Western European Navies (week 34)

Denmark
HDMS Esbern Snare, the current flagship of SNMG1, averted a pirate attack off the coast of Somalia last Saturday. SNMG1 is currently involved in NATO operation Ocean Shield.

The exercise DANEX 2010 has ended.

HDMS Søløven, the newest ship of the Flyvefisken class patrol vessels, will be converted to a training vessel for divers. She will replace the much smaller HDMS Læsø. The ship is expected to rejoing the fleet mid-2011.

Finland
One of the new minehunters of the MITO class has been christened.

France
A Lynx from the Royal Navy was stationed aboard a french frigate, during exercise DANEX 2010.

Germany
The political discussion about the future of the German defence forces has officially started.

The Netherlands
HNLMS Amsterdam has left for Somalia to join Operation Atalanta.

HNLMS De Zeven Provincien has left operation Ocean Shield in Somalia and to join Operation Active Endeavour in the mediterenean.

If the current coalition talks will actually result in a new government, the military will be happy. The parties involved in the talks have agreed upon a €300 million cut for defence. This is only a fraction of what people feared.

UK
The 7,400t HMS Astute, the UK's newest nuclear submarine, has been commissioned.

Four MCMV's from the UK, together with four from the US, will do a 10 day exercise in the Gulf. RFA Lyme Bay has joined as an afloat headquarters.

Other
Open Spirit 2010, the mine clearance exercise in the Baltic Sea has started and will last until September 8. A 2008 survey estimated there are still 80,000 mines in the Baltic Sea.

The Stack of Stuff

Due to a slight delay in the schedule of the good folks working on my house, my internet access is currently very limited at the moment - meaning I am blogging from my phone (not cool).

Hopefully the huge stack of articles on my laptop will start publishing over the weekend. Sorry for the unexpected break in blog content.

-Raymond

Published with Blogger-droid v1.5.5.2

A Brit Responds...

I received the following via email from a knowledgeable Brit overnight, and I contacted the author and received his permission anonymously to post his view of my post yesterday on the RUSI article.  My responses are interspersed in bold.



Dear Mr McGrath,

I read your comments on the Information Dissemination website regarding the RUSI paper on the future of the Royal Navy and I have to disagree with your suggestion that the authors, Blackham and Prins, failed to make the case for the size of the fleet.

You seem to be assuming that because the US Navy is now the primary naval power in the world that other nations should just rely on them to keep the seas open. But as you say geography matters, the UK is an island nation, its security depends on trade via the sea, is this not argument enough to have a strong navy irrespective of the strength of its allies?

It is an argument--but is it sufficient argument to obtain the funding required?  And I'm prepared to listen to an argument that says the UK shouldn't depend on the US to keep the seas open--but I'm not hearing that argument.  If I did, I would then hope that the force structure requirement put forward would be substantially larger than the one discussed in Blackham and Prins article, because keeping the seas open is a much bigger job than the even Blackham and Prins are resourcing.

The comparisons with Australia are ones that should be made because Canberra has recently gained an appreciation of what seapower can do, something that the British hierarchy has forgotten. Just because the UK is farther away from the Asian region does not mean its security is not affected by events there. 




I don't disagree that the British hierarchy has forgotten its appreciation for what Seapower can do, I just don't get a sense of how the RN will use it to contribute to security and stability in Asia.  What is the requirement?  An Asian squadron, forward deployed 365 days a year?  Presumably though, the Australian Seapower requirement would differ--greatly--from the UK requirement because of proximity.

As Blackham and Prins point out there are various choke points through which seaborne trade has to pass and these must be kept open. As an island nation to leave this job to other powers would be irresponsible.


Again, I'd like to see this argument made--the argument that the UK can't leave the protection of the world's sea lanes to the US.  But it isn't being made because protecting sea lanes these days is as much a power projection mission as a sea control mission, given the proliferating ability of coastal nations to exercise sea control from the shore (the return of shore artillery, so to speak).  Making a freedom of the seas argument requires a vastly larger force structure than the Exchequer can provide, and politically, it doesn't hold water given the fact that your closest ally is currently doing the job.  

Ultimately the US does not rely on overseas trade as much as the UK. Geographically the US has the capability to feed its own population and produce its own materials, and if it likes can reduce its navy to a coastal force and disengage from international affairs - which is what it did successfully until the early 1900s.


Shhhh.....be quiet or the US Army might hear you...here our interlocutor has stumbled onto an interesting argument--that there is a certain "Seapower hedge" that must be maintained on the chance that the US walks away from its role as guarantor of the global system.  Yes--on this basis (UK as an island nation, imports lots of stuff by sea, what if America became isolationist?)--there is a rationale for maintaining an RN with the capability to guarantee movement of materials necessary to support its economy.  It is however, one that UK politicians simply don't seem to be buying; for the moment, the US seems to be quite happy spending $600B a year (base budget) on defense including roughly 28% of that on Naval power.  Absent additional signs of the US walking away from its role, UK politicians have ample reason to turn the RN into a domestic bill-payer. 

In deciding the size of the Royal Navy you must take into account what jobs it is expected to do. Securing global trade routes (with or without the US) requires X number of frigates. Providing a carrier strike and an amphibious assault capability requires X number of destroyers and support ships etc. Protecting overseas territories, patrolling the Horn of Africa, providing minesweepers for the Gulf and other tasks all require more frigates and OPVs.


I agree--however, I see neither a "with or without the US" argument being put forward or the force structure to back it up.

The case for the nuclear deterrent is again that the UK does not want to rely on the Americans, it is also about industrial capabilities, independence of action, a seat at the UN Security Council and all manner of other influences that are not just purely military.


The wag in me would suggest that maintaining the nuclear deterrent is driven as much by the French (having one) as it is by any deterrent value.  But if maintaining it is the table stakes for playing as a permanent member of the UNSC, it should (as the RUSI authors indicate) not be funded out of the RN's budget to the detriment of its other responsibilities.

The Strategic Defence and Security Review will look at all the above mentioned tasks and undoubtedly will make some hard decisions about what the UK should and shouldn’t do. Ultimately the question will be asked about what the UK wants to do by itself and what it wants to do with allies. 


I agree.  Much of what you've written seems to indicate that some in the UK want to be able to keep the sea lanes open without the US, but the force structure put forward is pitifully underweight for such a mission. 

What Blackham and Prins are saying is that the Royal Navy is under strength for its existing commitments and that cuts under SDSR should fall on the other services. This is a document designed for the eyes of decision-makers in Whitehall and a way of attempting to show the Ministry of Defence that the navy is the best tool for a cheaper and flexible way of providing defence for the UK.

We are in perfect agreement here.  I do believe that the RN is under strength for its existing commitments.  I do believe it is less capable of protecting its overseas possessions than it should be and I do believe that cuts should fall more heavily on the other services (an argument I've made here in the US).  I do not however, believe keeping the world's sea lanes open is an RN responsibility; if the UK wishes to carve out a portion of it (some percentage, perhaps), I think that would be more effective that the politically dead in the water option of saying "well, what if the Americans go away?"

Bryan McGrath

On the Continuing Decline of the Royal Navy

RUSI has a new paper out by Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham and Gwyn Prins, in which they take on the unenviable task of advocating for Seapower in the UK.  This isn't the team's first crack at the subject, as their paper "The Royal Navy at the Brink" made quite a splash in early 2007.  I say unenviable, as the budget crunch facing much of Europe and the US is putting a good deal of pressure on the UK defense establishment, especially the Royal Navy.

