Observing Recent Russian Navy News

There is a 5 part series over at the Russian Navy blog that is very interesting reading. It is essentially an After Action Report following a joint exercise between the Russians and French in 2004. The series at the Russian Navy blog is "Even the Russians Know they Suck."

Harsh. However, the series is very informative.

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5

In other Russian Navy news, some English language reports have claimed the the Russians have begun construction of the 4th Borey class SSBN. Russian language news talking to executives over at Sevmash shipyard on the other hand says that is not true.

The rumor mill suggests Sevmash has not been paid for the submarine yet.

I am looking for a good link, Russian or English, that discusses and examines the new Russian military doctrine. If anyone knows of a good link, please leave in the comments. My thoughts on recent developments from Russia are thus.

I knew as soon as I read Spencer Ackerman's piece discussing comments from Jim Jones that the Obama administration would only put up token resistance regarding the Mistral sale by France, in fact at the time I told Spencer this on Twitter. Read Jones comment and think about what it means in the context of Mistral.

“The challenge of restoring the reputation of the United States as a nation willing to commit to leadership, willing to commit to a new era of engagement based on mutual interests and mutual respect,” Jones said, “is probably the defining feature of our foreign policy.”

The question is what you believe Russia's interest with Mistral is. Many believe Georgia is the focus and reason for the purchase. I am not one of those people.

What is being lost in the analysis of Russia's interest in Mistral is how important helicopters have been to Russian naval doctrine for decades. Russia never owned a dedicated aircraft carrier until the cold war was all but over, rather owned what they called aviation cruisers - or ships with long range missiles that also carried lots of helicopters. The Kiev class aviation cruisers are a good example because they had minimal fixed wing aviation capabilities, but carried tons and tons of helicopters.

Mistral represents an extension of existing the Russian naval doctrine that focuses on helicopter operations. The big difference is the lack of anti-ship missiles on Mistral. With that said, it should also be noted that Russia has long put its anti-ship capability into aircraft - usually long range land based; and submarines - many types both nuclear and conventional.

With the Russian naval budget still focused on submarine developments, it looks to me like Russia is focusing on the high end naval capabilities that are seen as the most difficult to develop - SSBNs, SSNs, and aviation vessels like Mistral; to be followed later by escorts once the shipyards are healthier. Some may expect Russia to build a few surface combatants soon, but I don't think that will happen until later this decade. I tend to think the next surface vessels we will see come from Russia are nuclear powered Ice Breakers, and I suspect they will carry some form of Coast Guard utility.

With that said, if Russia does look to buy surface combatants over the next few years, do not be surprised if once again Russia taps into the shipbuilding industry in Europe - and potentially Asia (but not China). The Mistral sale represents the beginning of Russia seeking help from with imports in restoring industrial capacity for military capabilities, not a stopgap solution.

Senators or citizens concerned that the Mistral sale represents a focus on Georgia need to take a harder look at the history of the Russian Navy. The idea that the Russian Navy would desire to field a large helicopter ship isn't new, rather it is the story of the Russian Navy over the last 4 decades.