.
When the Falklands War started there were about 80 military personnel at the islands, together with the patrol vessel HMS Endurance.
Currently there are just over 1,000 military personnel, 4 Eurofighters, a VC-10 refuelling plane, a Hercules and 2 Sea Kings. Naval assets currently at the Falklands are the type 42 destroyer HMS York and patrol vessel HMS Clyde. Underway are the fleet tanker RFA Wave Ruler and survey vessel HMS Scott.
I'd expect one or more submarines to emerge in the waters of the Falklands as well.

If it would come to a war expect the UK to go 'all in'. Yes, because of the oil reserves, but also because of the upcoming general elections in the UK. These must be hold before June 4 and the Labour Party of Prime Minister Gordon Brown could use a boost, since most recent polls indicate Labour is 9 percentage points behind the Conservative Party (the Tories).

So don't expect 'the Falklands War part II', but do expect tensions to be rising between the UK and Argentina.

Disputing the "Hearts and Minds" Strategy

Cross-posted at The Conservative Wahoo:

We had a nice discussion of the current operations in Afghanistan on The Conservative Wahoo Live! radio program last night, with several listeners very much espousing the "win their hearts and minds" strategy that has become part of the background noise in Washington's current fascination with counterinsurgency theory (COIN). Here is a rational, well-argued criticism of modern COIN from today's New York Times.

I was a student at the Joint Forces Staff College in the Summer of 2006, about the time the COIN cabal began their ascendancy. After a day-long symposium on the subject in which no fewer than five separate speakers parroted the "hearts and minds" line, I stood up in the Blue Bedroom (the main auditorium, so named because of its color and the propensity of the lighting/atmosphere to put students to sleep) and asked the unlucky lecturer a simple question:

"Has an insurgency ever been broken through a policy of fear, terror and murder?"

His answer was a very quick "yes", and as if to prove his credentials as a COIN expert, he named a half dozen or so. I then asked, "How come we don't study those?"

He was aghast. His answer was basically, "Because that kind of fighting is inconsistent with American values and ideals."

I then went on. "But we firebombed Japanese and German cities night after night, killing tens of thousands of civilians at time. We dropped two atomic weapons on an opponent who was obviously losing the war. Is it a question of from how far away the fear, and terror and murder is delivered? Is that the prime determinant of whether something is "consistent" with our values?"

My point is this: winning the hearts and minds of a population is a proven strategy for breaking an insurgency--because it has been proven to work. But it hasn't always worked. Shouldn't our forces then also at least discuss other methods of breaking insurgencies? Or is it the discussion of such distasteful methods that is actually inconsistent with our values and ideals, rather than the conduct?

I'm all in favor of the "hearts and minds" approach being the default, textbook US method of addressing COIN. I'm not in favor of ignoring history.

Bryan McGrath

Worse than Expected

A while ago, I noted that a feature film based on the boardgame "Battleship" was in the works, to be directed by Peter Berg and released in 2011. At the time, I wondered about who the enemy would be, and how the fleets would be constituted. It turns out that things are rather worse than I had imagined:

A couple of weeks ago Latino Review revealed that the bad guys in Battleship won't be another Earthly navy but in fact an alien fleet; that revelation is what spurred Berg and Universal to put this expedition together, as they wanted to get information about the movie - which won't start filming until next spring - out there to combat rumor, speculation and the natural skepticism that comes from hearing a movie is being made from one of the most plotless board games of all time.

Berg opened up the info floodgates, even showing us pre-production concepts of the alien ships. Designed by ILM, who will be doing the FX, the alien ships look like giant water bugs, with giant hydrofoil legs that race across the surface of the sea. They're huge, black and scary looking.

That's.... super. Regarding the constitution of the "Hero Fleet":

- The hero of the film is the Commanding Officer of a destroyer. The destroyer is the main ship in the film, and during the tour of the Sterett Berg told us (and the Sterett's CO confirmed) that battleships are mostly sidelined in today's Navy.

- There is a battleship component, but Berg won't explain how it works. However, he did mention that

- There is a WWII component as well. While the movie is set in the modern day and features the most cutting edge naval tech, a WWII element comes into play. I'm just spitballing here, but I bet that the alien's goal, as well as the enigmatic battleship, are connected to this WWII component.

Apparently one ship in the Hero Fleet will be Japanese; odds on whether this is the first friendly to go down? And here's Berg explaining the alien nonsense:

The idea of finding a credible context for that eluded me. The idea of a film where America goes to war against China, or a movie where America goes to war against England or Australia or Japan, one of the countries that has a credible navy, felt like it would borderline on some kind of jingoistic American military exercise I couldn't get my head around. I like the idea of something bigger, larger than life and the challenge it presented.

And so... your solution was to mashup Waterworld and Independence Day?

The Brazil-China Carrier Bit

Last week, Galrahn mentioned this Kai Thaler IPRIS article on the potential cooperation between China and Brazil on carrier operations training. The article includes a discussion of what China is getting out of the deal, and also briefly summarizes China's case for acquiring an aircraft carrier. Thaler's speculation on the Brazilian side is a little bit more interesting; he suggests that Brazil may want the general prestige associated with helping to train the military of a nascent superpower, but may also want concrete Chinese support for a permanent Brazilian spot on the UN Security Council, and assistance on a nuclear submarine program.

The first two make sense, but I'm uncertain about the last. While China might be limited in its potential naval aviation training partners, it seems likely that Brazil has multiple options for collaboration on nuclear submarines. Brazil has a good defense relationship with France, and Russia has proven more than willing to share technology associated with nuclear submarines (and even to lease boats). France and Russia are legally limited in their ability to transfer nuclear technology to non-nuclear states, but China suffers under the same handicap. Why, given these options, Brazil would focus on cooperation with a relatively inexperienced operator of nuclear submarines is unclear to me. I suppose it would have helped if Thaler had detailed the sources of what he calls "speculation" that China might assist Brazil with SSN technology and expertise.