There is a lot to like in their narrative--I find myself often wishing more American Seapower advocates wrote like this--but I have a tough time getting my mind around the logic. 

What I don't get from their analysis is "what size Navy does the UK need?".  I understand that they believe the one they have is too small and aging; but what I don't discern is a solid understanding of how to appropriately size the UK's fleet?  I have some passing familiarity with the logic of US Navy fleet sizing--but if anyone can lay out how the UK's fleet size is determined, I'd be grateful.

I ask, because if I were a subject of the Queen, I'd wonder what it is our (the Royal) Navy does.  I'd ask this, because I'd have some sense of that behemoth across the Atlantic--the Americans and their Navy.  Doesn't the US guarantee the passage of goods on the worlds oceans?  Isn't it American Seapower that serves to regulate the global system?  While we do some important things, aren't those things mainly in support of the Americans?  Can the Royal Navy make an intellectually coherent argument for itself as a "sea control" fleet?  If so, how much sea should it control, and where?  Just why is it that the UK has a strategic deterrent force on ballistic missile submarines?  Does the money the RN spends on that deterrent interfere with its ability to do other naval missions that it considers important? 

Put another way, I think Blackham and Prins do a fantastic job in justifying American Seapower--they simply don't make a persuasive case for UK Seapower.  Their comparisons to Australia and its rationale for enhanced Seapower are undercut by the plain fact that Australia is sharing a hemisphere with the most important geo-strategic challenge to the Anglo-American world since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Geography matters.

I'm not saying there isn't a compelling case for the RN--just that these authors aren't making it. Only one great power at a time gets to make the "sustaining the global system" argument, and at the moment, it is the US.  The RN needs to define itself differently.

Bryan McGrath

Colonel Gentile and Professor Layne On Our Afghan Strategy

I almost hesitate to post this, as I want to do nothing to discourage Colonel Gentile from continuing his lonely "Jihad" against the COINistas in the Army.  His arguments about the strategic emptiness of our current COIN fascination are at the heart of  the emerging Seapower/ Maritime Grand Strategy debate.

Of interest also is Christopher Layne's excellent editorial questioning the current strategy in Afghanistan, which includes this insightful closing paragraph:

"On its own terms, COIN is a problematic policy. Even more worryingly, it sets exactly the wrong grand strategic priorities for the United States. In an ironic coincidence, the same morning leading newspapers carried reports of Gen. Petraeus' remarks, another headline announced that China has overtaken Japan as the world's second largest economic power and is on track to overtake the U.S. by 2030 (indeed perhaps as soon as 2020, according to many leading experts). In the early 21st century, East Asia is becoming the world's geopolitical and economic fulcrum, and it is U.S. air and naval power that will be needed to meet the emerging challenge from China. That is where America's long-term grand strategic interests lie —- not in fighting futile Eurasian land wars in places like Afghanistan and Iraq."

Bryan McGrath

Delaying the LCS Down-select Decision

News here of the Navy slipping the expected (July/August) down-select in the LCS program until "the fall".  I'm sure there are a thousand good reasons the Navy feels it has to do this, but none of them make the Navy look especially competent in administering this program.

UPDATE:  Whoops--didn't see G had already posted on this--though he and I might not be in total accord.

Bryan McGrath

LCS Decision Delayed

It looks like we will have to wait a little longer before the Navy picks the winner of the Littoral Combat Ship competition. Chris Cavas at Defense News has the story. I think everyone was expecting the announcement sometime over the next month...

But the Navy, in a statement released Monday afternoon, announced it will request Final Proposal Revisions (FPRs) "soon" from competing firms Lockheed Martin and Austal USA.

"The Navy anticipates that FPRs will be received in September 2010, and will require that these revised offers remain valid for 90 days," the service said in its statement.

Cmdr. Victor Chen, a spokesman for the service's acquisition department, could not give a specific date for the FPRs to be turned in. If the responses are received by Sept. 30, the service would then presumably have until Dec. 30 to announce its decision.

This is a positive, not negative, development. There are so many talking points about this program that annoy intelligent people that at some point, the Navy needs to be more realistic when engaged in the Littoral Combat Ship discussion. We saw a little of that by VADM Harvey when he testified in front of the House in response to the Balisle report.

Slow down - take your time - make the right decision. I roll my eyes every time I hear a flag officer suggest we are going to build 55 Littoral Combat Ships (no chance, just because this CNO is unable to be realistic, don't expect the next one to be unrealistic too), but I am in full support of the current plan for two contracts to build 10 and 5 in two yards. I don't know if it will actually save money as has been suggested, but because I believe we will build about 20-25 of these platforms as a first run I see long term potential value giving more than one prime contractor and more than one shipyard experience building smaller surface combatants.

Whenever the Navy can slow down in this program without increasing costs of the program - I support the decision. The ship might be touted for its speed, but it is the speed of the program that has long raised greater concern with me. Better to get it done right than get it done fast.

Western European Navies (week 33)

As I explained in my introduction, Galrahn asked me to bring some European eyes to the blog.
To do that, I'm going to experiment (to see how much interest there is in this topic) with a 'Western European Navies' weekly, to show what is happening on this side of the Atlantic.
The 'Western European' part is because I don't understand the Eastern European languages. And there will also be 2 Western countries that will be (mostly) absent from my news clippings: Finland and Greece. Their languages differ so much from the other western european languages that I can't make heads or tails of it.
Because I'm Dutch, expect too see a disproportionate amount of news from the Netherlands.

Most of the news I will be blogging about, will come from the Navy websites from these European countries. To go through the (major) news sites of every country every week is just undoable.

Denmark

Exercise DANEX 2010 is a national Danish naval exercise with the participation of foreign units.

The exercise is conducted from 16 to 26 August in the Baltic Sea around the island of Bornholm, in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

The goal of this exercise is to train the units in cooperation in coastal operations in an out of area environment, focusing on operations that take place in unstable regions. This exercise is divided into two phases.

The main object through both phases is to let the units experience and train working in a multinational naval force. During the first phase the units train cooperation conducted by a serialized program and during the second phase, the units work out in a free play, while the level is intensified during the exercise.

Nearly 30 ships from 12 different nations, including the one of NATO standing mine forces Standing Naval Mine Countermeassure group 1 (SNMCMG1) will participate in DANEX 10.

Furthermore a number of helicopters and aircraft from Denmark, England and Germany will contribute. Finally, a large number of other Navy units such as Frogman Corps, Naval Districts, Naval Weapons Course and the Naval Operational Logistics Support Centre participate in a range of contributions, all of which provide exercise participants opportunity to discover more facets of being part of a multinational operation environment.

The website for the exercise is in English.

France
The Mistral sale isn't proceeding as planned, see Galrahn's article here.

Germany
Germany is thinking about reducing their armed forces with 33% and ending conscription. The navy might shrink from 16,000 to 11,500 in personnel numbers.

The State Attorney in Hamburg wants to prosecute the pirates who attacked the MV Taipan for attempted murder.

