This award is very good news, but a bit little and a bit late. I’ve harped on the need to deploy more ISR at sea before and will continue to do so as it remains the single greatest shortfall impacting future naval war fighting. The theater-level manned and unmanned ISR platforms and their associated PED architecture that have been deployed the past three or four years is nothing short of amazing. But like any other land based aircraft, Predators, BAMs, Reapers, and the like require ashore basing rights. These rights often come with considerable financial and political quid pro quo, operational caveats, and constraints. It takes time and money to establish landing and recovery elements, and provide the accompanying infrastructure and force protection. Conversely, afloat-based ISR can be quickly remissioned or repositioned, giving operational commanders the flexibility to move from scouting to offensive operations without shore-based renegotiation and infrastructure build up delays.
Future expected conflicts cannot be fought without significant quantities of intelligence platforms. Available ISR is the pacing function in offensive irregular and hybrid warfare. Needless to say, surface ships, aircraft, and special operators cannot engage targets they can’t locate and differentiate from among a larger group of people or vessels. In irregular warfare, prosecuting the wrong target is a recipe for IO failure and subsequent negative strategic consequences. Persistent and pervasive ISR is the primary path to avoiding these mistakes.
In a hybrid fight, relatively easy to locate targets such as corvettes or frigates will likely be nothing more than distractions as part of the enemy's deception campaign. A navy trained and equipped to scout exclusively for other combatants will not do well against surrogates who blend in with commercial, recreational, or fishing traffic. While a larger combatant might seem like the highest priority target, the reality is that the enemy’s most valuable vessel is probably an innocuous looking dhow or fishing boat providing target cueing for coastal anti-ship cruise missiles.
Current Capabilities, Future Options
The Sea Hawk family of helicopters provides the Navy's surface combatants a wonderfully flexible capability, covering missions from ISR, to offensive ASW and ASUW, to logistics support. But helicopters are expensive to acquire and operate, require expensive manning and training, and a fairly sizeable flight deck to deploy. The USN’s helo fleet should be immediately augmented by a variety of less capable UAS. In fact, every single combatant and amphibious ship should be deploying with organic ISR of some variety.
As we’ve often argued here before - the future US Navy will need to include a balanced surface fleet with more numerous affordable green water ships to complement high end capabilities. One way to enhance the utility of these smaller vessels across the spectrum of warfare is through the use of UAS.
The navy has had proven operational success with the fixed wing scan eagle, which can be launched and recovered from craft as small as a MK V. Scan Eagles are being produced in increasingly robust multi-int variants, including the Integrator referenced above. Unfortunately, scan eagle detachments are few and far between. The VTOL Fire Scout also shows promise, with the ability to carry armament and demonstrated
success in operational experimentation. But compared to other VTOL alternatives, they are limited in overall capability and flexibility. The Boeing A-160 (MQ-18) is a tremendously capable aircraft, and could easily perform multi-mission VTOL roles including ISR, autonomous resupply, and strike. A smaller, less capable (and less expensive) VTOL, the Schiebel S-100, is in service in many foreign navies today, and could provide multi-int ISR from green water combatants and other smaller surface ships.
The Navy’s choice on procuring ISR should be clear: await the outcome of additional ICDs and commission more contracted studies to validate what the war fighters already know... or, make a bold and decisive move to rapidly invest in the ISR capabilities demanded by current and future conflicts at sea and ashore. The Navy’s mantra for acquisition of afloat ISR should become buy, try and decide rather than the analysis paralysis that characterizes today's byzantine procurement processes.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
Future expected conflicts cannot be fought without significant quantities of intelligence platforms. Available ISR is the pacing function in offensive irregular and hybrid warfare. Needless to say, surface ships, aircraft, and special operators cannot engage targets they can’t locate and differentiate from among a larger group of people or vessels. In irregular warfare, prosecuting the wrong target is a recipe for IO failure and subsequent negative strategic consequences. Persistent and pervasive ISR is the primary path to avoiding these mistakes.
In a hybrid fight, relatively easy to locate targets such as corvettes or frigates will likely be nothing more than distractions as part of the enemy's deception campaign. A navy trained and equipped to scout exclusively for other combatants will not do well against surrogates who blend in with commercial, recreational, or fishing traffic. While a larger combatant might seem like the highest priority target, the reality is that the enemy’s most valuable vessel is probably an innocuous looking dhow or fishing boat providing target cueing for coastal anti-ship cruise missiles.
Current Capabilities, Future Options
The Sea Hawk family of helicopters provides the Navy's surface combatants a wonderfully flexible capability, covering missions from ISR, to offensive ASW and ASUW, to logistics support. But helicopters are expensive to acquire and operate, require expensive manning and training, and a fairly sizeable flight deck to deploy. The USN’s helo fleet should be immediately augmented by a variety of less capable UAS. In fact, every single combatant and amphibious ship should be deploying with organic ISR of some variety.
As we’ve often argued here before - the future US Navy will need to include a balanced surface fleet with more numerous affordable green water ships to complement high end capabilities. One way to enhance the utility of these smaller vessels across the spectrum of warfare is through the use of UAS.
The navy has had proven operational success with the fixed wing scan eagle, which can be launched and recovered from craft as small as a MK V. Scan Eagles are being produced in increasingly robust multi-int variants, including the Integrator referenced above. Unfortunately, scan eagle detachments are few and far between. The VTOL Fire Scout also shows promise, with the ability to carry armament and demonstrated
success in operational experimentation. But compared to other VTOL alternatives, they are limited in overall capability and flexibility. The Boeing A-160 (MQ-18) is a tremendously capable aircraft, and could easily perform multi-mission VTOL roles including ISR, autonomous resupply, and strike. A smaller, less capable (and less expensive) VTOL, the Schiebel S-100, is in service in many foreign navies today, and could provide multi-int ISR from green water combatants and other smaller surface ships.The Navy’s choice on procuring ISR should be clear: await the outcome of additional ICDs and commission more contracted studies to validate what the war fighters already know... or, make a bold and decisive move to rapidly invest in the ISR capabilities demanded by current and future conflicts at sea and ashore. The Navy’s mantra for acquisition of afloat ISR should become buy, try and decide rather than the analysis paralysis that characterizes today's byzantine procurement processes.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
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