Rare Exception

It isn't very often a ship is hijacked inside the internationally recommended transit corridor.

Somali pirates hijacked a Singaporean ship and took the 19 Chinese sailors on board hostage on Monday in the Gulf of Aden, the European Union's naval force reported.

The Singaporean-flagged MV Golden Blessing was seized inside the internationally recommended transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden that is patrolled by the anti-piracy naval coalition.

The vessel, which has a dead weight of 14,445 tons, was enroute from Saudi Arabia to India when it was captured.

What makes this worth watching is that the sailors are Chinese. China is looking for a big moment from their naval activities against Somali piracy, something that puts them on center stage and sends a signal both domestically and internationally that the PLA Navy is engaged globally.

I am not suggesting a rescue, but if any opportunity is given I suspect they would take a chance.

What to Watch For

As a three day weekend approaches many who will celebrate the day off Monday for the 4th of July, let us not lose focus of events unfolding in the Pacific beginning on Wednesday.

Andrew Erickson informs regarding what to watch for.

Marine Corps Operating Concepts Released Tuesday

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.

In some capability areas, meeting emerging challenges will call for the development of wholly new concepts of operation. Confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose particularly difficult problems. In recognition of the dynamism of the threat environment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department will be examining future operational needs in several capability areas, including ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications. Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, interactive war games, in which force planners, operators, and technical experts can explore alternative strategies and operational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary. Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development and, over time, will help decision makers to further rebalance future forces.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) pg 40-41

As I was reading through the Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition, this section of the QDR came to mind. The Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition document to be released publicly on Tuesday is one of the best documents I have read from a maritime service since I began the blog. If you are frustrated by the lack of specifics and generic speak that often characterizes US Navy documents like the recently released NOC, you will find the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) document a breath of fresh air. Detailed? You betcha. This document works on the Company CO's chalkboard, or PowerPoint - if you prefer.

The reason this section of the QDR came to mind is because there are still many questions about what Joint Forcible Entry means today - phrase that seems to have direct connotation for the Marine Corps. I think it is interesting that Information Dissemination author LtCol Roger S. Galbraith has been out fighting the perception war on this topic. His recent LA Times op-ed was akin to a rebuttal for the arguments against the Marines in another LA Times article. The discussion point that forcible entry amphibious assault is no longer feasible in the 21st century is becoming a popular meme, but it is also a distraction.

As the QDR stresses in the section quoted - the question isn't whether the nation needs the capability of forcible entry, rather how the capability is executed in the context of the emerging environment. When I read the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd edition), I was very pleased to read that the Marines are taking seriously the necessity to tactically adapt amphibious assault as part of the requirement to retain the tactical necessity for such a capability. Forcible entry in the 1940s and 1950s may have indeed been a large scale beach amphibious assault, but that isn't what it might look like in 2010 and beyond. The Marines seem to understand this, while those outside the Marines are framing the forcible entry discussion in historically accurate but otherwise irrelevant terms within the modern context.

The Marines come out swinging early and often with a focus on two mission areas - assuring littoral access and winning small wars. If first impressions mean anything - my first impression was that the focus on these two mission areas reads like a slap in the face of the Navy who I believe is actively retreating from the littorals at flank speed, and a slap at the Army as a reminder that it is Marines who own the small wars history of the United States. The document reads as a slap to neither in truth, but the Marine brand is strong enough that the first perception existed for me nonetheless.

But as I read the document I immediately found it one of the most insightful operational concept document produced by a maritime service I can ever recall reading. I was engaged with the specific guidance towards a general direction one finds in the issues framed by the contents, and when I finished reading I came away as a reader impressed by the depth and detail. This document is instructive to every Marine, and yet informative to broader defense establishment as well - indeed one could even note how the document gives guidance directly to the defense industry without doing the program centric cheerleading we used to see in the 90s in these types of documents.

For example, when reading through the section discussing the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) I was surprised to see the comment "there may be a requirement for a light-attack platform to add to the ACE inventory" being made as a comment of speculation - the implication being a recognition that the Marines must be open to examining alternatives. How refreshing - read a Navy document and you will never find a discussion of force structure of any kind whatsoever - nevermind a discussion that includes speculation regarding alternatives.

Briefly - a few points. A good portion of the document discusses Small Wars as the core of the Corps. Leveraging the 'small wars' meme (in no small part popularized by brand names) is a pretty smart way to introduce Enhanced MAGTF operations across a broad range of missions and relate it at a generic level with the reader. The detail of size, shape, and guidance towards operational requirements and capabilities is done very well.

But what caught my attention in the document is how the Marines emphasized themselves as a critical piece of assuring littoral access across a range of access environments; permissive, uncertain, and restricted. From a detail perspective I think one could argue the Marine Corps made a better case for US Navy 'joint forcible entry' capabilities at sea and in the air than the US Navy did with their own NOC. There are several pages dedicated to discussing a range of naval capabilities from mine warfare to carrier aviation to strike from the sea - indeed there might be more words dedicated to discussing the value of the aircraft carrier in the MOC than the NOC - and I'm not kidding - the word count will be close.

The MOC does an interesting thing to the reader - or at least this reader - by raising serious questions regarding whether or not the US Navy is capable of having a blunt discussion on forcible entry. That discussion would include topics like technologies and tactics, operational requirements and force metrics necessary to achieve access. The Marines appear willing to have a public discussion on the topic; but if AirSea Battle is any indication - the Navy is not prepared for that discussion publicly.

The open communication approach of the Marines in the MOC leads directly to Annex A - which for me is a critical discussion of Strategic Communications. I believe N3/N5 would do well to copy Annex A from the MOC, change a bit of text to 'navalize' the wording, and directly insert the section into the NOC. Annex A represents the single best discussion of integrating strategic communications into operations in any military document released by any of the maritime services to date, and one of the most important sections missing from the Naval Operations Concept. I highly encourage every US Navy officer, even if they don't give a shit about the MOC, to read carefully Annex A because there is no question that section belongs in every command at sea today.

I want to stress this point. The single most important lesson we can learn from the Israeli maritime blockade of Gaza incident that occurred recently is the role that YouTube played for the Israeli Navy. Without those YouTube videos that highlighted the events from the Israeli Navy perspective, Israel was left absent context and without weapons in an information war being waged against them. With YouTube videos, Israel had ammunition in their fight. Understanding the information and communication context of every operational decision will be critical to Navy leaders who will often find themselves in very difficult situations all alone in distant seas. Annex A emphasizes the role of these communication efforts to operations, and the discussion in the MOC is useful not only to Marines, but to the Navy as well.

I'll post a link to the MOC as soon as I find one, and I encourage everyone to read it. For once, I can recommend a document produced by the maritime services that won't make your eyes bleed, because the MOC is highly informative and a lot more thought stimulating (thanks to detail and depth) than the documents I typically link to from the blog.

