Nagorno-Karabakh Exercise

Last weekend the Patterson School, in conjunction with the Army War College, ran the latter's International Strategic Crisis Negotiation Exercise. The exercise is most often run with members of the AWC's International Fellows Program, but has also appeared at Princeton, Georgetown, and Texas A&M; in recent years. The simulation focuses on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and includes teams representing Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijian, and Nagorno-Karabakh. My latest WPR column details the purpose and course of the exercise:

The Caucasus exercise always takes place 10 years in the future. The scenario is meant to be plausible rather than predictive, and is built around the necessity of creating a compelling simulation. For the most part, the scenario involves extrapolation from current trends: Azerbaijan has enjoyed tremendous energy-driven economic growth, while Armenia has resolved some of its disputes with Turkey. Iran moderates its foreign policy, having reached an accord with the United States about its nuclear weapons program. The basics of the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation haven't changed appreciably. With the growth of Azerbaijani economic prosperity, the status quo in and around Nagorno-Karabakh has become increasingly untenable, leading to multilateral efforts to defuse the impending crisis...

the students failed to arrive at a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The Azerbaijanis were reluctant to accept a no-use-of-force pledge, while the Russians, Turks, and Americans could not agree on the constitution of a peacekeeping force. The Iranians maintained a relatively low profile, although they did react aggressively to perceived Azerbaijani brinksmanship. Efforts to create light and space between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation failed. Retired Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, who has participated in actual negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in this simulation several times, told the students, "If you find a solution, we're taking it back to Washington." Although the contours of each exercise develop along unique lines, Mr. Dion suggested that no simulation has ever culminated in a politically acceptable resolution of the problem. Indeed, the closest that the participants have ever come involved a near-abdication by Azerbaijan that would likely have resulted in significant problems for the Azerbaijani negotiating team upon its return to Baku.

The point of the exercise, however, is to highlight the importance of process. Principally, the problems result from asymmetries in interest, information, and commitment. Negotiators have a strong incentive to withhold information about the intensity and nature of their interests, in large part because others might take advantage of that information. The incentive to deceive animates all sides, narrowing the space in which agreement can be achieved. While outsiders can imagine a variety of potential settlements to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, the dynamics of negotiation make arriving at any of those outcomes difficult.