Interesting little tidbit on PLAN

The 7th 054A was commissioned today with PLAN ESF as No. 548. According to this article, it was named after the city Yiyang from Province Hunan. There is also a news report here.

We found out some interesting stats on 054A like that its standard displacement is 3600 tons (we previous found out that full displacement is 4053 tons), length is 134 m, width is 16 m and maximum speed is 27 knots.

However, the more interesting is the procurement cycle for PLAN. It reported that this unit was first ordered to be built by HuangPu shipyard in 2006. It was chosen to be named after Yiyang in April of 2009. It was launched in Nov of 2009, started sea trials in May of 2010 and got commissioned in Oct of 2010. So, it takes less than a year to go from launching to commissioning. At the same time, it takes 3 years to go from getting the order to being launched. I'm not sure if the earlier ships of this batch 571 was placed at the same time, so the construction time to launching + preparation work could be much shorter than 3 years.

EMP Talk

I don't do the Midrats show with Eagle1 and CDR Salamander anymore, but listening to the podcast of previous weeks show has become something I like to do early in my work week while banging out stuff on the desk. This week though, I may have to tune in live if time allows.

When you mention the possibility of an Electro Magnetic Pulse attack (EMP) - people have a reaction of, "What?" - either that or they get all fidgety or roll their eyes. Is the EMP threat trick or treat? Join bloggers Sal from "CDR Salamander" and EagleOne from "EagleSpeak" this Halloween to discuss the issue with their guests Jason Sigger, defense policy analyst, opinion writer and blogg'r for the first half of the hour. For the second half of the hour, James Carafano, Ph.D., Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

Jason Sigger's blog is one of the longest running links on Information Dissemination. Back in the early days of the blog I used a slogan "Observations of an Armchair Admiral" as kind of a branding technique for my alias. This was before folks started calling me Ray. I admit it; I borrowed the idea from Jason's blog name.

I am yet to meet James Carafano, but our schedules never seem to work out when I'm in DC. I never actually had a reason to meet him until I learned about his current book project - a history of the modern military. He is editing a new book series, The Changing Face of War, which examines how emerging political, social, economic and cultural trends will affect the nature of armed conflict. Modern history of war that studies modern trends? Sounds like my kind of book.

Different Views on LCS

Admiral Mullen, October 12th.

MS. WOODRUFF: You can slow the growth, but what about actual cuts? I mean, do you see actual cuts out there to reduce the size of the military budget, even by a couple percent?

ADM. MULLEN: I think there will be more cuts. We’re going through that process right now. Again, I’ve been doing budgets a long time, and I think what Secretary Gates did in the fiscal year ’10 budget amendment, where he eliminated so many programs - I mean, really tough, tough decisions - was signature, in terms of meeting this requirement.

And I think there will be more. I think major programs from all the services, which are not performing well, which can’t get themselves under control in terms of cost and schedule, that they’re going to be looking at either being slowed down dramatically or being eliminated.

MS. WOODRUFF: All right, a couple specific spending questions very quickly: The Navy, over the next few decades, we’re told, wants to extend the number of ships to about 313 from about 286 today. This includes 55 of the so-called littoral combat ships - shallow-water ships that have experienced major cost increases. Can the country afford them?

ADM. MULLEN: I would put them in the same category. If LCS is unable to contain itself, in terms of cost and schedule, then I don’t think it has much of a future.

Admiral Roughead, October 23rd. (DOC)

To be clear, our Navy has made some very good progress in anticipating such a challenging environment. We’ve achieved a certain momentum in building the future force, maintaining readiness and supporting our Sailors that will stand us in good stead as we weather tough fiscal seas. We will soon be building on average 10 ships a year, including the littoral combat ship, the joint high speed vessel, the mobile logistics platform and new guided missile destroyers to achieve our goal of, at least, a fleet of 313 ships. We released the total force vision for the 21st century and reduced the transition between active and reserve components from four months to one week, making us a much more responsive force for future operational requirements. And we continue to earn recognition as a top employer for competitive education, our health and compensation benefits, ensuring that we keep the immense talent we have in the Navy today, and remain competitive for the nation’s best and brightest of tomorrow.

More here by ADM Roughead on LCS.

A Leadership Culture That Selectively Applies Accountability

Tony Capaccio's latest article takes aim at the LPD-17 with a focus on survivability. It is an interesting article to read, made more interesting by the fact this is the latest information based on an interview with Michael Gilmore.

The San Antonio-class vessel’s critical systems, such as electrical distribution, ship-wide fiber optics and voice- communications networks, aren’t reliable, according to Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation. The ship’s armaments can’t effectively defend against the most modern anti-ship weapons, Gilmore said.

The ship is capable of operating “in a benign environment,” Gilmore said in an e-mail to Bloomberg News outlining the unclassified summary of a classified report sent to Congress in June. The vessel is “not effective, suitable and not survivable in a combat situation,” he said.

Craig Hooper notes that the the annual DOT&E report to Congress has historically only been available behind the firewall at Inside The Navy, but highlights that the reports are now available online at the DOT&E website. It looks to me like the annual reports publications page was updated in September, meaning these reports may have actually only been available to the non-ITN subscribers for about a month (I have never seen them before, but have been to that website before so I believe the availability online is new). That would explain why these new details are coming out in the broader press now even though these findings were in the 2009 annual report.

Craig Hooper is right - give credit to Michael Gilmore. The interview with Bloomberg is a smart way to communicate, but giving public access to these reports is also a good way to get Congressional attention in these types of issues that have apparently not been addressed adequately over time. I can say that because by posting the annual reports for the last 11 years - someone like me has a time line and history to draw information on programs from to track progress and activity related to DOT&E findings. For example, listed below are the sections in the annual reports related to survivability over the last 4 years. Keep in mind these are neither all the problems listed, nor do they list the successes in the reports.

2006

• PDT&T to date has shown the ship to have credible capability to defend against small manned surface threats, but has not confirmed the capability to defend against ASCMs. The IOT&E will include a ship self-defense phase focused primarily on the ship and crew’s capability to defend against ASCMs. Currently, there are too few high-diver targets. PDT&T has identified serious integration problems with the AN/SPS-48E radar performance while enclosed in the AEM/S. The Navy is conducting an AN/SPS-48E - AEM/S characterization study. However, it is too early to determine what mitigation will be required.
• The survivability of the LPD 17 class ships should be improved over the 1970’s-era amphibious ships they will replace. The increased survivability is attributed to reduced radar cross-section signature design features, strengthened hull girder design, improved bulkhead connections, improved fragmentation protection, fire insulation at fire zone boundaries, and redundant and separated vital systems.
• Based on proposed changes in the LPD 17 schedule, there is potential that TSST will not be conducted in advance of the lead ship deployment. DOT&E believes the TSST should be done before deployment as it can provide the Navy valuable data to characterize the ship’s survivability and response to damage.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. There were no recommendations made in FY05.
• FY06 Recommendations.

1. Performance of the AN/SPS-48E radar is critical to the ship’s capability to control aircraft and to defend itself. The Navy should investigate and understand the impact of the AEM/S configuration before deploying the ship.
2. The Navy should conduct the TSST in close sequence with IOT&E before deploying the lead ship.
3. The Navy should procure the necessary number of high-diver targets.

2007

• PDT&T identified AN/SPS-48E radar performance degradation while enclosed in the AEM/S. PDT&T and combat system ship qualification trial have not demonstrated the capability to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles; however, the IOT&E includes a self-defense phase focused primarily on this capability.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships should be significantly improved over the 1970’s-era amphibious ships they will replace. The increased survivability is attributed to: reduced RCS signature design features, strengthened hull girder design, improved bulkhead connections, improved fragmentation protection, fire insulation at fire zone boundaries, and redundant and separated vital systems.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. The three recommendations made in FY06 remain valid.
• FY07 Recommendations.