Reading Assignment

The most important article you will read today is published in Stanford Magazine. Titled Diplomacy 2.0, it is a must read that will be discussed in detail later this week.

I assure you this article is worth every second of your time, and goes to the very heart of why this blog exist. If you fail to read this article, then will not be prepared to examine Annex A of the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd edition), nor will you understand what the Navy is missing in the Naval Operations Concept.

Thanks for Playing, but...

I like people who take bold and subversive points of view, especially publically. Stepping out of one's comfort zone and area of expertise is admirable, and often, innovative and useful ideas emerge this way. So although I was pleased to see an article from an Army officer on surface ships recently in JFQ, LTC Shrader's piece predicting the end of surface warships leaves me disappointed.

In no particular order, there are a number of problems with his arguments.
- As long as 90% of the world's commerce moves over the surface of the ocean, surface ships will be required to maintain freedom of the seas. Submarines certainly play a part in achieving sea control against a competent enemy, but the vast majority of naval missions don't require the stealth or endurance of a nuclear submarine. To wit, MSO, partner navy engagement, BMD, AAW, mine hunting and sweeping, among many others, require surface ships.

- Without going into details, he over-trivialized the challenges of space-based targeting and long range missile engagements.
"It will be a simple matter to find the exact grid coordinates of any ship anywhere in the world, punch the data into a missile silo, and launch a barrage of missiles to the precise location of the ship or fleet."

But his point about massive salvos of missiles (whether ASCMs or ASBMs) overwhelming surface ship magazines is valid.

- Yes, ships are very expensive these days and take many years to design and build. But I wonder what LTC Shrader thinks the price tag would be on the giant submarine capable of carrying an USMC MEU and all its' equipment that he suggests? Developing super-sized cargo, aircraft, and troop carrying submarines would break the bank and shrink the fleet even faster than today's untenable ship-building plan.

I'm confident LTC Shrader's ersatz sea power strategy will not threaten surface warfare for a good long while. Good on ya for playing, though.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Boyko Here

Gentle readers, as of today, I have become the newest blogger on Information Dissemination. Galrahn has graciously allowed me to post here on topics which interest me. Having followed this blog for some time from both afloat and ashore, the discussion that takes place on this blog is what has drawn me to write in this forum.

In October 2008, Galrahn asked a both a reflective and forward-looking question regarding the role of blogs in the national security dialogue:

What is the role of blogging in the national security discussion?

This is an elusive question that I do not have the answer to. I know several Admirals read the blog. I know that many active COs and XOs in the fleet read the blog. I know that a number of government employees both executive and legislative branch read the blog. I know that executives of almost every defense company read the blog. I know many folks in the Pentagon read the blog. I know professors at Annapolis, the NWC, and the NPS read the blog. I know a number of employees of the major think tanks read the blog.

I also know that very few, if any, of those folks ever leave a comment. I don't believe "the power of the fourth estate" will be realized in the Navy blogosphere until those folks feel comfortable debating ideas openly. That means it is important to keep the comments professional and courteous. I have no expectations that this medium will evolve faster than the pace of necessity, and there is a lack of necessity for Web 2.0 to drive discussion right now for naval content.

That will not always be the case, but I'm content letting the evolution take place without pushing it. If by that time there are 10 Navy blogs better than this one, I'll be very content with that as well.

In the three years since Galrahn started Information Dissemination, this open forum has continuously improved and has always offered constructive criticism and floated new ideas. As a long time reader that fits a few of the categories of readers that Galrahn mentioned above, I hope that I can contribute to the open discussion of ideas and add something to what is already one of the top milblogs.

Thanks, Galrahn.

Swarm Tactics

A short story published on sina.com in late February shows four interesting photos from a Chinese convoy of ships near the gulf of Aden. The caption for each picture is quoted below each photo.

The first, from a Chinese helicopter, shows a group transit of merchant vessels, reportedly numbering 31 ships. Just guessing on the speed, I’d say they’re sailing at about 14 knots. Note how calm the seas appear to be. Prime sailing conditions for pirates.

Sina.com caption: “A helicopter of the Chinese naval fleet patrols above the Gulf of Aden to ensure ships' safety from pirates, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)”

The second picture, below, shows about 16 or so small skiffs. The caption says “50 suspected pirate vessels.” They could be fishing but that’s unlikely. It appears that least six of them have picked up speed and taken a course toward what might be the third or fourth merchant ship. Look closely at the merchant ship in this photo. It appears that the vessel may have already been alerted to the skiffs and has charged and activated fire hoses, at least near the superstructure.

Sina.com caption: About 50 suspected pirate vessels approach a ship escorted by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, Feb. 25, 2010. The vessels harassed the 31 Chinese and foreign ships that the naval fleet was escorting. They were driven out soon after the fleet dispatched vessels and helicopters. (Xinhua Photo)

Nothing much to note here, except that they’re moving away. They’re not waving hello.

Sina.com caption: A suspected pirate vessel is driven out by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)

The last of the four pictures is more difficult to analyze because it appears to be taken from the deck of a ship. The shallow angle makes it difficult to discern how close the skiffs actually are to the merchant vessel. Zooming in, it looks like there could be one or two skiffs close aboard. Again, just guessing, but the rest could be between 100 and 300 yards away. What is clear is that the merchant is using fire hoses.

Sina.com caption: Suspected pirate vessels harass a ship escorted by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)

The fact that it is difficult to make out all the skiffs in this picture is important because it demonstrates how difficult it is to see these small boats from the deck of a ship, even at close range. It highlights the importance of aircraft, such as helicopters, P-3C Orion patrol aircraft, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Also of utility in this environment would be an airborne 360-degree radar platform such as the E-2C Hawkeye. Without such aircraft patrolling the wide expanse of water to get the perspective shown in the first and second pictures above, this group transit may not have had enough warning to recognize and prepare for an attack.

CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum blogged about Iranian swarming tactics two years ago (and cross-posted here) describing the harassment of three U.S. Navy ships by Iranian speedboats near the Straits of Hormuz. In that post, Exum included an “explainer” for Iranian swarming tactics excerpted from this article. It could be argued that what we see in these photos is technically not a swarming attack because such an attack originates from several different directions at once. If what we’re seeing is an attack, however, it does appear that these skiffs are operating en masse, in coordination and attempting to use mobility to their advantage.

A book on piracy that I highly recommend to anyone wanting to know more about piracy: Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism by Martin N. Murphy.

