On Bloggers and Battleships

In a perfect world, the next big Navy conference (pick your favorite) will have a panel discussion that debates The Connections Between Navy Force Structure and Strategy that includes Bob Work, Mackenzie Eaglen, Wayne Hughes, and Barney Ruble moderated by a reporter like Sandra Erwin or Chris Cavas. In a world turned upside down, that debate would go without a moderator on Twitter - as each of the before mentioned strategists attempted to push big ideas 140 alphanumeric characters at a time.

I am a big fan of Dr. Stephen Metz, but in the Information Age - should strategists casually push complex ideas like this with Twitter?

In the Information Age, civilized nations should simply drop blockades from their strategic arsenals. They lead to pyrrhic victories at best

I'd like to thank Dr. Metz for leveraging a medium like Twitter for pushing this complex and controversial idea. Without Twitter, the reader would know the context of such a statement and the associated argument to support it. With Twitter - we thankfully get to presume both.

The strategic idea of the statement by Dr. Metz could be presumed to be that the effective use of strategic communications in the information age has made obsolete the tactic of a blockade - including a naval blockade. If true, that essentially means a well publicized political information campaign could defeat a naval blockade enforced by the US Navy. What if the information campaign is largely conducted using social software leveraging YouTube, Blogs, Twitter, etc. Could the US Navy only achieve a pyrrhic victory - at best - against the formidable power of pesky bloggers?

I was ready to completely dismiss and challenge this idea by Dr. Metz - until I attended the blogger roundtable yesterday regarding the Naval Operation Concept 2010. I arrived a few minutes late - so I opted to remain silent on the call and just listen, but it dawned on me during the call the Navy is an organization that would immediately and outright dismiss the idea suggested by Dr. Metz - and that is what makes him right.

I've read the NOC 2010 three times. Feel free to highlight how strategic communication is integrated into US Navy power. No, not just HA/DR or soft power - but in every use of naval power.

The absence of strategic communications by the Navy - whether for purposes of promoting strategy or in operations or even in explaining something simple like the purpose of the Navy - is the Black Swan of the US Navy. It is why the central focus of HA/DR in Haiti was a single runway airfield instead of what was ultimately the vast quantity of humanitarian power delivered by sea, and why the best idea currently available for using naval power to send messages to North Korea involves sailing an aircraft carrier into disputed littorals.

The next time a US Navy ship engages another ship with hostile fire, what are the odds the US Navy is victorious tactically? What are the odds the US suffers defeat strategically by the same action?

100% could be a potentially valid answer for the first question, but as of right now - I think suggesting higher than 50% to the second question would be optimistic. That should concern every single Navy ship CO and XO in the fleet, because it will be their career (not some Flag Officer) who will take the fall for strategic failure - of that you can take to the bank.

At West 2010 I was introduced to a retired Navy Commander who was working the floor at one of the booths. We talked for about 10 minutes, and as I was leaving I gave him my card - which includes a logo of this blog. He recognized the logo, and apparently had been a casual follower of the blog since I wrote this story while embarked on USS Freedom (LCS 1). In reference to that story, the retired Commander - who did not work for Lockheed Martin - mentioned that a lot of folks were lucky I was on the ship at that time. I asked him why he would think that, and he said "Because the AP headline would have been 'US Navy Ship Rams Canadian Dam' and there would have been hell to pay."

I'm skeptical, but it is an interesting thought exercise because you never know what will go viral in today's information environment. I do however believe it is completely possible that the activities, or inactivity, of an Ensign or LTjg PAO on a ship could be the difference between strategic success or failure in the next naval action conducted by the US Navy. I could be wrong, but I do question if the NOC writers considered that very likely possibility.

And if that is the context of Dr. Metz's 140 alphanumeric big idea - I think I might agree with him.