The Netherlands
The navy has launched a new website called 'in the middle of the navy'. It might be interesting because it is essentially a video documentary (in 7 episodes of a couple of minutes) about HNLMS Tromp during Operation Atalanta. This was the ship that freed the MV Taipan, so I'm hoping for some new footage on that in the episode that launches on 3 September.

HNLMS De Zeven Provincien has prevented a pirate attack off the Somali coast. This is NATO operation Ocean Shield and suddenly you can only find the news in the Dutch press. Looks like the EU is doing a better PR job than NATO, with their website on Operation Atalanta.

Damen Schelde have signed a contract worth $220 million with Indonesia to build a 2,400t frigate at the PT Pal shipyard in Indonesia. This is important for Damen (who are at the moment the sole builder of warships for the Dutch), because Indonesia's frigates are ageing, so this may become the first of a series.

Portugal
With the decomissioning of the Albacora, Portugal has no more submarines in its inventory. This will only last until 8 September, when the Tridente (a Type 214) will join the Portuguese navy.

Spain
The Spanish LPD Galicia has left for Operation Atalanta. It will be interesting to see how the Spanish will operate their LPD compared to what the Dutch did with their LPD HNLMS Johan de Witt.

United Kingdom
The much plagued Sea Viper has hit its first target in the Mediteranean. Sea trials are planned aboard the new Type 45 destroyer HNLMS Dauntless for later this year.

The UK is still busy discussing the future of its armed forces. This offcourse, includes the navy.

The UK MoD has accepted the PASCAT (Partial Air Cushion Supported CATamaran), a new type of landing craft, as a trials vessel.

Securing American Maritime Boundaries

When I started my blog Information Dissemination in 2007, I made the conscious decision to use a pseudonym from my days as an iRCop - Galrahn. The intention behind using a nickname was to focus the readers attention on the content of what was being written, rather than who was doing the writing. The maritime services - and indeed topics like maritime strategy and maritime security - are topics where the details are important to insiders but can sometimes be boring to average Americans. The citizens of our country no longer feel the same connection to the ocean as it relates to our livelihood as Americans once did in the early years of our country. I can be a long-winded writer though, and my tactic was to suck people into my message with just enough information to be insightful, educational, and hopefully interesting and entertaining. Like all bloggers - my success rates may vary.

My inspiration behind using a nickname was my favorite founding father and fellow New Yorker Alexander Hamilton, who along with James Madison and John Jay published the Federalist Papers from fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788. On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had approved a new constitution and sent it to the Continental Congress, which ten days later sent it to the states for ratification. It was a difficult period for America in those first years after the Revolutionary War - the country was broke and heavily in debt; and Congress under the Articles of Confederation had no power to raise funds. Our founding fathers believed the federal system under the Articles of Confederation was fatally flawed, and the country would not survive without a stronger federal system.

It was Alexander Hamilton's idea to publish a series of essays urging ratification of the new Constitution, and he threw himself into the work producing 51 individual essays in four months. James Madison added 29 and John Jay wrote 5. All were published under the pseudonym "Publius." The Federalist papers, as they are known today, were printed in four New York newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788.

In his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, Ian W. Toll describes how the Federalist papers revealed the importance of maritime security in the minds of our founding fathers.

Hamilton's Federalist essays made a ringing case for "active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine." (No. 11) It was America's destiny to trade by sea, and "the little arts of the little politicians" could never "control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature." The major Europeans powers were determined to suppress the growth of American trade -- to "clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." If America was serious about asserting her maritime rights and protecting her hard-won independence, "we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy." (No. 24) Madison pointed to the vulnerability of the nation's long, unfortified coastline. Those living near the sea, north and south, should be "deeply interested in this provision for naval protection." (No. 41) Without a navy to defend them, they were vulnerable to the "predatory spirit of licentious adventurers," and would sooner or later be "compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders."

Today these words are even more applicable, indeed with 90% of the worlds trade taking place by sea today - there remains an inherent bond between freedom and access to the sea and the United States of America. Today is the first day of Homeland Security 2020: The Future of Defending the Homeland conference at the Heritage Foundation. The panels for the day will include:

1000-1100: Defending Domestic Waters: U.S. Maritime Security Policies

Mr. Michael Barrett, President of Diligent Innovations and former Director of Strategy, Homeland Security Council, White House

Mr. Adam Salerno, Senior Manager, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

1100-1200: Programs, platforms, and People: Public Sector Capabilities for 2020

VADM Terry Cross, USCG (Ret), Vice President for Homeland Security Programs, EADS-NA, and former USCG Vice Commandant

Dr. Steve Bucci, Associate Partner and Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global; former DASD for Homeland Defense and Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

America's Maritime Challenge

The CIA World Factbook lists the land boundaries of the United States as 12,034 kilometers (7,477 miles), and the coastline as 19,924 km (12,380 miles). The CIA World Factbook breaks down the land boundaries further to include 8,893km (5,526 miles) for Canada (including 2,477 km or 1,539 miles with Alaska), and 3,141km (1,951 miles) for Mexico.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lists the US coastline as 12,383 miles. Most organizations who use geography figures of the US coast line cite the numbers provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration instead of the CIA Factbook, but maybe the CIA knows something about those 3 miles that the rest of us don't know?

The Learning Network has a breakdown of coastline length by state using the 12,383 mile coastline figures of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 12,383 miles of United States coast line includes 2,069 miles of Atlantic coastline, 1,631 miles of Gulf coastline, 7,623 miles of Pacific coastline, and 1,060 miles of Arctic coastline along Alaska's northern border.

Following 9/11 the US government gave priority to port security as the maritime defense layer in most need of security. While Congress has passed legislation to protect America’s ports, it’s important to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation passed, as well as that of intelligence measures taken since 9/11. 90% of the worlds trade is transported by sea, and an attack on a major port would have serious economic impacts to America. In every maritime security conference I have been to, port security is usually the first and foremost topic.

But in the conference at the Heritage Foundation today I hope to learn more about three other topics that I believe requires the constant attention of our national political leaders if they are to truly address the dynamic change of the maritime security environment around our nations maritime borders.

The Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard is a national treasure, but it is also taking on water at a phenomenal rate. The material condition of the Coast Guard has long passed the tipping point, and the funding necessary to provide the manpower and training for the US Coast Guard to address the emerging roles and missions of the 21st century has not been provided. It is a real credit to the men and women of the US Coast Guard that they are able to do what they do, because every single day they are - in my opinion - carrying more responsibility with less money provided than any agency in the Federal government today.

The budget and size of the Coast Guard is out-of-sync with the responsibilities being tasked. According to a recent tally by Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., in the past 35 years Congress has handed the agency at least 27 new responsibilities. Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf, the Obama administration planned to cut Coast Guard personnel by 773, decommission five large cutters, retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance aircraft, retire five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five 90-person marine safety and security teams next year. Following the BP oil spill, Congress has added minor increases to personnel end-strength for offshore oil monitoring, canceled the elimination of around 1,100 billets, and decreased the number of ships and aircraft scheduled for decommissioning. These adjustments are token changes and fall well short of what is necessary to strengthen the Coast Guard.

The FY 2011 budget for the Coast Guard is $10.1 billion (PDF) - 4% less than the FY 2010 budget. The Acquisition & Construction budget in FY 2011 for the entire Coast Guard is $1.536 billion - about 70% the shipbuilding cost of a single US Navy destroyer. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard. The US Coast Guard operates 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters is 41 years old.

