The Future of the Russian Navy Part 1: Large Combat ShipsThe analysis notes what I see as the 2 primary challenges facing the Russian shipbuilding plan. First, Russia needs a new large drydock to build aircraft carriers. Until we see construction of a large drydock, there will be no new aircraft carrier program.
The Future of the Russian Navy Part 2: Smaller Surface Ships
The Future of the Russian Navy Part 3: Submarines
The Future of the Russian Navy Part 4: Summary and Conclusions
Second, Russia needs to improve the Sevmash shipyard to stabilize the construction of nuclear powered submarines. Dr. Gorenburg describes the Yasen class as the Russian version of the Seawolf class submarine. I think that is a good analogy - it is a big submarine and is probably the best nuclear submarine in the world for under ice operations in construction today. The Yasen class nuclear submarine is intended to be the core of Russia's defense strategy in the Arctic, which means the problems at Sevmash shipyard will be a political issue, and will lead to additional funding for the shipyard in some capacity. Building nuclear powered icebreakers or upgrading the Kirov class nuclear cruisers are two options for pouring more money into the shipyard, but even doing both may not be enough.
The analysis of Russia's shipbuilding plan also reveals the strategic thinking in Russia as the Navy continues to receive priority in military budget funding. For example:
The nuclear submarine programs appear to be the most important Navy shipbuilding programs, ranked as Borei first and Yasen second. SSKs on the other hand are now being looked at as tailored assets for littoral operations in the North Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea. This is a change in the way Russia has traditionally looked at SSKs, which in the cold war were looked at as blue water fleet assets.
On the surface, Russia appears to be building a bimodal fleet. The bulk of the future Russian fleet will mostly consist of frigates and corvettes as a littoral centric capability armed with anti-ship missiles intended to protect shore and offshore resources. Including LSTs and the Mistral class for Command and Control, this littoral fleet of small combatants and amphibious vessels will consist of around 100 vessels of various types - mostly corvettes and LSTs.
At the high end the Russian fleet will likely end up being 2 carriers, around 8 cruisers, and around 12 destroyers that will make up the Russian blue water fleet by 2020, or put another way 2 carrier strike groups and a handful of additional major surface combatants represent the power projection requirements of Russia by 2020. The ratio of the 2020 Russian Navy will be somewhere near 4 small vessels for every 1 large naval vessel.
As a side note, notice how the rising powers - India, China, and Russia - all see the 2-3 Carrier Strike Group metric as the minimum 2020 strategic naval requirement for power projection capabilities. Keep that in mind as you read news covering Great Britain's MoD debate regarding the Strategic Defense and Security Review that is mostly dominated by Generals who are veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan effectively advocating a land power future strategy over a naval and air power future strategy. I highlight this to note what war has done to strategic thinking in the west, and how Asia sees the future strategic environment vs how the US and Europe sees the future strategic environment. Since the US, for example, has been engaged in land warfare for 14 of the last 21 years - from Panama, to Iraq, to Somalia, to the Balkans, to Afghanistan, back to Iraq, and back to Afghanistan - it is hardly surprising we see the strategic view on land. Still, worth noting the view of traditional powers like the US and Europe vs the view of rising powers.
Like Dr. Gorenburg explains, I see many challenges facing Russia in executing their plans. Official statements regarding time lines remain very questionable, but I also observe the Russian Navy plan itself to be quite impressive. The Russian fleet of the future will be balanced, well tailored to Russia's maritime borders, in line with securing Russia's maritime interests, and represents a higher level of power projection and expeditionary capability at sea than Russia ever had during the cold war. With a relatively few number of submarines (compared to Soviet times), and with the nuclear submarines specialized for the Arctic region, the plan suggests Russia's Navy is being designed as a primarily defensive force for sustained presence with a modest power projection capability.
I see that as a responsible approach to naval power for the worlds largest energy producer.
No comments:
Post a Comment