John Robb over at Global Guerrillas uses the term Open-Source Warfare to describe a shift in the monopoly of violence from state to non-state actors. This transformation is empowered by globalization and the Internet’s spread of the knowledge required to wage war into the hands of individuals. OSW in effect enables small groups or even individuals to wage war against nations. Since USS Cole was attacked by Al Qaeda nearly a decade ago, we’ve seen the entrée of a wide variety of non-state actors operating in the maritime environment. Among others:
- Lebanese Hezbollah attacked an Israeli corvette with anti-ship cruise missiles
- Drug traffickers employed stealthy semi-submersibles
- Ferocious Tamil Sea Tiger suicide attacks sunk Sri Lankan navy vessels
- Somali pirates ran amok in the Indian Ocean
- Hamas laid improvised mines near Israeli Beaches
- MEND guerrillas utilized boat swarms in the Niger Delta to disrupt oil infrastructure
- Lashkar-e-taiba high-jacked an Indian fishing vessel to infiltrate clandestinely for the Mumbai attacks
These are all tactical actions, but as special operations raids often create strategic impacts, so do some terror attacks.
So what will the next ten years of OSW bring to maritime conflicts?
- A proliferation of sea and beach-launched small (read model airplane size) UAVs utilized by non-state actors to help target their water-borne IEDS and anti-ship cruise missiles
- Small, randomly strewn maritime IEDS (mines) through vital commercial choke points - think the Verrazano Narrows between Staten Island and Brooklyn vice Strait of Hormuz. Really, the whole “E” component isn’t necessarily, just some sinister looking boxes and an emailed threat alone is enough to disrupt traffic for a while in any given port
- Commercially available UUVs designed for oceanography converted into torpedoes
- Cell phones and social media used to agitate “flash mobs” of local fishing vessels in order to block the movement of navy or merchant vessels
Those are some of less nefarious unconventional threats… What is the role of sea power in waging the kind of warfare our ground components have been fighting the past decade?
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
- Lebanese Hezbollah attacked an Israeli corvette with anti-ship cruise missiles
- Drug traffickers employed stealthy semi-submersibles
- Ferocious Tamil Sea Tiger suicide attacks sunk Sri Lankan navy vessels
- Somali pirates ran amok in the Indian Ocean
- Hamas laid improvised mines near Israeli Beaches
- MEND guerrillas utilized boat swarms in the Niger Delta to disrupt oil infrastructure
- Lashkar-e-taiba high-jacked an Indian fishing vessel to infiltrate clandestinely for the Mumbai attacks
These are all tactical actions, but as special operations raids often create strategic impacts, so do some terror attacks.
So what will the next ten years of OSW bring to maritime conflicts?
- A proliferation of sea and beach-launched small (read model airplane size) UAVs utilized by non-state actors to help target their water-borne IEDS and anti-ship cruise missiles
- Small, randomly strewn maritime IEDS (mines) through vital commercial choke points - think the Verrazano Narrows between Staten Island and Brooklyn vice Strait of Hormuz. Really, the whole “E” component isn’t necessarily, just some sinister looking boxes and an emailed threat alone is enough to disrupt traffic for a while in any given port
- Commercially available UUVs designed for oceanography converted into torpedoes
- Cell phones and social media used to agitate “flash mobs” of local fishing vessels in order to block the movement of navy or merchant vessels
Those are some of less nefarious unconventional threats… What is the role of sea power in waging the kind of warfare our ground components have been fighting the past decade?
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
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