Questioning the Efficacy of a Libyan Maritime Embargo

Italy announced today that it will lead the NATO embargo against Libya with 16 ships/subs. Preventing the smuggling of weapons at sea to the regime while allowing some modicum of trade and humanitarian support to continue will be a significant undertaking. The challenges include:

1) Geography: Libya's coastline is over 2000 km. Assuming even spacing of naval assets (a big assumption) hopefully supported by some overhead ISR, patrol sectors of about 125 miles per vessel will be needed to ensure that no ships or boats infiltrate any of the nooks and crannies along the coast, much less the major ports held by regime forces. This force/coast ratio is optimistic, at best. For some historical context, research the UK's 1966-1975 Beira Patrol against Rhodesia or our middling MIO efforts against Iraq in the '90s.
2) C2: Recent complicated NATO and non-aligned C2 arrangements with varying national caveats don't have a good track record at mission accomplishment. To wit, reference ISAF's struggles in Afghanistan and multi-coalition counter-piracy efforts.
3) Intel: Without good intelligence on the ground, it will be challenging to determine exactly when and where these shipments are bound.
4) Duration: How long will smallish NATO navies be able to support this mission, a counter-piracy campaign in the Indian ocean, and their own national requirements? What mission will give first?
5) Rat lines: Most importantly, even if the maritime embargo is air tight, Libya's land borders certainly are not. Like in any irregular conflict, if there is a demand for weapons -- notwithstanding that there is no shortage of them now in Libya -- smugglers will find a way to meet it. The Tuaregs and other smugglers have been running legitimate and illicit goods (primarily guns and drugs) across the Sahara for eons and could easily support either or both sides of this war.

Stopping Qadaffi from re-arming isn't impossible, but those embarking on this counter-smuggling mission should enter it with eyes wide open.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.