“No amount of maintenance can outpace the ravages of age,” retired Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said in a recent speech. “The condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate, putting our crews at risk and jeopardizing our ability to do the job.” Of the 12 major cutters assigned to Haiti relief operations, 10 of the cutters (87%) suffered mission-altering breakdowns. In the immediate hours following the explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, no less than 3 Coast Guard aircraft were unable to respond due to maintenance problems. In February of 2010, Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation made an applicable analogy:

The mismatched demands of the nation and the President’s budget cuts for the Coast Guard are unacceptable. One can only imagine the outcome—and outrage—if 83 percent of the fleet assigned to the Battle of Midway had to return to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs. The Coast Guard should not be held to lower standards.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON explosion is only one symptom of a larger problem related to the Coast Guard being able to meet the responsibilities they have been tasked by our national leaders, and the Gulf oil spill is only a taste of the real economic disaster that awaits any nation with insufficient capabilities in maritime security and protection.

Technology Evolutions

In November of 2006, a Coast Guard cutter operating 100 miles off Costa Rica observed a strange blur in the water. Upon investigation, spotters on the cutter observed what appeared to be several snorkels poking up out of the water. It turned out to be a self-propelled, semisubmersible built in the jungles of Colombia carrying 3 tons of cocaine. Nicknamed "Bigfoot" the simisubmersible is now on display at Truman Annex, Naval Air Station Key West in Florida.

In 2009 officials estimated that 70 such simisubmersibles are now being constructed every year, and it is estimated only 14% are interdicted as they transfer narcotics from source to destination. In 2009 simisubmersibles were believed to carry 30% of Columbia's total cocaine exports. The cost to build a drug smuggling simisubmersible is around $500,000, and simisubmersibles are only used for a single trip. However, it is a remarkably affordable way to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value.

In the 21st century, the rate of technological change drug cartels and other non-state actors have demonstrated is remarkable. In just the last 10 years, the drug trade has gone from go-fast speed boats to simisubmersibles to - as recently discovered in July 2010 in Ecuador - full midget submarine technology. Leveraging tides that ebb and flow through the rivers and tributaries in South America, simisubmersibles and submarines are being constructed well away from the coast in swamp areas sometimes as much as a hundred miles inland.

At roughly 30m long, the drug smuggling midget submarine found in Ecuador is roughly the same size as the midget submarine suspected of sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, albeit far less sophisticated than its North Korean counterpart. Leveraging off the shelf technologies like the Hummingbird depth finder and GPS technologies, Jay Bergman, Andean regional director for the DEA, told CNN the submarine costs about $4 million to build. As a fully submersible submarine capable of carrying 10 tons of cocaine and reusable unlike its simisubmersible counterparts, one can see how the full submarine approach would be more cost effective - thus more likely to be used - by drug cartels in the future.

Now that midget submarines have transitioned from a theoretical capability used off the US coast to an actual capability to be used off the US coast, how does this influence the resource and training plans of the US Coast Guard? If the drug cartels are already using submarine technologies, what happens when organizations with more nefarious plans than smuggling narcotics develop these capabilities to use off the shores of the United States? The United States is not only unprepared for these types of challenges, there is little evidence that Congress is taking the rapid technological evolution of maritime threats seriously. Asking tough questions about US Coast Guard sonar technologies and training highlights the significance of the challenge the US faces today - much less the near future.

America's Arctic Problem

In September of 2008 the MV Camilla Desgagnés, owned by Desgagnés Transarctik Inc., transported cargo from Montreal to the hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Kugluktuk, Gjoa Haven and Taloyoak through the Northwest Passage. The transit marked the first time supplies were delivered to communities in western Nunavut from an Eastern port.

In 2009 two German ships, the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight left the Russian port of Vladivostok with cargo picked up in South Korea bound for Holland. The traditional route for the ships would have been through the western Pacific towards the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean over to the Suez Canal, and out through the Strait of Gibraltar up to Holland for a total of roughly 11,000 nautical miles (12,658 miles). Using the Northeast Passage over Russia, the ships cut ~4,000 nautical miles from that trip and saved roughly $300,000 - of which $100,000 was in fuel savings alone. With permission from Russia to make the trip, the nuclear powered icebreaker 50 Years Since Victory escorted the two freighters through the Northeast Passage.

Last week the Barents Observer reported that the 100,000 ton tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk loaded with gas condensate for China escorted by 3 nuclear powered icebreakers. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker will take the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia. The Northeast Passage will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken around Africa, as a 100,000 ton tankers are too large for the Suez canal.

As the Northwest and Northeast Passages open up new sea trade opportunities, it is important to note that regardless of which route is taken, both routes will increase the number of ships transiting in US waters - as both routes require ships to pass through the Bering Strait. Alaska has 1,060 miles of Arctic Ocean coastline of which any vessel utilizing the Northwest Passage will transit through. What the United States does not have today is any operational heavy icebreakers to escort and insure safety of navigation in those icy waters.

The Coast Guard has two heavy polar icebreakers — Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11). The Polar Star is not operational and has been in what is called "caretaker status" since July 1, 2006. Congress has provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years, and the Coast Guard expects Polar Star reactivation to be completed by 2013.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine problem and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. That leaves the United States currently without any operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard also operates a third polar icebreaker — Healy — which entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, the medium polar icebreaker Healy has less icebreaking capability but more capability for supporting scientific research - and is primarily used supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With 1,060 miles of Alaskan Arctic coastline, and by international law the United States claims out to 200 miles of that coastline to be part of the American economic exclusion zone; how can our nation afford to have ZERO operational heavy icebreakers today? If I had a penny for every time I have heard a news anchor or politician say "Global Warming" on Television, our nation could buy 10 heavy icebreakers - and yet in 2010 we have none.

The Arctic policy of the United States has no political leadership at all, because there isn't a single US politician who would take responsibility for a policy we have no capabilities today to enforce policy with. There is significant global economic potential should either the Northwest or Northeast Passages become a viable sea trade route between Europe and Asia, which means the shipping industry will be exploring these trade routes over the next few years. While politicians in America will openly discuss scientific theory related to global warming, there is a tangible economic and maritime boundary issue for the United States taking place in plain sight today related to climate changes impact to global maritime commerce trade patterns that could result in US territory - the Bering Strait - becoming a crowded sea trade choke point in the very near future. The US economic exclusion zone off the Alaskan coastline is a marine resource, a potential energy resource, and a possible economic trade resource that the United States must be prepared to protect.

The condition of the United States Coast Guard, the technology evolutions by non-state actors and criminals in the 21st century, and the missing-in-action US Arctic Policy represent three homeland security concerns along our nations maritime borders that are evolving at a pace greater than our nations political leaders in Washington are adapting. I look forward to the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security 2020 event today in hopes that these issues are discussed thoughtfully and inform our national leaders on how the United States can best address these and other emerging challenges off our nations shorelines.

A more indepth look at Chinese maritime law enforcement

I've spent sometime the last couple of days preparing for a more informative post on cutters from different Chinese coast guard/maritime surveillance agencies. This is my attempt at a comprehensive look at Chinese maritime enforcement.

