IW JOC V2.0 - Maritime Implications

The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept was recently refreshed by ADM Olson and GEN Mattis. There is some difference of opinion in the navy over the terms irregular warfare and irregular challenges. The doctrinal issues and semantics are spelled out pretty clearly in the JOC, but more important for readers here are the implications to naval forces.

Of particular concern are failed and failing states, which could lead to more “ungoverned spaces,” which become safe havens for terrorists, criminals, and groups engaged in other illicit activities. These “spaces” could be rural, urban, maritime, air, or “virtual.” Also of increasing concern are rogue statesthat use proxies, which allow the state to distance itself from actions and achieve strategic aims simultaneously.

The greatest current IW threat to US interest is the Al Qaeda network, which persists in several coastal state safe havens, including Pakistan, the Arabian pennisula, and North and East Africa. Also note the not-so-subtle swipe at Iran in the above language. The JOC describes how IW threats vary greatly in type and environment.

State and non-state actors will find new and more deadly means of conducting
operations in all domains, to include land, air, maritime, and cyberspace to
further their aims. This may include piracy and smuggling on the high seas;
interruption of the flow of people, goods and services; fostering illicit
commerce and activities; and otherwise leveraging land, air and maritime areas
to ensure their freedom of movement and deny it to others.

The ability to engage with relevant populations is a key tenet of irregular warfare. It is important to understand both the capabilities and limitations naval forces bring to this effort. In any given day, only a small percentage of naval forces are actively interacting with populations around the world. These efforts include maritime civil affairs teams, navy led PRTs in Afghanistan, medical engagements associated with HADR deployments, and community relations projects by deployed ships. In some cases, such as the PRTs, its likely that these capabilities will be downsized, if not eliminated (and rightfully so) with the eventual drawdown from the two active combat zones. That said, the Navy brings much more to the IW fight than many appreciate.

According to the IW JOC, there are "five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats." These include counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). Naval general purpose forces have executed or supported from the sea special operations forces conducting all of these IW missions since 9/11/01.

The capabilities required to support IW are clearly articulated in the JOC and naval forces are well suited to provide all of them.

In particular, because these activities may be undertaken on a small or large
scale, depending on the level of the threat and the capacity of the host
nation, the joint force must be able to provide scalable, flexible force
packages to support distributed operations, including logistics support for
small unit operations, transportation, lift/mobility, air support, human and
technical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), force
protection, engineering, communications, medical assistance, and other
enablers. In many cases this entails employing existing capabilities in new
ways rather than developing new capabilities. Advisory personnel with the
requisite language and cultural skills are needed. The footprint should be
the minimum essential to accomplish the mission at an acceptable level of
risk, since a large foreign presence tends to provoke opposition and
undermine the legitimacy of the host nation. Various sustainment and basing
options can be employed to include joint forces based at sea.

As tough decisions are made in the next few years with regard to joint force structure, defense budget cutters should note that besides special operations forces, the Navy and Marine Corps are the services most suited to conduct IW in austere expeditionary settings where large numbers of ground troops ashore are politically unacceptable and economically or logistically unsustainable.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.