Why Korean Peninsula Remains Hot

A lot of people will wake up on Wednesday and be alarmed to learn that South Korea is planning a live fire military exercise of "unprecedented scale" along the DMZ on Thursday. People might also notice the ROK 6 ship naval firing exercise that began on Tuesday and is expected to last 3 days. For those who are curious, the naval exercise is intended as practice to track, target, and sink midget submarines.

As I was watching the reaction to the lack of war outcome from the Yeonpyeong island incident I kept thinking to myself the collective sigh of relief was premature, and I also found myself very concerned that South Korea had presumed some form of victory. Thankfully with the latest developments of more exercises, sooner rather than later, South Korea still has their eye on the ball. Lets try to make sense of the last few days...

If we analyze the events of the Yeonpyeong Island exercise, all we really learned is that North Korea cannot be baited to fight on the terms of South Korea. All night as I observed the drill there were numerous reports that indicated that both South Korean and US aircraft were in the air. Open source reports from Guam indicated there was 'unusually high activity' several hours before the drill began, giving the impression the 30th air wing there had numerous bombers in the air in preparation for the ROK military exercise. To what extent the South Korean and US military's were prepared to fight is unclear, but what is clear is that the bar has been raised in terms of cost for South Korea to even hold an exercise.

And that is the point. The North Koreans can sink a naval ship and no one, including the UN Security Council, will do anything about it. The North Koreans can fire artillery into civilian neighborhoods in response to shells hitting open water not even in the direction of North Korea - even kill soldiers and civilians - and no one, including the UN Security Council, will do anything about it. Now North Korea has raised the cost of even conducting a military drill along the DMZ, something South Korea has done without incident for decades until November, to the point South Korea must scramble their Air Force just in case.

What is odd however is how we are observing events we cannot easily explain. For example, why didn't South Korea warn citizens to take shelter during the exercise? Why hasn't the US State Department not issued any sort of warning to Americans traveling to South Korea? Why hasn't the military begun the process of encouraging family members in South Korea to return to the States for reasons of safety? It is noteworthy that the travel ban on South Korean workers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex was lifted after the exercise, suggesting perhaps tensions had settled.

Then we see other acts of intentional defiance by South Korea beyond the new military exercises. For example, the giant Christmas tree along the DMZ was lit up tonight, protected by Marines, and Christmas carols sung at the site could be heard in North Korea. North Korea has threatened to destroy the Christmas tree. What comes next? More military exercises and if we are looking for another step beyond that; we might read soon that the loud speaker broadcasts of anti-regime and pro-democracy messages over the border have begun again. Previously North Korea has threatened to shoot out the speakers.

Understanding the WHYS

One might look at events and start asking lots of questions. Lets look at a few.

Why no 6-party talks? That answer comes in an excellent interview over at the Wall Street Journal blog with Gordon Flake (part 1 and part 2).

WSJ: Is there any chance of getting back to the six-party talks?

Mr. Flake: There’s no short-term prospect for going back. There is a reason to go back. It’s a nuance that’s hard to grab, but here it is.

The six-party talks is not about a format right now. It’s about a set agreement. The fundamental question is: Is North Korea a nuclear power or not?

North Korea claims they are a nuclear power. They assert that they must be negotiated with as a nuclear power and that one day they will talk about theoretical denuclearization, but that’s mutual, with the U.S. doing it, as well as leaving the alliance with South Korea and going away from the South.

North Korea says pi-hae-kwa. We translate that as denuclearization. But they are explicit about what they mean. To them, it means being recognized as a nuclear power first, getting a peace treaty and all their issues solved and way down the road we will have a mutual disarmament discussion as an equal.

But the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement from the six-party talks says the exact opposite. It says North Korea is one of 180 other members of the NPT, that they must abandon all existing nuclear weapons and programs and return at an early date to the IAEA. And North Korea agreed to that. They agreed to unilateral disarmament, being a normal nation and part of the NPT.

The reason we won’t abandon the six-party talks is the U.S. is going to hold North Korea to the commitment they made in that process. The real problem with the six-party talks right now is the danger that the U.S. and South Korea are going to be portrayed as being obstacles to restarting it because we have preconditions. That’s what some people seem to be saying. Everybody [in Washington and Seoul] is being careful to say we don’t have preconditions for the talks. The question is what are the talks?

North Korea’s position is we’ll come to the six-party talks as a nuclear power. Those aren’t the six-party talks. The six-party talks are about the denuclearization of North Korea and they’re about the implementation of the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement, which North Korea rejects. The real precondition, if you want to call it that, is that they agree to the terms of the talks.

This is the other reason why the Chinese proposal for an emergency meeting of the six-party powers over the Yeonpyeong incident was just rejected out of hand. It conflates two different things.

Why is South Korea conducting more military exercises? For that we turn to Robert Haddick at the Small Wars Journal.

