The ongoing Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) currently taking place in London is perhaps one of the most interesting public defense debates since the cold war. Undertaken while the British government is at war in Afghanistan, the British government is attempting to make policy for the next decade without a clear understanding of current activities may mean for next year. Every decision carries an enormous political ramification, whether domestic or foreign, and as a public debate without a single statesman advocating compelling intellectual strategic arguments an observer might be left wondering what exactly the objective of British strategy actually is. Policy will ultimately be crafted by October 19, 2010, so the papers say - but what that policy is intended to do for the British people is the first question one might ask - and the last question one might find a good answer to.
The Nuclear Question
The public side of the debate began, legitimately, with the nuclear question. All indications are the SDSR looked at the nuclear question and has already decided that ballistic missile submarines are will be fielded to support the British government requirements for nuclear deterrence. I find alternatives hard to argue - the ballistic missile submarine is the most secure and the most survivable of the various choices, and provides any nation with such a capability unquestioned protection of nuclear retaliation to any state that may attempt a direct nuclear attack. As we live in an era where the number of states seeking nuclear weapons in increasing, protecting a nations future with underwater nuclear deterrence seems to be the appropriate choice for any nation. It explains why such a capability is currently a visible piece of the military development of China, Russia, and India - and that ignores the recently upgraded capability of the French and the ongoing planning to upgrade by the United States. With every other sitting member of the UN security council currently at some level of modernization for this capability, the British really have no choice in the matter if they wish to remain relevant on the nuclear deterrence issue.
Chicken or Egg
Once one gets past the nuclear question in the SDSR, one might begin to wonder what is driving the strategic discussion. The carrier debate is an excellent example, because one might ask what is the priority? Is this a domestic jobs issue? Is this a strategic capability issue? Is this an industrial issue? Are the British making a classic mistake with the carrier issue by allowing force structure to drive strategy and policy?
This is not as straight forward as one might believe, at least not if you examine the issues closely. The domestic jobs issue is one of politics. It does not matter what the political reason cited for support on any strategic issue, because even in the 21st century the decisions of geopolitics made within any local body of government still reflect the reality that all politics are local. There are no impressive political statesmen, unless one is to claim such a role of Liam Fox (which I will not). If one is searching for the modern Nelson, Wellington, or Churchill - too bad, one will not find a modern visionary within the current crop of British leadership. Agenda's are plainly evident, and among those in the SDSR debate no ones agenda begins with a discussion of British power, rather focus is specific to military power and capabilities.
The Royal Navy does not have a statesman. There is no vision offered from which one derives the necessity of aircraft carriers, nor any other specific capability. Capability leads the discussion first, and what the capability provides follows in discussion. This reality is a reflection of two things:
First, no one in British politics is willing to point to the purpose of military power in the 21st century, including a rational argument for current British involvement in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan was so important to the national security of Great Britain, then why has it already decided when the British are leaving? Will the Strategic Defense and Security Review offer the strategic rational for the current contribution of 9,500 troops to Afghanistan, or what the role of a large active duty Army (compared to reserves) might be in the strategy of the United Kingdom? Unless the Strategic Defense and Security Review defines the security challenge facing the United Kingdom today, then it doesn't matter what the size of the British military is - lack of definition can rationally be followed by greater lack of definition.
Second, for what reasons will British military power be used in the 21st century? Who will the British be attacking? Who will the British be defending? What are the British interests both domestically and globally that require military power for security? Even today the British are being accused of nineteenth century colonialism for their occupation of the Falklands by the President of Argentina. Are the Falklands a strategic priority to Great Britain today? I have no idea, but I do know that Argentina will be conducting a 21st century information war on the British because Argentina sees the enormous economic importance of the islands. Is defending the Falkland Islands on the short list of where military power might be necessary to protect the interests of the United Kingdom? The answers to those type of questions would, in classic strategic development, drive force structure.
But instead the British debate force structure first; ie..
The Carrier Question
I will skip my rant on how the British Army's role in future British military operations is implied and accepted rather than clearly articulated. It doesn't really matter though, because the SDSR debate is not really a debate on military structure and British strategic interests, rather a question of economics and political priorities. The intent of the SDSR is to find the magic formula that offers a perception of British autonomy in geopolitical affairs to a domestic audience while seeking the minimal economic investment in national strategic power possible. The British government's policy appears intent on leveraging as much reliance as possible on the United States in an effort to maximize budgets towards domestic political interests while attempting to maintain that autonomous perception for domestic audiences.