I would say that a good place to start is by looking at the Law Enforcement Cutters section of the Sinodefence Naval Vessel Page. Generally speaking, there are five agencies with a large hand in China's maritime law enforcement. The picture below shows the agencies and what is the prefix for their ship names.


The first one listed in there is the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The CMS has the primary mission of patrolling China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A 2008 report in China Daily revealed that CMS had a total of nine aircraft and more than 200 patrol vessels. The largest CMS ship right now is Haijian-83. It is in 3000 ton class and here is an article on it

That is followed by the 1500-ton Haijian-51. This ship has gotten into numerous confrontations with the Japanese over at East China Sea.

The 1200-ton Haijian-27 (aka 1000t-class Type II) cutter.


The 1150-ton Haijian-17/46 (aka 1000t-class Type I) cutter


A new 600-ton design


There are more ships in CMS, but these are just an example of the ships. It also recently received two ships that used to be Type-037 patrol boats for PLAN.

In October 2008, CMS Deputy Director Sun Shuxian declared that, “The [CMS] force will be upgraded to a reserve unit under the navy, a move which will make it better armed during patrols … the current defensive strength of CMS is inadequate”. CMS has stepped up patrol in both South and East China Sea. The build-up in South China Sea is really significant because it comes on the heel of large PLAN SSF build-up and China's recent elevation of South China Sea to Tibet/Taiwan in terms of Sovereignty discussions. We all know about the numerous confrontations between China and USN in this area recently. We have also read about numerous issues with Vietnamese in the same area. It looks like CMS' desires to take over many of the duties currently conducted by SSF as that fleet is moving further blue sea. The diagram below is the organization of the South Sea branch of CMS.


Probably the more significant part is the tremendous expansion that is currently under way for CMS's South Sea branch. According to a June 2009 article, they are planning more cutters of 4000t, 1500t and 1000t class. In fact, we've already seen the first 1000t-class Type II launched in HP shipyard as Haijian-75. At the same time, a 1500t-class cutter is under construction next to the 5th 054A in the dry dock of HP. Rumour is that HP will build a total of 4 1000t-class, 2 1500t-class and 1 4000t-class. Either way, we are seeing a huge expansion of CMS.

The second listed ministry is the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and its ships begin with the prefix YuZheng. FLEC is given the task of preventing illegal fishing activities in China’s coastal fisheries. The largest FLEC vessel to this date is YuZheng-88. It is actually converted from replenishment ship 888 that had just entered PLAN SSF a few years ago, so this is a 15,000t-class ship.

There are also several other large cutters in service like the 2500t-class Yuzheng-310 and 4000t-class Yuzheng-311


There are several other larger cutters like Yuzheng301 and Yuzheng303




The third listed ministry is the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of the Ministry of Transport. Its ships begin with the prefix Haixun or Haibiao. In terms of manpower, MSA exceeds any of the other maritime enforcement agencies with over 20,000 personnel, reflecting both the power of China’s commercial maritime interests generally, and the range of missions—from certifying seafarers to maintaining aids to navigation—that MSA oversees. MSA is headlined by the two largest ship in their inventory Haixun-11 and Haixun-31. They are both 3000t cutters.
Haixun-11 is built for Shandong branch of MSA

Haixun-31 is built for Guangdong branch of MSA.

There is also the 1500t-class Haixun-21 built for the Shanghai branch.

And here are a couple of other smaller MSA ships.


Despite having the most personnel, MSA does not have the most impressive fleet of cutters. The expansion of MSA is more even than CMS, with Shandong (next to yellow sea), Shanghai (next to East China Sea) and Guangdong (next to South China Sea) all getting their largest cutters. MSA cutters come together in South China Sea or East China Sea for patrolling exercises a couple of times a year. MSA will also be getting a 5000t-class cutter soon, which will be the largest and most modern cutter in service (if we don't include YuZheng-88).


The fourth listed ministry is the anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs. Its ships begin with the prefix Haiguan. It is probably the ministry that has seen the least new ships. I guess that indicates the general lower rank of the customs. It just have a few smaller ships like below.





The fifth listed ministry is the Coast Guard (aka Maritime Police in Chinese), which is under the control of PAP. Despite its name, it is neither the largest or the most influential of the ministries. Its ships begin with the prefix Haijing.
The most modern vessel in its fleet is Haijing-1001.

It has received 2 ex-Jianghu class frigates which were given the numbers 1002 and 1003. I believe as more Jianghu ships get decommissioned, the coast guard maybe getting more of them.

I have also posted several other vessels below, but they are really not that modern compared to what we are seeing for some of the other ministries.




In summary, it looks like CMS and MSA are undergoing the largest expansions among the ministries. I believe much of those ships will be delivered to the branches serving the East and South China Sea. These are part of China's effort to have more control in the disputed waters. As with PLAN, civilian maritime fleet were seriously neglected until recent times. So even with the recent expansion effort, it is much smaller and less potent than US and Japanese Coast Guard. The different agencies are procuring more aircraft recently to help with maritime patrol, but they are still tiny compared to that of US and Japan. At the same time, I'm also wary about how so many agencies would be able to work together in offshore patrol. Even so, the maritime agencies (especially CMS and MSA) have indeed expanded and improved a lot in the recent year. And with all of the major recent incidents, they have only expanded the pace of their expansions. I am also interested in seeing how these civilian agencies interact with the navy in patrolling duties. For example, would PLAN delegate patrolling activities to these agencies and not bother with having an OPV class?

Regardless, I think this is one significant development in Chinese maritime aspirations that is not really covered that well by PLA-watchers like myself or foreign government agencies.

Collin Thomas

On Friday the DoD announced the death of a Navy SEAL who was supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. The public announcement of a Navy SEAL is uncommon enough to note.

Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Collin Thomas, 33, of Morehead, Ky., died Aug. 18 during a combat operation in eastern Afghanistan. Thomas was assigned to an east coast-based SEAL team.

Virginia's WAVY 10 has a detailed article about Chief Petty Officer Collin Thomas worth reading. This was no ordinary sailor.

"Collin Thomas was a brave American patriot and an incredibly gifted Navy SEAL. His tireless professionalism, inspiring passion for life, and humble demeanor made him a role model for all who knew him. We are deeply saddened by this tremendous loss of a brother in arms," said a senior officer in his command. "Our hearts and prayers go out to the Thomas family during this very difficult time, and we will never forget the ultimate sacrifice that Collin made while protecting our nation and his teammates."

Thomas is survived by his parents Clayton and Paula, who live in Hertford, North Carolina, his sister Meghan of Morehead, Kentucky, and his fiancée Sarah Saunders of Virginia Beach.

The Navy says Thomas was a highly-decorated combat veteran and received numerous awards and citations during his 13-year Navy career, including two Bronze Star Medals with combat "V" distinguishing device; a Purple Heart; a Joint Service Commendation Medal with combat "V" distinguishing device; a Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; Six Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medals; Two Combat Action Ribbons (Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom); Four Good Conduct Medals; the National Defense Service Medal; Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two campaign stars; Iraq Campaign Medal; Marksmanship medals with "expert" service device for both rifle and pistol, and a multitude of personal, unit, and campaign decorations.

If you don't understand the significance of the medals, citations, and decorations listed in the last paragraph - let’s just say Rambo would be envious. I pray that God comforts the family of this extraordinary man.

Russian Mistral? Not So Fast...