Slow For Me

I will be unavailable for regular blog posting for a little while. In the meantime, the other authors are still active and I am looking into trying something that may or may not work out on the blog next week.

We'll wait and see.

Uruguay-Germany Rift

It appears that the saga of the Graf Spee isn't over:

In 2006, divers salvaged the huge bronze eagle with the swastika at its base from the waters off the Uruguayan capital. It's the swastika that is causing the trouble. The German government, as represented by its ambassador in Uruguay, is opposed to the display of the eagle with the Nazi cross. Germany, understandably enough, is sensitive about the ultimate symbol of National Symbolism. Public display of it is generally illegal in Germany although exceptions are made for historical and educational purposes.

There now seems to be some uncertainty about the ownership of the eagle. Germany believes the ship to be part of its cultural heritage. According to Uruguayan law, sunken ships predating 1973 in their waters are generally considered property of the Uruguayan state. Uruguayan businessman Alfredo Etchegaray has the rights to salvage the wreck and he doesn't believe that Germany even has the right to express an opinion on the matter. He points out that Germany has its own share of historical relics from other countries, including the head of Nefertiti which Egypt would very much like back. Uruguayan newspaper El Pais notes that Germany contributes money to the preservation of concentration camp Auschwitz, in modern-day Poland.

According to Wikipedia, earlier this decade there were plans to raise Graf Spee, restore her to original condition, and turn her into a tourist attraction. This work was apparently suspended by Presidential decree. While the idea of refloating and restoring the wreck seems far-fetched, I think that I would feel almost compelled to visit if the project ever came to fruition. Other German World War II vessels have been turned into tourist attractions, and the wreck of Graf Spee is not a war grave. Nevertheless, the technical challenges of restoring a ship sunk seventy years ago in shallow seawater would be extraordinary.

Via Alterdestiny.

Building a True 21st Century Fleet

The modularity and concept of space designed into the Littoral Combat Ship is exactly the right direction that the Navy needs to go. The 21st century fleet needs to be flexible with large payload space. Whether or not this space should be interchangeable is still a question to be answered in the future, but the ability to utilize space as an interconnected capability is absolutely the future of surface warfare.

One can make all kinds of comments regarding how many DDG-1000s the Navy should be building. In my opinion - 4 ships is a capability (NSFS w/ 4 BBs for example), 2 ships is a technology demonstration (USS Long Beach (CGN 9) and USS Bainbridge (DLGN 25)), and 3 ships represents a sign that no one in the Navy or Congress has the vision or leadership necessary to make a decision absent the influence of parochial self interest when it comes to Navy shipbuilding.

The DDG-1000 has consumed the greatest piece of Navy R&D for the last 7-10 years, but the ten key technologies are going to be game changers in the way we think about and design ships. I have said it on Midrats at least twice, and will say it again here...

The DDG-1000 program will represent a resounding success for the Navy even if the ships do not last their full service life or never make a substantial contribution in the service of the country as a warship. The intellectual capital that has been and will be gained from DDG-1000 is going to facilitate the Navy's effort to shift from a largely platform centric perspective - to a perspective of exploiting a network of combat and non-combat systems centric capabilities. This is a doctrinal change that will almost certainly emerge as part of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine development process mentioned in the 2010 QDR.

We are entering an age of energy. The most important technology on the DDG-1000 is the Integrated Electric Drive (IPS). Taking a comprehensive HM&E approach, the Navy has positioning itself to realize the incredible flexibility that comes with trade space for both the weapons system acquisition folks as well as the operators when these ships go into the fight.

This gives the Navy the opportunity to design and build platforms that are nothing more than the "boxes" of flexible payload space Bob Work discusses, utilizing integrated power and open architecture integration to enable the Navy to maintain pace with technology developments. This approach capitalizes on a common network interface systems for ESM, Missiles, Radars, Comms, C4ISR, Manpower, Guns, Lasers, Hospitals, etc. to give the Navy the flexibility for rapidly upgrading systems to insure a platform designed in the 21st century remains relevant through the life of the ship.

With a properly managed HM&E design that leverages IPS and open architecture, the Navy is poised to treat a 21st century warship like a smart phone - with network interface modules representing the apps. As the apps get old, the open architecture approach allows them to be rapidly upgraded as new technologies are fielded.

The challenge for the Navy is streamlining this process. We only hear pieces of this description from naval leaders, but no vision statement as articulated here - even as this represents the future as even they see it in the future fleet. The challenge is to invest in design to produce HM&E maturity for a future surface combatant with Integrated Electric Drive so that we can then take advantage of the systems - like AMDR.

So far in FY2011 budget discussions, Navy leaders have identified the Burke for HM&E and specific findings in an AMDR study as specific desired systems. The problem with this approach is that it wastes the decade by spending money on ships without Integrated Electric Drive. That matters, because any ship built without Integrated Electric Drive after 2015 will be obsolete before they retire. Can the nation really afford to spend so much money on high end fleet capabilities that will almost certainly not be viable in 20-30 years?

Last year Gene Taylor mentioned money may need to be spent getting the Burke design into a modern design software tool. It was a good suggestion, because that will be the only way the Navy can get the Burke aligned to the HM&E -> IPS -> Systems approach in the right order. Until the Navy gets to that point with a major surface combatant, the Navy will remain stuck in the 20th century at the high end of naval warfare.

Expect our challengers and adversaries to continue moving towards the approach discussed in this post by the end of the decade. Considering our nations economic problems, we should make it a strategic objective to get there first.