1. Because the AN/SPS-48E radar is critical to the ship’s capability to control aircraft and to defend itself, the Navy should correct the problem and conduct OT&E on the fix before deploying the ship.
2. The Navy should aggressively resolve the shortage of high-diver ASCM targets. Deficiencies with anti-ship cruise missile targets used to test NULKA must also be resolved.

2008

• The ship is capable of supporting C4I requirements in an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) environment; however, reliability problems observed in the SWAN and the Interior Voice Communications System degraded command and control of Marine forces. The Navy still needs to validate Information Exchange Requirements per the approved IOT&E test plan, and pursue a formal Information Support Plan approved by the Joint Staff.
• Information assurance testing revealed vulnerabilities to LPD-17 systems and networks, and the ship was unable to effectively demonstrate network detection, reaction, and restoration until installation of a shipboard Intrusion Detection System designed to help defend against network attacks.
• The ship is vulnerable against specific air and surface threats likely to be encountered by LPD-17 class ships. Testing also identified integration deficiencies with the AN/SPS-48E radar in the Advanced Enclosed Mast Structure as well as other SSDS combat system elements.
• The lack of interface between the real-time SSDS Mk 2 tactical display and the near real-time displays from the Amphibious Assault Direction System and Global Command and Control System-Maritime degrades situational awareness and increases the likelihood of misclassified contacts and potential blue-on-blue engagements.
• Major elements of LPD-17’s SSDS Mk 2 Mod 2 combat system collectively have a large number of high severity software trouble reports, increasing the likelihood of occurrence of one or more during operations.
• During the amphibious warfare phase of the IOT&E, the ship experienced system failures that significantly affected its operations and survivability.

1. The SWAN experienced faults, one of which resulted in a loss of the crew’s capability to control and monitor ship equipment including navigation, propulsion, and steering in the normal mode for approximately 18 hours. Off-ship contractor technical assistance was necessary to restore the system.
2. The engineering control system (ECS) and fire detection alarm system exhibited excessive false alarms and completely failed twice, resulting in the need to man additional engineering watch stations until restoration. The requirement for the crew to man additional watch stations revealed manning and training shortfalls that have implications on the ship’s capability to sustain combat operations.
3. The electrical distribution system exhibited uncommanded opening of breakers and experienced a total loss of electrical power. This highlighted a continuing problem with uninterruptible power supplies, which do not provide power when required.

• The Navy’s CBRD In-Service Engineering Activity documented significant design and installation deficiencies with the Collective Protection System and Casualty Decontamination Stations. Realistic CBRD testing has not yet been accomplished.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships appear to be improved over the LPD class ships they will replace. However, problems encountered with critical systems during testing (particularly with the SWAN and ECS) may offset some of the survivability improvements and have highlighted serious reliability shortcomings.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. Two recommendations made in FY07 are being addressed; however, the modified target (GQM-163A Coyote) intended to represent the high-diver ASCM threat has not been flight-tested.
• FY08 Recommendations. The Navy should:

1. Complete remaining IOT&E elements, including: modeling and simulation effort to support an assessment of the ship’s probability of raid annihilation requirement, an end-to-end test of the ship’s CBRD capabilities, and a demonstration of the ship’s capability to satisfy its information exchange requirements.
2. Continue installing the AN/SPS-48E radar antenna corrective shroud on remaining ships of the class and complete operational testing needed to demonstrate the radar’s effectiveness inside the Advanced Enclosed Mast Structure.
3. Conduct comprehensive information assurance testing during FOT&E, including testing to address privilege escalation and an assessment of LPD-17’s susceptibility to internal threats. Additionally, the Navy should re-examine protection, detection, reaction, and restoration capability after installation of an Intrusion Detection System.
4. Develop, test, and field fixes to critical systems including the SWAN, ECS, and fire detection and alarm systems.

2009

• The ship is capable of supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence requirements in an ESG environment; however, reliability problems with the SWAN and the Interior Voice Communications System degrade command and control and are single points of failure during operations.
• The Navy still needs to validate critical Information Exchange Requirements and pursue a formal Information Support Plan to support a Joint Interoperability Certification.
• The LPD-17 exhibited difficulty defending itself against several widely proliferated threats, primarily due to:

Persistent SSDS Mk 2-based system engineering deficiencies

The ship’s RAM system provided the only hard kill capability, preventing layered air defense

Problems associated with SPS-48E and SPQ-9B radar performance against certain Anti-Ship Cruise Missile attack profiles

Degraded situational awareness due to Mk 46 Gun Weapon System console configuration

• LPD-17 failed to satisfy its reliability requirement during the first five hours of an amphibious assault and its total ship availability requirement during IOT&E.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships appear to be improved over the LPD class ships they will replace. However, problems encountered with critical systems during testing (particularly with the electrical distribution, chilled water, SWAN, and ECS) and difficulty recovering mission capability may offset some of the survivability improvements and have highlighted serious reliability shortcomings.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. All recommendations made in FY07 and FY08 remain valid.
• FY09 Recommendations. The Navy should:

1. Formally address chronic reliability problems associated with amphibious warfare support equipment, propulsion and electrical systems, critical control systems to include the SWAN and ECS, and demonstrate the efficacy of fixes during FOT&E.
2. Review and investigate reoccurring INSURV deficiencies and lube oil system failures, identify related design, quality control, or training problems, and develop corrective action plans for each.
3. Complete validation of critical Information Exchange Requirements and pursue completion of a Joint Interoperability Certification.
4. Pursue mitigations to the identified weaknesses and longstanding system engineering problems associated with the ships ability to defend itself against threats in multiple warfare areas.
5. Demonstrate the ships ability to satisfy both its reliability and total ship availability requirements during FOT&E.
6. Revise the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to reflect incomplete events and recommended FOT&E from the IOT&E to include a timeline for completion.
7. Correct deficiencies identified in the Naval Sea Systems Command Total Ship Survivability Trial and Full Ship Shock Trial reports.
   

Heads Buried in Sand

I imagine someone in the upper echelon of the Navy chain of command is not happy with Michael Gilmore for talking directly to Tony Capaccio, but the fact is the history of these reports regarding the LPD-17 has led us to this point, and whoever is doing the complaining needs to look in the mirror first.

There are clearly issues here that raise serious questions of specific industry companies as to why they have been unable to meet requirements. There are also serious questions for the Navy though, starting with why the recommendations made by DOT&E have gone ignored for several years in a row through at least December of 2009. I think that is an interesting time frame btw, because the study of the LPD-17 class that was conducted by instruction of Admiral Harvey was completed in January 2010.

The article hits on some of the points that concern me the most.

Gilmore’s office in August told Pentagon officials the vessel demonstrated “poor reliability with critical equipment and control systems,” and an “inability to defend itself against a variety of threats.”

Navy test data indicated the vessels demonstrated an inability to “maintain or rapidly recover mission capability” after being hit by “the variety of weapons likely to be encountered,” the testing office said.

Raytheon Co. is a subcontractor providing electronics, a fiber-optics network and an anti-missile system the testing office concluded had “persistent engineering deficiencies.”

It isn't just Raytheon though, the DOT&E 2009 report specifically mentions problems with the AN/SPQ-9 radar developed by Northrop Grumman and the SPS-48E radar developed by ITT Gilfillan. For me, that seems to be at least as big of a problem because it precludes the possibility of adding ESSM to the LPD-17 class to increase the range of its defensive ring to protect the ship from ASCMs.

