Structure and Course of the Simulation
The simulation was conducted by about forty terminal MA students, with a selection of program faculty and graduates operating as Simulation Control and as team leaders. In addition, students and faculty from the UK School of of Journalism operated three in-simulation media websites, conducted interviews of participants, and attended press conferences. The simulation lasted twenty "real hours", operating on a schedule of one simulated day for every two real hours. This gave us some time to allow the situation to play itself out. Our simulations are primarily didactic rather than predictive, meaning that we will sacrifice realism to the need to put students into useful decision-making problems. This does not mean, however, that the simulation cannot expose real policy problems. The primary motivating concept behind a Patterson Crisis simulation is to force students to make decisions in a short period of time using limited, faulty, and often asymmetric information.
The catalyzing event for the simulation was a leak from the Yongbyon facility that spread radiation across parts of the DPRK, the ROK, and Japan. This leak was intended to spur North Korea's neighbors into action, as well as to provide the rationale for a protest movement within the DPRK. We had anticipated that the protest movement would be the primary driver of the crisis simulation. Our thoughts regarding the protests were guided by the intersection of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and perceptions of regime vulnerability. The nuclear incident andother domestic problems created a base sense of dissatisfaction. South Korean propaganda about Libya and Egypt created a perception of vulnerability sufficient to generate a small protest movement. This movement was primarily coordinated through the North Korean expatriate communities in Russia and China. In addition to being plausible, this allowed us to give Russia, China, and South Korea insight into and a degree of influence over the protest movement. Whatever steps the regime took to manage the protesters would either magnify dissatisfaction or increase the perception of vulnerability, putting the regime into a no-win situation.
The initial moves concerned an assessment of the disaster, as well as steps taken for containment. Ambiguity was a key value for planning the simulation. The only team ever made fully aware of the circumstances of the incident were the Russians, who sent a team to assist with cleanup and damage assessment. All of the other teams received their information through intelligence services of varying reliability. The North Korean leadership finally tortured its on-site nuclear engineering team into confessing that American and Japanese intelligence had arranged the incident, which provided closure of a sort. This would eventually cause additional problems, including another small leak at Yongbyon.
The protest movement didn't have immediate effect, but it did put pressure on the DPRK team over time. A reformist faction developed within the team, eventually convincing the bulk of the team that repressive efforts would likely create more disorder. Reports that police were reluctant to put down protests fed this perception. These developments were roughly in accord with our expectations. And then the North Korean team did something interesting. The military-led reformist faction killed Kim Jong Il, and handed power over to Kim Jong Un. Jong Un proved predictably erratic and aggressive, which gave the military the excuse to step in and displace him in a coup. The resultant junta immediately promised reforms to both domestic and international audiences.
This left Simulation Control, not to mention the protesters and the Six Parties, non-plussed. We judged the military regime to be somewhat less vulnerable than the Kim Jong Eun regime, and because the military said the right things about economic reform and nuclear cleanup, we also judged that some protester grievances were being answered. Accordingly, we slightly scaled back the protests, giving the regime some breathing room. The North Korean military took advantage of this to buy itself some international space by calling for, and participating in, a reopening of the Six Party Talks. Russia also pushed for this, and made a strong show of support for the new regime. The simulation ended without war, revolution, or an accord on North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The actual impact of the coup remained unclear; as one member of the junta noted, "it's only been three days, and it's very easy to say the word 'reform'".
The simulation was conducted by about forty terminal MA students, with a selection of program faculty and graduates operating as Simulation Control and as team leaders. In addition, students and faculty from the UK School of of Journalism operated three in-simulation media websites, conducted interviews of participants, and attended press conferences. The simulation lasted twenty "real hours", operating on a schedule of one simulated day for every two real hours. This gave us some time to allow the situation to play itself out. Our simulations are primarily didactic rather than predictive, meaning that we will sacrifice realism to the need to put students into useful decision-making problems. This does not mean, however, that the simulation cannot expose real policy problems. The primary motivating concept behind a Patterson Crisis simulation is to force students to make decisions in a short period of time using limited, faulty, and often asymmetric information.