USA

It took me awhile, but I have caught World Cup fever. I'll be at Wolff's Biergarten with the wife enjoying the game with three or four thousand of my fellow Americans. Yes, the bar really is expecting that kind of crowd, indeed the first two thousand get a free stein to fill - and Broadway in Albany, NY is already closed down 4 hours before the match starts. It feels like Halloween actually, I forgot to bring my American flag cape and red, white, and blue striped socks.

I find it very odd that it is Soccer that brings out American Patriotism in ways the Olympics never does, and I observe a kind of passion for ones self-identity for being an American I personally have not seen among average Americans since September of 2001.

I'll be uploading photos of the scene here to my Facebook page all day, for those who follow me there. Go USA.

About Those Fixed Wing Aircraft on Bonnie Dick

Wow. Scoopdeck had part of the story when they spotted the photos, but when I asked what was going on the other day I was told to wait for the rest of the story.

I am not disappointed.

The amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), en route to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2010, is carrying unique cargo for training evolutions during the international maritime exercise. Bonhomme Richard left San Diego June 14 with two Czechoslovakian-built 1964 and 1965 Aero-Vodochody airplanes, modified with U.S. standard small turbojet J60 engines. These planes will simulate air to surface missile attacks for training purposes, during RIMPAC.

Traveling aboard with the embarked aircraft is retired U.S. Navy Cmdr. Gerry Gallop, who is Chief Operating Officer for Tactical Air Support Inc. The company, that owns and operates the aircraft, provides consulting services, tactics development and test and evaluation services to U.S. THIRD Fleet.

“Our company’s main goal is to increase readiness through quality training with affordable platforms,” Gallop explained. “It adds realism and training value, because we can do a pretty-good job simulating a profile a missile would fly.”

Gallop said that he and three other retired military pilots will fly the Aero Vodochody airplanes during the RIMPAC exercise.

“We all happened to retire from the military, but we weren’t done contributing,” reflected Gallop. ”So we came together and found a way to continue doing what we are passionate about and continue to contribute to training and readiness of the U.S. military.”

Gallop said the modified Aero-Vodochody airplanes reach top speeds of approximately 420 knots or approximately 500 miles per hour. Tomahawk cruise missiles move at speeds of approximately 550 miles per hour. The ability to use the contracted aircraft in training simulations provides a more realistic and time-sensitive approach to the detection and countermeasures used to combat an inbound threat.

“They (Aero-Vodochody) are a particularly reliable, simpler airplane, which we have modified extensively to give us more power and performance,” explained Gallop. “We’re not as fast as an actual missile, but we’re pretty close.”

Big time well done to Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Katherine Barkley for the article, and indeed, the PAOs who are putting out information on RIMPAC 2010 appear to be doing a great job.

I guess I only have one question. Will they be offloaded by crane and flown from Pearl during the exercises, or will they take off and land on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)? I know, I know... Just saying, it can't be too hard to trap a L-29, and I don't think launching would be the issue.

What I'm really trying to say is it will be a very good day when we get some fixed wing aircraft back on our big deck amphibious ships - and I'm not talking about Harriers and Joint Strike Fighters either. I might be a big fan of big carriers, but I am not oblivious to the advantages and utility smaller carriers and the benefits these type of simplistic fixed wing aircraft can provide the fleet. We don't always need a fighter jet and there are still significant advantages to having people in the loop as a compliment to unmanned systems.

I certainly believe expanding the options of available aircraft types that could fly from the big deck amphibious ships would reduce overall Naval operational costs in specific conditions and circumstances (HE/DR, IW at sea, etc), because we get the option of having more aviation globally postured forward without necessarily having to send a big deck.

Seriously, something similar to the L-29 would be very useful in today's Navy for a number of things - potentially including fixed wing ASW support btw. I wonder if you could fold the wings in a way it could be deployed forward via C-17...

Germany to Withdraw From CTF 150 Early

As one who continuously observes naval deployments and patterns globally, I try to keep an eye out for news that seems odd, or doesn't add up. The news that Germany is basically stopping their contribution to Task Force 150 - the anti-terrorism international task force in the Gulf of Aden - seems very strange to me. There are plenty of perfectly legitimate reasons why the Germans would stop participation in CTF 150, but the specific reason given is not one of them.

Germany is withdrawing early from a US-led operation that patrols the sea off the Horn of Africa because the terrorist threat in that area is small, Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg said Wednesday.

A German Navy reconnaissance plane and 90 military personnel will end their activity on June 30 instead of at the end of this year.

'The terrorist threat in the sea area off the Horn of Africa is limited,' said Guttenberg in Djibouti. The minister is overseeing a cost-saving review in Berlin of Germany's military budget.

Either the German intelligence office is asleep, or there is another reason and this is simply an excuse - because the reason given appears contrary to the analysis of the terrorist threat everywhere else. The threat of maritime terrorism off the Horn of Africa and specifically the Bab-el-Mandeb strait is probably at the highest point it has been since 2001, when Task Force 150 was established.

For example, back in March there was a special advisory made by the US Navy Office of Intelligence.

ONI Special Advisory, 9 Mar 10. To ensure maximum dissemination to the maritime industry and/or community, ONI is bringing to your attention the following US DOT MARAD Advisory. Please note, this advisory is not piracy-specific. This advisory is regarding terrorism and is being disseminated in an effort to promote security for those operating within the maritime domain.

US DOT MARAD Advisory: Information suggests that al-Qaida remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen. Although it is unclear how they would proceed, it may be similar in nature to the attacks against the USS COLE in October 2000 and the M/V LIMBURG in October 2002 where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was detonated. Other more sophisticated methods of attack could include missiles or projectiles.

Although the time and location of such an attack is unknown, ships in the Red Sea, Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen are at the greatest risk of becoming targets of such an attack. All vessels transiting the waters in the vicinity of Yemen are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness and should maintain strict 24-hour visual and radar watches, and regularly report their position, course, and speed to the UKMTO. Vessels are at greatest risk in areas of restricted maneuverability and while in/near port or at anchor.

Merchant vessels are requested to report any suspicious activity to the UKMTO Dubai (ONI).

That followed disturbing direct threats from Al Qaeda in Yemen to the US Navy from the end of last year.

The Germans may have a legitimate reason to pull out of Task Force 150, but the suggestion that the reason is a reduced threat is ridiculous. National interest, economy, or a change in policy would all be valid reasons. It should be noted that the German Navy will continue to operate as part of EU NAVFOR to fight pirates off the Horn of Africa, so whatever the real reason is - the Germans are not retreating from the region.

Something is very odd here. It doesn't make much sense to reduce presence in a volatile maritime region for a reason that appears to be in direct contradiction of the facts. It leaves the question whether the reduction of forces in the region is for a good reason - perhaps too good of a reason to mention to the public?

Sigh...

I really wish the New York Times allowed blogs to embed their videos (yes mr. haxor, I know I can steal it, but with the embed option I know they are distributing).