In all, a lot of this is unacceptable and some of it goes beyond just the shipyard. LPD-17 class features networks with single points of failure that appear to be perpetually unreliable, new weapon systems that don't meet requirements, and unreliable communication and information exchange equipment - all of which piles on top of the incredible number of HM&E problems identified as a result of poor construction and shipyard practices that have had most the class sidelined.

In the context of activities that we have seen regarding the LPD-17 program since December of 2009, a lot of things are making sense. For example, one of the things ADM Harvey did when he requested the Balisle Report was have them focus on the LPD-17 class, which went above and beyond the report issued by RDML Michelle Howard back in January 2010 that focused on the LPD-17s problems.

How much difference will the additional additional attention to detail led by ADM Harvey make in improving LPD-17? It is unclear if we will know anytime soon, but the real concern is that we didn't learn about most of the LPD-17 class problems sooner.

Admiral Harvey took over Fleet Forces Command in July of 2009, and if you look over the CRS report by Ronald O'Rourke (PDF) that lists the history of construction problems from pages 17-45 (28 pages!), 10 of those pages disclose problems identified and reported over the 15 month time period since ADM Harvey took over responsibility at Fleet Forces Command. The first ship was procured in FY1996 and accepted by the Navy in June of 2005, and from June 2005 until July of 2009 - 49 months - very few of the major problems that are class-wide and often discussed today were apparently identified, or reported.

Why did everyone have to wait for Admiral Harvey to assume command of Fleet Forces Command to get the LPD-17 class problems identified and addressed realistically?

Why was ADM Jonathan Greenert, who was in charge Fleet Forces Command from September 2007 to July 2009, unable to uncover any of these issues? I think it is interesting that ADM Greenert was apparently completely oblivious to these LPD-17 class problems (nevermind fleet wide maintenance problems) and was apparently not held responsible for any of these problems since exposed by his successor. As a reward for ADM Greenert's apparent ignorance (or intentional concealment) regarding the depth of the LPD-17 class problems - he was promoted to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

I would also think there are plenty of questions for VADM Kevin McCoy who was the Chief Engineer in NAVSEA from 2005-2008 until he became commander of NAVSEA in June of 2008 - because all of the problems with LPD-17 took place while VADM McCoy was part of the leadership in NAVSEA over the last 5 years.

Problems with the LPD-17 class are similar to problems seen in other classes of ships built and maintained over the last several years, and these are problems that leadership at the time did not address and have gone on to cost the Navy billions to resolve. Noteworthy, as a reward for their work (and the problems listed in the Balisle Report is basically the resume of failure at Fleet Forces Command under ADM Greenert btw), the current CNO promoted these folks and the Senate approved those promotions. It is sad that in the country known for free speech, there would be very high costs for just about anyone who observes these things about the US Navy today, with rare exceptions like myself, because to highlight these little details about the job performance of Navy leadership would cost such an observer their job.

Screw up as a leader at sea - You're Fired! Cost the country billions while leading ashore - You're Promoted! That is my definition of a leadership culture that selectively applies accountability.

Western European Navies (week 42)

Political News
The biggest new was of course the 8% cut in funding in the UK.
Read Galrahn's post to see what effects it will have on the Royal Navy.
And Think Defence are doing a 12 part analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

The French Chief of Naval Staff is sounding the alarm bells, regarding the decline of the French navy.

Spanish Defence Minister Carme Chacon called for an analysis of the competitiveness of the Spanish defense industry, compared with that of other members of the European Union.

And the Germans are still busy with their research into a reform of the military. The Weise commission recommends a reduction to 180,000 personnel and they think it must also be possible to double the amount of deployed forces.

Global Operations
For news on Operation Atalanta: see their website.

Shipbuilding
The fifth ship in the Spanish Álvaro de Bazán class will be launched on November 4.

The Hellenic Navy has received its fourth FAC.

The Dutch will bet puting Low Frequency Active Passive Sonar on their two M class frigates (Karel Doorman class). They will replace the current passive sonars, starting at the end of 2011.

Four MCMVs from the Royal Navy have been testing mine hunting sonars from Thales.

The 22nd edition of EURONAVAL is from 25-29 October.

Exercises
Type 45 destroyer HMS Daring has been on exercise with USS Enterprise in the Atlantic.

The Belgians and Dutch are underway in exercise Beneficial Archer.

Upcoming Exercise
Emerald Move 2010
3000 personnel, 11 ships, 19 planes and helicopters from Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, The UK and host nation Senegal.
Ships (that I know of):
FS Cassard
FS Siroco
FS Tonnere
ITS San Giorgio
ITS San Marco
HNLMS Johan de witt

Other
HMS Astute has run aground.
So has the Swedish ship HSwMS Sundsvall.

When a Leader Writes...

See here. A few Admirals saying interesting things.

Cooperative Approaches: Carrier Air Wings

This Defense News article is discussing a topic I have long thought is an interesting idea.

If I was guessing though, I'd suggest most people first read this article from Defense News and had a cynical thought or two...

London's decision to fit catapults on its planned second aircraft carrier opened up the prospect of French Rafale strike fighters flying off a British flattop, with reciprocal rights for British aircraft off the French carrier, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin said Oct. 26 at the Euronaval trade show.

Morin asked the French military staff to assess whether the installation of catapults would allow French aircraft, such as the Rafale, to operate off the Royal Navy vessel, and the answer was: "Yes, it's technically feasible," he told journalists.

That opened up potential opportunities of interoperability and mutual interdependence between the British and French fleets, he said. With such cross-deck operations came the possibility of a "permanent presence at sea," he said.

The US Navy talks about building cooperative task forces of ships for meeting low end challenges, but with exports of the Super Hornet and Joint Strike Fighter coming, there is also the possibility that some allies might be interested in integrating higher end strike capacity into our carrier air wings.

Don't dismiss too quickly, I honestly think there is merit to the concept.

The Navy has integrated US Marine Corps Hornets into carrier air wings, so it isn't like there isn't a mature understanding of how to take a squadron and integrate. It also isn't like the US Navy hasn't identified just about every detail in the process.

We already base an aircraft carrier in Japan, so why not offer Japan the opportunity to operate a few squadrons from our forward deployed aircraft carrier? In the case of Japan we are building capacity and reserve into the forward deployed carrier air wing.

The same approach might also be useful should the US government ever seek to forward base an aircraft carrier in Australia. Australia already flies the Super Hornet, and plans to eventually fly the F-35. All we are doing is suggesting that opportunity exists should Australia choose to fly the F-35C version.

If the US Navy truly believes the Carrier Strike Group is the focal point of naval power, why wouldn't the US Navy examine the possibilities for an integrated, international option when it comes to carrier air wings? Australia cannot afford to build aircraft carriers and Japan cannot legally build aircraft carriers, but there isn't a technical reason why both countries couldn't field and operate a squadron of aircraft capable of flying off a US Navy aircraft carrier.

Obviously there are good reasons not to reduce the number or size of our own squadrons and air wings, but this is about adding resilience to naval aviation and broadening our strongest partnerships beyond traditional approaches while exploring new ways to build capabilities and capacity that shares cost burdens. I recognize the pool of nations this opportunity exists with is limited, but to name a few it might work with Japan, Australia, and the Dutch - all traditional maritime powers and close US allies.

Sea Based Air Power Is Petraeus Doctrine

Last week the United States Navy quietly surged the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) into the Indian Ocean to beef up American airpower in support of Afghanistan war operations. Joining the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75), that gives the US Navy two aircraft carriers to support war efforts against the Taliban. Under current US Navy battle doctrine, 24/7 air operations from the sea against targets on land are preferably conducted with two aircraft carriers, often in 12 hour shifts. This approach doubles the availability of tactical strike aircraft from the sea while allowing both carriers to operate for much longer periods of time, pausing only for logistical purposes.

The USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) deployed in May 2010, but due to delays in the refit of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) last year, it was decided last year that the Truman deployment would be extended two months - an eight month deployment - rather than the typical six month deployment. In theory this would extend the time the Truman would be in the region until late December, and with the Lincoln deploying in September and just arriving on station, two carriers will likely remain involved in Afghanistan operations for at least the next two months. It is unclear if this 'surge' of naval airpower will continue beyond December, but it is certain that there will be additional carrier deployments in a few months that could certainly give the US the option of keeping 2 aircraft carriers operating off Afghanistan again in 2011.

Over the same time period, the FS Charles de Gaulle (R91) will also be supporting operations over Afghanistan, meaning a full quarter of the worlds nuclear aircraft carrier force will be involved in the Afghanistan war effort at the same time by years end.

In hindsight, this should have been an expected development, as it fits the historical pattern for General Petraeus COIN operations. In 2007 the US Navy deployed 2 aircraft carriers in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to add additional airpower to General Petraeus at that time as well. If you recall, 2007 was the year where US forces went on the offensive becoming the year where the highest number of US casualties were suffered. 2007 is also considered by many to be the turning point of the Iraq war.

It is unclear if we are at such a turning point in Afghanistan, but what is noteworthy is how the US is concentrating a great deal of combat power into the region during a ~45-60 day window before the winter takes hold in Afghanistan. I think it is an interesting and important development, because in the war in land locked Afghanistan the United States is quickly surging airpower from the sea, and in an interesting twist of irony, just off the coast of Pakistan - meaning as an added bonus the US just doubled the number of fixed wing aircraft flying sorties over that nation as well.

Also worth noting is the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) was last reported to also be operating off Pakistan in support of humanitarian operations for flood victims. If we examine naval operations today in the context of the big picture, that means that half of the deployed strike/support groups globally are currently involved in operations either directly or indirectly supporting operations for Operation Enduring Freedom.

I am not sure whether that little operational detail speaks to the priority the US Navy has regarding war operations today, or the extent to which degradation of the US Navy fleet size can stretch the fleet so thin, so easily. The answer is probably both.

* Bloggers Note *

I have linked the Facebook page of both carriers above. If you use Facebook, there is one US Navy unit I would suggest following - the Facebook page of the USS Abraham Lincoln. There is something about this LCDR William Marks guy that is just different - or said another way - he has a way of making everything more interesting. While I observe Facebook pages for Navy ships are most commonly utilized to communicate fleet to family, the Lincoln page is that and more.

Another Pacific Nation Increases Sub Fleet Size

It is not uncommon to read someone asking serious questions about the value of US Navy submarines. At a very high cost of over $2 billion and with very little information regarding the capabilities of the Virginia class submarine discussed in public, a reduction in the number of US submarines is an easy target for folks who wish to take a political shot knowing that there will be no official push back.

But the trend in submarines is not one anyone, anywhere, can deny. We observe in imagery the growth of the Chinese submarine force on this blog. Authors here have also noted the increase in the submarine force of Malaysia, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Russia, and India. Now we see news from Japan.

The Defense Ministry said a bigger submarine fleet is under consideration, with a firm proposal likely to come as early as December. Officials who spoke to The Associated Press on Tuesday refused to give further details because the plan has not yet been formally tabled.

According to Japanese media reports, the number of submarines would be increased from 16 to 22 over the next four years, a substantial rise that could generate concern from neighboring China.

Though well outnumbered by the Chinese — who have about 60 subs — the Japanese navy's submarine fleet is significantly augmented by U.S. subs deployed throughout the region. Japanese subs are generally believed to be better equipped than many of the Chinese vessels and are hard to detect.

The submarine industry in Japan is remarkably healthy, indeed the way Japan has built and modernized submarines over the last many years is quite admirable. Basically, Japan builds a new submarine once a year every year, with 16 operational and a few used for training, with submarines constantly being retired at a rate of once a year - and never older than 20 years when retired (long before hull life expiration).

It is unclear if Japan is actually increasing the construction rate of submarines, or simply extending the life of submarines and training new crews - but the point is they have options. In theory Japan could build 2 per year for three years, extend the life of submarines by three years, and in three years add 6 submarines to the force. The hard part isn't the technology, rather adding new, experienced crews.

Why Japan is increasing the size of their submarine force? The simple answer is China, because China is replacing old, easy to detect submarines with modern submarines. The problem with that theory is that China is not actually increasing the number of submarines, simply the quality of their submarines. Or are they?

And that's the point, isn't it? We don't know how many submarines China is producing for two reasons: China is not transparent on military developments and the US has traditionally been very slow to offer any intelligence not already available to open source observers. Maybe China is increasing the size of their submarine force at a rate greater than retirement of old systems, but maybe the reason isn't only China. One has to believe that at some level this also has to do with the plans by Russia to operate more nuclear submarines in the Pacific, not to mention the recent activities of North Korea. In other words, China is the easy and obvious reason, but not the only reason Japan would want to increase their number of submarines.

As a nation without aircraft carriers, and unlikely to develop or operate aircraft carriers anytime soon, submarines makes a lot of sense as an insurance policy to hedge bets against the naval developments taking place in the Pacific region. In many ways, the 'insurance policy' reason is the same reason the US Navy builds 2 Virginia class submarines every year for the next several in the shipbuilding budget, although the US Navy leadership is unlikely to articulate it in that way.

Strategic Defense and Security Review Highlights

I think Bill Sweetman and Robert Wall know more than they are letting on regarding the Strategic Defense and Security Review details, but if they don't - I can fill in the blanks on what the SDSR decisions are on a few issues.

Key naval announcements are:

• 1st Queen Elizabeth Class to be LPH, 2nd to have CV variant.
• Immediate decommissioning of HMS ARK ROYAL.
• Joint Force Harrier to go by 2011.
• Loss of 4 frigates (Type 22) by 2011.
• Decommission of either HMS OCEAN or HMS ILLUSTRIOUS following a short review to determine which platform is better suited to LPH operations.
• Decommission an LSD(A).
• Rotate ALBION and BULWARK at extended readiness.
• Sea King to go by 2016.
• Nimrod MRA4 not to enter service.

2 high-level objectives:

• To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can effect us directly; and
• To shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.

The following Tier 1 risks are judged to be our highest priorities for UK national security:

• Terrorism
• Cyber attack
• Major natural hazards and accidents
• International Military Crisis
• Afghanistan will remain our top priority while British troops are deployed there.

Size and Shape - Future Force 2020 to comprise CASD ; 7 SSN ; 2 CVF, with one at extended readiness ; 2 of LPD, one at (alternated) extended readiness; 19 FF/DD ; 14 MCMVs.

Warfare:

• Wildcat to mirror 19 FF/DD numbers.
• Merlin Mk 2 CSP to remain - numbers to mirror FF/DD capability.

Air:

• Joint Strike Fighter Carrier Variant to be bought, Joint Force Harrier to be gone by Apr 11 and Carrier Strike capability gapped until 2020.
• QE class with “cats and traps” lends to UCAVs / COD/ AEW capabilities, as well as French and American interoperability.
• Numbers of JSF buy uncertain.
• CH47F buy now 12 rather 22.
• Wildcat ALM - safe but numbers unclear.

