Hunter-Killer Ops in the Littorals‏

The US is unlikely to have further appetite for more large scale, ground based COIN operations such as those ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. But the threat posed by non-state actors to US interests around the world is unlikely to dissipate any time soon, either. As noted here before, some of these groups, such as the Tamil Tigers and Nigeria’s MEND have become adept at using the sea, littoral, or inshore areas to facilitate their operations. MEND guerillas have employed hit and run tactics against oil infrastructure and security forces, then retreated to the refuge of the Nigerian Delta’s expansive creeks and mangrove swamps. So it would be wise for naval planners to consider offensive counter-guerrilla operations in their portfolio of options in the event these insurgent groups rise to a level that invites a discrete US intervention in support of a host nation’s counter-insurgency efforts.

Could hunter-killer operations as described by Joseph Celeski (COL, USA, SF, Ret.) in Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens be adapted for a maritime environment?

Hunter-killer operations are prolonged operations conducted in irregular warfare by a unique and specifically organized force, in conjunction with an indigenous
force, against irregular warfare adversaries by operating behind the lines or in
hostile, safe haven, or semipermissive environments, employing unorthodox
tactics, for the sole purpose of achieving attrition and punitive actions
predominantly against the personnel, leadership, and resources of the enemy.

Maritime hunter-killer operations (HKO) should work in conjunction with other offensive counter-guerrilla operations such as naval raids, interdiction of the insurgents’ supply lines, and man hunting of insurgent leadership (based from the sea). HKO are one component of a strategy of exhaustion, where the prolonged operations wear down and attrite enemy insurgents to the point of defeat. As Celeski notes, “Hunter-killer operational utility derives from employing an effective economy-of-force option, achieving persistence by operating in the same space and conditions of the enemy, while achieving a military and psychological impact out of proportion to its size (operational or strategic performance is achieved).”

A historical example of maritime HKO-like role were SEALs and their UDT predecessors who advised indigenous maritime units operating in areas such as the Rung Sat Special Zone, Laos, and Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

The Naval Special Warfare community remains the obvious choice to conduct Maritime HKO today. NSW is skilled in the tools of HKO, including working with indigenous forces and using mobility platforms (boats) to access enemy held terrain. Alternatively, as Celeski suggests, teams from MARSOC could be trained in the HKO mission. MARSOC MSOTs are performing well in Western Afghanistan, but as they eventually return to their maritime roots, HKO might be a desired niche capability for selected teams.

Future maritime HKO would be supported by intelligence, over-watch, and resupply from sea-launched UAVs and other distributed fire precision fires. However, in order to achieve success, the elements of SOF tasked to prepare for maritime HKO would need to train to tactics different from those used in the generally short duration direct action missions common today. Capabilities required for HKO include longer duration patrols in insurgent held littoral environments, enhanced de-confliction measures with other naval units operating in the battle space, incorporation of influence operations, and a smaller footprint for logistical sustainment. Hunter-killer ops should be considered as a viable component of an overall COIN strategy against a maritime-centric insurgency.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.