This is an interesting development.

Russia will invite bids from foreign and domestic shipbuilders to build a helicopter-carrier, broadening its options amid lengthy talks with France that have not produced a deal, the daily Kommersant said on Thursday.

Kommersant quoted the president of state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, Roman Trofimenko, as saying the Defence Ministry plans to hold an open international tender for the helicopter-carrier.

There are two key points mentioned later in the article. The first is the implication the US is pressuring France over technology exchanges - which is potentially part of the issue although I get the sense there is a bigger sticking point - as this quote is revealing:

"For Russian companies, construction of a modern helicopter-carrier is important first of all as a process of learning," Interfax quoted him as saying. "Our shipbuilders will be learning, filling the gap in some technologies."

France wants to build 2 of the 4 Mistral class ships in France, but part of the value of the deal for Russia is building up domestic shipbuilding capacity - so the Russians would prefer to build 3 ships in their shipyards instead of just 2. I think it is still very possible that either Spain or the Netherlands could still win this contract on this single sticking point - because my read is that politics surrounding buying foreign ships starts to get really ugly if Russia doesn't build at least 3 ships. The economics involved makes this a politically hot issue, and I don't get the impression France is taking that dynamic as seriously as they probably should be in the negotiations (if indeed they want to sell).

The Rotterdam is a very mature design capable of supporting 6 helicopters, and given the record to date of the LPD-17 program - I'd have to give the nod to the Rotterdam class being the best LPD class in the world right now (have to also factor the Zuiderkruis class JSS as part of that equation, making it the clear best IMO).

What is unclear is whether Russia can afford 4 of the Juan Carlos class LHDs that Spain is building. It will be interesting to see if Navantia is able to find any suitable shipyards in Russia to work with. The Juan Carlos is an export option - a variant will be the Australian Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Docks.

Friday Humor

No comment.

PLA Navy Shipbuilding Notes From Pentagon Report

The 2010 China Military Report is available on the DoD Website (PDF), but surely everyone has taken a peek by now.

Some have suggested - based on the usual open source options that us armchair observers have access too - that Chinese shipbuilding of PLA Navy vessels has slowed down in 2010. Appearances can be deceiving though if you are not watching closely. First, it is important to remember we are in the final year of the Eleventh five year plan (2006-2010), and in the final year of these five year plans we typically do not find pictures of new classes of ships - rather we start seeing those pictures in the beginning of the five year plans.

For example, 052B and 052C destroyers were part of the Tenth five year plan (2001-2005) and they were basically built within that time frame, just like the 054s were laid down in the Tenth five year plan. However, it wasn't until the Eleventh five year plan (2006-2010) that we began to see the 054A air defense frigates.

While the new China report is dated 2010, we also need to keep in mind that it covers 2009, so it doesn't actually include the developments we are seeing this year. That means that next year, when we are reading the Pentagon's 2011 Chinese Military report we can expect it not to be discussing any new classes of ships - even if by next summer we are seeing photos of new classes of ships under construction in Chinese shipyards.

Surface Combatants

Lets look at a few examples, like this quote from page 3 of the report:

The PLA Navy continues its acquisition of domestically produced surface combatants. These include two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM); two LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM; and four (soon to be six) JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range HHQ-16 vertically launched naval SAM currently under development. These ships reflect the leadership’s priority on an advanced anti-air warfare capability for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet.

By the end of 2009 China had launched six Jiangkai II class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFGs), but as of pictures posted online this week China has actually launched 8 Type 054As, with a 9th at HuangPu shipyard in Guangzhou province looking like it could launch very soon (Looks like Feng already posted this). Given the tendency to build in numbers divisible by 5, that means a 10th Type 054A is likely to be launched by years end at Hudong Shipyard.

China appears to be producing a steady state of 2 Type 054As per year that will continue for the next 2 annual Pentagon reports. There may also be a new destroyer class under construction at JiangNan shipyard, but pictures are hard to come by lately. Given the significant upgrades to JiangNan shipyard during the Eleventh five year plan, it could be these ships are coming out at the end of the 5 year cycle delayed primarily due to the upgrades at the shipyard.

When examining the pictures of the Type 054As from HP and HD shipyards, one of the things that stands out to me is the new class of cutters for China's Maritime Safety Administration visible in some of the pictures, as well as several older cutters that appear to be getting electronic upgrades at the shipyards (another point Feng covered before I posted).

While not often a focus, the modernization and expansion of China's Maritime Safety Administration is a major aspect of the Eleventh five year plan that has largely gone unmentioned in the Pentagon's report. One would think after the incidents last year with the US Navy surveillance ships off the China coast that this would be something the Pentagon would mention in the report for Congress.

Missile Patrol Boats

One of the differences between the Pentagon's 2009 report and the Pentagon's 2010 report is the number of Houbei class fast missile boats. The 2009 report states "more than 40" while the 2010 report claims China has "deployed some 60" of the wave-piercing catamaran hull missile patrol boats. In the vacuum of annual Pentagon reports, China somehow managed to add 20 high speed missile patrol boats each with 4 anti-ship missiles a piece (80 new anti-ship missiles fielded to sea in a single years analysis).

Over the same period, the US Navy has exactly ZERO anti-ship missile programs fielding exactly ZERO modern anti-ship missiles on our naval ships. What exactly is the point of building large capacity naval warships in the US if we aren't developing or fielding the missiles necessary to fill the VLS cells? It is a factual statement to point out that the only extended range weapon system for surface combatants currently in development by the US Navy is the gun system to be mounted on the DDG-1000. Maybe the Zumwalt is intended to be the US Navy's Houbei killer - since neither the Arleigh Burke class nor the Littoral Combat Ships will have the weapons capable of performing that role.

Submarines

The Pentagon's 2010 report summarizes the PLA Navy submarine force as follows:

China continues production of its newest JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China may field up to five new SSBNs. One JINclass SSBN has entered service alongside two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSN), four older HAN-class SSNs, and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.

China is further expanding its current force of nuclear-powered attack submarines and may add up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years.

China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class. The YUANclass SS are armed similarly to the SONGclass SS, but also include a possible air independent propulsion system. The SONG SS, YUAN SS, and SHANG SSN will be capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and testing.

The only difference worth noting is the DoD now counts an additional Yuan class submarine as operational. There have not been many new open source pictures of submarines this year, so it is unclear if there is a 5th Yuan running around somewhere.

Noteworthy is the Pentagon reports mention of the Type 095 SSN. That could mean that the Pentagon is aware of its construction. That would suggest the PLA Navy built only two Type 093s before starting construction of the Type 095s.

Aircraft Carriers

The Pentagon report statement:

China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class Hull-2, the ex-VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the release of China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), PRC-owned media reported high-level government and military official statements on China’s intent to build aircraft carriers. In April 2009 PRC Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated that “China will develop its fleet of aircraft carriers in a harmonious manner. We will prudently decide the policy [we will follow with regard to building aircraft carriers]. I am willing to listen to the views of experts from the navies of other countries and to seek opinions from our country.” While meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada in March 2009, PRC Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie stressed that China is the only big nation that does not have aircraft carriers and stated that “China cannot be without aircraft carriers forever.”