JHSVs Are Not Coastal Patrol Vessels

Yesterday I highlighted that over the last 4 years, the operational tempo for FFGs, LSDs, and PCs are all very, very high. The reason is not difficult to explain, these are the platforms the Navy is using to execute maritime strategy globally at the low end of the spectrum of national threats and naval responsibilities.

I fully support the Navy wanting to retire the Perry class FFs. They are a money sink of maintenance costs, other operational costs, and crew costs that includes training on very old technology. Had the Navy upgraded the frigates instead of remove the 'one-arm-bandit' capability 10 years ago, my opinion would be different. Hindsight is 20/20, as long as we live and learn I think it is OK to let these ships retire as they reach end of life.

The LSDs are great ships, but what impresses me more are the officers who command LPDs and LSDs. I am a huge supporter of Amphib COs, because I realize that the very high operational tempo globally over the last two decades translates into them being in a unique position to be at sea more than other COs; and usually in all the places where the rest of the Navy eventually finds itself only during bad times. Amphib COs are the ambassadors of the country to many places globally and represent the best tradition of what naval power means to a superpower building cooperative relationships. While it is unpopular to say in the Navy, Amphib COs make due at high operational tempos despite usually being underfunded to match the high OPTEMPO, and btw, usually with the sailors who wanted to be a on major surface combatant but didn't score high enough to make it. In other words, Amphib COs typically get the short, thin straw in today's Navy right before they get asked to drink from the biggest cup.

It is why among SWOs, I often find officers who served on Amphibs to be the most creative. One persons opinion, but adaptation takes practice and Amphib COs get plenty of practice adapting to tough situations - more so in my opinion than SWOs on surface combatants who go into almost every situation over the last decade with capabilities and support well beyond what is necessary to execute the required mission. I'm sure Navy leaders will disregard what I'm saying, but there is a very real bias against SWOs who are Amphib sailors today by Navy leaders, and I think it is a more serious problem for the Navy than people want to admit.

How many surface warfare officers currently ranked Vice Admiral or higher served on an amphibious ship during their entire career? According to their biographies... none. Why is it the only major flag officers who have served on an amphibious ship were from special warfare or aviation? Ponder that thought as you observe who gets Major Command and promotions this year.

I am a strong believer in Coastal Patrol vessels, but not because I favor PCs - because I don't actually think the Navy should actually build traditional PCs. I like PCs though, because I like that they allow Lt Cmdr's the experience of command at sea. Any officer who has effectively commanded one of the forward deployed PCs off KAOOT and ABOT at any point over the last 5 years is probably one of our best young officers. That job has probably been the hardest SWO job in the Navy over the past decade, as it is the true front line at sea in the wars we are in.

I think the Navy understands very well the value of that experience, but rightfully refuses to invest in ships that don't meet a minimum standard requirement for endurance. I made the point that the Navy intends to alleviate the pressure on these ships at sea by replacing their mission sets with Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels. In a recent interview of Bob Work by Chris Cavas, that is basically the point Bob makes.

The theme for the Navy is balancing all of these different missions. We think we were able to come up with a pretty good plan in aviation and shipbuilding, which reflected these budget priorities. You'll see, for example, improvements at the low end because we've stabilized the LCS program and increased the Joint High Speed Vessel program quite significantly, to 23 vessels.

There was a big debate within the department on patrol craft, PCs. People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need - SEALs, Marines, [a] Riverine squadron. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program, at the same time SLEPing [service life extension program] the 13 PCs we have, so they're going to be with us well into the 2020s. But the Joint High Speed Vessels will take over for them, because we like their self-deployability aspects - they can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they're extremely flexible.

I disagree with Bob Work in many ways in this quote. The Littoral Combat Ship program has yet to be stabilized. The Navy has two ships at sea and two ships under construction. We have seen 2 ships canceled while under construction, 1 ship deleted from a budget, and something like 4-6 ships removed from budgets since this program started? Even after the new plan was announced last year, the FY 2011 shipbuilding plan released Feb 1, 2024 added 2 more Littoral Combat Ships on top of this most recent plan - meaning the Littoral Combat Ship is so "stable" the current plan is officially - only 12 days old. That is not stability!

The budget situation has me conceding that self-deploying vessels are the only way to go. I say this because there is not enough money to buy the kind of logistics ships needed to support ships that don't emphasize endurance. I also have my eye on the Pacific, and we need ships with endurance out that direction. I think 4,000 nm should be the threshold, which is about what the Littoral Combat Ships can do.

I also think Bob Work has the vision right regarding the value of payload space. That is a concept I've been calling for on the blog from the beginning - motherships will be in the 21st century what aircraft carriers were in the 20th century. Manned and unmanned systems as payloads is the way ahead, and by unmanned systems I mean vehicles and/or/with weapon systems.

There is nothing more important to enforcing peace at sea than a qualified, well trained sailor. The necessity to put manpower to sea when necessary, or go unmanned with ISR or combat power as needed is the kind of flexibility the future Navy needs. I do not believe these needs are only at the low end, but I do think the Navy will find that they get more punch value from low end vessels with this approach as the systems architecture for payloads mature.

I have serious concerns with the idea that a JHSV can replace a PC. These are two very different platforms that perform two very different roles. I do not have confidence that a JHSV is the right platform to meet the vital sea control requirement against irregular warfare threats, and the Littoral Combat Ship is touted with the promise that it is on par with frigates, not PCs (insert joke here?)

I believe the Navy is missing a key piece in their vision for global maritime maintenance for coastal patrol and sea control against irregular surface threats, a piece neither the LCS nor the JHSV fits because of cost and capability - respectively. What is needed is a platform with the endurance to self-deploy, the speed to be a warfighter against irregular maritime challenges, the space to be flexible enough to conform to the needs of the warfighter in the ugly littorals, and manned capable to put peacemakers in a position to execute their mission. With flexible space, the degree to which the ship needs to be armed can be customized as necessary, and developed over time as technologies evolve for the LCS. Most importantly, the ship must be low cost. In the 21st century, the Navy has already built this ship.

