Anti-Piracy - Cooperation Is Only Part of the Solution

The number of articles calling for action against piracy in the Indian Ocean is increasing steadily. It is unclear if the larger number of articles calling attention to the issue will make a difference in policy anywhere, but the issue is certainly on the rise in terms of attention.

With that said, this Economist article raises a point that is very common among many articles attempting to offer a solution. This paragraph bothers me though.

The successful campaign against the pirates who caused mayhem in the Malacca Strait a decade ago suggests that the answer lies onshore rather than offshore. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to bury their differences and work together—patrolling, arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning pirates. At the same time as the risks for the pirates increased, conditions on shore improved. The post-tsunami peace settlement between the Indonesian government and rebels in Aceh, where most of the pirates came from, paved the way for investment, economic development and a better way of life.

There are two parts here that must be understood, otherwise the comparisons between Somali piracy and piracy in the Strait of Malacca becomes a false analogy.

Piracy in the Strait of Malacca was not wiped out by the cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. That cooperation had no impact whatsoever in curbing piracy that was taking place prior to 2005. None. Yes, there was a remarkable change in piracy between 2004 and 2005, but it had absolutely nothing to do with security cooperation.

It had everything to do with the Tsunami. The Tsunami wiped out piracy in the Strait of Malacca, and the security cooperation that came with the cleanup of the Tsunami helped prevent piracy from rising back up again.

Depending upon ones religion, it is more accurate to suggest God cleaned up Strait of Malacca than it is to credit anything done by man. Sorry, that's just a fact. Security cooperation is helpful, and on the land side it is certainly important once security conditions have been reset - which is exactly what the Tsunami did. In 2004 there were 60 attacks in the Strait of Malacca, in 2005 there were a total of 20. By 2008, when the cooperation began paying off with more law enforcement working the littorals because equipment had been delivered post Tsunami, there were only 2 incidents that year in the Straits. No matter how someone looks at the Strait of Malacca piracy, the Tsunami is what reset security conditions on land, and that is what ultimately enabled security cooperation to work.

If we want security cooperation to work in Somalia, we need to find some way to reset security conditions. Resetting the security conditions in Somalia will almost certainly be messy, but keep in mind the Tsunami killed an estimated 230,000 people, so there is no easy way to reset the security conditions in a region - whether the action is by the hand of man or by the wave of mother Earth.