The video that comes with this excellent article on the IRGC maritime network is really good, because it is something the average American can understand.

Picture of the Day

When the Soviets Russians come to town with their Soviet Russian cruisers, naturally I am going to post pictures. Big thanks to Scott for this nice shot. That looks like Craig Hooper in the bottom right corner.


This one is from Patrick, who caught the old Soviet Russian war wagon as she made the transit in SF bay last Sunday.

If you were at the open visitation and have photo's, send them in. This last one, also from Scott, is outstanding. Click the pic for higher resolution.


The Slava class runs about a little over 600 ft long and with about a 68 ft beam. If you look closely there is a rather nice sized Captains yacht back on the starboard side there near the ramp. That little boat is actually able to fit in the same space that consumes the large sandbox missile launchers outside the main superstructure going down the center of the ship.

A ship about the same length, with several well armed short range small boats able to be deployed like this little Captain yacht would make a perfect mothership for irregular warfare operations, whether one is talking about anti-piracy or riverine. I'd put a giant flight deck on top of those deployable boats (in other words, the ship would be a commercial design that would look like a 1930s era aircraft carrier) with the bridge up front.

For about $500 million (estimate based on T-AKE cost), that would be a pretty impressive irregular warfare mothership for deploying surface, subsurface, and air based vehicles, and we wouldn't have to send our Slava class combatant equivalents to chase speed boats off the Horn of Africa. Just saying.

The Pirate Biz

Great article. A must read.

Quote of the Month

The most interesting operational quote of the month comes courtesy of Rear Adm. Frank Caldwell, Commander, Submarine Group 9.

The Submarine Force has achieved another first with all four guided missile submarines (SSGN) deployed for the first time simultaneously.

Although the West Coast SSGNs, USS Ohio (SSGN 726) and USS Michigan (SSGN 727), and East Coast SSGNs, USS Florida (SSGN 728) and USS Georgia (SSGN 729), have previously been underway at the same time, this milestone marks the first time all four SSGNs have been forward deployed away from their homeports.

“I think it is remarkable they are all deployed at once because back in the mid 90’s this was just a power point presentation,” said Rear Adm. Frank Caldwell, Commander, Submarine Group 9. “We have transitioned from an idea on paper to an actual capability to the nation. Their capabilities are revolutionary in what a typical submarine can do because they can carry multiple Tomahawk missiles, special operating forces, improved sonar processers, and a battle management center. It is truly one of the most capable platforms in the Navy today.”

Before the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) made her first deployment, word was that the SSGN fleet would be operationally testing new technologies in the reconfigurable silos every deployment in order to advance the science and technology of underwater warfare.

It is my hope that was a standing order, and that practice continues to this day.

USS Ohio (SSGN 726), USS Michigan (SSGN 727), USS Florida (SSGN 728), and USS Georgia (SSGN 729) represent the most powerful conventional military capability in the world at penetrating enemy defense networks. They represent the true meaning of stealth strike power, and after a conversion of four submarines that carried a combined price tag less than the cost of a single B-2 bomber - the fleet of four submarines is probably the single greatest investment in conventional military equipment in all of our lifetimes.

Mission Unfinished

"In this age," he said, "I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines."

The quote above was spoken in May of this year, at the United States Naval Institute EAST conference sponsored by JFCOM. The speaker was General James Mattis.

The President had no choice; he absolutely had to accept General McCrystal's resignation. With that said, I am reluctant to praise the Presidents decision today to name General Petraeus as General McCrystal's replacement, and it is far too early to hand out any praise regarding how seriously the President is taking the military - civilian unity of command issues surrounding the Afghanistan war. It is a bizarre world we must live in that some can unequivocally suggest that by firing one General and demoting another General we have somehow made progress for civilian - military relations - even if it may be true.

If we understand the complexities that required General McCrystal to be fired, and General Petraeus to be demoted, at most we can highlight that the administration understands the challenges the nation faces in Afghanistan. That really isn't much to build praise from though.

When I watched the speech given by the President today in the Rose Garden, I heard President Obama's voice - but I also felt like I was hearing Secretary Gates words. For me, and I may be wrong, what I witnessed was the Pentagon leadership dealing with a military specific problem surrounding a Pentagon approved General, and the President merely showed up to deliver the message. General McCrystal may have offered his resignation to President Obama, but I am left with the impression Secretary Gates insured that action and had he been assigned to deal with the issue - would have fired General McCrystal himself. I find it as simplistic as a political sound bite to suggest that today was bold civilian leadership by the President to reign in control of the military, because more likely the civilian was Secretary Gates and action was more akin to the military taking decisive action to clean their own house.

I find it interesting that with the sole exception of General McKiernan, the Obama administration has never held anyone accountable for their actual job performance. However, General McKiernan was fired by Gates, not President Obama, so in effect the political side of the Obama administration has never actually fired anyone in their administration. Adjusting deck chairs on the civilian side of the Afghanistan war will become - in effect - a first for this administration. I have concerns that the Obama administration will be unable to take swift action on the civilian side of the war effort, because grading someone on performance is quite frankly - something the Obama administration has never done. The oil spill is a perfect example of how government under the Obama administration is held unaccountable for performance in crisis.

Maybe I am cynical, but I don't believe Obama intended to fire General McCrystal until Secretary Gates came along and insisted otherwise. All of the benefits to be gained by refusing General McCrystal's resignation were political in nature, while all of the benefits of accepting General McCrystal's resignation favored civilian control in the Pentagon. One of the politically appealing sound bites of the last 24 hours is the phrase that "the war is about more than one man."

Does anyone believe for a minute that the Afghanistan war policy would remain the same if it wasn't for one man - Secretary Gates? The war itself may be about more than one man, but how the war is conducted is primarily because of one man.

I find it very disturbing how little depth our nation has in the bullpen when the President has to demote our most decorated military leader of this generation - General Petraeus - in order to find someone willing and able to execute the existing administration policy for Afghanistan and simultaneously save political face for the Commander in Chief in the midst of a civil - military relations crisis. How effective is the policy itself when the President must borrow the prestige and respect of the nations finest General in order to reclaim civilian control? Color me concerned.

Start the clock, because dealing with the civilian side of the Afghanistan war issue may take some time. On Wednesday the President started something, but the timetable that matters isn't how long it takes for General Petraeus to pick up General McCrystal's fumble and start moving the ball down the field - rather how long it takes for the rest of the command structure - specifically the civilian side but also the CENTCOM replacement - to get sorted out.

The CENTCOM replacement will be interesting to watch, because as a premier military position directly responsible for the way the war is conducted, the list of names will again reveal how short the bullpen of Secretary Gates actually is.

