Making the Most of Small Ships: Leveraging Distributed Firepower

There appears to be a slow, but growing recognition in the defense establishment of present fiscal realities and the problems with continuing to procure exquisitely capable and expensive platforms. In the words of the VCJCS, “wake up, you’re not going to have 300, 500 ships...” Inevitably, if the US Navy is to remain our country’s premier armed force for projecting power globally while maintaining a wide variety of dispersed theater engagement missions, it will have to build a larger quantity of less expensive surface vessels to complement high end platforms such as destroyers and cruisers. [LCS cost vs. capability has been covered extensively in other places, so I won't go there...]

Coastal patrol vessels are ideal for working closely and persistently with smaller navies and coast guards - much more so than a multibillion dollar destroyer. Some will argue these ships are fine for today’s irregular conflicts but will be helpless in a major naval battle. Most advocates of this sort of force structure have accepted that reality, but counter that small ships are still necessary for today’s operations. However, we shouldn't have to take conventional wisdom at face value. In other words, we can give coastal ships (think Cyclone Class+) utility across the spectrum of operations from theater security cooperation with developing coastal nations, to maritime security operations, to support of major combat operations against the naval forces of a regional power. How could a balanced USN force structure employ numerous green water vessels against an ostensibly more powerful naval force?

The answer is to leverage distributed firepower. Special operations forces get this concept, probably more so than any other military community. I’ve heard special forces friends say they’d rather fight with a laser than a gun; meaning that they can engage the enemy at longer (i.e., safer) ranges and apply more firepower by laser designating targets for destruction by air than they can using their organic team weapons. Early in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, widely dispersed, small teams of SOF destroyed vastly larger ground forces, including mechanized armor and heavily entrenched ground formations, by controlling air power. JTACs were a valuable, but scarce commodity for ground forces, especially conventional forces. Today, they are more common, but still in short supply. Outside of ANGLICO and NSW, navy JTACs are virtually non-existent. Yes, larger combatants have personnel trained to control aircraft, but they don’t have the capability or training to visually designate surface and ground targets for destruction by airpower.

Although smaller and more numerous surface vessels will be essential to future littoral operations, air power and other fires called in from over the horizon will be the critical enabler of success. Smaller surface ships and combat craft must have the ability to designate and control air power to destroy targets. This airpower need not be limited to tacair from carriers or land bases, but should include larger numbers of sea and land based armed UAVs. Additionally, over the horizon, ship (or even sub) based surface to surface missiles could be employed in this manner. Along those lines, DARPA has programmed RTD&E money for the LRASM-B missile with an IOC of FY15. In addition to closing an expanding sea control gap, this VLS-launched, supersonic, stealthy, 200 km missile could be further enhanced by enabling OTH targeting from forward-engaged green water combatants. Pairing several green water vessels patrolling near shore with a large surface combatant 100 miles in the rear would create an extremely powerful tool for littoral combat.

Fleets of small, fast patrol craft and larger coastal patrol vessels leveraging fire power from distant air and surface forces would greatly complicate an enemy’s targeting problem. That said, ships without air defense systems are clearly more vulnerable to enemy air power than an aegis combatant. However, speed, size, and maneuverability will assist in avoiding enemy airpower while larger numbers of coastal craft can operate under the umbrella of air defense provided by an aegis combatant operating over the horizon. SOF use a system called ROVER to view real time imagery from manned and unmanned aircraft, share data, and designate targets. Introducing this system and complementary laser designators to the fleet would exponentially amplify the USN’s ability to engage hostile vessels, from FACs to frigates.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.