This is the behavior of all states that have neither the strategic vision nor the visionaries necessary to domestically articulate a nations self interest on the global stage. Call it concession to a superpower ally if you wish, but the degree to which Britain will retain autonomy in future strategic challenges will be limited based primarily on the decision to 'go cheap at home while leaning heavy on the US.' While legitimately labeled a strategy with limited political options, it is not necessarily a bad strategy.
But it might explain why the Royal Navy would be willing to sacrifice heavily for carriers. For those who are not familiar, the Astute class submarine ran into serious problems a few years ago. As it turned out, the industrial base of the UK nearly failed to produce the submarine, and when they ran into serious technical problems a United States contractor had to go overseas to straighten out the problems, and put the Astute class back on track. The inconsistent construction schedule over decades of building nuclear submarines in Great Britain led to the loss of critical skills, and had it not been for the United States the British not only would not have the highly capable Astute class, but wouldn't have the option of a highly capable future ballistic missile submarine replacement.
It is an important issue, because the industrial question also becomes a strategic question in that context. Aircraft carriers, just like submarines, are enormous investments of state. If the British decide for whatever reason not to build the CVF, they will eventually lose not only what they have in inventory, but the ability to build aircraft carriers in the future. That is a fairly significant strategic choice, because whether the British needs an aircraft carrier in 2010, or even 2020, is perhaps a legitimate question - whether the British will need an aircraft carrier in the 21st century is a very tough question to answer. Sure you can start from scratch with your industry if you lose that capability, but at what cost? For examples, see the Russians and Indians (and I predict the Chinese very soon), because the costs of starting an aircraft carrier program without industrial experience is enormous. Look at Russia - have you truly studied the political costs to Russia for seeking the Mistral class from France? Given the recent decision by Russia to quit selling military equipment to Iran, the cost could already be nearly $10 billion US in military sales over the next few years alone.
Are aircraft carriers aligned with the strategic interests of the UK? I have no idea, without clear articulation of the strategic interests of the UK how can anyone say for sure? I do know this, it is entirely possible that it is the United States encouraging the UK to make the choice it is regarding aircraft carriers, and because the UK's strategic review is a minimalist budget approach to defense with heavy reliance on the United States to fill gaps - US encouragement can act as a determining factor in those type of strategic choices.
Corbett, Nelson, Cochrane, and Smith
There is legitimately some concern regarding what the choice to purchase two carriers in the UK will have on the Royal Navy. It is hard to predict, but I would offer the suggestion that perhaps what we are seeing is the General's view of Julian Corbett.
One cannot observe the SDSR debate in the UK without noting how many Afghanistan and Iraq veteran Generals are out advocating for policy in public. I find it very interesting, because it demonstrates the degree to which the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy have virtually no leaders capable of making a public argument with credibility - primarily because the British have so few Royal Air Force Generals or Royal Navy Admirals who have a name people recognize as credible in the debate.
I have often asked myself to what degree will the 21st century COIN approach on land impact naval forces, and in a way I think we see a microcosm of that today in the UK. The reason why veteran war Generals are generally supportive of aircraft carriers is because aircraft carriers provide the possibility for air power support for ground forces. More noteworthy, a Royal Navy that consists of a force structure concentrated around strike groups means the Royal Navy will consist of a force of concentrated sea control - a modern variation of Corbett. In a carrier strike group deployment model, the Royal Navy offers the capability to be dynamically mobile, locally concentrated sea control force that can be directed selectively globally. Seen from the perspective of a veteran in Afghanistan or Iraq, it looks very similar to ink spot strategies used by ground forces for influencing local populations.
But it is counter to how naval forces have typically operated. I see remarkable irony that Admiral Nelson, perhaps the greatest Admiral in world history in deploying and using high value ships of war, is famously quoted many times for desiring more cruisers (modern day frigates) for distributing presence sustaining operations across entire theaters. There is little question that is Admiral Nelson were alive today, he would question the wisdom of all of the MoD to even contemplate capital ships at the expense of a larger cruiser fleet - for power is derived from the influence achieved from constant presence, not from the ability to temporary arrive with force. This is the most important lesson being relearned on the ground in the 21st century wars conducted by the west.