General Petraeus addresses half of the military - civilian equation that General Mattis is quoted discussing above - the easy half. Until the civilian half of that equation is addressed and conforms to the quote by General Mattis - the President has a mission unfinished in Afghanistan - and that mission has always been the hard part; the part his predecessor never got right in Afghanistan.

Obama's Ernest King Moment

On December 20th, 1941, when President Roosevelt called upon Fleet Admiral Ernest King after King's appointment to COMINCH, Admiral King was reported to have said "When they get in trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches”.

We now know who one of that group is - General Petraeus. The next will be the person named to replace General Petraeus at CENTCOM - who I hope is General Mattis...

But suspect could be Admiral Stavridis.

It is Time to Call in General Mattis

As much as I want to discuss some Naval issues in the news, I can't help but write down my thoughts on the McCrystal events that will unfold Wednesday. If you believe, as I do, that the Obama administration will do everything possible to avoid a war with Iran - then the decision President Obama makes on Wednesday will define the legacy of his role as Commander in Chief for his first Presidential term.

There was to be a meeting between General McCrystal and the nations national security leadership on Wednesday anyway - the only difference is that now it will be in person. It would be easy to focus on the politics of Rolling Stones articles. If the President is smart - the focus will be on Afghanistan first.

Before we move forward, lets look back and remember where General McCrystal started. This was how the original McCrystal report laid forth the Afghanistan war.

Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy.

In September of last year, I argued this approach was strategic confusion from the outset.

What? Is the strategic objective to defeat al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and deny them sanctuary or is it to protect the Afghan population, establish good governance, and rebuild the economy? Those are two entirely different strategic objectives, but both become the strategic objective when you add the words "that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign."

Counterinsurgency has become the slipper that fits every foot, when in fact military history suggests there are other military strategies for military engagement in failed states when unity governance cannot be achieved or established by an external state.

The McCrystal strategy depends, almost entirely, on the Afghanistan Army and Police forces being stood up and taking control of security of the country. How is that working out? I hope the President asks the question.

The McCrystal strategy also depends on a strong central government in Afghanistan, because without it the population of the country could legitimately be labeled the insurgent. How many tribes support the central government? How many support the Taliban? How many are partners with the ISAF? I hope these are questions the President asks.

Why is there such a disconnect between the Marines and McCrystal in Afghanistan? I'd like to know, I'm sure other observers would like to get McCrystal's take on that. Again, another question for the President.

The way I see it, Obama has several choices. McCrystal either stays or goes. The existing COIN strategy either stays or goes. I personally think the President should allow McCrystal to retire, and a Marine should be put in charge. I also think it is time to draft a strategy to meet the Presidents objectives of defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary and give up the central government building exercise that has been completely ineffective - and indeed perhaps counterproductive.

The Marines left Iraq to go to Afghanistan. They wanted it - I hope the President gives it to them. I strongly believe that President Obama needs to pick one of two men - Lieutenant General John R. Allen or General James Mattis. No more West Point COINdinistas guys - it is time to pick a Marine.

It is time to call in General James Mattis.

Picture of the Day

Check out this recent photo from Navy.mil.


I am probably the last supporter for more LDP-17s, despite their high cost, but this image is part of the reason why I believe this is naval power in the 21st century more so than simply focusing all funding on traditional warships.

Count the aircraft. I count 7 in this photo. Now consider what else this ship can carry and consider what comes packaged in this 24,000+ ton sovereign piece of US power.

Need VLS? LPD-17 can have that. Need ground power? This ship supports more than a company of Marines, and based on the equipment on that deck and below that deck, I can move that company of Marines to shore in at least three different ways - including well beyond the shoreline itself. Indeed, I could move a company of Marines, a platoon of tanks, with the HQ and logistics necessary for an days operation all from this one deck - and in this model I have the other two ships of the ARG - including the Nassau - as the reserve.

Before the LPD-17, the big deck amphib was always the primary, and the reserve was never so robust.

Disfunctional

Of all the things I am learning today surrounding the General McCrystal news, this is perhaps the most shocking to me.

Eric Bates, the magazine’s editor, said during an interview on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” that McChrystal saw the piece prior to its publication as part of Rolling Stone's standard fact-checking process - and that the general did not object to or dispute any of the reporting.

Asked if McChrystal pushed back on the story, Bates responded: “No, absolutely not.”

“We ran everything by them in the fact checking process as we always do,” the Rolling Stone editor said. “They had a sense of what was coming and it was all on the record and they spent a lot of time with our reporter so I think they knew that they had said it.”

But the end of the article is what I consider a /facepalm moment.

The general issued an apology late Monday soon after the story first appeared online, but Bates suspects McChrystal was surprised by the backlash.

“I don't think we got the sense that it was intentional,” the editor said, pointing out that McChrystal is “known for being very, very frank."

How is it even possible that the architect of our nations 'hearts and minds' COIN strategy for the war in Afghanistan is so tone deaf to media information that he didn't see a backlash coming from his comments in the Rolling Stone article?

If he truly didn't see the backlash from the article coming, then it is no wonder our troops are struggling in Afghanistan.

While it would be the political equivalent of a hail mary pass - and it would also represent the kind of risk taking this administration has never demonstrated in crisis to date - I do hope General Mattis is put in charge of this war. This is a 'call 911' moment for the Afghanistan war, and when the United States calls 911 it is usually the Marines who answer the phone.

McChrystal's Days Numbered, Part II

Word is, the General's on his way to the White House for a chat.  I think he's done.  Here's the daisy chain of replacements (you heard it here first)....

Odierno vectored from JFCOM to Viceroy in Afghanistan--temporary assignment, square things away, etc.  Six months.

Mattis stays where his is...for six months.

Odierno's replacement is named and goes and sits at Odierno's knee for a few months.

Odierno comes home and takes the job from Mattis he was already headed to. 

More on McCrystal

The Rolling Stone article in PDF format for those who want to get an early read.

General McCrystal will be fired, as he almost certainly should be. That really isn't the problem facing the Obama administration and the country. The problem is that we appear to be losing the war, and now you have an internal distraction the enemy had nothing to do with.

The President made Afghanistan his war when he decided to go with General McCrystal's counterinsurgency strategy and began surging additional troops. I don't want to hear how the President of the United States had no choice regarding Afghanistan and was backed into the corner - because to suggest that is true is to basically say Barack Obama is not qualified to be the leader of the free world. The President has lost his General. Has he lost the General McCrystal counterinsurgency strategy too? Is losing the war not so far behind?

I just wish there was one thing so far during the Obama administration to date I could point to and suggest there is a light at the end of the tunnel, but the lack of direction and focus that is displayed in every emerging challenge this administration has faced to date suggests that a pattern of panic, confusion, chaos, and indecision regarding what to do will become the next phase of the Afghanistan war.

