The CNO released his fourth (and presumably final) CNOG this week, and I'd like to spend some time with it here. My overall impression is that it remains a solid indicator of where the CNO wishes to prioritize, and that it continues the CNO's 2010 public campaign to assert the centrality of American Seapower. It is released in essentially the same format as its predecessors, and it reinforces the same big themes CNO has emphasized from the beginning. It is a document of continuity, though it is not without nuanced emphases worthy of discussion. Read the whole thing here, but I'd like to discuss a few parts I found notable. As is my custom, I'll cut and paste portions in bold, then comment afterward.
Our Maritime Strategy remains relevant. It has been affirmed by events over the past few years and by the recent conclusions from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel report commissioned by Congress.
The reference here to the QDR Review Panel is important. While they punted on making hard choices, one message coming out of their findings was the need for a bigger Navy, more engaged in Asia.
As ground forces draw down in the Middle East, the need for a strong naval presence will grow in importance. Naval presence is essential to shaping a favorable security environment globally, especially in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, areas closely tied to our nation’s economic prosperity.
Again, we'll hear this message over and over--as well we should. While the land forces "reset" by coming home and gearing up, the Navy resets "in stride", and its responsibilities transcend the present conflicts.
We will use warfighting wholeness reviews to identify capability gaps and direct our limited resources to areas with greatest impact.
The concept of looking at warfighting capability as a portfolio is a worthwhile undertaking. The Navy has done a good job over the years in identifying individual capability gaps, but has lacked a coherent methodology for placing those gaps within a larger warfighting construct. Only by looking across the ensemble can dependencies and opportunities be realized. Compound risk must be accounted for.
Our Navy requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements globally.
I take issue with this statement, though it is not untrue. The Navy has yet to release a force structure vision that represents the imperatives put forward in the 2007 Maritime Strategy. Very few observers believe the 2005 "313" ship navy was sufficient or optimized to carry out that strategy--so saying that 313 ships is the minimum, while technically true, evades the fact that we do not have a force structure number that reflects the strategy.
We will examine and revise our Forward Deployed Naval Forces methodology to align with the future security environment, our planned force structure, and forward presence requirements.
This is an important statement, and it dovetails in nicely with the work CNA has done on the Tipping Point. The CNO is indicating here a readiness to think more expansively about how and where naval forces are positioned.
We will continue to pursue affordable warfighting solutions that emphasize evolutionary vice revolutionary capabilities, common hulls and airframes, open architecture, modularity, lower energy footprint, and reduced manpower.
It is nice to see analyst Bob Work's "common hulls" mantra coming to fruition in a Navy he currently helps run. There is value and wisdom in the "ship as truck" analogy, with capability commoditzed in a way that gains the maximum utility from flexible ship design.
We will promote and increase cooperation and interoperability with our most capable partners on the high-end of naval power, and continue to bring together maritime nations to enable a common understanding of capabilities and tactics in the global maritime domain.
This is a nice bit of nuance here, taking on directly those who see maritime cooperation as a largely low-end phenomenon. We have valuable allies who possess very capable ships (Japan, Australia, South Korea among them),and this alliance can provide a strong disincentive to China's sometimes bumptious rise.
Integrate warfighting capabilities with the Marine Corps to meet objectives of the Maritime Strategy and Naval Operations Concept.
If the country is ever to get a military force optimized to extend and sustain its world leadership, its land power will likely be reduced while its Seapower increases. The Navy's Army (USMC) will be the primary means by which the US influences events ashore in the coming decades, and the Navy's role in facilitating that power redounds to the benefit of both.
Anticipate changes in joint force posture and operational demands in the Middle East, determine how those changes will affect Navy posture, positioning, and operational tempo, and adjust accordingly.
The CNO can't reinforce this message to senior policymakers enough. When the land forces go home, the Navy will still be there--just like it is today. In fact, without the land forces there, naval power will only become more critical.
Anticipate changes in global military (especially naval) forces, discern changes in operational and strategic patterns, and adjust Navy posture, positioning, and operational tempo accordingly.
Again--the CNO is signaling readiness to be innovative with how and where naval forces operate and are sustained. This could be the most important emphasis in this entire document.
We are emphasizing operational expertise in our wargames, including through Global ’09; the International Global Wargame; the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Title X wargames; and our own Maritime Domain Awareness, irregular warfare, and partnership building games.
I believe war-gaming will become even more critical in the years ahead. When you run out of money, you have to think.
There is more in the document, much more, but these were the sections that stood out for me.
Bryan McGrath
No comments:
Post a Comment