Log/RFA & N1:

• Overall 5,000 RN redundancies (600 RM), possibly compulsory.
• Loss of 1 AO and 1 AOR, but the commitment to a new tanker remains.
• Defense Training Review not to happen (no move of SULTAN to St Athan), but the Naval Estate to be reviewed.
• RN to work closer with the French logistically and operationally.

Technology & Equipment Programs:

• Investment will focus on developing capabilities and countering threats in key areas: autonomous systems, sensors, cyber, space and new materials including nano technology.
• Maintain close cooperation with US and others on Ballistic Missile defenses.
• Defense industrial and technology Green paper by the end of the year.

It is my observation that the Royal Navy is in transition from a military force to more of a constabulary force, with an aircraft carrier they know they need instead of the frigates strategy demands they need instead. I honestly don't think it will matter, primarily because I think the assumptions made will be proven wrong long before we reach 2020 - meaning this plan won't last the test of time.

More Helicopters Over Somalia

More helicopter action over Somalia where apparently no one can identify the owner, as reported here.

The European Union's anti-piracy mission on Monday denied that one of its helicopters was involved in a clash with Somali pirates in which four people were killed.

Residents in the village of Labad on Somalia's northern coast said pirates had shot at a military helicopter on Sunday night, which returned fire killing at least four people.

"That helicopter does not belong to EU NAVFOR," Lieutenant Colonel Per Klingvall, spokesman for the EU naval force, told AFP.

"We have not heard of any incident like this from other task forces," he said, referring to US and NATO operations in the waters around the lawless Horn of Africa country.

Abdi Yare, a pirate leader, said the helicopter fired one missile in response to the shooting, killing four people including fishermen.

The incident was confirmed to AFP by elders in Labad.

I am not really sure where Labad is, as I have never heard of that village. If it wasn't the US or Europeans, then who was it? As an anti-piracy action, this was probably a Pacific region nation or perhaps Russia? Australia maybe?

Random Thoughts After a Week Away

While out of town last week I was able to get my hands on an advanced copy of Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of K-129 by Norman Polmar, and quite frankly - I can't put it down. As the book isn't set to release until November 15, 2010, the conditions of my obtaining the book restrict me from discussing the book except to say...

This book is fantastic. If you have not ordered the book, or presume to be arrogant enough to know all the information surrounding K-129 - you have no idea what you are missing. This book is incredibly well researched with lots of newly uncovered materials and offers new revelations that will no doubt make mainstream headlines. Norman Polmar has written many books, and I own/have at least 14 of them - but Project Azorian is by far his best in my opinion. This being the opinion of a book nerd who goes to DC for the sole purpose of spending hours reading and researching in the Army/Navy Club library - trust me - you want to read this book.

Honoring Big Ideas

I landed on Tuesday to discover the blog had its best day in 2010 thanks to Bryan McGrath's Seapower Manifesto. Yes, I have lots to say about that topic. It made my morning on Wednesday when I found myself sitting next to Laurence Smallman of RAND and he kept saying "and if you read Raymond's blog" when discussing various topics at my table ranging from China to piracy, and I found it noteworthy he had read Bryan's manifesto written just the day before (indeed almost everyone I ran into had already read it). I really need to take Mr. Smallman with me everywhere I go when I travel for blog purposes.

On Wednesday night I attended honors night at the United States Naval Institute. As you have probably figured out, the US Naval Institute is an organization I am very proud to be associated with as both a member and a writer for their blog, and I have to say Wednesday was a really special day with a very compelling History conference followed by what turned out to be a special evening at the awards banquet. This years first prize winner writer for Proceedings was Captain Victor George Addison, U.S. Navy, whose four articles carried the day:

• You Can't Always Give What You Want, Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine, January 2010 Vol. 136/1/1,283
• Got Sea Control?, Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy and Commander David Dominy, Royal NavyProceedings Magazine, March 2010 Vol. 136/3/1,285
• The Answer Is the Carrier Strike Group . . . Now, What Was the Question?, Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine, July 2010 Vol. 136/7/1,289
• The Joint Force's "Wildcat Offense", Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine, October 2010 Vol. 136/10/1,292

I'm also very proud that Captain Addison chose to contribute two articles to Information Dissemination over the last year, CS-21's Core Themes and Vision Are Enduring and CCJO and Joint Maritime Operations.

On the subject of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, it has been suggested that Bryan McGrath's position as outlined in his manifesto would represent one extreme view, while Captain Addison's perspectives on Goldwater-Nichols is more representative of the mainstream middle in regards to evolution - and it is for that reason his articles deserve both praise and the serious attention of decision makers. I'm not sure I would have agreed with that point of view last week, but a pretty compelling argument was made that I have been unable to counter this weekend while thinking about it.

In time I hope to take that discussion on for some more analysis, because I believe more discussion is necessary on the topic.

Destination Annapolis

I never went to college so I do not typically pay attention to the affairs of academia except for cheering for college sports teams (Go Hogs!), and given how hard I found myself cheering for Navy to kick Notre Dame up and down the football field on Saturday - I thought I'd offer some thoughts and observations from my week observing activity at the Naval Academy in Annapolis.

I am certainly not into the affairs of Annapolis to the extent of CDR Salamander, indeed I have generally stayed mute even when I should not on events that have happened there. But something impressed me this week and I feel I need to say it.

You can't lie to the midshipmen. They are not stupid and smell bullshit a mile away - particularly on their own campus. When someone asks me regarding my thoughts of the Naval Academy, I will generally state that I believe that there is a serious leadership problem there. I personally believe that leadership problem was Vice Adm. Jeffrey L. Fowler and this is the example I used.

You may recall that Annapolis, just like Washington DC, had a great deal of snow earlier this year. Well, unlike DC, Annapolis doesn't have the same resources to dig out and was under a snow emergency for 2 full weeks - essentially buried in snow. What you may not know is that during this period, the Midshipmen were basically locked in their dorms for the vast majority of the snow emergency - even classes were canceled.

Now what do we say about the leadership at the US Naval Academy that locks up thousands of young, able young people being trained to lead the US Navy and US Marine Corps in the future, and they are prevented from responding to a natural disaster emergency in their own hometown? The current maritime strategy declares these young people will lead our nation in responding to natural disasters across the globe - and naval academy leadership at the time couldn't even lead them out of the gates of their own campus? Am I supposed to believe the greatest Navy on earth couldn't deliver 4000 shovels to the midshipmen and get them out of their dorm rooms to help their local community during a natural disaster?

That is an example of the leadership problems I had with Vice Adm. Fowler.

So when I walked into the USNI History Conference 2010 on Wednesday at the Marriott in Annapolis and observed numerous midshipmen attending, and then observed Vice Adm. Michael H. Miller also in attendance - I admit that I was sometimes only half listening to Mr.Smallman talk to the table as I was sometimes distracted studying the new USNA Superintendent. There have been other encouraging signs that change has come to Annapolis, but there was something I witnessed that really caught my attention.

Vice Adm. Miller was in attendance at the honors banquet for the US Naval Institute on Wednesday night. He was sitting next to Midshipmen Jack James, the new midshipmen USNI Blogger (the best gig in town I think, considering he seemed to get extra attention by a certain 4 star who likes writers), and right there at the table was none other than CDR Salamander.

Appearances are part of perception and both are part of communication, so I have to say after all the trouble CDR Salamander has given USNA for simply reporting the truth (as seen by folks on campus) regarding events at Annapolis, when you see the new USNA superintendent and a midshipmen enjoying dinner with CDR Salamander - I have to admit that appearance gave me a whole new perception regarding the kind of leadership that has taken control of the US Naval Academy.