SeaFighter (FSF-1)

No ship is more mythical, thus less understood, than Sea Fighter (FSF-1). Ask someone in the Navy what they know about Sea Fighter and unless they have actually been part of the crew, it is a good bet they will get some details wrong or claim ignorance. Ask a reporter or take my word for it, finding accurate information about Sea Fighter today is not easy at all.

Sea Fighter was the first Navy ship certified under NVR, in fact the same NVR that impacted both General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin when developing the Littoral Combat Ship came as a result of designing and building Sea Fighter. Sea Fighter has a 10,000 cubic ft bay, hit 54 knots in sea trials, can sustain 40 knots for over 2000nm in sea state 3, and sustain 50 knots if necessary. Sea Fighter has endurance of at least 4400 nm. Sea Fighter can sustain 20 knots on diesels. Sea Fighter is the only first in class ship designed and built by the Navy in the 21st century that met every construction requirement and cost requirement.

Sea Fighter has plenty of room for growth. Not only is the mission bay on Sea Fighter larger than that of USS Freedom (LCS-1), but the design allows for weight growth utilizing the bay that can hold twelve 20-ft ISO containers.

Most people in the Navy have no idea what an amazing piece of technology they have in Sea Fighter (FSF-1), because ONR never delivered the ship. ONR's only job is to develop new technologies and deliver them to the fleet. Why have they not delivered Sea Fighter (FSF-1)? Sea Fighter is currently being managed by PMR-51, which is ONR's Low-Observable/Counter Low-Observable Program Office. If you examine the most recent pictures of Sea Fighter more closely (you can use the two pictures on Sea Fighter in this post), you will notice the stealthy modifications to the hull including moving the exhaust from the side of the ship to the top of the ship on each side of the helicopter landing area. There are actually several modifications that can be observed, and the potential for further modifications for low observability and reducing radar cross section exists.

The taxpayer investment into Sea Fighter is probably around $200 million so far, although because PMR-51s budget is classified, the true dollar amount is unknown. $200 million for a first in class ship? There is no way this ship with necessary electronics and comms couldn't be mass produced at $150 million, and I'd bet the actual cost would be lower.

Sea Fighter is classified as a High Speed Naval Craft, same as the JHSV. Sea Fighter is classified for trans-oceanic operation with no weather routing required below Sea State 6. This is just about the same as the requirements for JHSV.

Obviously the JHSV is a larger vessel, and I am in complete agreement they are different ships for different purposes - JHSV is a fast payload transport vessel while Sea Fighter is a fast coastal patrol vessel. The Navy is estimating the cost of the JHSV, which is not NVR compliant, to be an estimated $195 million each. In my opinion, the JHSV does not represent a good PC replacement vessel, and the Navy should look at Sea Fighter as the future replacement for the PCs. To make JHSV NVR compliant would cost money, and it isn't necessary - Sea Fighter already is NVR compliant.

Sea Fighter is perfect as a self-deploying coastal patrol and sea control vessel and it fits the desired flexible capability wanted for future naval vessels. It would make a lot of sense for the Navy to look into the possibility of teaming with the Coast Guard for their OPC program, which the Sea Fighter is also well designed for (did you know the Sea Fighter folks have looked into a Coast Guard version of the design).

I see a future fleet that has to be dynamic with space on the low end and designed for open architecture flexibility on the high end. All of these ships must be capable of self deploying. As this fleet is developed, we should not try fitting round pegs into square holes, which is what the Navy would be doing by trying to turn a JHSV into a PC. There are excellent alternatives, and Sea Fighter is one of the best kept secrets hiding in plain sight that should be evaluated.

Very Interesting...

For folks interested in piracy, this might be worth your time and money.

Unpredictable Reactions

Three interesting developments with US and China.

China sent contradictory signals on Thursday about its policies toward the United States following the Obama administration's decision on Jan. 29 to sell $6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry had threatened the day after the administration's announced [sale] that it would halt some military exchanges with the United States and would take unspecified steps to punish American companies that produced the weapon systems. On Thursday, China seemed to ease its objections to military cooperation with the United States, but the country's flagship carrier, Air China, announced that it would buy 20 A320 jets from Airbus, a European consortium, rather than from Boeing, one of the manufacturers of arms for Taiwan.

I am sure Boeing was expecting to win the deal, but the Airbus A320 is a great plane so it is possible China simply picked it over the Boeing option. Possible...

But that isn't all, earlier this week China sent an envoy to North Korea to discuss their nuclear program.

A senior Chinese Communist Party official held talks with North Korea on Sunday, state media said, as Pyongyang comes under growing pressure to return to nuclear disarmament talks.

The trip by Wang Jiarui, head of the Communist Party's international department, comes shortly before UN chief Ban Ki-moon's top political adviser Lynn Pascoe is due in Pyongyang.

May seem like no big deal, but both the engagement with North Korea on 6-party talks and allowing the Nimitz to call port in Hong Kong are activities one could have expected China to snub because of the Taiwan weapons deal.

These are very noteworthy shifts, for no other reasons than they don't conform to conventional wisdom, or said another way, the way China has historically dealt with a US policy they disagree with.

FFs, LSDs, and PCs - OH My!

The excellent reporting in Inside The Navy (subscription only) has once again created the daily buzz, this time by quoting some comments by Gene Taylor during the QDR hearing on Feb 4th. Apparently Gene Taylor isn't happy that after 30 years of service, the Perry class FFs are going to be retired. These are the noteworthy comments.

“Expect language from this committee that says for every surface combatant you want to retire, you had best have two new ones in the budget,” Taylor said Feb. 4. “Because if you won’t do what is a logical thing to do on your own, then it’s going to take a congressional mandate to do it.”

