Chinese Fireworks on the 4th of July

On June 24th the Chinese government announced a live firing training exercise to be held in an area of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province in the East China Sea from June 30 - July 5. The 6 day exercise warns all civilian vessels to stay out of the exclusion zone for safety purposes. With the decision to conduct a military exercise on the weekend of July 4th, the impression China is giving is that this exercise is intended to specifically target the United States.

The exercises are expected to feature numerous Type 022 Houbei fast attack missile catamarans in addition to other ships and submarines of the PLA Navy, as well as other branches of the PLA. The Department of Defense annual report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PDF), the latest edition released in March of 2009, lists a count of 70 fast attack missile vessels currently in operation for the PLA Navy. The U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence report (PDF) (2010) notes there are over 50 Type 022 Houbei's in service, perhaps as many as 32 in the East Sea Fleet. The Type 022 is a relatively short ranged (500 nm) heavily armed stealthy catamaran that is thought to be utilized for swarming approaching warships and attacking from multiple axis with their 8 YJ-83 missiles. When I was at the Naval Postgraduate School last summer, Captain Wayne Hughes (ret) and I agreed that this vessel looks very similar to the "Streetfighter" capability discussion that he was centrally involved in on the pages of Proceedings magazine at the turn of the century.

As a technology the Houbei is not what US military observers will be watching, rather the command and control capabilities that are necessary to achieve a multi-axis coordinated joint forces integrated attack that also features Houbei fast attack vessels will be what experts are watching for. It would be no small feat for China to be able to demonstrate surface, submarine, and aviation capabilities in a coordinated multi-axis attack- because in tactical military operational planning such coordination done well is extremely difficult, and requires communication and coordination integration across services and commands that represents a capability many nations do not have today within their armed forces.

But even that isn't why the Pentagon has both eyes focused on this exercise. The reason this exercise has many concerned is that China may test a DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. Andrew Erickson noted in his latest article that China has appeared to be getting close to their first DF-21D test.

Given the nature of the reported training, it is at least theoretically possible that it might incorporate tests by the Second Artillery involving missiles launched from land. Open source background and timelines on Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) development-as offered in my China ASBM Analysis and Archive post-suggest that this could even include some form of ASBM tests, based on China’s current state of ASBM development and stated desire to demonstrate the ability to threaten carrier strike groups (CSGs).

If so (and it may well not happen at this time), this would be the world’s first live public test of an anti-ship ballistic missile. There are a number of indications that China may have reached the point that it is able to conduct some fairly sophisticated ASBM tests, which would then make such tests a necessary step to reach the next level in the ASBM development that China has so clearly prioritized.

Recent indications include the reported completion of a DF-21D rocket motor facility in 2009 and the recent launch of 5 advanced Yaogan satellites, three of which were apparently placed in the same orbit on 5 March-thereby perhaps offering better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery. Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed to China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D can hit “slow-moving targets” with a CEP (circular error probable, meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) of dozens of meters.

The DF-21D is the subject of much speculation and discussion related to Chinese military capabilities, and there are several valid reasons why. The DF-21D represents the first military capability of any kind developed by another country since the end of the cold war that is believed by US defense officials to represent an asymmetrical technological advantage over the United States military. For over two decades the United States has enjoyed technological superiority on land, air, and at sea over any potential competitors - that technology superiority is the foundation of our nations military power.

The DF-21D represents an evolution of technology that gives China the ability to reach out at long range and directly target the single largest and most expensive symbol of the technology superiority enjoyed by the United States - the nuclear powered aircraft carrier. As a weapon system, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile can be launched from a concealed position on land in the general direction of a US Navy carrier strike group, and while in flight, adjust course as necessary to directly target the aircraft carrier.

The key point to why the weapon system does in fact represent a significant technology evolution and asymmetrical capability is the ability of the DF-21D to change course and identify its target in mid-flight. The current anti-ballistic missile defense system fielded by the United States is not capable of intercepting a ballistic missile that can significantly change course during flight and identify a target in mid-flight - and that capability to maneuver significantly in flight is what gives the DF-21D its asymmetrical advantage against existing US anti-ballistic missile defense systems.

Current US anti-ballistic missile technology, including the AEGIS anti-ballistic missile defense system, develops data during the launch of a ballistic missile to calculate course and speed. Factors that include the speed of the ballistic missile and the trajectory of the ballistic missile are part of the calculations that are made to develop an intercept track. Anti-ballistic missile interceptors can then be fired in the general direction of the calculated path of a ballistic missile - and when the anti-ballistic missile interceptor gets close enough, the terminal guidance and detection system on the anti-ballistic missile interceptor can then detect and intercept the ballistic missile target.

Because the DF-21D is expected to adjust course at high altitude and detect an aircraft carrier after launch over what could potentially be hundreds of square miles at sea, the calculations based on the launch of the ballistic missile could in fact feed an anti-ballistic missile defense system inaccurate data for intercept. A course change of only a few degrees by the ballistic missile to track a US aircraft carrier could mean that an interceptor launched to intercept a DF-21D could be hundreds of miles away from the DF-21D when the interceptor goes into terminal mode to detect the ballistic missile - leaving the interceptor unable to intercept. At speeds that will likely exceed 13,000 mph and on a direct flight path from near orbit, the DF-12D anti-ship ballistic missile will be extremely difficult for conventional anti-ship missile defense systems to detect and intercept - leading some experts to dub the DF-21D a "carrier killer."

China has designed the DF-21D to be an anti-access weapon with the specific intent of sinking a US aircraft carrier with a single shot. The DF-21D has been in development since 1996, but it wasn't until 2007 that US analysts began taking the threat seriously when Chinese rocket artillery and engineering publications were published that suggested the capability was advancing. It was at that point the DF-21D became a feature (instead of a footnote) in the DoDs annual Chinese military power report to Congress.

The evidence of how seriously the United States takes the development of the DF-21D is essentially the story of the US Navy "transformation" over the last 3 years. The decision to truncate the DDG-1000 in favor of more DDG-51s was stated to be for the specific purposes of increasing the nations anti-ballistic missile capability. The decision by the Obama administration to shift development of national ballistic missile defense towards the Navy's AEGIS solution aligned the investment of scarce financial resources towards the AEGIS capability that is most likely to be challenged. The financial investments of billions of dollars that Congress has supported to upgrade the AEGIS BMD system also represents a sign that the government is vividly aware of what the DF-21D represents as an asymmetrical advantage in favor of the Chinese. The continuous discussion within circles of naval observers and analysts regarding the future of the aircraft carrier in the 21st century is a reflection of the concern defense watchers have in large part due to the development of the DF-21D. The acceleration of plans regarding the capabilities of the AEGIS weapon system is largely due to recognition that the current system is not currently capable of addressing this emerging threat.

The Chinese DF-21D and US AEGIS anti-ballistic missile defense system represents the first major offensive/defensive military capability arms race of the 21st century. If China successfully tests a DF-21D ballistic missile specifically designed to kill 5000 US sailors on the 4th of July, then there will be no question the pendulum in that arms race will have shifted in China's favor.