Observing a Systems Approach to Naval Power

The analysis by Project 2049 is worth reading in full, but to kick off my own thoughts I want to quote the hard data point in discussion in their blog post.

Last week, China’s state-run media quietly announced the construction of facilities for a new Second Artillery missile brigade - the 96166 Unit - in the northern Guangdong municipality of Shaoguan [??]. Although the province is already home to a Second Artillery short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) brigade (the 96169 unit in Meizhou), initial reports and indicators signal that the new unit could have unique capabilities that could complicate the strategic calculus in Asia, and the South China Sea in particular.

Although the introduction of the 1,700km range solid fuelled, terminally guided DF-21C ballistic missile into Guangdong is possible, the brigade is also a candidate to be the first unit equipped with the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21C, first introduced into the active inventory in 2005, is designed to attack fixed targets on land. If an ASBM is successful in passing the necessary design reviews and a sufficient sensor network is in place, the Shaoguan brigade could become the first in the PLA to field a lethal capability against moving targets at sea out to a range of 1,500-2,000km or more from launch sites.

The US Navy won't say it, for whatever reason, but China is how they measure themselves. In a perfect world, the US Navy wouldn't need to measure itself against any single nation - but with everything driven by budgets rather than strategy - it is what it is.

All we are really doing now is charting the potential course for the DF-21D, a course towards a capability that our naval leaders now believe is inevitable. The discussion is no longer what if, rather what now. I think as we observe the journey of this emerging Chinese capability designed to target US Navy forces, we need to continuously revisit anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and continue thinking about what it means towards how naval warfare will be fought in the future. It should be noted that all of these discussions begin with force structure - a conversation the US Navy avoids. It is about platforms and systems - two specific force structure discussions the US Navy avoids and communicates with generic terms like modularity (or boxes). This strategic level conversation - in the information age - must take place at some level of detail in the public space - which to repeat a phrase - is a conversation the US Navy intentionally avoids.

By avoiding a public force structure discussion, the US Navy has produced one tangible result we can all agree with - the US Navy's existing force structure plan is not funded sufficiently to address the stated emerging threats primarily because the US Navy today lacks a credible public argument for their mission requirements and objectives - an argument that could be used to leverage the administration and Congress for additional funding (or better use of existing funding).

Let us assume for a moment that in the very near future anti-ship missiles become even faster at lower altitudes making them harder to counter, and more capable against HVUs with technologies like anti-ship ballistic missiles - which is essentially a super fast very high altitude weapon. We then add in submarines, mines, unmanned vehicles, and satellite surveillance and communication. In essence this combination of military assets represents a holy grail of anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that our naval leaders believe can deny our naval forces mobility at sea in specific regions. Is it possible surface forces will be prevented from accessing an area under such a threat?

Yes.

However, one of the aspects of A2/AD discussions that bothers me is that at no point in history has a collection of systems been capable of achieving sea control for any country. In every maritime action in the history of seapower - a platform was required for control. During the Tanker Wars of the 80s, neither Iraq nor Iran ever achieved sea control despite broad use of mines and anti-ship missiles. In the Falklands War - anti-ship missiles and bombs could not deny the British from either approaching the islands or landing on the islands. In the fight against piracy, when the Maersk Alabama was hijacked - sea control was not possible until a platform (note in that case it could have been any platform) arrived.

I really like the way Bob Work talks about "boxes." I get it that some folks don't, but I'd wager that the folks who don't like the term "boxes" own neither an iPhone or a phone like my Motorola Droid. The term boxes strikes an image with me of two different and distinct things - a container and the substance inside the container. In naval terms - these are platforms and systems. To me platforms and systems are the two debate points in naval force structure - the debate the US Navy needs to have in public.

But that debate begins with systems - not platforms. The discussion needs to be function before form. What systems do we need, and why? A2/AD is a collection of offensive and defensive systems intended to deny - not control - sea lines of communication. What systems does the US Navy need to open up these sea lines of communications should a collection of systems be used to deny access? When looking at other core missions of the US Navy - what systems are needed to execute those missions? Once you are talking systems, you will begin talking comms. Once you begin talking comms - THEN, AND ONLY THEN, are you ready to talk platforms.

In my opinion, the US Navy does this out of order. First we discuss platforms - because that is the core shipbuilding discussion. Next we discuss systems - because that is where the integration to shipbuilding comes from. Then, if we are lucky, some thought is put into comms.

And while I strongly believe all conversations must begin with systems, and important point about platforms must be understood. Julian Corbett believed the object of naval warfare "must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it." The Chinese intend systems like the DF-21D to prevent the enemy from securing the sea lines of communication within the weapon systems range, but as a weapon system the DF-21D, at best, can only prevent the very largest enemy assets from securing sea lines of communication. Despite the wide range of capabilities - China's Second Artillery missile brigade has no functional capability towards actually taking control of sea lines of communication. That might seem trivial, but if you think about it the US Navy doesn't have a major conventional weapon system (particularly one that requires such significant investment as the DF-21D) that can't in some way contribute towards a sea control capability.

In the 21st century I believe there is a directly proportional relationship between the capabilities and quantities of systems and the ability to prevent the enemy from securing control of the sea, but there is also a directly proportional relationship between the quantity of platforms and the ability to secure command of the sea. I believe the leadership in the US Navy today - and indeed the prevailing thought of naval leaders globally (including China) - is that a nation can simultaneously prevent enemy control of the sea and secure control of the sea with systems alone - and I believe that theory is the false promise of the current maritime era. As I examine the direction of China, I see their reliance on systems for sea control as one of their biggest strategic weaknesses.

Unfortunately, based on the US Navy's current plans - I can easily see a future where it is also ours.