I received the following via email from a knowledgeable Brit overnight, and I contacted the author and received his permission anonymously to post his view of my post yesterday on the RUSI article. My responses are interspersed in bold.
Dear Mr McGrath,
I read your comments on the Information Dissemination website regarding the RUSI paper on the future of the Royal Navy and I have to disagree with your suggestion that the authors, Blackham and Prins, failed to make the case for the size of the fleet.
You seem to be assuming that because the US Navy is now the primary naval power in the world that other nations should just rely on them to keep the seas open. But as you say geography matters, the UK is an island nation, its security depends on trade via the sea, is this not argument enough to have a strong navy irrespective of the strength of its allies?
It is an argument--but is it sufficient argument to obtain the funding required? And I'm prepared to listen to an argument that says the UK shouldn't depend on the US to keep the seas open--but I'm not hearing that argument. If I did, I would then hope that the force structure requirement put forward would be substantially larger than the one discussed in Blackham and Prins article, because keeping the seas open is a much bigger job than the even Blackham and Prins are resourcing.
The comparisons with Australia are ones that should be made because Canberra has recently gained an appreciation of what seapower can do, something that the British hierarchy has forgotten. Just because the UK is farther away from the Asian region does not mean its security is not affected by events there.
I don't disagree that the British hierarchy has forgotten its appreciation for what Seapower can do, I just don't get a sense of how the RN will use it to contribute to security and stability in Asia. What is the requirement? An Asian squadron, forward deployed 365 days a year? Presumably though, the Australian Seapower requirement would differ--greatly--from the UK requirement because of proximity.
As Blackham and Prins point out there are various choke points through which seaborne trade has to pass and these must be kept open. As an island nation to leave this job to other powers would be irresponsible.
Again, I'd like to see this argument made--the argument that the UK can't leave the protection of the world's sea lanes to the US. But it isn't being made because protecting sea lanes these days is as much a power projection mission as a sea control mission, given the proliferating ability of coastal nations to exercise sea control from the shore (the return of shore artillery, so to speak). Making a freedom of the seas argument requires a vastly larger force structure than the Exchequer can provide, and politically, it doesn't hold water given the fact that your closest ally is currently doing the job.
Ultimately the US does not rely on overseas trade as much as the UK. Geographically the US has the capability to feed its own population and produce its own materials, and if it likes can reduce its navy to a coastal force and disengage from international affairs - which is what it did successfully until the early 1900s.
Shhhh.....be quiet or the US Army might hear you...here our interlocutor has stumbled onto an interesting argument--that there is a certain "Seapower hedge" that must be maintained on the chance that the US walks away from its role as guarantor of the global system. Yes--on this basis (UK as an island nation, imports lots of stuff by sea, what if America became isolationist?)--there is a rationale for maintaining an RN with the capability to guarantee movement of materials necessary to support its economy. It is however, one that UK politicians simply don't seem to be buying; for the moment, the US seems to be quite happy spending $600B a year (base budget) on defense including roughly 28% of that on Naval power. Absent additional signs of the US walking away from its role, UK politicians have ample reason to turn the RN into a domestic bill-payer.
In deciding the size of the Royal Navy you must take into account what jobs it is expected to do. Securing global trade routes (with or without the US) requires X number of frigates. Providing a carrier strike and an amphibious assault capability requires X number of destroyers and support ships etc. Protecting overseas territories, patrolling the Horn of Africa, providing minesweepers for the Gulf and other tasks all require more frigates and OPVs.
I agree--however, I see neither a "with or without the US" argument being put forward or the force structure to back it up.
The case for the nuclear deterrent is again that the UK does not want to rely on the Americans, it is also about industrial capabilities, independence of action, a seat at the UN Security Council and all manner of other influences that are not just purely military.
The wag in me would suggest that maintaining the nuclear deterrent is driven as much by the French (having one) as it is by any deterrent value. But if maintaining it is the table stakes for playing as a permanent member of the UNSC, it should (as the RUSI authors indicate) not be funded out of the RN's budget to the detriment of its other responsibilities.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review will look at all the above mentioned tasks and undoubtedly will make some hard decisions about what the UK should and shouldn’t do. Ultimately the question will be asked about what the UK wants to do by itself and what it wants to do with allies.
I agree. Much of what you've written seems to indicate that some in the UK want to be able to keep the sea lanes open without the US, but the force structure put forward is pitifully underweight for such a mission.
What Blackham and Prins are saying is that the Royal Navy is under strength for its existing commitments and that cuts under SDSR should fall on the other services. This is a document designed for the eyes of decision-makers in Whitehall and a way of attempting to show the Ministry of Defence that the navy is the best tool for a cheaper and flexible way of providing defence for the UK.
We are in perfect agreement here. I do believe that the RN is under strength for its existing commitments. I do believe it is less capable of protecting its overseas possessions than it should be and I do believe that cuts should fall more heavily on the other services (an argument I've made here in the US). I do not however, believe keeping the world's sea lanes open is an RN responsibility; if the UK wishes to carve out a portion of it (some percentage, perhaps), I think that would be more effective that the politically dead in the water option of saying "well, what if the Americans go away?"
Bryan McGrath
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