Because different services perform different missions, not all contribute equally to certain grand strategic tasks: The Royal Navy's contribution to the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan is severely limited, while the British army does not normally contribute to anti-piracy patrols such as those off of Somalia. Inter-service conflict focusing on resources, therefore, is about the prioritization of particular strategic goals. Each service, like any other bureaucratic organization, tends to believe that its own parochial missions fall more in line with national security goals than those of the other branches. The classic example of a resource conflict involves that of a warship versus army brigade: The units have different capabilities, perform different jobs, and suggest a different focus for national strategic priorities. Nations may find themselves forced to choose between options, but can reconcile limitations by adjusting strategic commitments.
A different kind of inter-service conflict involves mission allocation. In the last century, the need for collaboration between air, ground, and sea assets has increased dramatically. The primary driver of such integration has been the expansion of warfare into the third dimension. Aircraft now represent an organic part of most military missions, from ground assault (close air support) and interdiction (exploitation) to anti-submarine warfare and counter-sea operations. Aircraft are as necessary to the efficient and successful execution of tactical- and operational-level military tasks as infantry, armor, and artillery. However, bureaucratic walls have been erected in both the United States and the United Kingdom placing different elements of these missions in different services.
This was part of a longer piece on why inter-service conflict seems so much more bitter in the UK than in the US; long story short, the answer has more to do with the structure of government and division of power than it does with the tighter fiscal climate. This isn't to say, though, that the US services won't start bickering with one another if serious defense cuts come down. Another implication is that breaking organic elements of a particular mission (say, ASW) into separate services is a really bad idea, because the services rarely agree on prioritization. Giving the RAF responsibility for any aspect of naval air is always a bad idea because the RAF doesn't give a damn about naval air, and this failure to give a damn has dreadful consequences for the ability of the RN to do its job. I think it's clear that the answer to the question posed at the end of this article should be a resounding "no," because the RAF is exceedingly unlikely to provide useful support for the naval mission.
Finally, while I don't want to heap too much abuse on the RAF, it's not a surprise that destructive inter-service conflicts seem to most often happen on the boundaries between air forces and other services. Airpower is an integral, organic part of most modern military missions, and erecting bureaucratic service barriers between infantry and close air support makes about as much sense as creating such barriers between infantry and artillery.
No comments:
Post a Comment