The frigates slated for decommissioning are still usable, he noted.

“If those frigates are good enough to give to another nation, why aren’t they good enough to keep in the fleet for a few more years, particularly for a mission like piracy off of Somalia or keeping the small boats away from our ships as they transit off of Iran?” he said. “I would think they would be ideally suited. So why does it make sense to take a ship that’s good enough to give to an ally and retire it today if we need bodies out in the sea?”

I think it is a good idea to have a discussion in Congress on the Perry class frigates, because they represent an opportunity to address something that deserves more Congressional examination. Let me begin from the top.

Right Direction

I fully support the Navy's decision to retire the FFs once they turn 30 years old, which most of them will over the next decade. With that said, we have a bunch of ships that are over their half-life and in my opinion, the FFs represent an excellent opportunity to evaluate how effective a job the Navy is doing in maintenance. Let me explain.

Gene Taylor is advocating the FFs from the perspective that we should be using them in the 5th Fleet area of operations, half way around the world. The Perry class has not been built or upgraded significantly in the United States in years. I think Congress should have the Navy, under oath, give the Chairman a detailed walk step by step through the process of what happens when something breaks on a Perry class while deployed halfway around the world.

For example, lets pretend the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) is somewhere in the Indian Ocean and is having a serious engine problem. How many layers of "sea enterprise" does it take to identify the problem, get the part shipped out, and the part installed to resolve the problem - you know, without a tender or serious base support structure? Over how many days given the time difference does this process take? How many emails does it take because there is no bandwidth to use live video? How many people in Washington have to fill out forms for "reach back?" And when it is all said and done, how much does this process cost - before we pay for the part?

I ask these questions because I heard something recently that surprised me, and I'd be interested to hear what people think. If there is a problem in a deployed Burke anywhere in the world, it usually takes less than a week to resolve the problem even if they have to reach back to the original designer or contractor in the US through the reach back process, and the cost is usually relatively inexpensive, usually in the thousands.

But for a Perry class, I hear the cost of the same process is sometimes much greater. I'd like to know if that is true, and if so... why?

How expensive is it to operate Perry class FFs forward, because I'm curious if it is prohibitively expensive to the point we can explain why Perry's have not been utilized to any real degree for protecting shipping against attack - the primary mission the ship class was built in the first place.

Gene Taylor picks a hobby horse issue at the beginning of every budget year, and this year it is the frigates. I'm OK with that, but can he put Eric Labs or someone at GAO on the issue to dive into the cost of operating and maintaining FFs in the Indian Ocean so we can all work with some good information? It would be an important exercise, after all, isn't the longevity of the existing fleet of Burkes the most important issue for the Navy right now? Why not use the Perry class FFs to examine existing processes for maintaining ships to see if there is anything Congress should be looking closer at in regards to the Burkes. Older ship classes don't come along often as a good case study, and I think everyone would be interested to know how FF operating costs compare to say, estimated LCS operating costs?

Multiple Targets

I don't know what exactly has Gene Taylor focused on the FFs, but I think Gene Taylor is missing a real opportunity to beat on the Navy with the facts on behalf of his district.

Just in case you are wondering who the hardest working sailors in the Navy are, they currently serve on USS Bataan (LHD 5) and USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43). I would love to know how many days since February 3rd, 2009 those two ships have been to sea, because I bet that number is very close to 300 days. If you think about COMPUTEX in Feb 09, CERTEX in March 09, deployment from May 13, 2024 - December 8, 2009, then back to sea on Jan 14, 2024 through today in Haiti - both ships may be over 7000 hours underway over the last 53 weeks. As an editors note, when considering the recent leadership changes on USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), what the crew of that ship has been through over the last year makes problems on other ships throughout the fleet look really silly.

Consider the following. In 2008 there were seventeen ships from Atlantic fleet with more than 4,000 hours underway. I have not seen the numbers yet for 2009, so I am using the most recent I have. Lets consider a moment the ships:

USS San Jacinto (CG 56)
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Gonzalez (DDG 66)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
USS McInerney (FFG 8)
USS Boone (FFG 28)
USS Dewert (FFG 45)
USS Simpson (FFG 56)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)

• Two of ten Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 20%
• Four of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 16%
• Four of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 22%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 33%
• Five of nine Atlantic Fleet PCs - 55%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2008, the breakdown is as follows:

• Five of ten Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 50%
• Thirteen of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 52%
• Nine of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 50%
• Three of five Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 60%
• One of four Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 25%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%
• Five of nine Atlantic Fleet PCs - 55%

In 2007 there were nineteen ships from Atlantic fleet with more than 4,000 hours underway. Lets examine them for comparison:

USS Anzio (CG 68)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS McInerney (FFG 8)
USS Underwood (FFG 36)
USS Klakring (FFG 42)
USS R G Bradley (FFG 49)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Shreveport (LPD 12)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)

• Two of eleven Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 18%
• Five of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 20%
• Five of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 28%
• One of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 17%
• One of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 20%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%
• Two of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 25%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2007, the breakdown is as follows:

• Six of eleven Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 55%
• Eleven of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 44%
• Ten of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 56%
• One of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 17%
• One of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 20%
• Four of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 67%
• Five of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 63%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2006, the breakdown is as follows:

• Seven of twelve Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 58%
• Twelve of nineteen Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 63%
• Seven of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 39%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 33%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 50%
• Three of seven Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%*
• Three of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 38%

*USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) plus USS Tortuga (LSD 46) adds up over 3000

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2005, the breakdown is as follows:

• Four of thirteen Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 31%
• Six of twenty five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 24%
• Eight of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 45%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 33%
• Two of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 40%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 33%
• Four of seven Atlantic Fleet PCs - 57%

I think it is fair to say that there is a relationship between the number of hours a ship class is at sea and the demand for that capability. If someone believes this is an unfair assumption, please explain in the comments.