China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia. Since 2006 China and Russia had been in negotiations for the sale of 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighters at a cost of up to $2.5 billion. These negotiations reportedly stalled after Russia refused a request from China for an initial delivery of two trial aircraft. Russian defense ministry sources confirmed that the refusal was due to findings that China had produced its own copycat version of the Su-27SK fighter jet.

The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. In May 2009, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that the Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in aircraft carrier operations.

Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domestically produced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China’s shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those projections. In March 2009, PLA Navy Admiral Wu Huayang stated that “China is capable of building aircraft carriers. We have such strength. Building aircraft carriers requires economic and technological strength. Given the level of development in our country, I think we have such strength.” The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020.

Based on the pictures that continue to pop up all over the Chinese internet, it seems pretty clear to me that the Varyag will be able to get to sea by the end of next year. That will only be the beginning of the training and learning curve for China regarding aircraft carriers though.

I strongly suspect, based on various writings and activities, that there is already some advanced construction for parts taking place for a domestically produced carrier. With that said, my guess would be we won't see evidence of shipyard construction of a domestically produced aircraft carrier for some time with funding for the first carrier provided by the Twelfth five year plan (2011-2015).

Measurements

The 2010 Pentagon report makes PLAN shipbuilding predictions based on analysis, for example, when discussing Type 095 SSNs the report says China "may add up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years." When discussing the Type 041 Yuan class the report states "China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class." When measuring China in 5 year plans, the next of which is set to begin next year, the report suggests China is about to build some 20 submarines while refraining from giving a time line. Between 2005-2010 China added 16 new submarines to their force - but 8 of those submarines were KILO-class imports, plus 4 Type 041s, 2 Type 094s, and 2 Types 093s. It is unclear what type, if any, submarines China is launching this year. There is speculation China will launch a 3rd Type 094 and a 5th Type 041 this year, meaning China's submarine production is currently averaging 2 per year.

The Pentagon's report may not be accurate with its projections of submarine construction, but I think the assessment is valuable for analysis even if it does turn out inaccurate. The question I have is whether anyone can predict what the 5 year plan for the PLA Navy will be for 2011-2015 based on the information available through open sources? There are 6 shipyards to work with - give it a shot in the comments.

Dalian Shipbuilding Corporation
ex-Varyag upgrade
New Aircraft Carrier?
Surface Combatants?

Shanghai Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding Base
New Aircraft Carrier?
Surface Combatants?

Huangpu Shipbuilding Corporation
Surface Combatants?

Hudong Shipbuilding Company
Type 071s?
Surface Combatants?

Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. (formerly known as Huludao)
Nuclear submarines?

Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co.
Type 041s?

This is the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (PDF) Pentagon report if you would like to compare the five years from 2005-2009 (remember, 2010 report is about 2009).

I think this is a useful exercise for any analyst, because when you give serious thought to the exercise you can then compare it to the US Navy 5-year shipbuilding plan. Naval power is a lot more than equipment though, and if you have seen the articles that interview sailors working in their new Type 054A frigates you will note how surprised they sound when discussing all their new technology.

Those articles suggest the PLA Navy still has a huge learning curve they can't buy off the shelf.

New 054A + MSA ships

First of all, I was hit with a huge surprise yesterday morning when I saw pictures of the 5th 054A from HP shipyard. Normally, we see a nice progression of photos of the ship being built, but this one was almost ready to be launched by the time we got the first photos. On top of that, I had expected PLAN to stop producing 054 ships for a while after the 2nd batch of 4 were completed. After more extended look and checking my sources, it does appear to be authentically the 5th 054A from HP shipyard. They did a really good job of hiding this ship behind a civilian ship, so we did not know it was being built all along. By the time this ship was in plain sight, it was already fitted with sensors. This ship appears to be a little different from the previous 4 from far out, so I'm eagerly waiting for more close up photos before it is launched. As we know, 054 ships normally get built in pairs with one in HP shipyard and one is HD shipyard. With the appearance of this one, we can assume a 5th one will also be built in HD. That indicates we would have at least 2 054s and 10 054As. A while ago, Richard Fisher did an interview with one of the diesel engine makers that said they expected PLAN to produce about 12 054/As based on the diesel engines they purchased. After that, they expected PLAN to move on to a design that also used gas turbines. From that, I would expect that they stop producing 054A designs after this pair and start producing a modified design that is a little larger after 2 to 3 years. A separate possibility is that they will produce a few more 054As to rotate to Gulf of Aden. Anyhow, here is the new ship. You can see that the 4th 054A from HP (No 548) has come back.


Another interesting part is seeing a new MSA ship beside No 548. From following Chinese Maritime patrol ships, it appears that they are all either Haixun or Haijian. I could be totally off here, but Haixun ships seemed to be for the Chinese Ministry of Transportation and Haijian ships are for the State Oceanographic Administration.

According to the State Oceanic Administration website, that MSA ship should be Haijian-75. It was launched on July 29th and will be delivered to south sea branch in the end of October. It is one of the 4 such 1000-ton class ships that HP shipyard is building for the south sea branch. They are also building 2 1500-ton class ships (Haijian-15 is the first one) and 1 3000-ton class ship (Haijian-50). This is all part of China's effort to increase patrols in the South China Sea (or as other countries see it, an effort to dominate South China Sea).

Some of the ships currently in service:
Haijian-20

Haijian-83

Haijian-27

Seth Cropsey

A good friend of mine highlighted that I have a huge omission in the list of Navy thought contributors from the Think Tank post.

Seth Cropsey at the Hudson Institute should be at the top of the list for 2010. If you follow the link you will see much of the material he has published the last few years.

I feel like a fool, because I've read everything on that list - and still somehow omitted his name. Just goes to show: be weary of bloggers, we write too much to ever be thorough.

The Call Sign Culture

I caught this TIME magazine article about Navy aviator who was protesting his call sign, and didn't know what to think.

A rookie Navy aviator can end up being called "Torch" if he sports red hair — or if he's too quick to turn on his afterburner. A pilot who struggles to fit into his flight suit can be dubbed "Shamu." But as barriers to the once insular, made-up-of-white-men world have fallen — first to minorities, then women and, maybe soon, openly gay personnel — what's an edgy call sign to one person could be seen as an offensive epithet by another.

That's what led Ensign Steve Crowston to complain, he says, after Navy aviators in Strike Fighter Squadron 136 in Oceana, Va., considered many humiliating call signs for him before settling on "Romo's Bitch," a reference to their suspicion that the fan of Dallas Cowboys quarterback Tony Romo was gay.

I shot a few emails with a link to this story to a few friends of mine and asked if anyone had an opinion. A friend of mine responded and explained that the call sign her squadron came up with for her was a play on "Bitch" - and she seemed quite proud of that fact. I see it all as inside baseball culture stuff of the naval aviation community - and it is not much different than any other professional community where nicknames are used.

"Galrahn" was a nickname given to me by some guy I never actually met in person, but he was setting me up an account when I began working as an IRCop in the early 90s. I later asked about the name because people kept asking what the name was in reference to, and I didn't know the answer. I eventually called and asked, and the guy told me it was because on the phone he thought I was a girl (I was 15 years old when I started and probably did sound like a girl, and that explained why he always called me "Gal" for short).

In beta testing for an MMO in the late 90s I was given the nickname "JoeCool" because prior to the interview, I was so nervous I was outside smoking - and before it started I had ended up giving a camel cigarette to the guy who eventually conducted the interview. They revoked that name before it ever went public though as to not infringe on a trademark.

