CJCS Speech at Kansas State

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen gave a speech at Kansas State last night that has caused quite a stir in the military strategic blogosphere, and was heralded by the New York Times as having "re-calibrated" the use of force by the US military. Without identifying any of the writers, here is a sample of some of the reactions to the speech that appeared in my email today:

"The Mullen doctrine emerges"
"Sounds like a seminal speech to me"
"Could be a durable legacy"

The comparisons to the Powell/Weinberger Doctrine are being made, and people I respect very much seem to think that this speech was very important.

I've read it through several times now, and for the life of me, I just can't seem to figure out what all the fuss is about. You should read it for yourselves, but I'll cut and paste some of the meatier portions here, then comment on them.

First there's this: "And I’ve come to three conclusions - three principles - about the proper use of modern military forces. The first is that military power should not - maybe cannot - be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s earthquake. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security."

This is a straw man. As I wrote in an email about this subject earlier today, I haven't heard a single adult in Washington DC indicate that military "power" should be seen as a last resort. I've heard them cite military "force", but even Mullen's examples point to uses of the military (Haiti, ISR) that are clearly not uses of "force". This SOUNDS like meaningful stuff, especially when coming from the CJCS--but it really is pretty meaningless.

Then there's this: "There’s a broader issue involved here. For, in addition to bringing the full weight of the U.S. government to bear, we must also bring our allies and partners with us to the fight. Forty-two other nations fight alongside us in Afghanistan, as did so many others in Iraq. Whether by formal alliance or by informal agreement, these multinational commitments lend not only a higher sense of legitimacy to the effort, they lend to local populations certain skills and knowledge which we alone do not posses."

Has the CJCS just made a huge policy pronouncement committing the US to a future of use of force ONLY when allies and partners are willing to be brought along? Have we dealt away the ability to act unilaterally?

Next, there's this: "That brings me to number two: Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way. War costs the societies that engage in it a great deal; lives and resources diverted from pursuits that a more peaceful time would allow. Even now, as we are poised to reach 1,000 troop deaths in Afghanistan, we’re reminded of the thousands more Afghans who have been killed and the hundreds of over coalition soldiers who have likewise perished; not to mention the property and infrastructure damage that will yet take years from which to recover."

Again, words like these sound magnificent and meaningful when uttered by someone like Admiral Mullen, but doesn't Mullen's number two sound like two thousand years of Judeo-Christian teaching on just war theory?

Now, onto this: "Because frankly the battlefield isn’t necessarily a field anymore. It’s in the minds of the people. It’s what they believe to be true that matters. And when they believe that they are safer with Afghan and coalition troops in their midst and local governance at their service, they will resist the intimidation of the Taliban and refuse to permit their land from ever again becoming a safe haven for terror."

Obviously, Admiral Mullen is touching on a key aspect of counterinsurgency theory here--but the notion that war is only just now being played out in national psyches ignores history. Huge propaganda machines have accompanied nations going to war specifically to manipulate the thinking of the people, and acting to break or reinforce those notions has been the object of combatants throughout history.

More here: "The notion proffered by some that once set, a war policy cannot be changed, or that to do so implies some sort of weakness, strikes me not only as incompatible with our history but also as quite dangerous. Lincoln did not emancipate the slaves when Fort Sumter was fired upon. He made that policy change when he deemed it most necessary. Though he favored a Germany-first policy, FDR still struggled to properly balance the war’s efforts against both Japan and Hitler’s Germany. And Kennedy did not embark on the war in Vietnam with any sense that his successors would be fighting it at all, much less the way they did. "

Uh oh--another straw man. Who are these people who say that once a war policy is set it cannot be changed? Have we elected people like this? Have we promoted them to General or Admiral? If so, we're in deep trouble. The use of the straw man argument in modern rhetoric has been raised to a high art by the Commander in Chief, and it seems ADM Mullen has caught the bug.

But wait, there's more: "Contrary to popular imagination, war has never been a set-piece affair. The enemy adapts to your strategy and you adapt to his. And so you keep the interplay going between policy and strategy until you find the right combination at the right time."

Again--who thinks that war is a set piece affair? Are there names?


This was a solid, interesting speech given to an appreciative audience. It was not however, an important speech in terms of setting a new vision or moving the military in new directions. It was quite plainly a re-statement of the way things largely are and have been.

Bryan McGrath