Now that we have some data, here are some questions for Gene Taylor to add to his FF concerns:

We have all heard about the problems with the San Antonio class LPDs. The USS New York (LPD 21) crew heard something that didn't sound right in the engine, and didn't know they were supposed to simply turn the engine off (not shutting the engine off caused a bigger problem on that ship). Why? How did virtual training as opposed to time working on an actual engine factor into this becoming a bigger problem? Is the Navy training our mechanics correctly? Is the Navy prepared to deal with problems when automation fails?

SUPSHIPS inspected and approved welds on the LPD-17 class, but we didn't hear about problems until many months later. Why? Why is it that when the Navy announced the LPD-17 problems, it was only the Program Manager of the LPD-17 program with reporters? When an entire class has problems, the best the Navy can do is send a Captain out to get shot at by the press? Where was VADM McCoy on this issue? Where was Allison Stiller? How extensive is the problem on DDGs anyway? This LPD-17 situation smells of either a cover-up or a cluster-fuck.

Allison Stiller has testified in front of the House Seapower committee many times claiming the problems in shipbuilding related to issues just like what has specifically occurred with LPD-17 over the last few months are being addressed - in fact she has made the same testimony for at least the last few years. How can she be so inaccurate in testimony on this issue for more than two years in a row? Why should anyone believe the Navy has fixed the problems 'this time?'

The LPD-17 program, built in Gene Taylor's district, has taken an enormous reputation hit because of repeated problems - several of which are not the fault of the shipbuilder. As a coincidence, the Navy is making several decisions that avoid building ships in his district - like pushing way out Command Ship replacements (which would use LPD-17 hulls) and limiting the number of amphibious ships to the bare minimum (and those are also built in his district).

At the same time, over the past several years (and I expect 2009 to be very similar) the frigates, LSDs, and PCs are consistently disproportionately at sea more often than cruisers and destroyers, and yet the Navy is looking to retire the frigates, build as few amphibious ships as possible, and has decided not to replace the PC rather just SLEP them. If new PCs are not a worthy investment in the future Navy, why is the Navy clearly using the hell out of the PCs in the current inventory?

Why is the Navy building Burkes for BMD if this is a temporary problem anyway, and there are better ways to address the issue. The Burke run from FY11-FY15 is cost neutral to the previously proposed DDG-1000 purchase, so there are no savings. They create less work for the yards, so there is no advantage to the industry. The ships will be fielded to the fleet too late to be part of the BMD system being developed - which is the ground based SM-3 system. They have no new technologies, so it isn't like a new capability is being gained. Modernization of existing DDG-51s is a quicker and less expensive approach to BMD. My point in asking these questions is to highlight that R&D investment for the Burkes is more important than actual construction right now, because if we expect these ships to be the future in FY16 and beyond, we have to find a way to get DDG-1000 technologies like integrated power into that hull. Failure to do that makes building the Burke the biggest waste of money in the DoD, and that is saying something.

The plan, based on my read of the FY 2011 budget, is to replace the high demand for the frigates and LSDs with Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels. Is this a square peg and round hole approach, because on paper it looks like the Navy is giving up a lot of capabilities - not to mention survivability - in trade for the added capability of... tactical speed? What is the compelling argument to bet the farm on an unmanned systems capability that is tiny in the Navy today, and will run on a current sea based network that has extremely limited bandwidth even before the enemy adds extra tensions in wartime.

While Gene Taylor is worried about the aging and clearly heavily utilized FFs, he should expand his questioning to at minimum include amphibious ships and PCs, although there are so many questions for the Navy right now he could hold hearings until summer and still be short all the needed questions.

It is my hope that as part of his support for frigates he gets someone in the Navy to explain why the Perry frigates, built for merchant ship protection duty, are not out fighting pirates that are threatening merchant ships off Somalia. I have a feeling the answer is maintenance, and my hope is if Congress takes a closer look there they will see what an expensive mess it is to work within this top down managers logistics dream but operational level logistical nightmare - a serious problem that needs to be examined as the rest of the fleet ages.

Iran's Big Day Begins on Thursday

Just in case you have been living under a rock (or perhaps 3 feet of snow with no power), tomorrow is sure to be a big news day about Iran. It is unknown how good the information will be coming out of Iran though, the internet is almost completely on lock down coming out of Iran right now and the Great Persian Wall is unlikely to come down if all hell breaks out... which it likely will.

Gmail has already been cut off, as is Facebook and Twitter, and there have been satellite dishes and cell phones confiscated by the authorities. Information control in Iran has gone beyond anything any other democracy in the world has ever done.

I guess that tells us a bit about Iranian democracy...

The IRGC has recruited over 200,000 people to represent a big show of support for the government, but organizers of the opposition are hoping for numbers as high as 3 million in protesting the government. I'll wait and see. Big numbers are easy to throw around, too easy...

There is good reason to believe that tomorrow will begin a brief period of internal unrest in Iran. There are all kinds of ways to speculate what comes next, including some fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. I actually think the odds war is about to break out across the Middle East are very low, but I will note a few points of interest.

As is usually the case in the Middle East, the US fired first - specifically with more economic sanctions against the IRGC - a reminder the US does not want war in the Middle East.

And one small observation... the new moon is Saturday night, just after the Sabbath. If Israel was to take on Lebanon and Syria while all hell is taking place in Iran, so much for that mutual defense treaty thing between Syria and Iran. I do not see a scenario where Iran attacks Israel while dealing with huge internal problems; the government would only be reinforcing the protester complaints the government is too focused on other people and not the people of Iran.

All we know for sure is if all hell breaks out internally in Iran over the next few days, which is very possible, watch out for unpredictable events that in hindsight - will be reflected upon as completely predictable.

