Sri Lanka Lessons Learned

If you haven't seen it, the recent article in The Island titled Sri Lanka’s Admired Innovations in war highlights several interesting points in the defeat of LTTE by Sri Lanka. It starts by making the case for a military solution to insurgency - which is a point to be discussed by experts elsewhere. There are other points made though - many of which are worth noting.

I do not normally quote so much of the content of a single news article - but this article is brilliant and must be examined in full (including what I do not quote, so read it!. For example:

Strategic Communication:

Sri Lanka made several innovations in order to win the war. The government started a website, "Defence.lk" in order to obtain public support for the war. This website was a great success. It became the most visited Sri Lanka website, with a daily average of 8 to 13 million hits. It provided hourly updates on the progress of the war. ‘Defence.lk" was the subject of a MBA research project.

Regional Partnership:

Sri Lanka devised a ‘unique arrangement’ to keep India briefed on Eelam War IV .A team consisting of Defence Secretary, Secretary to President and Basil Rajapaksa was formed, by passing the Foreign Ministry. India was represented by its Foreign Secretary, National Security Advisor and Defense Secretary. Gotabhaya Rajapakse said ‘We visited India many times, they came here and we discussed many issues. Lines of communication were kept open at all times. There was continuous dialogue and the war continued unhindered’. India is now considering using this model in its discussion with other nations.

Naval Tactics and Equipment:

The main tactic used by the LTTE at sea was the ‘swarm attack’ of 20-25 boats with 5-6 suicide craft and sophisticated equipment. Each boat had about 15 persons, with each combatant donned in helmet, body amour and carrying a personal weapon. Swarms were used to attack isolated naval craft, to escort LTTE craft coming from deep sea carrying ammunitions, and also terrorists moving along the coastline. To counter this, the Navy decided to create its own ‘swarm’.

Navy engineers designed three types of small, high-speed, heavily armed inshore patrol craft, suitable for operations in different types of sea .These boats were built at Welisara where there were rudimentary facilities for boat building. 150 boats were manufactured in three years .It took just eight days to complete and fully equip a single craft. "We manufactured these boats through day and night because we needed them quickly ". They manufactured more than one hundred 23- feet long, fibre glass ‘Arrow’ boats, powered by Japanese 200 horsepower outboard motors. ‘Arrow’ was very effective in shallow waters where Dvora could not go. There was also a 17- meter long command-cum- fighting boat. All boats were manned by highly trained sailors from elite units, such as the Special Boat Squadron.

In 2007 the navy was able to launch a flotilla of "Arrow" boats which outnumbered the LTTE boats. When LTTE launched 20 boats, the navy launched 40. It was ‘swarm against swarm’. The boats operated in groups of four. Squadrons consisting of 25-30 craft were kept at strategically important locations. Squadrons could be shifted from place to place in a very short time. They were combined when necessary and about 60 boats were available for some battles. These boats used infantry tactics. They went in arrowhead formation or in three adjacent columns in single file so as to mask their numbers and increase the navy’s element of surprise.

"These boats used infantry tactics" is very interesting to me, because I believe that is how swarm tactics will be successfully deployed in the maritime domain. Several years ago there was a popular Iranian military forum (mostly Russian language) where the most popular post discussed small boat swarms in the context of Soviet era armor tactics - and how small boats fielding guns, mortars, and rockets could leverage Panzer tactics of WWII to leverage communications, mobility, and speed to defeat an objective - which was usually a large navy warship.

Organization and formation alone will not bring success with swarm tactics though - the key to successful swarm tactics at sea will be the ability of each individual boat commanders ability to think and act independently as necessary to achieve the objectives of the overall plan. Decentralization of command at the tactical level while operating within the framework of the battle strategy is critical to successful swarm tactics - and I note that was not mentioned in this article - even though there are numerous cases in the Sri Lanka battles against LTTE at sea where decisive action taken by individual officers during the battle often made the biggest differences in the fight.

On Maritime Security:

The Navy also created On Board Security Teams (OBST). These were deployed on merchant ships to provide security when the ships transited through dangerous waters. These well trained teams were an effective deterrent against terrorist attack. Navy authorities said these teams could be used to combat modern day piracy. Recently, Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative at the UN, Palitha Kohona pointed out to the UN Security Council, that the dense shipping lanes south of Sri Lanka had been free of any piracy in the past 28 years, despite heavy traffic. This was due to On Board Security Teams. They were a visible deterrent, they could react immediately to attacks. He said Sri Lanka was ready to share its expertise and personnel regarding the OBST with the rest of the world.

On Tactical Choices Against Insurgency:

Had the govt ordered an all out war effort, ignoring civilian casualties, the war would have been over in February 2009. UN chief Ban Ki-moon, when he flew over the Vanni battlefield in the last stages of the war, had asked why they did not carryout an amphibious assault on the Mullaitivu beach to conclude the offensive. The President ordered a No Fire Zone, in the east where the LTTÉ was using the villagers as a massive human shield. Air attacks were prohibited and army was ordered not to use heavy guns while LTTE continued to use them. The decision to create a No-fire Zone was Sri Lanka‘s own, innovative decision. International law did not demand this. This No-fire Zone is unique to Sri Lanka. Gotabhaya Rajapakse said that other countries should also follow its example.

A truly informative article by Kamalika Pieris. I was somewhat surprised how few people have apparently read the article as noted by the hit count at the bottom of the page.