I hope I am wrong, but it is the safe prediction given the pattern of behavior by this Administration to date.

McChrystal's Days Numbered?

Uh-oh.  Nothing good is going to come of this.  Nope.  Nothing. 

Navigating the Interagency Morass

Today in some defense circles, one's mastery of jointness isn't enough for success. The currently en vogue "whole-of-government" approach requires senior military officers to maneuver (or plod) their way through the IA environment. Former SECDEF Rumsfeld once remarked that the interagency process can "suck the life out of you." For those sea service folks lucky enough to find themselves working in an interagency environment, the GAO provides some insight.

"This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained work force, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration."

Having a bit of experience in this lane myself, I offer the following IA Truths:

1. The degree of success usually realized in IA coordination is directly proportionate to the distance from the Beltway.
2. Consensus building is overrated. Successful interagency coordination requires a lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way approach.
3. Personalities trump bureaucracies and formal chains of command. If your initiative isn't progressing due to a certain personality, go around, over, or through them.
4. When an agency rep asks "why is DoD doing that?" it really means -- stay off our turf because you are embarrassing my agency, even though we aren't competent or willing to do what we were chartered/authorized/funded to do.
5. Never forget that DoD is always the 800 pound gorilla in the room. Always.


Feel free to add your own.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

What is Green Water?

Advocates of building out a balanced force structure consisting of larger numbers of smaller, shallow draft ships to complement a smaller number of higher end surface combatants often use the term "green water" to characterize the environment where a smaller vessel capability would operate. But what does green water really mean? During a recent CSBA workshop on maritime irregular warfare, a lively debate ensued on this issue, without much consensus.

The NOC delineates three categories which one might assume are included to help differentiate operating environments and steer the range of capabilities that might be required by naval forces in those areas:

"Blue water refers to the open ocean; green water refers to coastal waters, ports and harbors; and brown water refers to navigable rivers and their estuaries." The distinction is important, not just from an operating paradigm, but in relation to the spectrum of future (and current) naval force structures.

An advocate of exclusively high end ships would be quick to point out that large combatants are equally capable of operating in coastal waters. Which of course is true, as deep draft cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships frequently perform missions in areas near the OPLATs in the Northern Arabian Gulf or within sight of land off various third world coasts. Because blue water ships are capable of operating in coastal areas, one will frequently hear the argument that a force of less green water ships to complement multi-mission blue water ships isn't required.

Balanced force "green water" evangelists must challenge this logic. In an effort further the discourse, let me suggest a new definition for consideration: green water is a maritime environment in which a large naval vessel is unable to perform effectively due to any number of operational constraints. These reasons could include, but are not limited to:

Draft - The most obvious limitation of large ships in coastal areas is hydrography. For example, the LCS' 15 foot draft opens up the number of ports that the Navy can access globally from 362 to 1,111. Extrapolated from the number ports to actual of square miles of acessible waterspace, a 15-20 feet less draft makes a considerable impact and a sub-10 foot draft exponentially more so. As much as we may want to relive the glory days of WWII and Cold War naval operations, the more likely scenario is that current and future operations and conflicts will occur in the littorals. The ability to operate in nearly every square meter of water is an imperative to exercising US sea power globally.

Partner Force Overmatch - When working with nascent navies, employing billion dollar vessels that in some cases represents a significant percentage of a partner nation's GDP makes little sense. At best, utilizing larger surface combatants even in exercise roles can be patronizing or intimidating. Small navies more readily identify with vessels that are actually within the realm of the possible for them to procure, operate, and maintain.

Sovereignity Considerations - In a scenario where the US Navy operationally supports a partner nation in a FID role in coastal waters, the host nation would probably like to minimize the perception of US involvement. Large, overtly-US ships conducting MSO or other missions inside territorial waters may create a sense of illegitimacy toward the host-nation government. Ironically, the same constraint applies even to HA/DR operations in situations where host government control is tenuous. Deploying our large blue-water hospital ships in such an environment isn't advisable if a lower profile vessel with adequate medical capability is available.

Enemy Decision Cycle - In an hybrid warfare environment, a stateless enemy with only a handful of higher end, state-provided, sea denial capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles will likely choose his targets carefully to maximize impact at a minimal cost. A capital surface combatant off the coast makes a more tempting and high profile target than a larger number of smaller green water combatants.

Vulnerability to Sea Denial Threats - Although losing the initiative in naval warfare is always tactically unwise; recent history, culture, and ROE leads one to the conclusion that US surface ships usually take the first hit upon initiation of hostilities at sea. Given this probability, smaller, less expensive vessels should be stationed closer to shore than large ships where land-based enemy sea denial threats such as ASCMs, FAC swarm attacks, mines, or any combination of those may be expected. Although unpleasant to think about, the loss of a billion+ dollar combatant and hundreds of Sailors is much less palatable to the American people than a couple dozen Sailors and a sub-one hundred million dollar vessel. The oft-heard counter-argument is that larger ships are more survivable than smaller ships; in future posts, we'll explore that contention in more detail.

The above green water definition is admittedly imperfect; however the debate of high end only versus balanced force must take into account non-traditional constraints to blue water ship operations in the littorals. A corollary of this definition that favors maintenance of a robust force of large combatants is that smaller vessels are often unable to operate independently for any duration in "blue water" due to considerations such as range or sea state. Clearly a properly balanced blue/green/brown water naval force is in order to deal with the full range of operating environments.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Deepwater Horizon: Dutch Point Of View

In Dutch media I'm reading an increasing criticism regarding the response to the oil spill in the Mexican Gulf and the use of their expertise and equipment.

So, first, the timeline according to the Dutch press and press-releases from Dutch companies and governments:

• April 25. Only 3 days after the accident with the oil platform the Dutch offered their skimmers to combat the oil spill. According to the Dutch consul-general in Housten the reaction of the American government was that help was not needed, because they could handle it themselves.

• May 6. Dutch research institute Deltares and dredging company Van Oord propose an inovative concept to combat the oil spill. The US government has been alerted to the existence of this proposal through the contacts that have been established between the 2 governments since hurricane Katrina.

• May 12. Jo Ellen Darcy, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), visits Deltares.

Although this must be a visit that has been planned months in advance, I would expect the visit would now focus heavily on the concept proposed on 6 May.

• May 28. The Dutch have offered 3 sets of sweeping arms, after a US request. T&T Marine Salvage, which has been hired by BP, will use these skimmers. They should be operational next week.

• June 16. Boskalis has gotten a contract to deliver sand to make barriers to protect the Lousiana coast, based on the proposal from May 6.

