Observing Poor Execution

After reading this article in Popular Mechanics, I've been thinking about just how much of a threat Midget Submarines are.

We have such a difficult time detecting these mini-submarines that continue to deliver drugs to continental United States from Central and South America that I do wonder how effective anyone can be in detecting and protecting themselves from these types of littoral weapons when they are deployed with purpose.

Given our questionable track record protecting our own shores from mini-submarines, it raises questions how effective we will be attempting to give South Korea a crash course in the identification of mini-submarines. I also find it noteworthy the Popular Mechanics article ends by discussing the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), which represents one more Littoral Combat Ship module system that gave a lot of credibility to the Littoral Combat Ship at one time, but last I heard ADS was canceled as a program.

While watching events on the Korean peninsula unfold from afar, it is important we keep the eye on the ball at home. There has been plenty of rhetoric regarding the threat of littoral submarines (including mini-submarines), small boats, suicide divers, and shore based anti-ship missiles - but are the programs intended to address these challenges given proper priority in the US Navy? When the Army canceled the Netfires system, the Navy took over development of the system - but was any funding or priority directed towards the program as a result? When ADS was canceled, no replacement system was announced. How many different MIW systems intended for LCS have had nothing but problems? How many different Littoral Combat Ship module systems have experienced funding cuts or delays primarily because of the problems developing the technologies?

It is understandable when some of these systems have problems in development, but when it comes to the LCS modules specifically intended to address these irregular challenges - virtually every system has run into development problems. Now that we need these systems, where are they? Where is the focus? Where is the leadership?

The disconnect worth noting is the amount of emphasis made in the words of naval leadership in testimony and speeches over the last decade and the lack of results continuously demonstrated on the programs intended to address the threats emphasized. I would ask about accountability, but because I do not believe the Navy is a results oriented organization, I won't even bother with such rhetorical questions.

Our ships will be sailing today into an area where mini-submarines do shoot torpedoes and has sunk a Navy ship, and the purpose for sailing into those waters today is to train against mini-submarines shooting torpedoes at Navy ships. Noteworthy we take this action without the technologies and systems discussed, funded, but never completely developed over the past decade - technologies and systems that were intended to help the US Navy address mini-submarines shooting torpedoes.

It is remarkable to me how good the Navy is at identifying the challenges of the future, and how consistently terrible the Navy is in executing program plans for the systems intended to address those challenges. It is a reminder that information alone is not enough, and an observation that the story of the 21st century is one of the Navy relying on the skills of the sailors at sea to make up for the failures of the sailors on land.