While that scene represents symbolism that only observers like myself might appreciate, I walked away from Wednesday thinking to myself that Vice Adm. Miller is the kind of leader who will find the 4000 shovels next time the Arctic decides to descend on Annapolis, and Vice Adm. Miller leads from the front. Whether true or not is yet to be seen, but without question there was a solid, positive impression conveyed by the new superintendent and I did think it was worth noting.

Thank You

I take these trips to various places to put faces with the names I read in my little digital world. I wanted to say thank you to Dr. Martin Murphy, CDR John Patch, Laurence Smallman, Claude Berube, LCDR BJ Armstrong, Bill Miller, Mary Ripley, CDR Michael Junge, CDR Salamander, Eric Wertheim, Captain Mark Tempest (ret), Boston Maggie, the great folks at CNA, Rear Admiral Dennis Moynihan and his remarkable cadre of DC 'social' PAOs, all the folks who turned out for the "ID Happy Hour Meet and Greet" at Sines, and several dozen other folks who go unmentioned.

Most of all I want to thank Tom Wilkerson. Everyone claims to know Tom, but I think very few know or appreciate how Tom Wilkerson is a tremendous mentor to so many young writers like myself. On Wednesday night I found myself sitting next to LCDR BJ Armstrong (an accomplished writer btw (PDF)) in the very center of a small room with over 200 people listening to a short speech by ADM Stavridis talking about the power of writing in a room filled with some of the greatest writing contributors to the Navy discussion of this generation. LCDR Armstrong and I are about the same age and among the dozen or so youngest folks in the room. It was almost certainly a coincidence that LCDR Armstrong and I seemed to have the best seats in the room, but I seem to find myself having numerous positive coincidences when I find myself in the vicinity of Tom Wilkerson.

For example, while it was almost certainly a coincidence, the first time I met Captain Vic Addison just happened to be after the only meeting I have ever had with Tom Wilkerson in his office. With incredible fortune or fate like that - all I can say is that i hope to run into an abundance of Tom Wilkerson coincidences in the future. Thank you sir.

Book Review: War is Boring

Most of the security blogosphere will be familiar with David Axe. He has his own group blog, War is Boring, and has contributed to Danger Room, World Politics Review, and several more-or-less mainstream media publications. Axe has long been a friend of Information Dissemination, as well as Lawyers, Guns and Money. In August, he published War is Boring, a graphic novel depicting his experiences in 2006-2008.

It's a good title for a blog, and a good title for a book. There's an expanding literature on the boredom of war. The idea that war is fundamentally a boring, uneventful endeavor punctuated by moments of raw terror has a very long history. However, this vision of war has understandably been difficult to portray, especially on the big screen. Probably the best portrayal of boredom that I can recall is Sam Mendes' film version of Jarhead, which chronicled the long wait and minimal action in the desert in 1990-1.

However, War is Boring is less about the various wars that David Axe has covered than it is about David Axe and the modern profession of war correspondent. Over the course of War is Boring, Axe visited Chad, East Timor, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, and (for good measure) Detroit and Washington D.C. We come to know a little bit about all of those places, but Axe focuses on the commonality more than the difference. For Axe, appropriately, the most important commonality is his own presence.

Without question, emotional detachment characterizes Axe's journey through the various war-zones. He clearly cares about the people he works with, but he doesn't seem to have a lot of involvement in the disputes that underlie the actual wars. To great extent this is admirable, as it puts a degree of distance between he and his subjects. However, this distance seems to be almost central to Axe's obsession with war. War is Boring isn't even really about Axe's obsession with war; it's about his obsession with what his obsession with war has wrought psychologically.

I first came to know David shortly after the period that this book covers. He had just returned from Chad, and I invited him to come to Lexington and participate in Patterson's conference on Africa. David gave a very grim appraisal of the state of conflict in Chad and Darfur, suggesting that it was very hard to know who the good guys and bad guys were, and that Western intervention efforts may have helped extend the life of the conflict. A student asked him "What would you do to save Darfur?" David seemed a bit surprised with the question, then finally responded "Don't save Darfur. Screw Darfur."

It's fair to say that the audience was surprised by this. Indeed, at least one member of the audience was quite irritated; the "screw Darfur" idea seemed oblivious to the suffering of refugees, and could be understood to imply a certain racist indifference to the fate of non-Europeans. This isn't how I read the comment, however; I understood it to be an argument along the lines of Edward Luttwak's "Give War a Chance," which argued that Western intervention tends to prolong wars by preventing victory. In the case of Chad and Darfur, I thought that Axe had an entirely reasonable point.

This is not to say that War is Boring doesn't carry a lot of insight into the profession of war correspondent. Title aside, Axe's book isn't just about the boredom of war. It's also about repetition, futility, and all of the soul-grinding nuisances that afflict those who remain dedicated to covering war. You get the sense from War is Boring that Axe doesn't have a very clear idea of why he covers war. Axe makes clear that the career he has selected isn't ideal for the maintenance of inter-personal relationships, both in terms of professional demands (lots of travel for not so much money), and because of the detachment.

War is Boring also serves to remind that what David Axe does is very, very different than what I do. I read, write, and teach, but have never been to a war zone. Now that I have kids, I'm considerably less likely to accept the kind of assignments that would take me into harms way. I must say, though that War is Boring doesn't make the profession of war correspondent look particularly attractive. Nevertheless, I highly recommend it.

HMS Astute Runs Aground Off Scotland

According to the Telegraph, HMS Astute has run aground by the stern while it was conducting a crew swap in shallow water.

“Astute ran aground by her very stern earlier this morning as she was transferring people ashore,” a Navy spokesman said. “There’s no nuclear issue or no environmental issue that we are aware of and no one has been hurt.”

The submarine, which carries a crew of 98, will now wait until later today for tug boats to pull her off when the tide comes in.

Thomas Harding is covering the incident for the Telegraph and has offered more details in this article. According to his report, the tide should come in around 6:00pm this evening and tugs will try to lodge the submarine off the shoals.

This news strikes many obvious thoughts. Yes, yesterday was Trafalgar Day but that doesn't mean anything anymore to the British, and the Royal Navy is so far removed from the days of Nelson the comparison could be used as more of a national insult from Americans like me than an observation. It is also true this comes after the results of the 'strategery' review conducted by the best and brightest in the UK. I wonder if that 'strategery' review built in the cost of business, which includes attrition due to a variety of factors. Unlikely.

After learning this news a few hours ago this morning, I decided to conduct a little experiment. I set up several feeds on my laptop and phone to monitor a few Twitter hash tags like #astute, #submarine, and #RoyalNavy. Bottom line, the Royal Navy is a punchline, and is getting killed by comedy (some of which is very funny). Unfortunately, it highlights how the Royal Navy has no control over the information space. However, what escapes me is how that somehow translates into their apparently belief that they have very little to contribute to the perception of the event. The Royal Navy has a nuclear submarine aground within view of the shore, and more specifically a major bridge, where thousands of people are going to see this in person - and likely care.

It will start as an infinite source of comedy, the irony of the "Astute" running aground. The individuals involved will be made infamous for their mistake, and the accident will be turned into a mockery in future news. This stuff will happen - but there could be more done.

How many people in the UK know that Astute submarines are a double hulled submarine? Are the details of a shore transfer from a submarine to shore top secret? If not, why isn't the process being explained - and put into the context of frequency. Is this the first time a submarine has gone aground in this area despite 100 previous shore transfers? a 1,000? 10,000? Even when bad things happen - or particularly when bad things happen - isn't that the time to broaden the knowledge of an interested audience? What MoD PAO is down at the BBC studios available to jump on live TV or radio to provide up to date information? What about CNNI or other news outlets? I've been streaming the news feed online for at least the last hour, and I haven't seen anyone in either studio.