Check out what Lex says about the article.

SECDEF Responds to the QDR Review

In a story hidden behind the Inside Defense firewall, Christopher Castelli has written a story detailing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' six page response to the QDR Review Panel's report.  Nobody thinks their baby is ugly, and SECDEF is no different, apparently mounting a focused defense of both the methodology and the product of the QDR 2010 process.  A couple of thoughts:

1.  On the QDR Review Panel's dissatisfaction with the QDR's long term force planning construct, and the force sizing and shaping constructs, I find for the Secretary.  I see in the QDR an innovative and thoughtful approach to force planning, and from my familiarity with the scenarios used, I am satisfied that a broad range of potential conflict/combinations of conflict were reviewed.

2.  On the Review Panel's general assertion that the QDR did not adequately address the "future" well, I find for the Review Panel.  It appeared to me that this QDR's emphasis was far too near-term (as in within the POM) based. This view is not in conflict with the view rendered in #1--while I believe the QDR panel to have been innovative in its constructs, I believe much of that work gets swept aside in the near-term focus.

3.  On the criticism of the Review Panel's recourse to the Bottom Up Review force, I render no clear decision.  Obviously, the Review Panel was familiar with and yearned for some kind of standard force planning construct.  Presumably lacking the resources (or mandate?) to create their own, they looked back into our recent past and selected the 1993 BUR force as representative of the force levels required today.  To review--the Soviet Union had fallen, leaving no peer or near-peer competitor.  There was no global Jihad.  While there were security interests around the world, the framers of THAT force structure faced a far more benign world than we do today and yet they STILL produced a force structure far in excess of that which we have today.  Yes of course, capacity does not equal capability, and the technology jumps made in the interim have erased some of the difference between that force and this one.  It is an open question though, just how much was erased.

4.  Specific to the Navy ship numbers, I find for the QDR Review Panel.  Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work debuted the Administration's counter-argument about the Navy ship numbers on August 3rd in a speech at CSIS, and Secretary Gates letter reflects that argument.  The review panel recommends a force structure of 346 ships -- though it is fairly vague about the types of ships advocated, as opposed to the QDR which breaks them down more specifically.  The Administration's response to the QDR Review Panel is summarized with a quote from the cited story:  "The fleet described in the QDR, with its overall target of 313 to 323 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-attack submarines, surface combatants, mine-warfare vessels and amphibious ships as the larger BUR fleet, Gates notes. “The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics, mobile logistics and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of these ships, they are now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift Command and meet all of DOD's requirements,” Gates adds."  This is an artful response, containing just enough truth to be true, but not enough to be persuasive.  From a simple numbers perspective, the low end of the current target is 33 ships lower than the QDR Review Panel force.  This is not an insignificant gap, especially when one considers the unlikelihood that even the low end of the QDR range is achievable within current budget constraints and projections.  Furthermore, while I remain a believer in the utility and effectiveness of the LCS, that so much of the QDR force is comprised of this lightly armed ship that does not kill other capital ships or project power ashore raises questions as to the a total power comparison between a 21st century rendering of the BUR force and the smaller QDR force. 

On the whole, there is a lot to like in the QDR and a lot to like in its formal review.  The tension among these views and others is the scale upon which national security strategy will be weighed--and there will be a heavy thumb on the scale wielded by our troubled economy. 

Bryan McGrath

On Think Tanks...

If think tanks is a topic you find of interest, I think this article by Peter Singer is a very good read. You may want to also see this report (PDF), which ranks think tanks by several categories (and I believe is the ranking system that Peter Singer refers to in his article).

From the perspective of this blog, most think tanks don't really contribute ideas I find useful for discussion because most think tanks don't discuss naval or maritime issues specifically - rather in the context of larger strategy or a more general topic like China, Iran, etc...

If you exclude CNA, the pool of maritime experts in the private think tank industry is so small I think I can name the specific people contributing the most by name:

Mackenzie Eaglen - Heritage
Jan van Tol - CSBA
Dakota Wood - CSBA

Don't get me wrong, CSIS and Brookings both contribute to the Navy discussion (and specifically I would say Peter Singer and Anthony Cordesman are excellent), but they are big picture thinkers who don't focus on the maritime services like the 3 mentioned above. If you remove CNA - where are the thinkers outside the Navy who contribute ideas for public understanding as described by Peter Singer as part of the Think Tank function?

As I was thinking about Peter Singers article in the context of where the creative thought is on topics covered by this blog, if you remove CNA from the discussion - I think I could make a good argument that in 2010 Bryan McGrath is the most publicly published idea producer of naval topics in Washington, DC right now - on this blog and elsewhere.

In 2010 Mackenzie was pregnant, Jon is busy on AirSea Battle, and Dakota is stuck in EFV purgatory. With the exception of the Navy academics and contributions by Proceedings - that basically leaves Bryan McGrath and a small handful of bloggers as the only outside contributors of ideas to the Navy discussion.

When you consider how small the public discussion really is, particularly since the academics all talk over email instead of blogs (with a few notable exceptions), it is worth asking the question whether this is a good thing or a bad thing for the Navy - or does it even matter?

Frustrating

My thoughts on the Virginia piracy ruling is up on the USNI Blog.

I think Congress, and even the President to some degree, can legitimately be criticized for the legal mess we find ourselves in regarding these piracy cases. These incidents happened well after the MV Maersk Alabama incident - so no one on Capitol Hill has any excuses for not taking action to shore up the laws relating to piracy in preparation for these types of cases.

Sea Trade Sea Change

This is a not so trivial sea trade change that needs to be noted.

The 100,000 tons tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk on Saturday loaded with gas condensate for China. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker takes the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia.

The tanker will be followed by no less than three nuclear powered ice breakers on the journey, Vesti reports. During the two weeks long sail, the crew will gather information on ice conditions in the area. This data will be used to estimate the commercial benefit from using this route compared to the more traditional routes in the south.

The transport is ordered by the company Novatek, Russia’s largest independent gas producer.

Sailing along the Northern Sea Route is seen as increasingly attractive by shipping companies because of the retreating ice and subsequently longer shipping season.

This route will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken, and avoids all the trouble spots in the world. If this turns out to be successful, the question is how much can the Europeans save by sending ships around Canada to Japan and China - and thus open a new, less expensive trade route between northern Asia and Europe.

Pakistan Discussions Around the Web

Chris Albon doesn't have much faith in the local charity groups providing assistance in Pakistan. We saw this in the 2005 earthquake - they were quickly overwhelmed and simply wouldn't go to some of the really bad places. A Marine who was there described it back then with the phrase 'some areas were a block too far for them.'

Nitin Pai has a very thoughtful analysis regarding how the Pakistan floods play out. If that analysis turns out accurate, that outcome furthers the case why it is time to draw down in Afghanistan in my opinion. I am much less optimistic than that analysis though.

The impact to GDP and food that will play out the rest of the year will have serious repercussions - with some economic estimates suggesting Pakistan's GDP could be cut in half this year. The flooding will hit the man on the street in Karachi over the next several months a lot harder than the man on the street understands today. Unemployment will go up, and government funding is likely to drop significantly - including military funding. That adds quite a bit of uncertainty to the situation well beyond the direct disaster impacts.