Internal chaos in countries like Iran is never a good thing for regional stability.

1915 USN Documentary

The National Film and Sound Archive has an eleven minute transfer of a USN documentary from 1915. The film is incomplete, but is thought to represent the oldest available USN documentary still in existence.

Early on, the Navy had recognized the power of moving pictures and collaborated with the Biograph Company on a now-lost series of 60 short films showing sailors and officers at work. The series screened at the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair and 1905 Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition in Portland before being put to use in a Midwest recruitment tour. Naval facilities and ships also figured prominently in early newsreels and narratives. The service took care to ensure that depictions presented it in a favorable light and reserved the right, for commercial films shot with official approval, to reuse them for the Navy’s own purposes.

While the full story behind the enigmatic fragment—and how it ended up in Australia—may never be known, it was clearly filmed with permission and may even have been commissioned by the Navy from a newsreel crew. The documentary was probably made between 1914 and early 1915. (The “E-2” class submarine, pictured in the opening scene, was taken out of service in 1915 and the shells mentioned in a intertitle—“It costs the U.S. government $970.00 for each 14 inch projectile fired”—were added to the naval arsenal the earlier year.) The location seems to be New York Harbor, the site of several naval reviews during this period. Indeed, given the appearance of the presidential yacht and the number of battleships bedecked with ornamental flags, it is possible that this particular show of readiness was staged for the Commander-in-Chief.

More on Data and DADT

With due respect, this doesn't cut it:

In the first, we are told that there are other fine militaries around the world in which gays are allowed to serve openly. In this latest edition of this line of thinking, the Australian, British, Canadian and Israeli Armed Services are put forward as examples of countries where "unit cohesion" issues are apparently insufficient to stymie gay service. I take a backseat to no one in admiration of these country's armed services, but come on now--who'd you take in a fight with us? The Canadians? The Australians? I know, I know--that's not what the proponents are saying--but what I'M SAYING is that there is only one global superpower and the forces and influences upon ITS combat readiness are different and more important than those that impact any other nations.

I'm sorry; "come on" doesn't constitute an argument. If you're going to suggest that allowing gays to openly serve negatively affects the application of military power, then you have to give some explanation of why that's the case. The "unit cohesion" is one such effort at an argument, although it has notably failed; there is thus far no meaningful data that indicates that openly serving gay soldiers negatively effect the capability of tactical units. If you want to SAY that there is only one global superpower and the forces and influences upon ITS combat readiness are different and more important than those that impact any other nations, then you must at least hint at what those forces and influences might be; if you know what you have in mind tell us, and if you don't, then please stop making the argument that the experiences of other major military organizations don't matter. Call me a crazy academic, but I need both a causal argument and some data indicating the validity of that causal argument before I accept this line of thinking.

I suppose you could argue that not enough data exists, and that it would be irresponsible for the United States to risk its military effectiveness on the experimental introduction of openly gay soldiers into its military organizations. To this I would respond that, again, you need a convincing argument about a) how openly serving gays has damaged the military effectiveness of Israeli*, German, British, Australian, and Canadian units, or b) a convincing argument about why none of these should be relevant to the US case. Neither of these are here; that the US military is bigger than the British can't in and of itself explain why unit level effects for similar sized units would be different in the UK than in the US.

So, again; "come on" doesn't constitute an argument that anyone has an obligation to respect. Please specify terms, articulate a relationship between variables, explain how we might test, and introduce some data. The advocates of openly serving gay soldiers have already done this; it's time for the opponents to step up to the plate.

*The argument has been made in a couple of places that the German and Israeli experiences shouldn't count because those countries retain conscription. This would make some sense if either Israel or Germany had anything approaching full conscription, but they don't. Escaping military conscription in Germany has been easy since before the end of the Cold War, and has been relatively easy in Israel since the mid-1990s. The Israelis have discarded the idea that mass is an important determinant of military effectiveness, and have consequently made the avoidance of conscription, even by military age males, relatively easy. If the IDF really believed that excluding gays would increase its effectiveness, then it is entirely capable of doing so.

Repealing DADT: Two Specious Rationales

Crossposted at The Conservative Wahoo:

As the Obama Administration moves forward with trying to get Congress to repeal Don't Ask Don't Tell (a move I support), two arguments are frequently raised.

In the first, we are told that there are other fine militaries around the world in which gays are allowed to serve openly. In this latest edition of this line of thinking, the Australian, British, Canadian and Israeli Armed Services are put forward as examples of countries where "unit cohesion" issues are apparently insufficient to stymie gay service. I take a backseat to no one in admiration of these country's armed services, but come on now--who'd you take in a fight with us? The Canadians? The Australians? I know, I know--that's not what the proponents are saying--but what I'M SAYING is that there is only one global superpower and the forces and influences upon ITS combat readiness are different and more important than those that impact any other nations.

Secondly, there's the "military should reflect the society it serves" argument. In this line of thinking, since there are gay people in society, there should be gay people in the military. Hogwash. There are obese people in society. There are wheelchair-bound people in society. There are people in persistent vegetative states in society--yet we seem to have no problem excluding these people from military service.

No, the only reason to overturn DADT would be the recognition that excluding gay people--qualified in every other way--makes us a less combat ready force, a force appropriate to the needs and interests of the world's most important power. Not because the Brits do it or the Israelis do it. Not because our military should reflect our society.

And it is my opinion that we are losing talented people whose presence in the ranks far outweighs whatever loss in unit cohesion might apply. Unit cohesion isn't binary--a 1 or a 0. It is a continuum, constantly changing, increasing and decreasing as leadership and unit make-up changes. What matters most are how good you are and how well you work with the others. I'm convinced that gay people can do those things as well as straight people.