Think about it though. If a US nuclear submarine was to run aground off the east coast, how would the US Navy react? Would they promote Twitter hash tags to coordinate the humiliating comedy - with the intent of adding knowledge to the stream? Would the US Navy flood the internet with photography of the submarine, knowing full well that images matter? Not just far views where the media is - but up close and personal photos that give the viewer the impression - "I am 7,800 tons of silent steel, and this the only time you will ever see me, if you're lucky."

Would a PAO be dispatched from the New York office to CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC to be in studio, ready for live TV, ready with new information at real time? Considering the number of PAOs in New York City - unlikely.

But Ray - its a digital world, you don't have to be in studio...

Wrong. CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC measure responses to content in real time - TV news has trended towards a 2 way conversation with real time feedback, and if the PAO is at a remote site then there will be no feedback on content contributed by the television medium - only by being in studio does one get to measure responses and react appropriately with speed.

In the UK today, the Royal Navy will suffer another black eye, and the problem is compounded because they do not have the leadership or planning in place as an organization to immediately apply the eye cream - and contribute towards the purpose of giving understanding of Astute class submarines (or the Royal Navy as an organization) to the currently interested population. The moment will pass, no one will care - but the question is will folks learn something in the process? In the UK today, probably not. What about next time?

"Silent Service" indeed. At a time when the Royal Navy budget is suffering because they lack any connection between themselves and the population, an event occurs that puts the Royal Navy on the front page and the Royal Navy does nothing to take advantage of it. Yes, the event itself is not a good thing - but Royal Navy is failing as an organization because they willingly waste an opportunity to communicate themselves to an interested audience.

Handicapping the Queen Elizabeth Race

I have considerable doubt as to whether the British will really sell HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2020. If they do, however, they’ll need a buyer:

• Russia: The Russians are interested in another aircraft carrier, and it’s unlikely that the Russian shipbuilding industry will have produced a vessel of comparable size and capability by 2020. Even if they do, Admiral Kuznetzov will be close to thirty years old; not too long in the tooth for a CV, but of worrisome age given concern about Russia maintenance capacity. The Russians could probably afford Queen Elizabeth, and could undertake any modifications necessary to fly their own carrier aircraft. On the downside, such a purchase would be an express vote of no-confidence in a Russian shipbuilding industry already made nervous by the Mistral acquisition. Moreover, unless Russia-NATO relations warm appreciably in the next ten years, both the British defense establishment and Britain’s NATO allies would freak out over the prospect of a Russia purchase. Odds on Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya: 50-1
• China: Like the Russians, the Chinese will probably be able to afford Queen Elizabeth, and there’s good reason to believe that they’d be interested in acquiring a CV. However, by 2020 indigenous construction may have proceeded to the point that the Chinese won’t believe that they need to bother with foreign acquisition. Integrating Queen Elizabeth into the PLAN would be a pain. The biggest obstacle would be on the other side, however; the USN would go absolutely ape if the British tried to sell QE to the Chinese, and I doubt that the British defense establishment would be terribly enthusiastic, either. Odds on Empress Dowager Cixi: 99-1
• France: France could certainly use a second carrier; recent events have demonstrated the problems associated with even a reliable single carrier fleet. However, I would be deeply surprised if the French government chose not to take advantage of the opportunity to build such a vessel in French yards. Even though QE might fit the bill, I suspect that the French will either go with a French built ship or no second carrier for the foreseeable future. Odds on Carla Bruni (R92): 20-1
• Brazil: In 2020, Sao Paulo will be fifty-seven years old. Refurbishment notwithstanding, that’s really old, and it’s unclear where Brazil intends to acquire a replacement vessel. Brazil has CATOBAR experience, and will presumably at some point decide on a modern carrier-borne fighter/strike aircraft. Brazil also appears to have an interest in expanding its navy. Queen Elizabeth would seem to fit Brazil’s needs perfectly. While it’s possible to envision competition between Brazil and the United Kingdom over South Atlantic sea access, the scenario is somewhat far-fetched. I don’t see why the British defense and foreign policy establishment would object overmuch, or why the United States would try to veto the deal. Odds on Empress Isabel: 3-1
• South Korea: South Korea has a large, modern, and growing navy, and is gaining experience with large flat deck amphibs. Queen Elizabeth would be a substantial step up, but not necessarily an insurmountable one. Of course, if the South Koreans want a carrier they can always build one themselves, but Queen Elizabeth could provide an extremely useful bridge to a domestically built CV force. South Korea could equip QE with F-35s. Much depends, of course, on changes in South Korea’s strategic situation; by 2020 that situation may have changed radically. I can’t imagine why such a sale would be a problem for either the US or the UK. Odds on Empress Myeongsong: 4-1
• India: India represents another obvious potential customer. Queen Elizabeth is going to be a considerably more powerful platform than the refurbished Admiral Gorshkov. However, India is also expects to have two domestically built carriers in service by 2020. Four carriers would be a major commitment for India, so I’m not sure I see them as a potential customer for Queen Elizabeth. On the upside, India and the UK have maintained a procurement relationship that could facilitate the deal. Odds on INS India Gandhi: 15-1
• Japan: In ten years, Japan might well be interested in stepping up to a genuine fleet carrier. It’s gaining experience with large flat deck warships with the Hyuga class. Japan will also probably buy the F-35, giving it a CATOBAR capable aircraft. However, as with France I suspect that the Japanese would rather build a carrier themselves than purchase one from the British. The Japanese constitution would present some difficulty, but objections from either the UK or the US would not likely be a problem. Odds on Empress Michiko: 7-1
• Australia: Australia has increased its naval profile over the past several decades, and appears to continue to believe that the RAN has an important role to play in maintaining order in Oceania/Southeast Asia. The RAN tried to buy HMS Invincible in 1982, a deal that would have been remarkably similar to the proposed Queen Elizabeth sale. However, Queen Elizabeth would be a substantial step forward for the RAN, although it will gain experience with large flat decked warships with the Canberra class. Australia operates the F-18, and is expected to be a customer for the F-35, and so will have the aircraft necessary to operate a (presumably CATOBAR capable) fleet carrier. Finally, Australia obviously has a strong, positive relationship with the United Kingdom. Odds on HMAS Queen Elizabeth: 9-2
• Canada: Canada hasn’t operated a carrier since 1970, and won’t have Australia’s experience with large flat deck amphibs. However, Canada enjoys some of the same advantages as Australia, including operation of the F-18 and the F-35. Canada can probably afford the QE if it wants it, and has a large and growing maritime backyard to worry about. Indeed, Canada might even eschew the catapult upgrade and operate QE as a helicopter carrier, although either Ark Royal or Invincible would probably be a better fit for such a mission. As with Australia, Canada maintains a strong, positive relationship with the UK. Odds on HMCS Queen Elizabeth: 15-1

LCS Thought of the Day

I just read through Ronald O’Rourke's latest CRS report regarding the LCS, RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. The latest is dated October 14, 2024 and should be available at that link above by the end of the week.

The report has grown into 62 pages that documents no mentionable successes, plenty of mentionable failures, dozens of course changes, and a destination filled with question marks.

If you have Bloomberg TV channel you might want to look out for the program "Conversations with Judy Woodruff. On the episode that aired on October 15th, Admiral Mullen puts the Littoral Combat Ship program squarely in the cross-hairs of the POM12 discussion stating flat out that if the LCS cannot stay on cost and schedule, the program has no future.

I honestly believe the program is about to die, but as of this week the official Navy position is that the decision has been delayed to insure the integrity of the selection. As I meet with other USNI Bloggers this week, I intend to get a good group together and see if they wish to each contribute a post regarding which LCS version they would select if they were King for a day.

