The US Navy's Submarine Numbers Challenge

Aviation Weekly's Michael Fabey is reporting on the shortage of Virginia class submarine numbers in the 30 ship plan submitted last year with the FY 2011 budget.

The Navy’s so-called 30-year shipbuilding plan, as updated for Fiscal 2009 and earlier years, showed the SSN force recovering to 48 boats by the early 2030s, the CRS pointed out. But the latest update indicated that benchmark may not be made after all. “The Navy’s new Fiscal 2011 30-year (fiscal years 2011-2040) plan shows the SSN remaining below 48 boats through 2040. The change is due to a reduction in planned SSN procurements,” CRS reported. “The Fiscal 2009 plan included procurement of 53 SSNs over 30 years, while the Fiscal 2011 plan includes procurement of 44 SSNs over 30 years.”

The reduction in SSN procurements in the Fiscal 2011 plan, the CRS reported, may be due in large part to the planned procurement of 12 next-generation SSBNs (nuclear-powered strategic ballistic-missile submarines) in Fiscal 2019-2033. “The Fiscal 2009 plan did not account for the cost of these 12 SSBNs, while the Fiscal 2011 does, apparently causing reductions in planned procurement rates for SSNs and other types of ships during that period,” the CRS reported.

You can find a copy of the CRS report here. The topic is discussed in detail beginning on page 6. The report shows a graph where the number of attack submarines bottoms out to 40 in 2029, after which the number does not reach the QDR requirement of 48 by 2040. The CRS report discusses several options that could increase the number by as many as 4 to a low mark of 44, but none of these options prevent the number of submarines from dropping below the QDR number of 48.

It is an interesting problem, but ultimately it comes down to availability of money - and there is no money available. If numbers really matter, then the only real option is to look into one option not listed in the CRS report - building smaller, reduced range conventional submarines. Absent a forward basing strategy (and we do plan on forward basing submarines in Guam, for example), I am not sure building conventional submarines is a good idea for the US.

On the other hand, if US submarine activities around Africa, South America, and Europe can be conducted effectively by conventional submarines, then perhaps now is the right time for the US Navy to build conventional submarines and base them all in the Atlantic fleet, allowing the US Navy to meet the SSN requirement for the Pacific. Now would also be a good time to make the change, as the design costs could be shared with allies like Australia who is working on building a large, conventional fleet submarine - not to mention what could be gained by working with Japan who is expanding their fleet of conventional submarines.

The one point that must be understood is that conventional submarines are not as capable as nuclear submarines. Despite the popular commentary on the internet otherwise, it really isn't even a close debate. The only way I see conventional submarines as a legitimate option is if it could be done as some sort of stimulus (with money that doesn't actually appear to exist) in addition to the existing nuclear submarine plan that falls short. Short of building a dozen conventional submarines with extra money obtained somehow, I do not see conventional submarines in the future of the US Navy even while I acknowledge there are enormous benefits to the US Navy building and operating conventional submarines.

I ultimately think the US Navy wants to reduce the requirement and use unmanned vehicles as a way to meet forward operating requirements. Given how slow unmanned technology underwater is developing, that may not be an option. Ultimately, short of a new conventional submarine program forced upon the Navy by Congress (which is not a bad idea either because it could be used as a much needed energy technology development initiative) - there may not be a solution coming from the Navy to meet the 48 attack submarine requirement as outlined by the QDR.