Bryan McGrath

Observing Recent Russian Navy News

There is a 5 part series over at the Russian Navy blog that is very interesting reading. It is essentially an After Action Report following a joint exercise between the Russians and French in 2004. The series at the Russian Navy blog is "Even the Russians Know they Suck."

Harsh. However, the series is very informative.

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5

In other Russian Navy news, some English language reports have claimed the the Russians have begun construction of the 4th Borey class SSBN. Russian language news talking to executives over at Sevmash shipyard on the other hand says that is not true.

The rumor mill suggests Sevmash has not been paid for the submarine yet.

I am looking for a good link, Russian or English, that discusses and examines the new Russian military doctrine. If anyone knows of a good link, please leave in the comments. My thoughts on recent developments from Russia are thus.

I knew as soon as I read Spencer Ackerman's piece discussing comments from Jim Jones that the Obama administration would only put up token resistance regarding the Mistral sale by France, in fact at the time I told Spencer this on Twitter. Read Jones comment and think about what it means in the context of Mistral.

“The challenge of restoring the reputation of the United States as a nation willing to commit to leadership, willing to commit to a new era of engagement based on mutual interests and mutual respect,” Jones said, “is probably the defining feature of our foreign policy.”

The question is what you believe Russia's interest with Mistral is. Many believe Georgia is the focus and reason for the purchase. I am not one of those people.

What is being lost in the analysis of Russia's interest in Mistral is how important helicopters have been to Russian naval doctrine for decades. Russia never owned a dedicated aircraft carrier until the cold war was all but over, rather owned what they called aviation cruisers - or ships with long range missiles that also carried lots of helicopters. The Kiev class aviation cruisers are a good example because they had minimal fixed wing aviation capabilities, but carried tons and tons of helicopters.

Mistral represents an extension of existing the Russian naval doctrine that focuses on helicopter operations. The big difference is the lack of anti-ship missiles on Mistral. With that said, it should also be noted that Russia has long put its anti-ship capability into aircraft - usually long range land based; and submarines - many types both nuclear and conventional.

With the Russian naval budget still focused on submarine developments, it looks to me like Russia is focusing on the high end naval capabilities that are seen as the most difficult to develop - SSBNs, SSNs, and aviation vessels like Mistral; to be followed later by escorts once the shipyards are healthier. Some may expect Russia to build a few surface combatants soon, but I don't think that will happen until later this decade. I tend to think the next surface vessels we will see come from Russia are nuclear powered Ice Breakers, and I suspect they will carry some form of Coast Guard utility.

With that said, if Russia does look to buy surface combatants over the next few years, do not be surprised if once again Russia taps into the shipbuilding industry in Europe - and potentially Asia (but not China). The Mistral sale represents the beginning of Russia seeking help from with imports in restoring industrial capacity for military capabilities, not a stopgap solution.

Senators or citizens concerned that the Mistral sale represents a focus on Georgia need to take a harder look at the history of the Russian Navy. The idea that the Russian Navy would desire to field a large helicopter ship isn't new, rather it is the story of the Russian Navy over the last 4 decades.

European Shipbuilding

The predecessor of the current European Union Was called the European Economic Community and they had one big achievement: a free flow of goods, people and services between all their members and thus creating a single European market. That also meant that governments had to open their tenders for this single market.
There was however a notable exception to the single market regulations: it was not applicable when national security was at stake.

In practice that meant that every country would claim national security issues with defence contracts and award the majority of these contracts to companies within its own borders.

Shipyards
This all has resulted in the following in shipbuilding in the EU (+Norway).

Combatants (2000t>)	Combatants (<2000t)	Subs	Amphibious	Carriers	AOR	OPV
10	9	7	9	4	3	5

This is the number of shipyards involved in building specific types of vessels over the past 10 years and vessels currently under construction.
Combining all the data and removing the duplicate yards that have build more than 1 type, it means since 2000 24 different shipyards have been involved in building these naval vessels. The number of (parent) companies that own these yards is 21.

In comparison: since 2001 ships for the US Navy have been build by 6 yards owned by 2 companies.

Vessels
And although some vessels were designed by multiple countries, it still means that Europe has produced 4 classes of 5,500t+ frigates/destroyers:

• Absalon and Ivar Huitfeldt in Denmark
• LCF (Zeven Provinciën), Sachsen (F124), Álvaro de Bazán (F100) in the Netherlands, Germany and Spain
• Horizon (Orrizonte) in France and Italy
• Type 45 in the UK

And while the Absalon may be the odd one out, the Ivar Huitfeldt class that is based on the Absalon has the same AAW role the 3 other classes have.

Radars
In the naval radar business it's 5 companies:

• Thales with the APAR, SMART-L, SMART-s, Herakles and Integrated Masts (Seamaster/Seawatcher/Gatekeeper)
• BAE with its SAMPSON and Artisan 3D
• Saab and their Sea Giraffe
• EADS with the TRS-3D
• SELEX has the S1850 and EMPAR

Of these Thales has the biggest market share and SELEX's S1850 is actually a modified SMART-L.

Conclusion
The cost of the overhead and duplicated efforts that could and should have been avoided in military ship building must run into the billions for all projects combined. Money that would have been well spend on more vessels or capabilities instead.

Although baby steps are taken all the time to come to a single European defence market in the European Union it will take time before this will be realized (if ever).
It would require the lead of the UK and France, because they have -by far- the biggest defence budgets and highest ambitions. Unfortunately they are also the ones fighting for the 'top' spot in Europe and seem not able to work together at all, as can be seen in the withdrawal of the UK from the Horizon project and France from the Eurofighter.
Maybe the construction of the Queen Elizabeth class and the PA2 can be a new starting point.

Because if there is one thing the EEC and EU members must have learned after all these years is that a single market is a requisite for economic growth.

People interrested in a bigger picture about what's wrong with European Defence Policy are highly recommend to read this policy paper from Nick Witney.