In my opinion this is pretty fast. Two bad choices had to be weighed carefully, but doing nothing would guarantee an ecological disaster and this might help without creating an ecological disaster. Deltares and Boskalis must have been astounded at the speed of which it went, since they are more used to the speed Dutch governments work at.

And now for the critique.
One thing that always pops up is the Jones Act, or more correctly Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act from 1920. In practice the Act means that foreign vessels can't be employed in the oil spill.
Boskalis has a local company, Stuyvesant Dredging with a US flagged ship, so that's how they were able to get a contract.

The US thinks that the sand barriers will take 9 months to be completed, but Belgian dredgers claim they can do it in 4. They also say the Jones Act is the reason the US is using antiquated technology to combat the oil spill. The European companies, of which the Dutch and Belgians ones are seen as the best in the field by most, buy their ships in the Middle East for only halve the cost of building it in the US.

The company that manufactures the skimmers that have been sent, has said that had the US allowed them from the beginning to use their skimmers they could have done this clean-up with their eyes closed. This is because the skimmers have the capacity to clean up the amount of oil that is leeking in 7 hours.
They also say the USCG was well aware of the skimmers and have visited the company 3 times in the past.

But now the skimmers are in use, the company that manufactures them says they are not being used right. They say communication with the Americans is going slowly and they do not listen to the Dutch instructors. Currently only 5% of their actual capacity is being used, because BP is sending the ships too close to the source. The problem is that the oil is not very thick there, reducing the effectiveness of the skimmers.
The communication between the USCG, BP and T&T Marine could also be a lot better, the Dutch company says. Now it is 'too many chiefs, not enough indians'.
Cargo capacity is also a problem, and because of the Jones Act, foreign ships with a cargo capacity 3 times that of US ships cannot be deployed.

From what I read in the Dutch (and to a lesser extend Belgian) press it reminds me of hurricane Katrina in 2 ways. The first is that the inital US response was: help is not needed.
The second is that it is unclear who is in charge, at least for those on this side of the Atlantic who want to help.

What surprises me, is the huge say BP seems to still have in the way the operation goes. I would expect the USCG to have hired T&T Marine Salvage to use the skimmers and just forward the bill to BP.

Using some replenishment oilers from the MSC should easily solve the problem of the cargo capacity.

Dutch Court Ruling On Alleged Somali Pirates

Instead of having to translate the verdict myself, the Court was kind enough to make an English press release, which is below.
The short version: all 5 men have been sentenced to 5 years in jail.

Judgement case Somali pirates

Today the district court of Rotterdam rendered judgement in the case of five Somali men suspected of piracy. They were arrested in the Gulf of Aden on 2 January 2025 by a Danish naval vessel at an attack of the Samanyolu, flying under the flag of the Netherlands Antilles. They were transferred to the Netherlands on 10 February 2024 for trial.

The defences put forward by the lawyers to bar the prosecutor have not been granted. One of the questions to be answered in that respect was whether the Dutch court has jurisdiction in this case. According to the court this is the case, now that the Netherlands has vested so-called universal jurisdiction in the Criminal Code for cases of piracy on open sea. This national regulation is not contrary to international conventions.

The Court agrees with the lawyers that it took too long before the suspects were brought before a judge after their arrest. In this case this was 40 days. That could and should have been done earlier. This constitutes a breach of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, no consequences follow from this in these criminal proceedings.

All 5 suspects are pronounced guilty as charged. It is proved that they went out to sea in a small boat, heavily armed, with the plan to hijack a ship. No credence was given to their statements that they only committed violence out of self-defence against an attack by the Samanyolu crew.

The judgement emphasizes that piracy in the Gulf of Aden forms a serious threat for international shipping and that this should be dealt with firmly. The unfavourable circumstances in Somalia, both in a general sense and concerning the suspects personally, have not been accepted as a justification for acts of piracy.

All 5 suspects have received a 5-year prison sentence. The sentence is lower than the 7 years demanded. Although to a minor extent, it has been taken into consideration that in other comparable cases the arrested suspects were released and will not be tried. It has furthermore been taken into consideration that detention in the Netherlands forms a heavy burden on the suspects, who are far from home and can not, or hardly, maintain contact with their families in Somalia.

EU To Extend Operation Atalanta Another 2 Years

Today the Council of the European Union has extended Operation Atalanta with another 2 years, so they will be off the Somali coast until December 2012 at least.
The Council has also agreed to extend the current AOR further to the east and south.

The press release doesn't say how much further east and south, but currently they operate as far from the Somali coast as the Seychelles and Tanzania. So maybe we'll see in future news thatsome EU vessel has diverted a pirate attack near the Maldives or the southern point of Madagascar.

The Council reiterates the EU´s commitment to help countries in the region to enhance their capacity to facilitate the prosecution and detention of suspected pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law. The Council commends Kenya and the Seychelles for their cooperation and invites other countries in the region to engage in these efforts.

It is a really good thing, to get all regional players more involved. Because whatever the verdict will be in the pirate trial in the Netherlands, it is clear that the pirates will be better off: a Dutch prison cell-with television, shower and a toilet- beats any Somali shack, as does live as a refugee over here.

Another interesting bit is this:

It strongly encourages the international maritime community to further promote full adherence to recommended best practice in order to continue increasing its capacity to meet its responsibility to keep its vessels safe.

While it sounds so obvious, apparently it isn't. The recently released analysis of the deployment of HNLMS Evertsen to Operation Atalanta from August 13 - December 18 in 2009 concluded that the majority of hijacked vessels didn't adhere to Best Management Practices or used the recommended transit routes from the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). The report says that (during the time of the Evertsen's deployment) 28% of all merchant vessels do not register with MSCHOA and 4% doesn't use the IRTC. And about 10% of the vessels that are categorized 'very vulnerable' due to their slow speed do not use group transits through the IRTC.

One other thing the EU should look into the Dutch claim that EU vessels are also doing national tasks, such as protecting the fishing vessels and hijacked ships from their respective countries, although they're officially under EU orders.
This hampers the effect of Operation Atalanta because the vessels can then not be deployed for those tasks.
This could leave the operation with not enough ships to carry out it's tasks.

The Future of the Corps: Thoughts by LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC

The Future of the Corps

So I’ve sat in on a couple media interviews with LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC. He is the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, i.e…..the future. Of course you don’t make general by throwing out bold, radical statements to the media, but there were a few interesting nuggets in what he has been saying.

On the Future of the Corps

“In eight years of a land war, where the Corps has been acting as if we are a second land army, we need to get back to our amphibious, expeditionary roots.” Nothing new here, but it at least shows a priority of where we want to go. Evidenced by a recent amphibious training exercise Dawn Blitz in Camp Pendleton, CA, and one coming up this summer on the east coast. Dawn Blitz was the largest amphibious training exercise in the past four years.