The catalyzing event for the simulation was a leak from the Yongbyon facility that spread radiation across parts of the DPRK, the ROK, and Japan. This leak was intended to spur North Korea's neighbors into action, as well as to provide the rationale for a protest movement within the DPRK. We had anticipated that the protest movement would be the primary driver of the crisis simulation. Our thoughts regarding the protests were guided by the intersection of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and perceptions of regime vulnerability. The nuclear incident andother domestic problems created a base sense of dissatisfaction. South Korean propaganda about Libya and Egypt created a perception of vulnerability sufficient to generate a small protest movement. This movement was primarily coordinated through the North Korean expatriate communities in Russia and China. In addition to being plausible, this allowed us to give Russia, China, and South Korea insight into and a degree of influence over the protest movement. Whatever steps the regime took to manage the protesters would either magnify dissatisfaction or increase the perception of vulnerability, putting the regime into a no-win situation.
The initial moves concerned an assessment of the disaster, as well as steps taken for containment. Ambiguity was a key value for planning the simulation. The only team ever made fully aware of the circumstances of the incident were the Russians, who sent a team to assist with cleanup and damage assessment. All of the other teams received their information through intelligence services of varying reliability. The North Korean leadership finally tortured its on-site nuclear engineering team into confessing that American and Japanese intelligence had arranged the incident, which provided closure of a sort. This would eventually cause additional problems, including another small leak at Yongbyon.
The protest movement didn't have immediate effect, but it did put pressure on the DPRK team over time. A reformist faction developed within the team, eventually convincing the bulk of the team that repressive efforts would likely create more disorder. Reports that police were reluctant to put down protests fed this perception. These developments were roughly in accord with our expectations. And then the North Korean team did something interesting. The military-led reformist faction killed Kim Jong Il, and handed power over to Kim Jong Un. Jong Un proved predictably erratic and aggressive, which gave the military the excuse to step in and displace him in a coup. The resultant junta immediately promised reforms to both domestic and international audiences.
This left Simulation Control, not to mention the protesters and the Six Parties, non-plussed. We judged the military regime to be somewhat less vulnerable than the Kim Jong Eun regime, and because the military said the right things about economic reform and nuclear cleanup, we also judged that some protester grievances were being answered. Accordingly, we slightly scaled back the protests, giving the regime some breathing room. The North Korean military took advantage of this to buy itself some international space by calling for, and participating in, a reopening of the Six Party Talks. Russia also pushed for this, and made a strong show of support for the new regime. The simulation ended without war, revolution, or an accord on North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The actual impact of the coup remained unclear; as one member of the junta noted, "it's only been three days, and it's very easy to say the word 'reform'".
Russia: Our Russian team saw this as an opportunity to increase Russian influence at a time in which Russia's maritime interest in the Pacific is expanding. Russia was very generous to North Korea, offering immediate technical and humanitarian assistance. Combined with Chinese intransigence, this indeed did open some opportunity for developing North Korea as a Russian client. Russia eventually parlayed this into a leadership role in the Six Party talks that concluded our simulation. However, the Russian team also bypassed an opportunity to head off the second leak at Yongbyon, in spite of a clear understanding of the risks that incomplete containment posed.
Japan: Japanese policy was relatively restrained. We had designed the scenario to give the Japanese team an opportunity to "break out" and take an assertive posture on the eventual northeast Asian political settlement. However, Japan played it relatively passive, in spite of the substantial economic damage caused by the fallout. Japan made no aggressive military maneuvers, and generally sought to hew to the United States. Upon learning of the second leak, however, Japan responded with quick offers of assistance and technical help for North Korea.
