Before moving ahead I want to revisit one point on the Ethiopian invasion that often gets lost - the CIA and the DoD operated from two different pages, if not two completely different books during that invasion. There was very little communication between the armed forces of the US and Ethiopia during that invasion, but quite a bit of communication between the CIA and Ethiopia, and in the context of Somalia it is yet another example how there are too many hands in the cookie jar when it comes to shaping objectives. One of the important - and often overlooked - aspects of that action is how the DoD coordinated more with the Russians than they did the Ethiopians, because it was Russian "trainers" who were doing the precision bomb runs in Ethiopian MiGs and no one on either side wanted any mistakes in the airspace over Somalia.
One can relive and rehash that event a dozen times, but in the end the media narrative produced by the New York Times was what shaped perception, and that narrative got a lot of things wrong. If you get too caught up in the narrative established by the NYTs, then you can be incorrectly influenced in observing how future events might unfold. That time in Somalia is representative of everything else one finds in regards to Somalia - self interests always rule on any single day and even when there were shared interests; they didn't align or coordinate well.
It clearly didn't end well for anyone either.
What I find interesting is the emerging discussion from virtually every institution regarding what to do about Somalia should the TNG fail - which is very possible. Even the UN smells the impending failure of the Transitional Federal Government if we read into their latest release, and with the TFG scheduled to end in August 2011 that process has clearly failed and times to develop plan B can start now. The recent developments in Somalia combined with the publicly available information that has emerged from Somalia this year reveals a nation at the pivot point, and no can predict which direction the pivot will take Somalia. Even worse - few care.
How bad is it? Well, these are the good guys, or at least this is who the US is supporting. From the New York Times back in June:
Awil Salah Osman prowls the streets of this shattered city, looking like so many other boys, with ripped-up clothes, thin limbs and eyes eager for attention and affection.Oh, and for the record, Awil Salah Osman is 12 years old. The TNG is using children conscripts to fill their ranks. Now combine that with the information reported in the press conference in late August - again from the New York Times:
But Awil is different in two notable ways: he is shouldering a fully automatic, fully loaded Kalashnikov assault rifle; and he is working for a military that is substantially armed and financed by the United States.
Ismail Haji Noor, a local government official, recently arrived in this notorious pirate den with a simple message: we need your help.The good guys in Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government, are being supported militarily by the African Union with ~8000 troops and US tax money, even though they have no support from the local population, use children conscripts (often as young as 9 years old according to a May UN report), and have made political deals with the pirates in Puntland which certainly makes it very difficult to solve piracy on land when the government on land is sponsoring the pirate activity.
With the Shabab militant group sweeping across Somalia and the American-backed central government teetering on life support, Mr. Noor stood on a beach flanked by dozens of pirate gunmen, two hijacked ships over his shoulder, and announced, “From now on we’ll be working together.”
He hugged several well-known pirate bosses and called them “brother” and later explained that while he saw the pirates as criminals and eventually wanted to rehabilitate them, right now the Shabab were a much graver threat.
“Squished between the two, we have to become friends with the pirates,” Mr. Noor said. “Actually, this is a great opportunity.”
The bad guys is Al Shabab, who has been discussed many times on the blog so we'll skip the review. The only update worth mentioning regarding Al Shabab is that they basically own most of the south but are still having trouble, albeit not from effort, gaining support in Puntland. However, as the Wall Street Journal discussed last week, they may be ready to cut deals of their own.
A Somali militant group that has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda has turned to piracy to finance its effort to topple Somalia's government, posing new risks for shipping companies and the international naval forces patrolling the waters off the horn of Africa.Background and Analysis
Al Shabaab, which has been designated by the U.S. as a terrorist group, has proceeded from taxing Somali pirates' ransom revenue to dispatching its own fighters to attack ships—American vessels in particular—according to pirates, al Shabaab officials, residents of seaside towns and the Somali government.
In a recent sermon in the southern port city of Kismayo, Sheikh Mahad, a senior al Shabaab official, branded the group's piracy as "sea jihad" and called on young militants about to head to sea to target American ships. "America is our enemy," he said, according to a person who was present and recorded the sermon. "We have to retaliate against them by sea or by land."
That is how the press is reporting several of the major Somalia events of the last few weeks, but I'd like to add some additional background as it relates to the readers here.
The unexpected transparency regarding Puntland piracy we see in many different western media news articles comes as part of a recent press conference held in Hobyo by Ismail Haji Noor - which was noteworthy because it was for western press only. The intent of the press conference was simple - pirate organizations represent the only alternative in a region with no schools, no hospitals, and no security that is under siege by Al Shabab. The TFG either works with the pirates, or makes another enemy they lack the resources to deal with right now. In the land where allies of convenience are the rule rather than the exception, the government sees transparency about the situation in Puntland and the loose relationships between the factions as the best public relations campaign available.
And it is actually an interesting use of media to tell a narrative - at least when examined against the backdrop of events unfolding in Mogadishu. World governments are not willing to solve the piracy issue in Somalia, and indeed do see Al Shabab as the greater concern. The conditions of piracy have been in serious change ever since Al Shabab took control of Xarardheere, where Al Shabab appears to be establishing a naval element based on the pirate organizations that were established and operating in that city over the last few years. The public transparency approach from Puntland sets up two distinct elements of sea threats coming from Somalia - the ransom (money) minded piracy in Hobyo and the terrorist sponsored piracy (and potentially violent) activities originating from Xarardheere.
Piracy has gone from regional nuisance to the funding model for the violent geopolitics unfolding in the region, and it is time to consider geopolitical possibilities. If you are a shipper hijacked from a group operating in Xarardheere, if the insurance company pays the ransom - by every definition the payer is supporting terrorism because a portion of that money is going to Al Shabab. Geography helps one determine whether an insurance payment is going to terrorism.
What are the potential legal ramifications of some of the worlds largest insurance companies actively supporting terrorism?
What happens if down the road a cruise ship is attacked by a sea based terror cell operating from Xarardheere, and hundreds of civilians are killed in an attack Al Shabab takes credit for? Can the insurance companies be sued by families of the victims? After all, the insurance companies were helping to finance the terror group involved in the attack...
Somalia piracy has become a nightmare, because it is no longer rogue clan piracy in a failed state - the two largest pirate cities are Hobyo and Xarardheere - meaning most piracy is now either a funding mechanism for Al Shabab terrorism or essentially under a quasi state sponsorship with the (very) loose affiliation Hobyo pirates have developed with the TFG.
The Somalia issue is getting bigger, becoming harder to contain, and has political components with the TFG and Al Shabab that can't simply be ignored.
I encourage you to check out that Threat Matrix post, and read all the links including the PBS article by Joshua Foust that started the discussion. Somalia is, as always, an ugly issue approaching yet another ugly turn and even the United Nations senses the fork in the road ahead. The US is doing almost nothing about the changes taking place in the region, but Ethiopia continues to stage troops in Somalia and you never know when Eritrea will stir the pot as well.
I don't claim to know the way ahead, but I think it is time to get Dr. J Peter Pham up on Capitol Hill to listen to his assessment and options again. Last year he highlighted how supporting Somalialand independence might be a good place to start for developing a working policy in Somalia. I still believe that is a compelling step one, and the election results from earlier this year seem to validate that.
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