[The Corps] “is the nation’s sea-based crisis-response force.” Watch this flavor….if a new widget doesn’t help us do this, it’s not as valuable.

On Ground (or sea) Vehicles

In the design of a ground vehicle, LtGen frequently refers to an iron triangle, “Performance, Payload and Protection.” You can protect the heck out of vehicles, but then they don’t move as well [MRAP’s], or you can move faster with little protection [LAV’s]. “We think mobility provides some level of protection” said the general as he was asked for a response to the development of the new (50 - 70 ton) Army combat vehicle. That explains the Corps’ proposed vehicles, why we like the idea of a HMMWV with more protection (search for HMMWV Capsule), and lighter JLTV variants.

On Amphibious Ops

The SecDef has publicly questioned amphibious operations in this day of cheap anti-ship missiles, LtGen Flynn’s comments on amphibious ops, “We’ll need to use the sea as maneuver space (from the NOC) and be able to move from ship to shore fast enough to confuse the enemy. The enemy won’t be able to defend everywhere. Now the Navy says we’ll have to come from over the horizon, well the EFV supports that. We will have to disperse our forces. The enemy will get precision [meaning precision-guided weapons], and we can’t let them have a target.”

That phrase “the enemy will get precision” puts a whole new light on the type of military operations that collect a large amount of forces or materiel, essentially creating a target for the enemy. So as we go forward, will we keep forces small and dispersed, or will we create targets then create the layers of protection required to protect those targets? LtGen Flynn only talked about dispersion.

The NSS stresses engagement as a key tool to work in peacetime with partner nations. LtGen Flynn said, “Engagement is the seam between diplomacy and defense. We see a vital need for the Corps to be engaged in the areas of the world where future security will be uncertain and challenging. Seventy percent of those areas can be reached by sea.” And then he of course went to list the advantage of an amphibious force for engagement, no basing rights, no overflight required, etc. Of course those are easy things to say when you don’t have to eat chow on ship!

Somalia Piracy - Recrafting the Strategic Narrative

What is the current strategic narrative on piracy and do our policy and actions reflect that narrative? On one hand, Navy officials have expressed very clearly that piracy originating from Somalia is a strategic problem requiring a pro-active solution. What follows are a series of statements drawn from USNAVCENT articles.

CTF 151, a multinational task force established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.

CMF, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region by working together for a better future.

U.S. forces conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) to help set the conditions for security in the maritime environment. From security arises stability that results in global economic prosperity. MSO complements the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists' use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.

So clearly, it appears piracy must be a problem worthy of eliminating (or at least supressing to a locally managed level) by whatever means possible. Contrast the above with the evolving and varying narratives below:

13 Dec 08: “Under the United Nations Security Council resolution passed last week, members of the international community must work together to aggressively pursue and deter piracy...” Land pursuit operations would carry a high risk of harming innocent civilians because of the difficulty of identifying those guilty of piracy, U.S. Fifth Fleet spokeswoman Lieutenant Stephanie Murdock said yesterday.

“This has become a very good business and the first thing we need is better intelligence on who’s behind it,” Gates said. More information is needed on the culprits to minimize any collateral damage from land pursuit, Gates said. “With the level of information that we have now we are not in the position to do that kind of land attack,” he said. With “adequate intelligence” only, land attacks may be carried out, he added.

16 Dec 08: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, Secretary of State of the United States, said that several factors were limiting the effectiveness of the response to piracy and armed robbery. Specifically, because there was no existing mechanism for States to coordinate their actions, the result had been less than the sum of its parts. The United States envisioned a contact group serving as a mechanism to share intelligence, coordinate activities and reach out to partners; it would work quickly on that initiative. Also limiting was the impunity; piracy currently paid, and pirates paid little for their criminality.

She said the United States believed that, with the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government, as authorized by the Council today, pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact. Maritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.

14 Apr 09: Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he doesn't see any immediate need to bulk up the military response to piracy on the high seas.

14 Apr 09: "There is no purely military solution to it," Mr. Gates said in an address to the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Va. "There's really no way in my view to control it unless you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids."... Among the advocates for more serious initiatives in Somalia has been Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, commander of U.S. naval forces in the Middle East, who on Sunday reiterated his ships could only do so much and "the ultimate solution for piracy is on land."

15 Apr 09: Clinton said there is a need for a more muscular approach to ending the threat posed by pirates, rather than continuing to tolerate it.

In addition to the above, it is frequently articulated that piracy is little more than an annoyance for shipping companies, who don't mind too much as their insurance covers the bottom line.

Still, dozens of countries have increased their efforts and coordination in an attempt to defeat Somalian piracy. The underlying rationale (or hope) is that cooperation will equal results. Yet from 2007 to present, pirates have expanded their reach from a couple of hundred miles off Somalia to well over 1,000, an area encompassing not only the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden, but the majority of the western Indian Ocean and up into the Red Sea. Depending on what statistics one looks at, the number of successful attacks has decreased somewhat in the last year, but the total amount of revenue secured from ransoms continues to grow. Clearly, the rewards of piracy still greatly outweigh the risks associated with current counter-piracy efforts and the pirates can evolve their tactics faster than we can make decisions, adapt our own TTPs, and coordinate them amongst multiple agencies, two combatant commands, EU, NATO, CMF, and non-aligned maritime forces and their national caveats.

The case for more proactive and assertive operations against piracy must evolve and our actions must match our strategic narrative. Along these lines, here are some additional talking points for consideration:

- By allowing piracy to proliferate and expand, the greatest navy in the world has effectively ceded freedom of the seas to teenagers toting Kalishnikovs and RPGs. If our Navy cannot address this relatively minor situation, then how can we be expected to exercise sea power globally?
- Our failure to defeat piracy has greater strategic implications. Without trying to sound alarmist, it must be noted that piracy provides emerging strategic naval competitors with a perfect excuse to conduct unprecedented out-of-area deployments and improve their naval operations by watching the coalition and learning from their own successes and mistakes.
- Somali pirates negatively affect not only maritime trade, but pose a risk to increased regional instability.
- Similar to the proliferation of suicide bombers and IEDs, other non-state actors will realize the successful business model that Somali pirates have developed and emulate them in around the world.

Many of the above arguments have been made somewhere or another before, but we continue to ignore them.

I offer no solutions here and leave that up to the appropriate policy makers and planners. That said, a more assertive and decisive campaign to defeat piracy will need to be carefully designed rather than just evolved on the fly. This design should consider combinations of US unilateral and multilateral operations, military and non-military actions, kinetic and non-kinetic, both afloat and ashore. Finally, strong leadership is required to eliminate or at least minimize the self-limiting geographic, interagency, legal, and policy boundaries which heretofore have provided the excuse narrative resulting in the failure to decisively address the problem.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.