North Korea: At the outset of the simulation, I told two of the seven members of the North Korean team that they represented a "reformist" faction interested in PRC style reforms and limited opening to the world economic system. The DPRK team also included two leaders, one representing Kim Jong Il and the other representing Kim Jong Un. Unsurprisingly, DPRK policy cantered wildly from engagement with neighbors to hostility, the latter including an extended live fire exercise off Yeonpyong Island.
South Korea: The South Korean team divided into two factions, one pursuing an aggressive response and the other more accomodationist. Relatively early in the simulation, reformists in North Korea contacted the South Korean government, which helped to calm tensions. Nevertheless, South Korea came very close to taking action against the DPRK on several occasions, especially after North Korea resumed artillery exercises near Yeonpyong Island. The South suffered considerable long-term economic damage from the leak, which produced considerable anger in the ROK population.
China: Chinese behavior during the simulation exhibited a degree of strategic confusion. The Chinese initially decided to play hardball with the North Koreans, under the assumption that the DPRK had nowhere else to go. The PRC closed the border, and didn't lend much rhetorical assistance to the North Koreans. Later, the PRC initiated a half-hearted crackdown against dissidents in the North Korean expat community. In part because of the Russian willingness to oblige North Korea, and in part because the North Koreans were too busy to pay much attention, Chinese hardball didn't have much of an effect.
United States: The United States, not directly affected by the radiation leak, played a coordinating role between the Japanese and ROK teams. The US restrained South Korean hawks and helped provide reassurance to the Japanese. One early move was to redeploy the USS Abraham Lincoln to the region in order to counter any DPRK adventurism. The US also helped manage the Chinese.
Lessons Learned
If a situation of vulnerability develops within the North Korea regime, the stance of the military will become very important. While neither comparison is particularly apt, the KPA resembles the Egyptian military much more than the Libyan; we can expect that the KPA will have the power and coherence to formulate an independent position in any transition crisis. The problem is that, like the DPRK itself, the KPA requires an environment of tension and hostility with Japan, the ROK, and the US in order to maintain its existence. However, the potential for the development of a measured reformist faction within the military that would tone down some of the more bizarre aspects of DPRK foreign policy and pursue certain PRC-style policies probably isn't out of the question.
In terms of the international lessons, the stance of Russia was quite interesting. If Dmitry Gorenburg is right about Russia turning its military focus to the Pacific, then Russian overtures to North Korea aren't out of the question. This is especially true if tensions with Japan continue to grow. I think that the simulation probably overstated the willingness of the Chinese to play hardball with the DPRK, although I also think that there's a good chance North Korea would react badly to Beijing yanking the leash. I also expect that in a scenario such as this popular sentiment would push Japan to more assertive action, which could trigger serious problems in most of the other teams.
Dogs that Didn't Bark
Apart from the existence of the Yongbyon facility, North Korea nuclear weapons played almost no part in the simulation. The North Korean team never inquired too closely about the disposition of the weapons, although the Americans were interested in determining their location as tightly as possible. As neither the ROK nor the US initiated military action, the discussion didn't go far beyond this point. I should also note that we played fast and loose with the Yongbyon situation; it's unclear that the reactor is currently in a condition that would make such a leak possible.
We also expected that there might be more in terms of naval confrontation between the North and the South. Naval confrontation would have allowed the DPRK to ratchet up tension without directly threatening a land war on the peninsula. For whatever reason, however, the North Korean team focused on mobilization of its land forces and on artillery bombardment rather than on naval provocation. It's possible that this was the result of overwhelming ROK-Japan-US superiority at sea, combined with China's recalcitrant attitude.
Conclusions
From our perspective, the simulation worked; our students left with more information about the situation, and they were forced to make critical decisions in limited time with limited information. The simulation didn't develop precisely as Simulation Control had expected, but then it never does; we would be disappointed if we could predict exactly what our students can do. In terms of predictive policy the simulation has limited utility, although it does suggest a few moves that key players, including Russia and the North Korean military, might make in case of a crisis.
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