I have made no secret in writing here or elsewhere of my strong sense that American Grand Strategy should more centrally feature its maritime power. I adhere strongly to the notion of a global system working to the benefit of those nations that actively seek to participate in it, protected and sustained by all elements of American power. No aspect of military power is as critical to that protection and sustainment as American Seapower.
China’s unwieldy rise and nearly a decade of land conflict in Asia have combined to create a growing sense among Washington’s policy elite that a new emphasis on Seapower may be warranted. That said, the Battle of the Budget may snuff out any nascent move to fundamentally question our current grand strategy and its attending military component. The momentum though, is clearly moving (at the strategic level) in a favorable direction. Given the bureaucratic/Joint impediments to Seapower advocacy by the Navy itself, what then can the Navy do to contribute to this gathering momentum? The answer is simple, and it is close at hand: the Navy must more closely embrace the Marine Corps; and the Marine Corps must more closely embrace the Navy. To paraphrase Ben Franklin, the Navy and Marine Corps must hang together, or assuredly they will hang separately.
There is an interesting conundrum developing in our nation. The Navy continues to attempt to build a constituency of interest among the American public through an aggressive outreach campaign, but whether such efforts will amount to any lasting impact remains in doubt. Among the Washington defense community however, the Navy’s stock is rising. On the other hand, the Marines enjoy unparalleled public identification and approval, even as defense insiders increasingly question deeply held roles, missions, and identities of the USMC.
From a public relations standpoint, closer alignment between makes sense. But this is a serious matter, not a PR campaign. Closer alignment between the two Services must serve important strategic and operational ends, and not simply fill in the gaps between Service external communications plans. What then, could such an alignment accomplish?
Promote Land Power….From The Sea. While I and others have been advocating for a significant cut in budget share to the Army, it is naïve to think that the country does not and will not have a continuing need for “boots on the ground.” Increasingly though, America should come to see those boots as belonging to Marines (America’s “911” force) deployed from ships for a variety of reasons and likely to return to those ships in an expeditious manner. Put another way, Seapower enabling Land Power.
Promote Defense, Development, and Diplomacy. For a large portion of this nation’s history, its foreign policy was carried out by the Department of State, closely assisted by the Department of the Navy. An active foreign policy that seeks to assure friends and allies even as it deters adversaries can be greatly enabled and renewed by a new era of targeted, and metered engagement facilitated by the mobility of Naval forces.
Promote Naval Solutions to Naval Challenges. Two emerging operational problems appear amiable to solutions that demand closer cooperation between the Navy and the Marine Corps: swarming surface craft (simultaneous or near-simultaneous attack) and piracy.
The Navy has spent considerable time, resources, and energy in attempting to mitigate the effectiveness of swarming surface craft in attacking our surface vessels. Navy Surface Warfare Officers have long advocated for an armed-helo to take on this role, and the Navy has responded with modifications to the LAMPS MK III system to provide embarked helos with a limited anti-surface capability. This is insufficient to the threat. Consideration should be given to embarkation of USMC Cobra Gunships on Navy vessels to provide a powerful anti-swarm capability to dispersed Navy ships. With respect to piracy (and lesser maritime security challenges such as Visit, Boarding Search and Seizure), detachments of Marines operating from surface combatants provide highly trained forces to platforms increasingly stretched to provide for maintenance and self-protection. One can imagine a day in which an LCS sails with a USMC Aviation detachment and a USMC Infantry detachment.
The sum total of these suggestions is to close the distance between the Navy and the Marine Corps such that they begin to be seen as a blended service, one with outsize influence and impact on the nation’s grand strategy due to harmonious and integrated approaches to operational problems.
Additionally, it is difficult to see a day when the defense policy community coalesces around a military strategy more reliant on maritime power, if the Navy and Marine Corps do not first coalesce. As long as the Services continue to be seen by others as independent, their true strength and value will not be as readily apparent, and bureaucratic mischief designed to drive wedges between the Navy and Marine Corps will be more effective.
What are some immediate and palpable steps that the two Services can take to demonstrate alignment and promote integration?
1. The Navy should articulate and support a shipbuilding plan that fully supports validated USMC requirements. If that is 33 amphibious ships, so be it. If it is 38, that is the number to be supported. There is a concomitant responsibility on the USMC to ensure its requirements are well-articulated and not simply reflections of cultural norms that Marines have come to embrace. If supporting USMC lift needs drive the shipbuilding numbers higher, the Navy should articulate the requirement and the two Services must mutually support its defense. If the requirement is not funded, the Services must articulate what roles/missions/operations will be insufficiently resourced.
2. The Navy should recognize that the landing of amphibious Marines under fire cannot and should not be dismissed as a possible use of American military power. Therefore, the Navy must be a FULL PARTNER in the design, resourcing, and operational planning of such operations and the forces, platforms and networks that will enable them. Continuing to hew to the “we haven’t had an opposed landing since World War II” line does not recognize the reality of where we may someday have to fight, and by this I mean the environs of the South China Sea and the island archipelagoes that surround it. War scenarios there might not DEMAND opposed landings, but removing the capability to do so is unwise.
3. The Marine Corps, in close cooperation with the Navy, should lay out a road-map and timeline for its “return to sea”, a return that includes embarkation on a greater variety of vessels in support of a greater variety of missions. Much of what follows will be “experimental” and therefore should be well-thought out and phased in a way that promotes success.
Are there significant roadblocks to implementing a closer relationship between the two Services? Absolutely. But I can foresee a day in which both Services find themselves shadows of their current selves, in no small measure due to a failure to recognize a strategic advantage inherent in a closer alignment.
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