I already know which one I'd pick, but I'll save that for my detailed post explaining my thoughts on the subject. I will go ahead and admit one thing though - I absolutely believe the Lockheed Martin version of the LCS will win the competition - and indeed the competition itself is mostly for show. Ever since the original announcement regarding the acquisition strategy, when they tied the combat system to the respective hulls instead of having a competition for the combat system separate from the hulls like the Navy originally intended, it was decided in my mind at that time that Lockheed Martin would win.

Indeed, that is also the reason why I could see any protest by Austal/General Dynamics/Raytheon/etc... being successful, no matter how many i's get dots and t's get crossed.

Observing Al Qaeda Threat to France

I don't really know what to make of the threat to France by Al Qaeda, but it has been suggested that even though the information regarding the threat comes from someone attempting to cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the threat itself is supposedly originating from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Details:

French Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux, told a European television network that Saudi Arabian-supplied intelligence has described a new terror threat from al Qaeda, prompting France to placed its security and intelligence agencies on high alert.

Hortefeux confirmed that “in the last few hours,” France received a warning that a potential attack was forthcoming, but did not give any specific details. Hortefeux went on record as stating that the "threat is real" adding that, "We must not underestimate or over estimate the threat. We are directly concerned."

Three thoughts come to mind.

First, noteworthy France is currently deploying the Charles De Gaulle to the region, despite the ships minor detour. As the situation develops it will be interesting to see if the French carrier projects power towards the Arabian Peninsula. Unlikely, but it is worth noting it is a potential option for France.

Second, AQAP knows the French aircraft carrier is coming their way, and given how 2010 started with AQAP threats of attacks at sea against naval targets... it raises the question whether AQAP would attempt an attack against the French aircraft carrier. Given that France will be prepared for such activity, I see this as unlikely, but some one probably said the same thing about ramming the twin towers with commercial airlines.

Finally, contrast the situation France is in with that of the UK. Here we have France, with their aircraft carrier battle group deploying at a time the nation has a specific threat to deal with essentially projecting military power to the region as a strategic option to support the defense of France at home with disruptive attacks where the enemy is should that option become necessary.

On the flip side we have the UK, busy executing political strategery in support of a jobs program to produce aircraft carriers without combat aircraft, and moving to retire the only aircraft carrier in the nations inventory capable of projecting air power. I have no idea what the budget obligations and priorities of the British government is, but whatever it is - the results of the defense budget suggest national defense is driven by a domestic agenda and was given the priority of a national afterthought.

Western European Navies (week 41)

Political News
As of now there is a limit on the value off offsets in defence contracts in the EU.

It looks like NATO will say 'yes' to the missile defence project in Europe during the Lisbon meeting scheduled for November, now France has approved the project.

The British National Audit Office has published its reports on the major defence projects. Their conclusion: 3.3 billion pound over budget and an overall 38 billion pound "black hole" between spending and money available. In that 3.3 billion the two planned new aircraft carriers account for 650 million pounds.
But the NAO also drew attention to some positive findings. In 2009/10, the cost performance on the majority of projects was broadly stable, for the second year running. The rate of project overruns also fell significantly and 98% of performance indicators were likely to be met.

Defence spending in Italy down 10% for 2011. Expect cuts and delays for FREMM frigates.

No cuts for the navy in 2011 in Norway.

In Belgium there are hardly any Francophone generals. Dutch-speaking Belgians have 66% of all the top positions and all departments are being led by Dutch speaking Flemish people.
Belgian law says that top officers have to speak both languages fluently and from personal experience I can say that, on average, the French of the Dutch speaking Flemish is much better than the Dutch of the French speaking Walloons. Even so much so, that my French (3 years in high school) is better than their Dutch 99% of the time and I don't stand a chance against the French of the (Dutch speaking) Flemish.

Global Operations
German's State Attorney has indicted the 10 Somali men that were caught during the Dutch action on the MV Taipan.

Denmark is airlifting a helicopter to Africa to replace the current one on HDMS Esbern Snare, to fight piracy.

AGAPANTHE 2010 is not even a day old and the French carrier Charles de Gaulle has to head back home already. Repairs will take a couple of weeks.

Another blog about Operation Atalanta. This time from the FGS Köln (in German).

Shipbuilding
The final type 45 has been launched in the UK.

The UK is competing against France and Italy to sell warship to Brazil.

The Swedes have modified two CB90's, so they can be taken onboard Dutch and British LPD's, and loaned one to the Netherlands and one to the UK for 6 months.
I'd expect to see them in exercise Emerald Move.

The Irish have ordered two OPV's from Babcock Marine for €100 million. One vessel is scheduled to be delivered in 2014, the other in 2015.

The first Spanish S-80 submarine is scheduled to sail in 2013.

French DCNS setting its sight on the Maritime Security Cutter Medium from the USCG.

Exercises
The UK, France, Australia and the US have done an anti-submarine warfare exercise in the Gulf of Oman.

Upcoming Execercises
Emerald Move 2010. An exercise from the European Amphibious Initiative (EAI) to be held in Senegal in November. While original plans were to put a force of 2,500 ashore and support them for 10 days, all countries involved have since decided to scale the exercise down, due to costs.

Royal Navy on Coastal Watch off Somalia

Eagleone doesn't advertise himself much, actually for someone who runs one of the original Navy blogs in the US - the premier maritime law blog - he is probably the worst promoter of himself in the Navy blogosphere. But Eagleone's work is second to none, and should be a daily read for those who are interested in global maritime security affairs.

If you plan on attending the US Naval Institute History Conference in Annapolis tomorrow, you can shake his hand since he is on the 11:10am panel under his not concealed but rarely revealed real name - CAPT Mark Tempest, USNR (Ret.).

If you didn't catch the activity of the Royal Navy being discussed over at Eaglespeak, it is worth checking out. It adds context to the latest news, which highlights how the Royal Navy has been very busy off Somalia this week. From CNN:

While conducting routine patrols, a helicopter identified a "suspicious whaler towing a skiff," Combined Maritime Forces said in a statement. "The whaler contained a significant amount of fuel barrels and when approached by the helicopter, four of the nine passengers tried to hide themselves from view."

Suspecting the vessel was involved in piracy, the crew of the ship Fort Victoria was allowed to board it. As Royal Marines approached, the suspected pirates attempted to flee for shore but were rapidly surrounded, the statement said. Authorities found they were carrying six AK-47s, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher with four warheads and six RPG booster charges along with hand-held GPS units, mobile phones and other equipment, Combined Maritime Forces said.

The nine suspects were transferred to the smaller skiff, and Royal Marines disabled the outboard engine and gave them oars, the statement said. Once they were safely ashore, "the whaler was rigged with explosives and destroyed along with other confiscated pirate paraphernalia."

We are seeing something from the Europeans that is definately worthy of discussion - look how much mileage the European countries are getting from their auxiliary ships. HNLMS Amsterdam just completed an escort of a WFP vessel, and now we have a British Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship raiding pirate boats deploying from the coast of Somalia.

It goes to the point that fighting the skiff pirate fleet operating from Somalia isn't about vessel type - which is why building bells and whistles into small ships intended to perform maritime security is an enormous waste of money. This is a gun fight, so the side that brings the biggest guns and the most guns is almost certainly going to avoid a fight or win the fight if it occurs.

This is also why I agree with Bob Work, and see platforms like the JHSV very appropriate as a maritime security vessel in the future. It isn't about the ship, it is about the capabilities that can be deployed - and non-technological capabilities like a platoon of US Marines is a trump card I'll take over any skiff swarm every single day.