It is unclear what comes when western leaders decide to wind down major military activities in Afghanistan. The Obama administration and the British government have already set timelines for the reduction in ground forces in Afghanistan. It is unclear whether these time lines will be kept, but we should know more after the next review of the Afghanistan war likely to be released after the next US election.
What is coming is a major strategic discussion in the US on military power, a US version of the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). We have already seen the US DoD push back decisions, likely waiting for the reduction in ground troops in Afghanistan before undertaking such a serious debate. The rise of China and the shift of economic power from west to east will likely drive discussions and decisions, and because that debate continues to be pushed out by the US it is almost certain that some form of pushing out major reorganization decisions will rise up in the British SDSR.
I am a strong believer that the structure of the US Army must change. I believe that ultimately, the United States needs to have a larger Army with between 75-100 brigades, but must find a way to have between only 1/4 and 1/3 of that force active duty - the rest reserve. The US can never, ever be allowed to fight a land war half way across the world again without the support and without significant impact to the American population, and I believe the way to do that is to insure any future war requires a mostly reserve force that has significant impact to local communities, thus doesn't allow for political decisions to be made without careful understanding of the political calculation and impact to the whole of the population. A smaller active duty force and larger total Army force is a huge change in the structure of the US Army, because one must account for the necessity to have a healthy officer Corps, among dozens of other critical factors, in both decreasing the size of the active duty Army while increasing the size of the overall US Army. That debate won't happen until operations in Afghanistan wind down.
But if you move that direction, and remove the potential for politically casual use of land military forces to achieve strategic objectives, you must then have a plan for how to influence limited strategic objectives over core national interests without major military presence on the ground. Ultimately, that is the same challenge facing the UK today, albeit within a very different context. I would argue the way to do this is found in British military history.
I strongly believe that naval power must assume a central role in the national security policy of any nation wanting to compete in the 21st century primarily because we are moving towards a global system where security is achieved by which regional major powers balance each other, and find compelling positive sum gains through cooperation and collaboration rather than zero sum gains and losses through competition. I also believe the politics that manages zero sum gains and losses that will occur in competition will be complex, and will be primarily decided with the presence of military power.
With that said, there will also be complex geopolitical challenges with the lessor powers, and how those problems are managed will be increasingly important to the balancing of major states. War is an enormous strain to the limited resources of states, so modern methods of preventing war is just as important as the use of military power to win wars. For both the US and the UK, I believe one way to prevent war is to adopt modern policies and strategies of those who successfully addressed complex military challenges with limited resources, and there are examples in British history.
This blog is guilty of often quoting Julian Corbett and Horatio Nelson. In reality when I think of how naval forces should operate and organize in the 21st century to manage the daily stresses of non-state actors, I attempt to conceptualize how to implement modern versions of the activities of Sir Sidney Smith in helping the Turks stop the French after they landed in Egypt, and the activities of Thomas Cochrane in harassing the French in support of the Spanish. Both men offer historical guidance on how to leverage sea power and limited ground combat power effectively in support of indigenous forces for the purposes of defeating common enemies. Unofficially they both represented part diplomat, part politician, part army officer, and part naval officer in executing operations in complex political climates where indigenous interests always prevailed, but they were successful in also insuring British interests were forwarded within the context of a clear understanding of strategic objectives.
I believe it is in that context nations like the UK, as well as the future US, should make choices within the context of a Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). By clearly stating objectives, what needs to be done in providing for the national interest drives the conversation how something should be done in achieving the national interest objective. Only once a nation determined what the ends are and the ways which ends will be achieved can a nation effectively determined the means necessary to meet the objectives. The British SDSR has this backward, and starts with means to determine what ways are on the table as an option, and only then can that square peg be shoved into the round hole of what the political ends of strategy/policy are. It is in that way the political and industrial limitations of the SDSR limit the strategic context of the SDSR itself.
The SDSR skipped the important discussions of developing strategy, mostly because it isn't about strategy at all - it is about a minimalist budget first and foremost. Something tells me the cost of such a 'strategic' approach will financially be much higher than anticipated, because all those other discussions of policy really do matter a lot. I only pray that when it comes time for a similar debate in the US, the US debate has more substance on the ends and ways of strategy than the debate in the UK has.
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