South Korea called the North’s bluff and the North folded its hand, at least for now. The South boosted its leverage in several ways. First, it evacuated civilians on the island and in other forward locations. Second, it waited for clear weather and put F-15 fighter-bombers in the air, presumably in preparation for counter-battery strikes against North Korean artillery positions. Finally, about 20 U.S. soldiers participated in the exercise as observers, or more accurately as “trip-wires” for a U.S. retaliatory response against the North. The North’s leaders likely concluded that in this case they did not possess escalation dominance. The North has exposed itself as a bluffer and will have to run much greater risks in the future to reestablish its reputation for ferocity.

This weekend’s drama was a breakthrough for the South Korean government. Previous sable-rattling by the North typically resulted in multilateral negotiations, which usually concluded with some kind of payoff for the North in exchange for promises of future good behavior. The South Korean government now has an opportunity to break from that pattern.

I disagree with some of the other points that Mr. Haddick makes in that article, but on this point he has it right. The military drill over the weekend was intended to shape a conclusion that gave a sense of shifting political momentum. I am not in full belief that this momentum is real, but in politics perception is often enough to skew what is and isn't real. South Korea finds itself backed into a corner, losing in every effort, and needing to reset conditions back to normal. For awhile, that new normal will include tension, but after the deaths of 48 military personnel and 2 civilians, not to mention the incalculable political damage caused by an attack against South Korean soil, expect a lot of hard line diplomacy until conditions reset.

Where does the US and China fit into ongoing events? This is where it starts getting tougher, because one might conclude the US is winning and China is losing. Short term, this appears true. Following the Cheonan sinking incident we have seen Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and South Korea all seeking security arrangements with strategic partners like the US, India, and Russia as an alternative to China in the region. Those efforts are counter to stated Chinese goals of regional hegemony, and are not insignificant. I have not seen evidence, yet, that China's reaction to the latest attack by North Korea against South Korea has strengthened China's image with their neighbors as a responsible actor towards regional security. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of China in the latest crisis is that the US is no longer talking about China in the role of an indifferent bystander, but in statements appears to be holding China partly responsible.

With that said, I think Hugh White's analysis at The Lowy Institute Interpreter blog highlights the dangers for the US in the evolving situation.

We might assume that China has failed because its aim has been to demonstrate its power by controlling North Korea, or expand its influence by wooing South Korea, or both. But China has never claimed to control North Korea; it is the US that promotes the idea that Beijing has such control. So why should China see controlling North Korea as a test of its power, when they judge that America cannot control it either? Beijing may calculate that America's rash and easily falsifiable implication that it can stop further Northern provocations will make America look weak and China look wise.

Likewise, I don't think it has ever been part of China's plan to woo South Korea by promising to protect it from the North. Beijing's major card with Seoul is not its ability to control Pyongyang's actions today, but its central role in managing the consequences of the North's presumed eventual collapse. When Pyongyang crumbles, China will decide what happens, and Seoul will have to rely on Beijing to help manage the crisis and facilitate South Korea's absorption of the North. That remains true today, and it gives Beijing a strong hand to play.

In fact, I have a hunch — nothing more - that China's refusal to even condemn North Korea may have been intended to punish South Korea for its recent lean towards Washington. Beijing wants to remind Seoul that there is nothing much Washington can do to help when push comes to shove on the Peninsula. The message to Seoul is, 'Do not think you can cosy up to Washington and still expect us to jump when you call. If you want our help with North Korea, you need to lean back towards us. In the end, we are more use to you than America.'

That message might well have some traction in Seoul if, next time Pyongyang misbehaves, Washington does no more than talk tough again.

All three articles look at the events unfolding on the Korean Peninsula, and all three authors see the unfolding situation differently. I still believe there is an effort underway, either by South Korea or by the United States, to get back at North Korea for the attacks this year. When I hear news reports of an impending nuclear test in March, I can't help but think that sets a time line by which we will see some random action take place that has incredibly negative consequences for North Korea, but is very difficult if not impossible to trace back to any specific country like South Korea or the United States - even though everyone will know it was one, the other, or both. I would not immediately expect such random action to be military in nature.

Perhaps my analysis is callous, but I do not see the present situation as defused and I do see the situation getting much more tense before a format for official diplomatic negotiations is even discussed by South Korea, Japan, or the United States. The crisis on the Korean Peninsula will continue to be one of calculated steps that involves a number of public demonstrations of military power and plenty of bellicose statements from all sides.

Ultimately, I do not expect any military confrontations between South Korea and North Korea until at least after Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington, DC in January, no matter how many military exercises South Korea conducts. It is also important to note that the unofficial New York channel for diplomacy has been reopened. This might be important to events because if North Korea conducts a military action while engaged in negotiation, the consequences would be devastating for prospects of any future diplomacy for a long time - and diplomatic concessions for food, among other things, is something North Korea needs in the short term.

The one diplomatic issue that seems to be on everyones mind is the sale of the 12,000 plutonium fuel rods to South Korea. This concession by North Korea is very being hard to believe, but it is also outrageous to believe that South Korea should buy these fuel rods from North Korea after recent events. The best way I see the diplomatic ball moving down the court is if the US can somehow convince China to purchase and remove all 12,000 plutonium fuel rods. In order for this crisis to end well, somehow the US and China have to get on the same page on at least one of the major North Korean issues on the table. If China purchases the fuel rods and disposes of them, that action helps build up China's credibility as being committed to regional security.